In this timely book, John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon have brought together a set of leading scholars to explore major issues in Northeast Asian international relations. The book consists of twelve substantive chapters divided into three sections. The first section consists of country-specific studies that explain each country's grand strategy in the region; the second section has three chapters that look at various aspects of U.S. relations with Northeast Asia; and the third section takes a more comprehensive view of regional relations. The chapters are uniformly smart, well written, and theoretically motivated. In short, this book is an excellent primer on general debates and major issues in Northeast Asia.
The country studies contain two complementary chapters that ask essentially the same question: why has an obvious power transition not led to greater conflict or instability? In the first instance, Avery Goldstein asks why China's rapid economic emergence over the past thirty years has not disrupted the balance of power in East Asia and led to greater arms racing and competition? Focusing on two theories—power transition and institutionalism—Goldstein argues that China's behavior toward Korea and Southeast Asia fit largely within institutionalist expectations that greater Chinese multilateral and economic ties will build cooperation in the region. In contrast, however, Goldstein sees China–Taiwan relations as largely reflecting a power transition approach, where China is increasingly able to envision some type of political resolution on its own terms to the Taiwan issue. Arguing that neither of these approaches fully explains Chinese foreign policy, Goldstein argues that “definitive judgements will probably remain elusive” (p. 63).
Similarly, William Wohlforth explores an equally interesting question about power transitions: why did Russia's rapid loss of power and prestige following the collapse of the Soviet Union result in a graceful decline and adjusted expectations, rather than nationalist and provocative actions? Wohlforth concludes that Russian peaceful decline was a result not only of material factors, but ideational and domestic political variables as well. Russian policy makers are sensitive to the limits of Russian power, and they face few domestic incentives to engage in a risky strategy of competitiveness at this time.
Other notable chapters include Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon's argument that Japan will become an “ordinary power” in the near future with characteristics similar to those of Great Britain—a Japan that has revised the Constitution to allow more military involvement in overseas missions, and that sees the U.S. alliance as a central aspects of its overall foreign policy. Two other interesting chapters come to different conclusions about North Korea: Yongho Kim argues that although North Korea is clearly a “rogue” state, it is rational within its own mind-set, and that much of its policies are driven by domestic considerations and need for internal cohesion and legitimacy. Chung-in Moon takes a slightly different approach, emphasizing external as well as internal components to North Korean behavior. Moon concludes that isolation and coercion are unlikely to result in a positive change in North Korea, advocating a return to the Six-Party Talks and negotiations as the way to ameliorate the North Korean problem.
Two final chapters provide an interesting theoretical and empirical contrast: Michael Mastanduno takes the largely conventional American perspective that U.S. hegemony in East Asia is both enduring and beneficial to the region, concluding that “fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, the striking feature of contemporary world politics continues to be the disproportionate power position of the United States” (p. 279). In contrast, Vinod Aggarwal and Min-gyo Koo see much more institutional evolution in Northeast Asia. They see “new institutional architecture” emerging in the region, writing that, “within two decades, Northeast Asia, and East Asia, have moved from lacking any significant regional organization to a point where new collaborative arrangements in both trade and security have mushroomed” (p. 299).
The debates about Northeast Asian foreign relations involve some of the most important theoretical and empirical issues of our day: To what extent to ideas and perceptions affect grand strategies? To what extent does economic wealth and military power drive foreign policies? How do nations determine their priorities in dealing with a myriad of different and competing exigencies? How can the countries in the region deal with dangerous small countries and rapidly changing large countries? The chapters in this volume wisely steer clear of categorical answers to any of these questions, and the arguments they present will doubtless be challenged by other scholars in the future. However, the chapters in this book all offer cogent, thoughtful, and deeply researched perspectives on these enduring issues, and this book will be a worthwhile read for anyone interested in the future of Northeast Asia.
