The book under review is a comprehensive analysis of asymmetric power relationships. It is rich in its contents, and it brings forth many dimensions of asymmetry that are yet to be explored in international relations, let alone in social sciences. The book explores bilateral asymmetric relationships as well as multilateral asymmetries fairly effectively. It focuses on the multimodal world of today where hegemony is not easy to exercise and the possibility of a rising power overtaking or equalizing power with the established dominant state exists. The structural and behavioral attributes of power asymmetries have attracted attention here almost in equal measure.
Brantly Womack begins by contending that power asymmetry has been an enduring reality in world politics, and he offers a refined definition of the concept of an asymmetric relationship: “one in which the smaller side is significantly more exposed to interactions than the larger side because of the disparity of capabilities, and yet the larger is not able to dictate unilaterally the terms of the relationship” (p. 10). Three dimensions of asymmetry are captured in the definition: first, the relatively fixed disparities in capabilities; second, that major differences exist in perspectives between the stronger and weaker sides; and third, that the larger power’s capabilities do not allow sustained domination over the smaller side.
Although this definition is interesting and captures a lot of nuances in power asymmetries, the problem is that it is more in terms of relational than actual measures of power. So, it is still a puzzle as to how a materially weaker party, such as North Korea or Pakistan, is able to dictate terms on a sustained basis by way of asymmetric warfare or nuclear/missile testing in different strategic and regional contexts. These relatively weaker states can acquire a certain coercive capability that is useful in bridging the asymmetry, especially in the context in which their asymmetric military capabilities matter the most. The perceptual dimension is most interesting as weaker parties tend to view the stronger side’s actions and intentions more intensely than does the stronger side, as the latter is distracted with other relationships, especially with third parties, some of which may be viewed as more threatening than they actually are by the weaker side. The stronger side also may have wider interests beyond the region in context. This dimension was key in Womack’s previous work, and as reformulated here, it can capture a great deal of interactions between such pairs as Pakistan–India and India–China.
Theorizing asymmetry takes some space in the book, and Womack considers paradigms such as realism, in particular, the philosophical underpinnings in the works of Hobbes, and modern-day realists like Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. The author correctly points out the limitations of capability-based realism and the need to explore beyond material differentials to understand outcomes and persistent patterns of interactions among asymmetric parties. More importantly, the three tools of order inherent in realism—balance of power, power preponderance, and deterrence—all assume the need for symmetry and capability and credibility in signaling. Balancing presupposes parity, while preponderance, superiority of the hegemonic actor, and deterrence are seen as sufficient capabilities for status quo powers to prevent attacks by challengers. Power asymmetry theory impinges on all the three dimensions in a very direct manner.
Asymmetry and International Relationships suffers from a few weaknesses. The previous works on asymmetric theories of conflicts and wars are discussed in a very cursory manner. Key existing scholarship on asymmetric war initiations and victories by weaker parties is given short shrift, with limited treatment of the contributions in the existing literature that were virtually nonexistent two decades ago. The author gives the impression that previous works do not exist and, in that process, cumulation is sacrificed to a great extent. Another major weakness is not giving adequate attention to different forms of asymmetric warfare, in particular, terrorism, guerilla warfare, and civil wars. These forms of asymmetric conflict have attracted much attention in recent years and historically have been the key enduring themes in studies of warfare beyond the interstate level. More importantly, asymmetric peaceful struggles also do not receive much attention in the book. There is a considerable literature on nonviolent resistance and the so-called peaceful revolutions that have been conducted or won by parties often weaker in material power capabilities. Focusing more closely on the enduring interstate rivalries that persist despite power asymmetries would also have helped the analysis.
Another issue that deserved more attention was the specific tools/mechanisms that weaker parties tend to use to bridge power asymmetries. Here, the application of bargaining theory would have been useful. The availability of allies, certain limited time-bound capabilities, better strategy and tactics, and a “willingness to suffer” are factors that can sometimes compensate for material power deficiencies of the otherwise weaker side in an asymmetric relationship and that can lead to war initiation by it. Guerillas and terrorists fight with very powerful enemies despite realizing the weaknesses of their asymmetric weapons, and yet they enter combat knowing that the stronger side can wear down in a long struggle because its staying power is limited due to various domestic- and normative-level factors.
Womack discusses fixed disparities that create embedded relationships with expectations of each other, differential perspectives of the stronger and the smaller, and the changing nature of relative power position of states over time. There is merit in explaining each of these relationships. Expectations of hierarchical social systems, social classes, and communities are determined by embedded beliefs about the other. There is also the socialization dimension. Those powerful classes and groups that can socialize the weaker side to accept the legitimacy of their dominant position can sustain their hegemony longer than those that cannot do so. For instance, imperial powers have used multiple techniques to socialize subordinate political units to believe in the virtues of disparity, their benign attitudes, and their ability to offer collective goods, including order. Powerful social groups and corporations declare the need for inequality in order to create wealth for the country as a whole because of their ability to mass-produce and market their products and services, while offering employment and technological innovations. The alternatives are presented as risky, and most people in their lifetime will not have the opportunity to see what alternative structures would look like if they emerge at all. The uncertainty of the alternative systems’ benefits offers a certain kind of legitimacy, as the fear of the unknown allows some dominant actors to stay where they are. These deep-rooted structural elements of asymmetry are discussed by the author, but not clearly enough to make testable propositions. So, each chapter could have developed some testable arguments and the relationships for different types of asymmetric relationships rather than quick treatments.
Further, an engagement with the literature on social change as well as global change would have offered some interesting insights. When do actors challenge asymmetric power relationships? What are the reasons for episodic versus transformative changes? How do ideational factors and individual leadership matter in asymmetric relationships? What does revolutionary change and evolutionary change imply for asymmetric power relationships?
Despite these weaknesses, this book is a major advancement of asymmetric theory and needs to be taken seriously. It offers a rich menu for different types of works and diverse issue areas, including hegemony, power preponderance, the rising power phenomenon, and complexity in conditions of global interconnectivity. Future work needs to be developed in the key areas identified by Womack.
