
Whenever I am faced with something about classification I have two conflicting emotions. One is heart-sink, when I consider how little we know about this topic and how little it has moved on for decades, perhaps centuries, maybe millennia! The second is wry amusement as I recall the story a senior consultant told me when I started training some 45 years ago. A man was out for a walk in the park and saw a boy playing with a dog. ‘That’s a nice dog’, said the man, ‘what’s its name?’ The wee lad replied, ‘Well, we don’t know, but we call him Rover!’
Kevin Jones has taken this seemingly dry subject and weaved an interesting and fascinating story around it in exhaustive, sometimes exhausting, detail. The classification at the centre of these debates, the Medico-Psychological Association (MPA)’s Table of the Forms of Insanity, was adopted not long after the Asylum Act of 1845 as that to be used for national medical statistics and, therefore, as the standard classification in the asylum. As the importance of statistics grew within medical, administrative and even public circles, the debates about the Table intensified and divisions grew deeper. Jones traces these debates and describes how little the classification moved forward before the Table of Forms of Insanity fell into obscurity after its final set of revisions in 1932.
The interesting aspect of this story is how all the dramatis personae of 19th- and early-20th-century psychiatry are involved, and the fascinating part is how they all behaved true to type on this topic, mirroring their work and personality. Pragmatists like Esquirol, Pinel, Prichard, Tuke and Bucknill, who considered that all that could usefully be used to classify inmates were symptoms, generally held sway but were challenged by those who were convinced that the classification should be based on (what they perceived as) aetiology, such as Griesinger, Skae and Mercier (the latter’s ‘waspish tone’ is reported to have created often vitriolic debates; as elsewhere, Mercier was strong on destructive rather than constructive criticism). Also featured are those who, while accepting the pragmatic sense of using symptoms, felt that physical/organic issues should be more highlighted, such as Clouston and Crichton Browne. They both emerge as sensible mediators and, of course, their assertions were backed up by masses of both clinical experience and research. Interestingly, however, the person who emerges best is Kraepelin, and one feels this relates to his ideas being backed up by detailed clinical research, extensive case note analysis and the additional focus on outcome.
This book can be recommended to anyone interested in the development of psychiatric thought across the 19th century and early 20th century. We should be grateful to Jones who, by focusing on the minutes of the relevant MPA committees, has placed a great deal of new information in one place, information that sheds a useful light on the thinking and debates of that period. The volume highlights how difficult it is to classify patients even when they are a ‘selected’ (often captured!) sample, the asylum population. How much more difficult a procedure this is across a community. The book also reminds us of the usefulness of classifications, which is that they usually possess some degree of reliability (as opposed to validity), so that when we talk to one another we have a fair idea of what we are talking about. Classifications also provide a research tool so that categories can be examined and stress-tested. It’s just a pity that more users are not like the little lad’s family in the story above: knowing what they call something but admitting they don’t really know much other than that…

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