The importance of the sixteenth century to the development of English naval power is well known. At the death of Henry VIII in 1547, the navie royal was capable of defending the coasts of England and exercising force throughout the North Sea, the Channel, and Western Approaches. By the death of Queen Elizabeth in 1603, the ability of the English to apply pressure that stretched across the Atlantic and into the very harbors of its enemies had gone a long way to changing both the English view of themselves and that of the states of Europe toward them. The reasons why this was possible, and the narrative of the process, is the subject of David Loades's book.

Professor Loades's extensive knowledge of Tudor politics and diplomacy enables him, economically, to bring a range of factors into play and to present important caveats to any assumptions that naval power was either natural or overwhelmingly decisive. Against France, Henry VIII put his faith as much in new fortifications as in his ships. Against Spain, Elizabeth relied on subsidies and expeditionary forces to the Netherlands as well as an effective naval force. At critical points, English naval power was as much a function of the weakness of French or Spanish navies as it was of the intrinsic power of English ships or fleets. Nevertheless, this history is one of expanding naval power based upon institutional and political change, or opportunity, in England.

Loades explains the changes in facilities and administrative systems that, by 1546, enabled the English navy to achieve a degree of permanence with ships being maintained during peace time. This navy was used offensively against the Scottish and French coasts and was a vital element in the defense of Boulogne. Throughout the sixteenth century, naval power rested on a combination of royal ships united with private merchantmen brought into the service of the crown in times of crisis. However, during Henry's reign, it was the growth of both the number and power of royal warships, armed with large cannons, that characterized the most significant change in structure of the fleet. The decision of the admiral of France, Claude d’Annnebaut, not to attack the powerfully armed English ships waiting for him in the Solent in July 1545 may have been determined by the disparity of firepower in the fleets.

Under Edward VI and Queen Mary, the fleet did not change much. For King Philip of Spain, Mary's husband, the navy was probably the only significant military asset his wife brought him, but the loss of Boulogne (1549) and Calais (1558) and the indecisive operations against Scotland illustrated the fact that, ultimately, the navy was still a weapon of limited diplomatic and military power.

Elizabeth was not a great purchaser of ships. Expenditure on the navy fell significantly between the 1560s and the 1580s, but English naval power extended powerfully. Loades demonstrates that this was owing to the growing partnership between the crown's navy and the merchant community. Although the crown had undoubted rights to levy the service of ships or men, the Queen did not overexploit this right. Instead, from the 1560s, it was the great voyages by the likes of Dudley, Hawkins, and Drake, interloping into the Spanish American empire, which she variously tolerated, encouraged, or invested in, that formed the basis of a political partnership. This partnership sometimes delivered spectacular financial rewards, but critically it delivered naval force. Expanding English trade demanded more powerful merchantmen, useful for war as well as commerce. In the same period, English gun foundries began to provide them with some of the best and cheapest cannon in Europe. Rather more than feudal duty, the appeal to national independence, Protestant survival, and private profit brought these powerful, well-armed merchant ships into joint operations with royal warships. This combination raided Cadiz in 1587, encountered the Great Armada of 1588, and attacked Cadiz again in 1596. In the West Indies, the Spanish response to English interloping had made the ventures extremely hazardous. Nevertheless, within two generations, the English had begun to think of themselves as natural navigators capable of raiding or blockading wherever ships could go.

Loades provides a clear narrative of these events, blending diplomacy, operations, and administrative changes with chapters on the financial background and the maritime community. He states that the book is not free-standing, but a sequel to his 1992 work, The Tudor Navy. Indeed, the similarity is so close that this volume is probably best seen as an updating rather than either a chronological or thematic sequel. The narrative is rather less detailed in many places than The Tudor Navy, but the arguments and conclusions are very similar. New works are referenced, but the author does not give any hint as to how these have changed perspectives or debates since 1992. The Tudor Navy is an excellent book, but, sadly, it is no longer easily obtainable. It follows, therefore, that—for the new scholar—the publication of The Making of the Elizabethan Navy is an important replacement.