“We cannot fully respect people of diverse cultural backgrounds … without making a serious effort to understand and appreciate … features of their culture that they cherish and see as crucial to their particular identity.”1
Thomas E, Hill J. Respect, Pluralism, and Justice: Kantian Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press; 2000:83.
“The ultimate goal [of cultural competence] is a health care system and workforce that can deliver the highest quality of care to every patient, regardless of race, ethnicity, cultural background, or English proficiency.”2
Betancourt JR, Green AR, Carillo JE. Cultural Competence in Health Care: Emerging Frameworks and Practical Approaches. New York: Commonwealth Fund; 2002:2.
“In human rights work, however, research and critical assessment are insufficient. No more adequate, for all their virtues, are denunciation and exhortation…. To confront, as an observer, ongoing abuses of human rights is to be faced with a moral dilemma: does one's action help the sufferers or does it not?”3
Farmer P. Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor. Berkeley, Calif: University of California; 2003:226.
To promote so-called cultural competence in work of direct-care providers and other health professionals among diverse peoples, cross-cultural training (CCT) is now widely advised. However, in ethically assessing aims and content of CCT, and surrounding issues and concerns, what should guide us? And if we can elaborate satisfactory moral touchstones, what do they imply for healthcare professionals, overarching structures, and bioethicists? Building on prior work, this paper tries to help answer these questions.
After briefly considering background, including moral theory, I argue that ethical principles of (1) equal and substantial respect and (2) justice capture central moral concerns and provide practical moral guidance in cross-cultural healthcare. I then explain some key implications of these principles for CCT for healthcare practitioners and healthcare structures. The concluding section considers ramifications for bioethicists.
Healthcare Inequalities and Cross-Cultural Training
Inequalities in healthcare and social determinants of health are morally outrageous inequities that cause many of the world's preventable human health problems.4
For example, see note 3, Farmer 2003.
Mann JM. Health and human rights. British Medical Journal 1996;312(7036):924–5.
Smedley BD, Stith AY, Nelson AR, Institute of Medicine (U.S.). Committee on Understanding and Eliminating Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care. Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press; 2002; Lurie N. Health disparities—Less talk, more action. The New England Journal of Medicine 2005;353:727–9.
See note 6, Smedley et al. 2002; Betancourt JR, Green AR, Carillo JE, Park ER. Cultural competence and health care disparities: Key perspectives and trends. Health Affairs 2005;24(2):499–505; American College of Physicians. Racial and ethnic disparities in health care: A position paper of the American College of Physicians. Annals of Internal Medicine 2004;141(3):226–32.
I adopt the IOM's meaning of “culture”: “an integrated pattern of learned beliefs and behaviors that can be shared among groups and include thoughts, styles of communicating, ways of interacting, views on roles and relationships, values, practices, and customs.”8
See note 6, Smedley et al. 2002:201. On evolution of cultural concepts, see Simon C, Mosavel M. Key conceptual issues in the forging of “culturally competent” community health initiatives: A South African example. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, this issue, 195–205.
On diverse health beliefs, see Fadiman A. The Spirit Catches You and You Fall Down: A Hmong Child, Her American Doctors, and The Collision of Two Cultures. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; 1997. On unexpected commonalities, see note 8, Simon and Mosavel, this issue.
In light of all this, reputable accounts recommend that CCT provide healthcare providers (1) knowledge of diverse cultural beliefs, customs, and thinking related to health that increases “sensitivity”; (2) skills in cross-cultural communication; and (3) attitudes that exclude stereotypes, prejudices, and biases, and include openness to and respect for difference. Of course, strong motivations for equal treatment and cross-cultural work are crucial.10
See note 6, Smedley et al. 2002:203; also see note 2, Betancourt et al. 2002; see note 7, Betancourt et al. 2005; Tervalon M, Murray-Garcia J. Cultural humility versus cultural competence: A critical distinction in defining physician training outcomes in multicultural education. Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved 1998;9(2):117–25.
Betancourt JR. Cross-cultural medical education: Conceptual approaches and frameworks for evaluation. Academic Medicine 2003;78(6):560–9.
Given these goals of CCT, writers increasingly stress that “cultural competence” is a misleading and trivializing label for the underlying concept, because related knowledge, skills, and attitudes needed for excellent cross-cultural care are deep and vast. Thus, rather than a threshold concept, the better notion entails career-long work to enhance/develop relevant capabilities, transformations that require continued self-reflection. Hence, Melanie Tervalon and Jann Murray-Garcia argue that “cultural humility” is a more apt term than “cultural competence” for the goal of CCT.12
See note 10, Tervalon, Murray-Garcia 1998 and additional elements they suggest; also see note 11, Betancourt et al. 2003.
Ethical Foundations of Cross-Cultural Training in Healthcare
One strategy is to construct a general moral–theoretical framework and derive guiding ethical principles. Such an endeavor is far beyond the present scope, if it could be successful. But a brief consideration of moral theory is helpful.
Moral Theory
A prominent approach is Norman Daniels' theory of justice in allocation of healthcare resources, an extension of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice.13
Rawls J. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 1971.
For examples, see Daniels N. Just Health Care. New York: Cambridge University Press; 1985; Daniels N. Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice. New York: Cambridge University Press; 1996; Buchanan A, Brock DW, Daniels N, Wikler D. From Chance to Choice: Genetics & Justice. New York: Cambridge University Press; 2000.
In contrast, Amartya Sen stresses that Rawls (and Daniels by implication) mistakenly ignores our varied capabilities to convert resources into rewarding life pursuits, sustaining important inequalities in people's actual freedom to pursue diverse life alternatives. Sen argues that justice grounds promoting equal capabilities. Importantly expanding Sen's work, Martha Nussbaum argues among other things that capabilities are essential for human flourishing.15
Sen A. Inequality Reexamined. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 1992; Nussbaum MC. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. New York: Cambridge University Press; 2000. On whether Sen's approach would excessively expand what medicine should do, see Sen's pp. 44–5; see note 14, Daniels 1996.
Other approaches address rights. Some contend that all people have equal rights to health and derivatively to effective healthcare. A more basic approach argues that people have certain equal basic rights to decent minimal conditions for pursuing a good life or for human flourishing. We could reason that rights to health and healthcare follow.16
On basic rights to health, see note 3, Farmer 2003; Mann J, Gostin L, Gruskin S, Brennan T, Lazzarini Z, Fineberg HV. Human rights and the new public health. Health and Human Rights 1994;1(3):229–33. On fundamental rights, see Buchanan A. Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-determination: Moral Foundations for International Law. New York: Oxford University Press; 2004. (Buchanan draws on Nussbaum. See note 15, Nussbaum 2000.)
Extensive sifting and sorting among such theories to develop a comprehensive moral framework for cross-cultural work may be worthwhile, but is work for another day. Complicating such an effort are significant debates about meanings of and relationships among justice, equality, rights, and other concepts.17
Madison Powers made this point in response to an earlier draft.
Ethical Principles
Foundational in the above moral-theoretical approaches is that everyone has equal moral worth. In what follows I build on this concept of equality by explaining its connection to the primary ethical principle that I argue should guide cross-cultural work regarding healthcare: (1) “equal and substantial respect.” The goal is to explain this widely accepted principle and elaborate its implications for providers, structures, and bioethicists. However, a more complete account requires that we add (2) an ethical principle of justice that functions in concert with the respect principle, or so I will argue. As noted, the overarching goal is to provide an account that is practically relevant. Given space constraints, the following discussion of the two principles is rather a summary, especially of justice. The first step is to explain why “equal” and “substantial” should be overt terms in (1), the respect principle.
1. Equal and substantial respect.18
On equal respect and equal moral worth, also see Ornelas IJ. Cultural competency at the community level: A strategy for reducing racial and ethnic disparities. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, this issue, 185–94; Hyun I. Clinical cultural competence and the threat of ethical relativism. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, this issue, 154–63.
See note 6, Smedley et al. 2002; Dula A, Stone JR. Wakeup call: Healthcare and racism. Hastings Center Report 2002;32(4):48. Regarding care of the poor, see Blacksher E. Healthcare disparities: The salience of social class. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, this issue, 143–53.
However, it is possible to show everyone equal and minimal respect for their suffering, health, or beliefs.20
See the “leveling-down” objection to equality per se, for example, Temkin LS. Egalitarianism defended. Ethics 2003;113(4):764–82.
Attending to people's beliefs does not imply acceptance. See note 18, Hyun, this issue, 154–63.
The above remarks about “equal” and “substantial” help clarify “respect,” the latter familiar in Western stress on the principle of respect for autonomy in clinical care and biomedical research, drawn from Immanuel Kant's notion of respect for persons.22
See Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th ed. New York: Oxford University Press; 2001.
As Thomas Hill explains in his informative account, Kantian respect is both independent of and attendant to people's values, beliefs, and lives.23
See note 1, Hill 2000.
In providing individually focused and culturally appropriate healthcare, thoughtful exploration of possible culturally related issues will avoid stereotypes. Rather, respectful and particularized care draws on cultural knowledge, skills, and attitudes to explore what may be pertinent in a specific individual's care. For example, informed and thoughtful health professionals would reasonably presume that African Americans do not trust that health professionals and structures will treat them with equal and substantial respect.24
Gamble VN. Under the shadow of Tuskegee: African Americans and health care. American Journal of Public Health 1997;87(11):1773–8; Crawley LM. African-American participation in clinical trials: Situating trust and trustworthiness. Journal of the National Medical Association 2000;93(12):14S–6S.
See Perkins HS. Culture as a useful conceptual tool in clinical ethics consultation. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, this issue, 164–72.
See Sara Lawrence-Lightfoot's account of pediatrician Johnnye Ballenger in her Respect: An Exploration. Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus; 2000.
The principle of equal and substantial respect also involves regard for preserving and fostering people's personal dignity and moral agency, both qualities involving power considerations. For example, in healthcare a well-known way to maintain people's dignity is by honoring their preferences about bodily cover, although often in the breech. Affronts to personal dignity may reduce moral agency by undermining people's self-esteem and sense of self-efficacy. Or, affronts to dignity may produce strident reactions that harm patient/family–professional relationships and impair healthcare goals. In contrast, showing equal and substantial respect demands sustaining or enhancing power such that people are effective self-advocates and equal partners in healthcare encounters.
One way to capture many elements of respect is that they are how we substantially “recognize” people.27
In response to an earlier draft, Leonard Ortmann pointed out this concept of recognition.
2. Justice. As considered here, the ethical principle of justice works in tandem with equal and substantial respect.28
Tempkin's discussion of fairness and equality informs this concept of justice. See note 19, Tempkin 2003.
However, a common concern is that justice considerations often motivate moral agents to “go abstract,” to disconnect from people's humanity and particularity. For this reason, especially in cross-cultural work, justice and the principle of equal and substantial respect should always be considered in close company, the latter anchoring the former. This overt tie of justice to “respect” mitigates perhaps a special tendency in cross-cultural work: Biases about “others” as different can further disconnect professionals and structures from those they would serve, aggravating the general problem of distancing in applications of justice. So the general notion here is a principle of justice tightly and overtly grounded to equal and substantial respect.
Regarding justice and different treatment, of course there are ethically justified reasons for varied healthcare. One interpretation of justice is that people with urgent and remediable health-related threats to life generally should get healthcare before those with less threatening conditions because the former have more to lose, a position I hold. However, this position only makes sense if the importance of everyone's healthcare is equal and significant—as follows from equal and substantial respect. In light of such respect and its implications for moral agency and self-efficacy, justice considerations suggest that those served should have a major voice in institutional policies and practices, as discussed later.29
See Stone JR. Race and healthcare disparities: Overcoming vulnerability. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 2002;23:499–518.
Also, when people are treated unequally, justice is a guide for deciding what they may be due for reparation or compensation and how those decisions should be made. An example of the latter is when fairness requires that people disproportionately loyal to one party recuse themselves from adjudicating claims involving another party. In cross-cultural issues, comparable justice considerations apply when determining, for example, what resources providers and institutions should devote to providing translation services and eliminating healthcare disparities.
However, a clear basis in equal and substantial respect leaves many ethical conundrums about justice in allocations of scarce healthcare resources. A well-known concern is how to balance people's health status with their potential health benefit. If allocations would minimally help a few who are quite badly off or greatly benefit very many more who are significantly better off, our intuitions may suggest that justice requires benefiting the better off.
This account of the principle of justice leaves much unsaid. Not explained is exactly what justice requires when the principle of equal and substantial respect is violated. However, we cannot expect such concrete outcomes in part because how to implement justice is significantly context dependent and what would be right generally depends on fair deliberation that includes the appropriate stakeholders in ways that serve equal and substantial respect.
I do believe the above account is sufficient to show that principles of justice, and equal and substantial respect, are both necessary and key principles for guiding the content and use of CCT, as well as related issues involving organizations and bioethicists. The following discussion aims to show implications in these three areas. However, first a comment about incompleteness.
Incompleteness and Rejection of Principlism
This account so far implies neither that the principles, (1) equal and substantial respect and (2) justice, cover all ethical issues surrounding cross-cultural concerns in biomedicine nor that a principled approach is sufficient. Far from it. For example, in considering how we should treat each other, elements of an Ethics of Care have much to offer. Also, although I do not advocate a primary virtue approach, many considerations here have obvious implications for professional virtues among healthcare personnel and bioethicists, as we shall see. And in considering African American distrust, for example, narrative approaches to bioethics have an important role. So although I advocate significant stress on the principles of equal and substantial respect and justice, much more is ethically relevant in the cross-cultural arena that I cannot address here. Finally I have ignored a basic principle such as beneficence that is widely accepted as a guide for healthcare. Whether beneficence includes a harm avoidance concept or the latter is stated separately, I take my remarks about principles for cross-cultural healthcare to assume or be superimposed on such basic principles in biomedicine. The account here also ignores a variety of important ethical and philosophical questions about what should be the proper aims of healthcare.
Ethics, Cross-Cultural Training, and Healthcare
In considering implications of these two ethical principles for CCT, the discussion begins with cross-cultural knowledge, a complex element.
1. Providers and direct patient care. Cross-cultural knowledge is obviously essential for showing the equal and substantial respect that is necessary for high-quality, individually nuanced, compassionate, and sensitive healthcare.30
For recent suggestions, see Tervalon M. Components of culture in health for medical students' education. Academic Medicine 2003;78:570–6.
Consider African American distrust. Vanessa Northington Gamble explains that it rests on collective knowledge of extensive historical abuses, murder, and other violence, some health related, as well as continued racist encounters for many.31
See note 24, Gamble 1997; Crawley 2000; Feagin JR, HernanVera, Batur P. White racism, 2nd ed. New York: Routledge; 2001; Cose E. The Rage of a Privileged Class. New York: HarperCollins; 1993.
Also essential is understanding based on appropriate emotional attunement to people's attitudes. In the distrust example, caregivers should emotionally connect to and empathize with anger, frustration, fearfulness, and other emotions that often ride with distrust. Better care ensues in part because emotional perception of these bases of distrust fosters professional patience that in turn builds trust.32
On empathy and emotional connection in respect, see note 26, Lawrence-Lightfoot 2000. On knowledge's importance, see note 9, Fadiman 1997; also see Halpern J. From Detached Concern to Empathy: Humanizing Medical Practice. New York: Oxford University Press; 2001.
Healing illnesses requires understanding what diseases mean to people. See Toombs SK. Bodies and persons. In: Fulford KWMB, Dickenson DL, Murray TH, eds. Healthcare Ethics and Human Values. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell; 2002:36–40. Regarding emotional knowledge and curiosity, see note 32, Halpern 2002; on curiosity and respect, also see note 26, Lawrence-Lightfoot 2002.
In promoting people's self-advocacy, such dual cross-cultural knowledge is again important. An example is knowledge of how to be courteous in a given culture. And emotional perception of anger and frustration, for instance, not only reveals disempowerment, but also motivates fostering people's agency. Obtaining and employing this double knowledge requires skill development, as Jodi Halpern explains regarding clinical empathy.34
Regarding skills, see the story about Jennifer Dohrn, note 26, Lawrence-Lightfoot 2002; note 32, Halpern 2001.
In cross-cultural work, showing equal and substantial respect often requires not only new knowledge and skills, but also significant personal transformation. Bases of such changes include self-knowledge and self-critique of biases, stereotypes, and prejudices plus the virtues of openness and humility, as previously noted.
For many, to promote equal and substantial respect and justice, they will need to positively transform their “whiteness.”35
On CCT and personal transformation in healthcare education, see note 10, Tervalon, Murray-Garcia 1998; Wear D. Insurgent multiculturalism: Rethinking how and why we teach culture in medical education. Academic Medicine 2003; note 6, Smedley et al. 2002. About racial identity, see Tatum BD. “Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria?” and Other Conversations about Race. New York: Basic Books; 1997; Helms JE, ed. Black and White Racial Identity: Theory, Research, and Practice. Westport, Conn.: Praeger; 1993.
These brief comments show how principles of equal and substantial respect, and justice, justify measures to promote certain kinds of knowledge, skills, and attitudes in CCT for providers. However, focus on enhancing the direct cross-cultural work of practitioners with clients/patients and families ignores how structures sustain inequitable and disrespectful treatment.
2. Healthcare structures. As shown in the IOM report, structures such as healthcare and insurance systems, hospitals, laws, and policies profoundly influence who get what kind of care.36
See note 6, Smedley et al. 2002.
To show equal and substantial respect and serve justice, healthcare institutions must understand and be sensitive to the diverse communities they serve. They must know how to work effectively (skillfully) across cultures. And attitudinally, that work should be without stereotypes, biases, and the rest. Given the prior remarks, these implications should be obvious.37
Also see Brannigan MC. Connecting the dots in cultural competency: Institutional strategies and conceptual caveats. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, this issue, 173–84; and see note 18, Ornelas, this issue, 185–94.
However, these ethical principles also demand elimination of policies, practices, and personnel composition that sustain unequal and inequitable treatment and/or unjustly represent those served. As I have argued elsewhere, served communities should have proportional and representative voices in bodies setting and advising on policies, programs, and practices.38
See note 29, Stone 2002; IQ Solutions Inc. National Standards for Culturally and Linguistically Appropriate Services in Health Care: Final Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Minority Health; 2001.
Taking seriously implications of equal and substantial respect and justice about structures leads back to CCT content. Noting that CCT can either sustain or undermine unequal treatment at structural levels, Delese Wear argues that “insurgent multiculturalism” is an important model of CCT for medical education and training, following the work of Henry Giroux.39
See note 35, Wear 2003; Giroux HA. Insurgent multiculturalism and the promise of pedagogy. In: Duarte EM, Smith S, eds. Foundational Perspectives in Multicultural Education. New York: Longman; 2000:195–212.
However, strong obstacles include power arrangements. In altering power arrangements and dominant views so as to uphold equal and substantial respect in ways that sustain justice, addressing whiteness is crucial, including whiteness as invisible normalcy and supremacy.40
See note 35, Wear 2003; note 39, Giroux 2000; Frankenberg R. Introduction: Local whitenesses, localizing whiteness. In: Frankenberg R, ed. Displacing Whiteness: Essays in Social and Cultural Criticism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press; 1997:1–33; Mills CW. White supremacy as sociopolitical system: A philosophical perspective. In: Doane AW, Bonilla-Silva E, eds. White Out: The Continuing Significance of Racism. New York: Routledge; 2003:35–48.
Whiteness, including its infusion into perspectives, laws, and policies, sets itself up as natural or normal. Without addressing and transforming whiteness, structural reforms to eliminate inequities regarding cross-cultural healthcare will be inadequate because the dominance of whiteness fails to show equal and substantial respect for diverse perspectives. Importantly, such an approach rejects color blindness as the right way to promote equal and substantial respect and justice because lack of attention to race/ethnicity obscures persistent inequities in treatment, including access.
I am not presuming to give anything like a complete argument that addressing whiteness is essential for needed structural reforms in supporting the principles of equal and substantial respect and justice. However, I hope to raise many readers' awareness such that they will give the matter greater attention. The next section considers how whiteness involves bioethicists, as well as other implications of the principles being discussed.41
On color or difference blindness, see Andersen ML. Whitewashing race: A critical perspective on Whiteness. In: Doane AW, Bonilla-Silva E, eds. White Out: The Continuing Significance of Racism. New York: Routledge; 2003:21–34; Bonilla-Silva E. “New racism,” color-blind racism, and the future of Whiteness in America. In: Doane AW, Bonilla-Silva E, eds. White Out: The Continuing Significance of Racism. New York: Routledge; 2003:271–84; Kymlicka W. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press; 2002.
Ethics, Cross-Cultural Work, and Bioethics
First consider clinical ethics consultation. Excellence in this work requires understanding stakeholders' perspectives, beliefs, and values, plus ramifications for them of moral choices.42
See note 25, Perkins, this issue.
To see this dual need, return to African American distrust. Understanding facts and attuning emotionally to sources of that distrust give insights into potentially associated (rational) anger, fear, and hostility. This dual knowledge fosters empathy, patience, and thoughtful conflict resolution.
However, bioethicists presumably are just as likely as clinicians to employ unconscious biases and stereotypes in judgments. A corollary and reasonable assumption is that bioethicists are comparably ignorant of how to show equal and substantial respect across cultures. Thus, bioethicists doing clinical consultation also need CCT throughout their professional lives to provide and/or enhance relevant knowledge, skills, and attitudes.
Furthermore, white bioethicists—most are white—are just as likely as white clinicians to embody whiteness elements that sustain racial/ethnic inequalities, including the “normalcy” of whiteness and attendant white dominance or supremacy. In her important paper on whiteness and bioethics, Catherine Myser discusses these and related issues for bioethicists.43
Myser C. Differences from somewhere: The normativity of whiteness in bioethics in the United States. American Journal of Bioethics 2003;3(2):1–11. Also see responding articles, same issue. An early draft of Myser's essay focused my attention on whiteness.
Moving outside direct patient care issues, serving those ethical principles in cross-cultural work obviously requires that bioethicists address how whiteness and other elements sustain structural inequities or structural causes of unequal care that flow through policies and decision processes. Bioethicists should give significant priority to analyzing and correcting such foundational wrongs. However, bioethicists only occasionally address structural causes of inequitable healthcare, and professionally they usually need not.44
Such omissions are often characterized as inattention to matters of social justice. See Fox RC, Swazey JP. Examining American bioethics: Its problems and prospects. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2005;14(4):361–73; Turner L. Bioethics, social class, and the sociological imagination. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2005;14(4):374–8. For a view that bioethicists have previously been more oriented toward advocacy and social justice, see Callahan D. Bioethics and the culture wars. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2005;14(4):424–31.
About bioethicists' roles I am indebted to discussions with Annette Dula; a conversation we co-led with Craig Klugman at the Bioethics Summer Camp at Asilomar, California, June 2005; and Gbadegesin S. Beyond race or culture: Toward a global bioethics for equity in health care. Oral paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for Practical and Professional Ethics; 2004, reflected in my response published in Stone JR. Race/ethnicity, health disparities, and bioethics. American Philosophical Association Newsletter 2004;4(Fall):16–8.
Given (1) the importance of these principles, (2) the primacy of such injustices, and (3) their professional goal of helping to ensure right action in healthcare, bioethicists are obligated to foster structures that provide equitable treatment and to give such work high priority. The absence of such emphasis is a collective and profound moral failure.46
Regarding bioethics' inaction, see note 3, Farmer 2003.
What, then, are bioethicists obligated to do in response to such inequities? How strong are the obligations? The main elements of an answer to this question include the following:
Analyses of structural and policy causes of unjust healthcare inequalities should increase. For effective change agency, these accounts should be widely disseminated beyond academic venues. Examples are writing op-ed articles and speaking out in public forums—now merely occasional.
Advocacy should build on the above analyses. Reasons are that (1) vigorous advocacy is generally needed to provoke structural changes; (2) obligation for advocacy follows from the ethical principles unless there are good reasons to think others will perform these actions (there are no such reasons); (3) a corollary obligation is that bioethicists should learn how to be good advocates; (4) advocacy includes a wide spectrum of actions, including demonstrations, petitions, strikes, and behind-the-scenes work.
Obligations for analysis and advocacy are neither optional nor absolute. Given the moral principles of equal and substantial respect and justice, whether to address such inequities is not merely a matter of personal choice. However, obligations to address them are nonabsolute because injustices in cross-cultural healthcare are one among many ethical issues that warrant bioethical analysis and advocacy.47
Others, including healthcare providers, are also obligated to be change agents. See note 35, Wear 2003; Gruen RL, Pearson SD, Brennan TA. Physician-citizens—Public roles and professional obligations. JAMA 2004;291(1):94–8. Also see Coulehan J, Williams PC. Professional ethics and social activism: Where have we been? Where are we going? In: Wear D, Bickel J, eds. Educating for Professionalism: Creating a Culture of Humanism in Medical Education. Iowa City: University of Iowa; 2000:49–69.
Finally, regarding cross-cultural healthcare, bioethicists should further explore what equal and substantial respect and justice, among other moral considerations, mean for beliefs and practices about health and healthcare that differ from the Western biomedical model, including more critical reflection on the model itself.48
See note 44, Fox, Swazey 2005; see note 18, Hyun, this issue, 154–63, on moral relativism; see note 18, Ornelas, this issue, 185–94, on alternative healing approaches.
Conclusions
Ethical principles of (1) equal and substantial respect and (2) justice are tangible guidelines that justify much of the content and applications of cross-cultural training for providers and institutions. Further, these principles will often call for structural changes in systems, institutions, and practices. Regarding cultural differences and healthcare inequalities, institutions often should change extensively, including rearrangements that eliminate inequitable power relationships and insure fair representation of those served. To serve equal and substantial respect and justice, bioethicists have much greater moral responsibilities to be change agents than usually presumed. To provide respectful and equitable care to all, systems, organizations, providers, and bioethicists should strive to understand, transform, and/or eliminate elements of whiteness that sustain white dominance and whiteness as normalcy.
