Breaking the Cycle: Civil Wars in Lebanon, edited by Youssef M. Choueiri, presents the findings of a conference held (in summer 2006) by the Center for Lebanese Studies, England, on the major Lebanese civil wars in the 19th and 20th centuries. The book is organized into three parts with a total of thirteen chapters (plus a forward and an introduction). The three chapters in Part I (“The Historical Context”) provide historical background for Lebanese civil wars and analyze them within the context of the modern and the contemporary history of Lebanon. Three chapters in Part II (“Memories of War and Forgiveness”) then shift the focus from history to the role of war memory, recollection, and forgiveness. The book finishes with seven chapters in Part III (“The Politics of Reform: An Agenda for the Future”) that deal with the deficit in Lebanese polity and society and offer a wide range of recommendations for reform in the electoral system, education, and civil society “so as to bolster the Lebanese political system against civil war and to arrest the fragmentation of Lebanese society into self-enclosed sectarian cantons” (p. xviii). Contributors to the book include well-known authors such as Ahmed Beydoun, Rudy Jaafar, Maha Shuayb, Michael Kerr, and Nawaf Salam.
Because of limited space, I only discuss three chapters that represent the different angles authors in this book have used to approach the Lebanese civil wars.
In the second chapter, Choueiri examines the three major Lebanese civil wars of 1860, 1958, and 1975–90 (with focus on the last two). In his historical analysis, Choueiri contrasts and compares these wars in terms of their causes, duration, and conclusions. Choueiri finds a pattern: absence of a viable political formula, emergence of new sectarian configurations demanding recognition, and settlement through mediation by external forces. No war has come to an end as a result of the unmediated negotiations of the parties involved. In addition to addressing the complex internal factors of Lebanese society and politics, Choueiri deals with regional and international pressures. The rest of his chapter focuses on Lebanon's present and future, providing different scenarios for the recent confrontation between Shiʿi political Islam and the 14 March forces.
In Chapter 8, Maha Shuayb focuses on the educational reforms launched by the Lebanese government after the Taʾif era, which primarily aimed at abolishing sectarianism and fostering a unified national identity. She examines the new curriculum and the textbooks that were designed for that end and compares the philosophies and practices of fifteen public and private schools, studying factors common to citizenship research that contribute toward national upbringing and impact students' sense of belonging to the school. Shuayb argues that political obstacles as well as educational gaps prevent the social cohesion of Lebanese society intended by educational reforms.
In terms of political obstacles, the aim of the Taʾif Accord was to abolish sectarianism, but the Taʾif Accord elements as reflected in the 1990 constitutional amendments are not “fully committed to that cause” (p. 169). The Taʾif Accord also failed to limit religious authorities' control over religious education. As a consequence, attempts to secularize education and create a secular and unifying national identity are blocked. Religious private schools teach their own curriculum conveying their particular ideologies—often depriving students of knowledge of other identities, sects, and religions.
In terms of educational gaps, Shuayb finds a number of obstacles afflicting the new curriculum's educational theory and practice. For instance, active learning, critical thinking, and participation in simulations of democratic institutions (such as student councils) are absent from the new Lebanese curriculum and deprive students of the knowledge, skills, and interest important to fostering values of citizenship, democracy, and participation. In contrast to public schools, private schools in Lebanon respond to their students' diverse needs and involve them in an active participative environment. Thus, students in private schools register a stronger sense of belonging to their schools (and by extension to their sect) while students in secular public schools register less satisfaction with their schools. If Lebanon is to create a cohesive society, concludes Shuayb, nonsectarian schools must adopt the policies followed in private schools and care for the child.
In Chapter 11, Halim Shebaya discusses the state of Christians during the post Taʾif Accord period (1990) and following the Syrian withdrawal in 2005. He reviews a whole range of political events with emphasis on events following Syria's extension of President Emile Lahoud's term, the passing of U.N. resolution 1559, the assassination of former prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri and the subsequent demonstrations and counterdemonstrations (14 March and 8 March movements), the parliamentary elections (summer 2005), and the recent debate over the presidency's roles and responsibilities. He argues that the despair of Christians encapsulated their mood during the last fifteen years, especially under the Syrians, when their Arab nationalist sentiments were challenged and often questioned; the main theme when the Syrian security apparatus controlled most of Lebanon's governmental institutions was, after all, national security.
Later, after the Syrian forces' withdrawal from Lebanon, Christians once again felt isolated when they gained a majority vote in the May 2005 parliamentary elections based on the 2000 election law. This law had in the past precluded Christians from having representatives due to an unfair balance between popular votes and divisional/provincial representation. These events prompted General Aoun, the leading figure among Christians, to take an opposing stance against the “new majority,” formed as part of a quadripartite agreement amongst Sunnis, Shiites, Druze, and certain Maronite Christian figures to undertake the 2005 elections. Aoun and other Christians also argued that even after the Syrian troop withdrawal and 2005 election results, the presidency post held by a Christian is still disrespected by the “new majority.” Unlike the head of parliament (a Shiʿi Muslim) and the prime minister (a Sunni Muslim), the president's powers and recognition are diminishing.
Shebaya makes a number of recommendations to avoid a new civil war and/or the mistakes of the last fifteen years. These recommendations range from restoring balance in Christian representation, accommodation of different perspectives of key national tragedies even if only considered as such by one group, education reform, using a public editor to thwart the threat of the media, and the convergence of the three political lines that have emerged in light of Hariri's assassination.
This book is highly informative. Its coverage of recent political developments in Lebanon is timely and much needed. I highly recommend it to students and scholars alike.
