In the brief introduction, ch. 1, Sergio Yona presents Epicureanism in late-Republican Rome, noting that it might seem surprising that a philosophical system that was seemingly so antithetical to mainstream Roman culture could become so popular. It is this presumed paradox that the volume addresses. Y. asserts, ‘What this volume does … is attempt to understand the paradoxical appeal of a system allegedly incompatible with Roman politics and culture through the contrasting (and at times seemingly dialectical) accounts of its most prominent opponents as well as proponents’ (3). Y. positions the book in relation to recently edited volumes on philosophy at Rome, commenting that this volume addresses one single tradition, whereas other recent edited volumes on philosophy in Rome have been driven by various alternative focuses. A chapter overview, interwoven with comments on Cicero's and Lucretius’ biases, fills out the chapter.

Two chapters approach Epicureanism through Cicero. In ch. 2, G. Roskam asks to what degree the practice of Epicureanism in late-Republican Rome was incompatible with the practice of Romanitas. Roskam engages On Ends 1 and 2 extensively, with focus on Cicero's literary construction of Torquatus. In this learned contribution, Roskam concludes that neither Epicureanism nor Romanitas come in tidy, one-size-fits-all packages and that Epicureanism, despite Cicero's protestations, was eminently compatible with Roman identity construction. In the third chapter, D. Hanchey studies Cicero's circumlocutions for the Epicureans, observing that Cicero uses circumlocutions both to slight the Epicureans (i.e. Epicureans are not worth naming) and to bring attention to their core doctrines (e.g. ‘those who refer all things to the standard of pleasure’) that are anathema to Cicero. The chapter is enlightening particularly for its discussion of the concept of measurement (e.g. the hedonic calculus) and the manner in which Epicurean measurement of self-interest runs contrary to ideas of inherent value espoused by Cicero.

The next three chapters query the Epicureanism of individuals. In ch. 4, N. Gilbert takes up the question of Atticus’ philosophical allegiance to Epicureanism. In a series of thoughtful responses to ‘problem texts’, Gilbert shows that there is much less evidence to discount Atticus’ Epicureanism than is regularly assumed. In the fifth chapter, K. Volk sifts through the evidence related to Epicureanism in relation to Caesar's life and sensibly concludes that, although we cannot say that Caesar was an Epicurean, some of his views seem to have been informed by Epicurean doctrine. I found her discussion as to how we might conclude whether someone should be counted a proponent of a particular philosophical school especially valuable. The chapter also includes a stimulating discussion concerning the manner in which scholars have studied philosophical allegiance in relation to changes in Epicurean theory and practice from the time of Epicurus to late-Republican Rome. In the following, wide-ranging chapter, M. Gale bounces between Lucretius, Philodemus and Catullus, and concludes that Catullus ‘abnegates any kind of philosophical commitment’ (88). The chapter includes several compelling observations on allusion, although some of the argument can be strained. For example, Gale (90–91, 94), I think, misinterprets the idea inherent in Philodemus’ Greek at AP 11.44.7–8. Philodemus seems to suggest, I contend, that a dinner party will be ‘richer’ if Piso attends because Piso's presence will add value to the occasion, rather than because Philodemus presumes that Piso will bankroll Philodemus, should Piso attend. Note Philodemus’ emphasis on presence (ὄμματα, 7). Gale is not alone in her interpretation (cf. D. Sider's commentary, 160). Furthermore, it is too great a stretch to conclude, as does Gale (88), that Catullus 47 provides evidence for Catullus having a degree of antagonism toward Epicureanism in general; and moments of polemical allusion on the part of Catullus need not be read as generic hostility toward Epicureanism (pace Gale, 92) rather than as moments of artistic aemulatio.

The following two chapters take us outside the proposed purview of the volume, since they do not address the socio-cultural contexts of Epicureanism in Rome. In ch. 7, E. Asmis provides a reading of De rerum natura 3.931–962, Nature's diatribe/ultimatum. She argues that ‘through Nature's ultimatum, Lucretius displaces the problem of deprivation from Nature to us: Instead of being deprived, we deprive ourselves by failing to accept the natural order of things’ (112). The chapter would serve as a good general introduction, for novice readers, to the passage under consideration. In the following chapter, P. Gordon employs the concept of kitsch to Epicurean doctrine, especially as Epicurean doctrine is developed by Lucretius in his diatribe against death in Book 3. Following M. Kundera, she suggests that kitsch is antithetical to reality given its categorical agreement with an unenlightened understanding of being (130). We are all subject to annihilation, and Lucretius employs outré imagery to enlighten his reader into the nature of reality. G.'s argument concerning Lucretius’ hostility to seemingly irrational sentimentalism could probably have been made solely with reference to the Epicurean tradition of ‘frank criticism’, without recourse to the concept of kitsch. Nonetheless, the chapter includes insightful observations.

Ch. 9 returns obliquely to engagement with the proposed thematic interests of the volume. M. Hanses focuses on Lucretius’ practice of polemical allusion against Ennius, citing the performance of Ennius at the Roman ludi as being particularly detrimental to Romans, from Lucretius’ perspective, given the indoctrination effect during performance. Hanses also provides discussion of intermedial polemical allusion, citing Lucretius’ engagement with works of visual art, such as depictions of the sacrifice of Iphigenia (analogous to that which may be found in Pompeii at the House of the Tragic Poet, illustrated at 161). The chapter includes enlightening readings of Lucretius's practice of polemical allusion and may be read profitably alongside J. Nethercut's recent Ennius Noster (Oxford, 2021), which develops analogous arguments regarding Lucretius’ polemics against the Ennian thought-world.

In the final chapter, T. Gellar-Goad addresses the famed topic of the Epicurean view concerning the size of the sun. Gellar-Goad's primary original contribution is an examination of Lucretius’ syntax within Lucretius's exposition of the topic: he argues that Lucretius uses complex syntax, with numerous subordinate clauses, to model the difficulty of answering the question as to the size of the sun. This valuable suggestion is made within the context of an overview of the ancient Epicurean sources on the size of the sun as well as within the context of a discussion of ancient and modern responses to the Epicurean position. This excellent chapter should be required reading for anyone still hesitant to grant sense to the Epicureans regarding the size of the sun.

An observation: The famed templa serena of De rerum natura 2.8 are evoked twice in this volume (Volk, 72; Gale, 88) in ways that suggest to me that the contributors, like most readers, have not fully grasped Lucretius’ imagery in that passage (on the templa serena, see now Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 163 (2020), 167–73; Mnemosyne 74 (2021), 152–60).

The volume is a notable success. Although I do not know that it is ever correct to say that the sum of a volume is greater than its parts, it is fair to say that the individual contributions in this volume, all of high quality, have been curated in such a way that readers of the volume will be well positioned to think through the most important concerns related to the theory and practice of Epicureanism in late-Republican Rome. And those chapters that do not firstly engage with the proposed theme of the volume are, nonetheless, valuable contributions to Epicurean studies.