Recent work in ‘science and religion’ sometimes uses that title interchangeably with ‘science and theology’. Hastings’ monograph, by contrast, fits squarely under the latter, proposing that the trinitarian concept of coinherence (or perichoresis) should be applied to the relationship between science and theology. It hopes that by appealing to coinherence, contemporary, antagonisms between science and theology (focusing on the North American context) can be defused.
The proposal proper begins by arguing from the history of ideas (chapter 3). The complex interactions between science and theology are painted with broad brush-strokes in a brief treatment which risks oversimplification. This is not to deny that historically science and theology have been profoundly entangled, as careful histories such as Peter Harrison's have shown. However, this chapter sometimes takes on the tone of apologetic rather than measured history.
Hastings then turns to epistemology (chapter 4), arguing for critical realism concerning scientific and theological knowledge. Even if one is persuaded by this, it seems largely orthogonal to the overarching thesis, since there is nothing inherently trinitarian about critical realism. Hence the modest contribution of this chapter is to argue that both disciplines share ‘similar’ epistemologies, as conflicting epistemologies might undermine coinherence. Curiously the author insists that in instances of conflict theology trumps science (the coinherence is ‘asymmetric’; pp. 120, 210). In a truly coinherent relationship one might not expect any conflict. Moreover, for the critical realist, theological statements are only provisional – hence a conflict may require revision on the theological side. One can claim theological hegemony or be a critical realist about theology, but not both.
The core of the argument focuses on ontology (chapters 5–7). Aspects of trinitarian theology are aligned with scientific findings concerning non-human creation under headings such as relationality, freedom, goodness, immensity, agency, fecundity, particularity and mutuality. The book is at its strongest when Hastings draws upon his experience as a chemist; these details move beyond generic notions of science to the particulars of scientific practice and discoveries, a most welcome contribution to the science and theology discussion. Ontological analysis is then extended to theological anthropology, suggesting that imago Dei leaves a vestigium trinitatis in humans. Consequently, humans can make sense of the universe and appreciate its beauty, traits helpful for theologian and scientist alike. Disappointingly, few implications of coinherence are identified for the practice of science or theology, other than those focusing on the scientist who is Christian: she is able to see her scientific findings in a larger Christian narrative (for scientists who are not trinitarians, coinherence is likely to remain incoherent). The volume concludes by contending that the Trinity succeeds as a ‘theory of everything’ (Polkinghorne's phrase).
As this summary indicates, Hastings ambitiously covers a vast terrain. Consequently, he foregoes detailed engagement with burgeoning literatures in many areas, such as the philosophy of science, the history of science and theology, divine action, fine-tuning and critical realism. Nevertheless, many in the field of science and theology will recognise the appeal of coinherence he identifies: by understanding the two disciplines as mutually interpenetrating, yet not mixed, coinherence strikes an attractive balance which maintains the integrity of both disciplines (though the theological hegemony mentioned above somewhat undermines this) while rejecting a total separation (as in Gould's non-overlapping magisteria). However, those who find this balance attractive may nevertheless question the need for a trinitarian ontology to underwrite it.
Objections to Hastings’ thesis, then, are likely to arise from his two major moves: that we can expect creation to echo the Creator's coinherence; and that we can expect knowledge about Creator and creation (i.e. theology and science) to be coinherent (p. 26). These seemingly common-sense expectations may be confounded for two reasons. First, on the basis of a strong Creator–creation distinction (which Hastings affirms, pp. 61, 188), one might not anticipate trinitarian coinherence to traverse that ontological divide. Promisingly, Hastings warns of the dangers of applying trinitarian categories to humans or creation via ‘facile’ resemblances (pp. 3, 124). His primary strategy for guarding against this is by identifying pale ‘echoes’ or ‘traces’, rather than ‘replications’ (pp. 12, 15, 127). What remains undertheorised is what, precisely, makes a resemblance facile, or distinguishes ‘echo’ from ‘replication’, and therefore what identifying an echo achieves. Without criteria to distinguish between naïve and nuanced resemblances, one risks cherry-picking scientific findings which ‘resemble’ already-vague trinitarian concepts, whilst ignoring data which does not suit this purpose, an exercise akin to seeing trinitarian faces in the clouds.
Second, even if one is content to identify coinherence-like features in creation as trinitarian, it is not clear how this relates to science as a discipline. Part of the problem is that the volume lacks a working definition of ‘science’. This results in a tendency to conflate science as it is technically understood – namely as a methodology characterised by testing hypotheses empirically – and the subject matter of science (i.e. ‘nature’ or ‘creation’). Traces of coinherence in the latter do not necessarily imply coinherence in the former, and many scientists manage to be productive without a trinitarian ontology.
The argument would have benefited from an engagement with analogous disputes about social trinitarianism (briefly referenced on p. 125), where theologians have similarly disagreed about whether human activity ought to be patterned according to the Trinity. Those who are sceptical that the Trinity should function as our social programme are likely to have similar doubts about it becoming our scientific programme.
