Against Marriage: An Egalitarian Defence of the Marriage-Free State argues that justice requires a marriage-free regime. Chambers’s argument, at the intersection of liberalism and feminism, is in two parts. Part I provides a detailed account of why the civil institution of marriage is unjust. Part II outlines what a marriage-free state, consistent with justice, should look like. The book is nuanced and clear and provides a powerful argument for getting the state out of the marriage business. Others, including Elizabeth Brake, Martha Fineman, and Tamara Metz, have also challenged our current civil marriage regime. What sets Chambers’s argument apart is that she does not seek to replace marriage with any kind of alternative status such as Elizabeth Brake’s “minimal marriage” (Minimizing Marriage: Marriage, Morality, and the Law, 2012) or Tamara Metz’s “Intimate Care-Giving Union (ICGU)” (see Untying the Knot: Marriage, the State, and the Case for their Divorce, 2010). Rather, Chambers argues that justice requires a marriage-free regime, full stop.

Her argument consists in first explaining why marriage violates both equality and liberty. In doing so, part I of the book draws on liberal and feminist theory to make the case against marriage. Although some of these critiques are familiar ones, Chambers discusses them in interesting and new ways. For instance, in discussing the way in which marriage has oppressed women and violated equality, Chambers considers this argument in light of same-sex marriage. Does the advent of same-sex marriage diminish the strength of this objection to marriage?

Chambers does not think so. She argues that even extending marriage to same-sex couples does not suddenly fix the equality problem. This is because the “meaning of marriage” still matters. Drawing on a range of work by Katherine Franke, Nancy Polikoff, Judith Butler, and others, Chambers argues that gay marriage did not change the way in which civil marriage still stigmatizes those of us, gay or straight, who are not married. Chambers also discusses the way in which marriage violates a commitment to political or liberal neutrality. In crafting this argument, Chambers does not simply focus on the way in which the meaning of marriage is heavily value laden (something I discuss in my own work). She also focuses on the way in which civil marriage bundles together various rights and duties. Bundling itself is part of the problem, because it “makes sense only from within a conception of the good that assumes that certain relationship practices should go together, and which prioritizes unifying those practices over and above supporting them individually” (p. 65). That means that, even if we replace marriage with another kind of legally available status such as an ICGU, the problem of deciding which practices should go together will inevitably arise, violating a commitment to political neutrality. Chambers’s focus on bundling struck me as spot on. It revealed an undertheorized way of considering the implications of political neutrality.

Part II of the book makes the positive argument for a marriage-free state. This is where the argument becomes more interesting. In imagining a marriage-free state it is not enough to show that civil marriage is unjust. Chambers also argues that a marriage-free state is consistent with justice. The largest challenge for part II is addressing the fact that we live in a society marred by gender inequality and power differentials where caregiving and, in particular, child raising are not economically compensated in the same way as other kinds of work. This is why Chambers argues that a mere regime of contract will not be sufficient from a perspective of justice. Although this would maximize individual liberty—allowing individuals to contract and form any kind of personal relationship they desire—it would threaten to raise “problems concerning equality and distributive justice, and problems concerning third parties, particularly childen” (p. 136). For example, in a mere contract regime, alimony would be “awarded according to fault.” The partner who is at fault would have to pay money damages. If that partner turns out to be the primary caregiver in the relationship, “they could easily be left with little or no financial support” (p. 136). And if women are usually the caregivers in heterosexual relationships, a contract regime stands to harm women more than men. It is precisely this concern that may motivate some kind of status-based regime, such as “minimal marriage” or an ICGU, to address those inequalities and protect the vulnerable spouse. Yet, Chambers rejects that approach in the first part of the book as a violation of liberty.

If a contract regime values individual liberty at the expense of equality, and if a more minimal kind of status values equality at the expense of liberty, what should a marriage-free state look like? Chambers’s solution is a contract plus directive regime. That is, she alloys the contract approach with the need for default directives or rules. These directives would define particular practices, such as raising children and contributing financially to a property for a certain period of time, as triggering various rights and duties. In effect, these would be default rules that courts would apply unless the parties have opted out of them in some particular way. Chambers thinks that this kind of proposal to regulate the “domain of personal relationships” balances liberty and equality, avoiding the injustice of a status-based regime on the one hand and a mere contractual regime on the other.

Chambers supplements her philosophical argument here with concrete details about regulation and instructive examples from other jurisdictions. This reveals that her solution is not simply an abstract one but one that could actually be implemented in our society. In fact, I think she may undersell her solution. The idea of directives or default rules is not a new regime that must be created: it is a familiar feature of commercial relationships. For instance, business and corporate law already contains a wide range of directives to ensure equality. Some of these directives concern implied contracts, unconscionability, duties of loyalty and care, equity, and fiduciary obligations. These directives seek to ensure that commercial relationships, including for instance the relationships of corporate bodies to their shareholders, are not simply about maximizing liberty but also balance liberty and equality. Consider, for example, that a tenant may not waive a warranty of habitability when signing a lease. This is to ensure that the vulnerable party, here the tenant, is guaranteed by law a place to live that has, for instance, electricity, heat during cold weather, and a working toilet. This directive about habitability seeks to ensure equality in the commercial sphere.

I take Chambers’s solution as seeking to apply that framework to the personal sphere. Regulations or directives exist in the law as a way to ensure equality and protect vulnerable contracting parties. What is provocative about Chambers’s argument is that she seeks to apply these directives to our personal relationships. The idea that the law should treat relationships in the personal sphere like those in the commercial sphere is central to envisioning a marriage-free state that is consistent with justice. Chambers’s book is distinctive and important for really taking that idea seriously. I highly recommend it.