Introduction
The assumption, in a liberal democracy at least, is that individual persons have or should have the right to determine their own life plans – including decisions on careers, sexual partners, where to live, what type of lifestyle to adopt – through their own informed choices, not dictated by the state. This fine series of essays, with twenty-four expert contributors, investigates and explores issues fundamental to the nature and purpose of law itself. It questions the limits and boundaries of regulating individual private lives, specifically the extent to which the state should be able to impinge on individual autonomy. But Regulating Autonomy is not an abstract discussion as to what exactly individual autonomy means: it applies the notion to three specific areas: the regulation of sex, reproduction, and the family. These are the most intimate and personal areas of one's life. The analysis contained in Regulating Autonomy therefore correlates with questions raised by John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century (Reference Mill1991 [1859]), and the Wolfenden Committee's analysis (1957) followed by the Hart/Devlin debate in the twentieth. What is the law's business? In what instances should the law refrain from interfering – or have no right to interfere – in the private lives of citizens?
Debates analysing these issues, and their corresponding conclusions, are often muddied by straw men representations of what individual autonomy means. Whilst such accounts of autonomy are limited and often inaccurately portrayed as the liberal version of the person, much of the work critical of the notion helpfully highlights the inaccuracy of an individualistic autonomy both normatively and factually: there is no such thing as an isolated, unencumbered, human independent of context and relationships (Sandel Reference Sandel1982/1998). Further, to use such a vision as the foundation of a legal person is not only unfairly gendered (Naffine, Reference Naffine1998) but will also lead to an impoverished notion of what it means to have personal freedom in society (Glendon, Reference Glendon1999; West, Reference West2003).
In keeping with this, in a carefully honed, informative, introduction, Jackson and Day Sclater neatly encapsulate the complex issues surrounding this area. They start with dictionary definitions of autonomy and privacy, then go on to explain that these definitions have been much critiqued recently, particularly by communitarians and feminists. Their analysis categorises these criticisms as threefold. First, the critiques show we are not isolated, self-interested individuals, but are instead socially embedded. Second, historically the prioritisation of the ‘right to be left alone’ has been to the detriment of those without means or opportunities to exercise meaningful choices. Third, being free from interference does not inevitably mean we will have viable options from which to choose (pp. 1–2). Having said all that, they point out that ‘[w]hile being wholly self-determining is neither possible nor desirable, having some space in which to shape our own conception of the good, free from state interference, is undeniably important to all of us’ (p. 1). The editors therefore conclude that:
‘There cannot be any simple answer to the question of state intervention into ‘private’ aspects of our lives; these essays call into question the very nature of privacy, as well as the meanings, impacts and limits of autonomy, whether it is conceived of as an individual attribute or capacity, or a democratic right, or as a relational process. And, ultimately, they point to a need for us to interrogate each case or situation for whether it promotes or undermines the kind of autonomy we might be prepared to struggle for.’ (p. 15)
Regulating Autonomy is divided into two parts, the first on intimacies and domestic lives, and the second on reproduction. While completely separate from each other, and ranging from topics as diverse as breastfeeding and Internet sex offenders, the essays form a coherent volume of scholarly analysis on the nature of autonomy. Without exception, these sophisticated contributions stimulate the reader to question his or her own understanding of regulation in these areas.
Permissible choices
Crucial to most people's notion of being autonomous is the right to make choices for ourselves. Yet the debate over which choices are permissible is ongoing, and is particularly prominent in a number of the essays in Regulating Autonomy. Suzanne Jenkins's piece, on the role of law in regulating prostitution, picks up on the gendered nature of prostitution. She argues that the shift towards gender neutral legislative terminology is important symbolically. However, in her view, it is doubtful whether it will have any substantive effect on gender equality. Her argument is based on the prevailing double standards about what constitutes appropriate male and female behaviour. This leads to the conclusion that ‘until the state accepts that women can make rational, autonomous decisions to work in prostitution as men do, it is unlikely there will be significant consequences of extending laws to male prostitutes’ (p. 20). Meanwhile, Martin Richards questions the permissibility of controlling particular characteristics in our children, in a world of artificial reproduction. He examines particular examples of such chosen characteristics, such as sex, saviour siblings and disabilities, specifically deafness. These essays force us to question our own preconceptions, whether they tend toward libertarian licence or moralism. Some would argue that such questioning helps enrich our own autonomy.
Different forms of regulation
Some of the essays are distinctly methodological, examining the form and structure of regulation. For example, Johnson and Petersen's piece explores the nature of the regulatory structure which deals with assisted reproductive technology. They note that, regardless of the regulatory structure used, all intrude on the reproductive autonomy of the patient and the professional autonomy of the doctor and the scientist. Ellie Lee and Jennie Bristow intriguingly look at the rules for feeding babies. The regulation they write about is not strictly legal. As they explain:
‘At a formal level the freedom of the mother to make decisions in this area of private life – her decisional autonomy – is upheld. How she feeds her baby is deemed a decision for her to make. Yet evidence suggests it can feel as though decision-making in infant feeding is far from autonomous: despite the differences in how mothers actually feed their babies, the common experience of mothers is, “an acute sense of being watched by the world” (Knaak, 2005, p. 201).’ (p. 73)
They argue that the activity of infant feeding is surrounded by conventions and culturally powerful precepts about permissible maternal choices. Whilst these are not legal, the authors argue that they operate as rules that powerfully impact on mothers' experiences of decision-making and that they have also been formalised in policy. This illustrates what they describe as ‘pre-juridification’.
Different versions of autonomy
Some of the more provocative essays, such as Helen Reece's chapter on feminist anti-violence discourse as regulation, allow an open-minded reader to reconsider his or her own position. Reece wants to refine the analysis of feminist anti-violence discourse. Hers is a subtle and complex argument, in which she examines criticisms that feminist researchers have made of non-feminist researchers who have used wide definitions of violence for their own benefit, specifically in the debate over gender symmetry in domestic violence. She focuses particularly on the main criticism that feminist researchers have made of other research, that it decontextualises violence. She argues that feminist researchers' particular interpretation of context leads them to define domestic violence as what men do to women and not what women do to men.
A contrasting approach is provided in Jonathan Herring's contribution on relational autonomy and rape. His essay is in two parts. The first seeks to consider the notion of relational autonomy, exploring the strengths and weaknesses of the writings about this version of autonomy, an aspect also referred to in Jan Pryor's largely comparative piece in Regulating Autonomy on step-parenting. One difficulty in this literature is however identified by Herring: much of it has been at an abstract level. Herring seeks to remedy this in the second part of his essay where he applies relational autonomy to the law of rape. Non-consent is central to the law of rape; Herring somewhat controversially argues that the current conception of consent fails to place the sexual act within the context of the relationship between the parties.
An approach based on relational autonomy would in Herring's view improve the law's current approach (p. 67). Whilst largely agreeing with him that “[r]especting another's autonomy requires not just asking whether or not there was “consent” (whatever that means) but looks to enabling people to have autonomy and a careful analysis of the circumstances in which a choice was made’ (p. 67), I am less convinced as to the legal consequences of requiring in this situation ‘a far greater awareness of the social context in which a decision is made, the relationship between the parties, and the transactions between them prior to any consent being given’ (p. 67), as he suggests. In the messy, complex world of sexual intercourse, it is unclear how ‘recognition of the patriarchal forces within which women “consent” to sexual intercourse’ (p. 67) can be legally regulated without policing people's bedrooms. In this context, his very last line that the ‘true picture of an autonomous man is not our Jack Bauer figure riding off into the sunset in a blaze of smoke, but the man at home changing a nappy’ reveals what could be interpreted as a didactic streak about a right and wrong type of man.
Some of the articles, such as Riley's and Furedi's concerning abortion laws, Maclean and Eekelaar's on contact cases at the English family bar, and Glennon's about reproductive decision-making, helpfully analyse laws and empirical evidence relating to areas impinging deeply on decisional autonomy. These assist the reader in grasping the contextual, applied, use of autonomy, as opposed to the abstracted nature of much of the analysis of autonomy, highlighted by Herring.
Other pieces, such as Golombok's insightful article on anonymity in the donation of gametes and embryos, focus more on informational autonomy. Her particular emphasis is on the freedom to obtain or withhold information about the use of donated gametes and the identity of gamete donors from the perspective of each of the main parties involved: offspring, parents and donors. She subtly reveals the difference between this situation and adoption, comparing instead children conceived by donor insemination to those conceived as a result of extramarital affairs:
‘… unlike many adopted children, [the children] did not experience a relationship with a genetic parent that was later broken; donor-conceived children are generally much wanted children who do not have the history of rejection by birth parents that is associated with adoption.’ (p. 224)
Through analysis of the scant empirical research available on this relatively new phenomenon, Golombok highlights the fact that the majority of parents, excepting lesbian and single heterosexual women who choose to become mothers through donor insemination, do not tell their children that donors were involved in their conception. However, a tentative conclusion is reached that while it appears that the psychological wellbeing of children and the quality of their relationships with their parents are not compromised by secrecy surrounding the method of conception, earlier disclosure of these facts in a loving family is probably less likely to cause psychological distress than later accidental revelation at a time of trauma, such as parental death. Golombok also notes that the number of men donating has decreased since the removal of donor anonymity in 2005.
Davidson and Martellozzo's essay, ‘Internet Sex Offenders: Individual Autonomy, “Folk Devils” and State Control’, suggests that legal measures threaten not only individual autonomy but also the successful social reintegration of such offenders. As the authors themselves explicitly state, this touches on ‘contentious issues around the right of sex offenders to lead a life that is free from state intervention and manipulation despite the nature of their offending’ (p. 129). This is perhaps the most difficult and uncomfortable area for readers to accept that the concept of autonomy should even exist in.
This book, which covers a variety of areas of the law, has strength and gravitas in its combination of analytical and socio-legal perspectives on autonomy, one of the most important philosophical, psychological and legal concepts. This will make it both of interest to and recommended reading for those working in policy, practice and academia in the areas of law canvassed.
