II. Scheffler's Prerogative and Its Rationale

Scheffler's whole discussion of the introduction of a prerogative into morality assumes that morality begins as fully consequentialist morality. We have some formula for ranking overall states of the world from impersonally best to impersonally worst, and the impersonally best state of the world summons everyone to do her bit in its promotion. Indeed, for Scheffler, it is a fixed and unshakeable idea that individuals and/or their representatives (e.g., the government) are always allowed to perform whatever action will promote the impersonally best outcome. That “one may always do what would lead to the best available outcome overall” is “the deeply plausible-sounding feature” of utilitarianism and of consequentialism in general. The moral theorist is simply “faced with the plausibility of the idea that it is always permissible to do what would have the best outcome overall.”¹¹

Scheffler says that a plausible prerogative “would allow each agent to assign a certain proportionately greater weight to his own interests than to the interests of other people.” Each agent would be “allowed to give M times more weight to his own interests than to the interests of anyone else.”¹²

I have followed Scheffler in speaking as though the overall best outcome is the state of affairs in which the good is maximized, but it should be noted that Scheffler endorses the introduction of distribution-sensitivity into the ranking of overall states of affairs. On the one hand, he correctly holds that the introduction of distribution-sensitivity into the ranking of overall states of affairs is not itself a departure from consequentialism. One need not hold to an aggregative conception of the overall best in order to be a consequentialist. On the other hand, he fails to notice that this distribution-sensitivity makes it very difficult to see how one can specify the magnitude of the value difference between the best overall state of affairs and the state of affairs that will obtain if Rebekah performs her most personally rewarding action. Yet one needs to be able to specify this magnitude, along with the magnitude of the value difference for Rebekah between the two states of affairs, if a Schefflerian prerogative is to tell us whether Rebekah may decline to sacrifice her own concerns and commitments. For Rebekah may perform the nonoptimal action if and only if the magnitude of her gain from doing so (compared to her performing the optimal action) multiplied by M is greater than the magnitude of overall gain if the optimal action is performed (compared to Rebekah's most personally rewarding action).

Scheffler's prerogative makes it sometimes acceptable that Rebekah not perform the optimal action. However, even when it is acceptable for Rebekah to perform some more personally rewarding, nonoptimal action, it remains acceptable for her to perform the optimal action. Although it is sometimes permissible to depart from the optimal course of action, it is always permissible to adhere to the optimal course. This claim seems reasonable enough within the context of the sort of example we have just considered—an example in which Rebekah needs to choose how to deploy her personal resources. A prerogative that allows Rebekah to keep her organs—because M is high enough compared to the number of people who could be saved by transplanting those organs—does not require Rebekah to forgo evisceration. Yet Scheffler goes further than this. Quietly stepping beyond cases in which an agent may choose to produce the best overall outcome by devoting her resources to or sacrificing herself for that outcome, Scheffler concludes that the ascription of a prerogative to individuals does not at all limit the permissibility of agents' performing optimizing actions—even if an agent's optimizing action consumes others' resources or lives. Scheffler observes that it is in no way an implication of Rebekah's possessing a prerogative that Rebekah is under a restriction against imposing costs on herself for the sake of overall optimal outcomes. From this he seems to infer that the general introduction of prerogatives can in no way call for accompanying restrictions on anyone against any optimizing action.

Scheffler has other bases for his belief that morality does not include restrictions—in particular, restrictions that might forbid some optimal action. There is, of course, his fixed belief that optimizing actions are always permissible. In addition, there is his belief that the deontic character of restrictions renders them paradoxical. Scheffler's belief in the “paradox of deontology” requires a brief explanation. If individuals are subject to some deontic restriction—for example, the restriction against unprovoked killing of other individuals—then sometimes they will be required to abide by the restriction even if a result that is at least in some ways more attractive will be produced by violating the restriction. If individuals are subject to such a restriction, they may even be required not to engage in a certain sort of behavior in situations in which their engaging in this behavior would have the attractive result of minimizing how much of that very kind of behavior occurs. For instance, if Rebekah is subject to a deontic restriction against unprovoked killing, Rebekah may be required not to engage in an unprovoked killing of Joshua even if her unprovoked killing of Joshua would prevent Sebastian from engaging in the unprovoked killing of five other people. Advocates of deontic restrictions are well aware of this feature of such restrictions and are, on reflection, comfortable with it.¹³

Finally, in support of his combined acceptance of a prerogative and rejection of restrictions, Scheffler maintains that whereas there is a plausible rationale for the prerogative, there is no comparably plausible rationale for deontic restrictions. More pointedly, Scheffler maintains that the plausible rationale for the personal prerogative does not also serve as a rationale for accompanying deontic restrictions. This is the previously mentioned “independence thesis.”

In order to assess Scheffler's introduction of his prerogative and his independence thesis, we need to know what this rationale is. This rationale is the accommodation within moral theory of the moral independence of the personal point of view. This rationale emerges from a recognition of the clash between the impersonal point of view and the personal point of view. To trace its emergence, let us start with the impersonal standpoint. This standpoint is the one that recognizes and takes direction from impersonal value—value that attaches to conditions or activities, or to certain distributions of valuable conditions or activities, in such a way that everyone has reason to promote the valuable conditions, activities, or distributions. (If there is no impersonal value to recognize and take direction from, there is no impersonal point of view; there is merely a mistaken belief in the existence of an impersonal point of view.)

A patch of sensorial pleasure is often thought to be impersonally valuable if anything is. It is just a good thing for such a condition to obtain. The universe is better for it. And each person, in principle, has reason to contribute to the existence of this condition—usually, in practice, by allowing the lowest-cost producer of the patch to “do his thing.” Of course, if this patch of sensorial pleasure comes to exist, it will exist at a particular (mental) location, within a particular (lucky) receptacle—for example, within Joshua. The particular receptacle, Joshua, will almost certainly have a greater desire than others that this valuable patch of pleasure obtain and will be more motivated than others to promote it. Still, Joshua has, in principle, no more (and no less) reason to promote this pleasure than any other agent. Indeed, each has the same reason: its impersonal goodness. A slightly more extensive patch of pleasure experienced by Sebastian would, by hypothesis, be more impersonally valuable than the pleasure desired by Joshua. And every individual would, in principle, have a stronger reason—whatever his natural subjective preferences—to promote the more extensive patch of pleasure than he would have to promote the pleasure for which Joshua longs. If only one of the patches could be produced, it would be better overall for the larger patch to be produced; and, all things considered, each individual would have reason to contribute to that outcome. Joshua would have the same reason as everyone else for promoting the larger patch in Sebastian rather than the smaller patch in himself.

Of course, the choices that will have to be made between alternative outcomes will typically be more complicated than the choice between a lesser and a more extensive patch of sensorial pleasure. One will have an operative impersonal standpoint only if one has some formula for making these choices, that is, some formula for ranking alternative sets of impersonally valuable (and disvaluable) conditions and activities against one another, and hence for determining which overall outcome everyone has reason to promote.¹⁵

Yet surely we are not each thoroughly subject to the claims of the impersonally best. Surely benefits that would accrue to others—to make the point sharply, benefits that would accrue to strangers—do not as thoroughly or unconditionally rationally direct us to incur costs for their promotion as do benefits that would accrue to ourselves (or to those within the ambit of our special concerns and commitments). The view that we are all thoroughly subject to the claims of the impersonally best seems to miss something essential. In this era's most renowned challenge to full-fledged consequentialism, this view is said to miss the separateness (and distinctiveness) of persons.¹⁶

For Scheffler, this sort of consideration is introduced by way of the idea of the independence of the personal point of view. Within each individual, “concerns and commitments are naturally generated from [that] person's point of view quite independently of the weight of those concerns in an impersonal ranking of overall states of affairs.” “Each [personal] point of view constitutes … a locus relative to which harms and benefits can be assessed, and are typically assessed by the person who has the [relevant personal] point of view.”¹⁸

Although this pretty much exhausts what Scheffler says about the naturalness and the independence of the personal point of view, it hardly seems enough to draw the conclusion that moral theory ought to accommodate or reflect the existence of this standpoint. After all, many commentators have noticed that it is natural for individuals to have personal concerns and commitments that differ in their motivational direction or strength from the concerns or commitments they would have if they were purely impersonal in their point of view. These commentators have gone on with perfect consistency to condemn this natural feature of human beings and to urge its greatest possible suppression or transcendence. Many people have seen the “selfishness” of the personal point of view not as something that moral theory should accede to or even embrace but, rather, as something that moral theory should direct us to annihilate. Moreover, a moral theory that commands us to transcend our special regard for our own concerns and commitments cannot be said to fail to recognize the naturalness and independence of the personal point of view. Nor can we get to the conclusion that the personal standpoint is to be accommodated or reflected in moral theory from the assertion that “[t]o have an independent point of view is part of the nature of a person if anything is.”²⁰

What Scheffler needs, but does not explicitly endorse, is the proposition that the particular conditions and activities that are the objects of an individual's special concerns and commitments do indeed have value for that individual and provide the individual with reasons to favor those conditions or activities quite independently of any value they have or any reason they provide from the impersonal standpoint.²¹

In light of the moral significance of the personal point of view, a sensible moral theory will contain some element (or set of elements) that protects individuals from being morally under the impersonalist thumb. It will contain some element (or set of elements) that liberates individuals from the moral subjugation to the impersonalist calculus that would otherwise be their moral fate.

The rationale for the prerogative takes the form of liberation of the individual from moral subjugation to the impersonal standpoint. Still, the rationale for Scheffler's prerogative cannot be total liberation from the claims of the overall best. For Scheffler does believe in the impersonal standpoint, which means that he believes that to some considerable extent we all ought to be morally subject to it. All we can say is that, for Scheffler, the rationale for the prerogative is to liberate individuals from moral subjugation to the impersonal standpoint to some unspecified extent. Scheffler's claim is that the inclusion within morality of a prerogative that allows each individual to weigh gains and losses for herself M times as much as gains and losses for others will satisfy the rationale for that prerogative. However, given that we get neither a specification of the extent to which that rationale calls for individuals to be protected against subjugation to the impersonal standpoint nor a specification of M, how can we determine whether the inclusion in morality of a bare prerogative—a prerogative without accompanying restrictions—satisfies the rationale for that prerogative? The answer is that we can determine that the introduction of the prerogative—with whatever M it embodies—will fail to satisfy the rationale for the prerogative if there are two distinct dimensions along which an individual can be liberated from or subject to the impersonal standpoint and the introduction of the prerogative into morality liberates the individual along only one of those two dimensions. If the introduction of the prerogative simply does nothing to liberate the individual along the second dimension, then the mere introduction of the prerogative will leave the rationale for its introduction crucially unsatisfied. As we shall see, there are two distinct dimensions: An individual can be liberated from or subject to the impersonal standpoint with respect to whether she herself is required to devote herself to the production of impersonally best outcomes and with respect to whether others are allowed (or even required) to devote her to the production of impersonally best outcomes. If only the further inclusion in morality of deontic restrictions will liberate the individual along the second dimension, then we can conclude that prerogatives without accompanying restrictions are unacceptable.

III. The Schefflerian Prerogative without Restrictions Is Unacceptable

Suppose M = 4, so it is acceptable for Rebekah not to volunteer for evisceration even though the healthy organs that would be made available through her fatal dismemberment would save the equally valuable lives of three other individuals. Similarly, it is acceptable for Rebekah to spend n dollars on an expensive vacation for herself even though she might instead use that money to send three other people on much less expensive but, for them, equally satisfying vacations.²⁵

But what does a morality that departs from full consequentialism only through its inclusion of such a prerogative say to other agents about how they should act with respect to Rebekah's exercise of her prerogative? What does such a hybrid morality say to other agents about their being allowed or even required to coerce Rebekah into donating her organs to save three other individuals or donating her vacation fund to send the three to Atlantic City? After all, as Scheffler repeatedly says, the introduction of a bare personal prerogative does not morally preclude any agent from choosing the optimal action. Such a hybrid morality will tell other agents that whenever the specific costs associated with suppressing Rebekah's exercise of her prerogative (i.e., with coercing her instead into performing the optimal action) are low enough, the agent is morally allowed to suppress Rebekah's exercise of her prerogative.

Moreover, since the specific costs of some other agent suppressing Rebekah's exercise of her prerogative will often be low enough, some other agent will often be morally allowed to interfere with Rebekah to block her exercise of her prerogative. Furthermore, in almost all cases in which some other agent will be morally allowed to suppress Rebekah's exercise of her prerogative, that agent will also be morally required to suppress it. I contend that a morality with these implications thoroughly undermines the moral independence of the personal point of view vis-à-vis its teaching about what may or must be done to the individual by others in accordance with the impersonal standpoint. It subordinates the personal point of view not through teaching that the individual must direct herself to the impersonally best, but rather by teaching that others often may and often must direct her to the impersonally best. Such a hybrid morality does not satisfy the rationale for the inclusion of the personal prerogative in morality; along a crucial dimension, the inclusion of the bare prerogative leaves individuals morally subjugated to the impersonal standpoint. To sustain this conclusion, I will say a bit more in support of the multipart claim that it is the teaching of hybrid morality that (a) whenever the special costs of doing so are low enough, it will be allowable for some other agent to suppress Rebekah's exercise of her prerogative; (b) the costs will often be low enough; and (c) in almost all cases in which it is morally allowable for another agent to suppress an individual's exercise of her prerogative, it is also morally required for that agent to suppress that exercise.

If Joshua can coerce (or trick) Rebekah into donating her organs or vacation fund without too much additional cost—cost in addition to Rebekah's cost were she voluntarily to donate the organs or the vacation fund—then, under the circumstances, Joshua's so coercing (or tricking) Rebekah will almost certainly be his optimal action. Hence, the hybrid morality says that such suppressions of Rebekah's exercise of her prerogative would be morally allowable. Moreover, it is likely that the additional costs (if any)²⁶

Here it is worth noting that the higher M is, the greater the potential impersonal gains from suppressing individuals in the exercise of their prerogatives; and, hence, the higher M is, the more readily a given cost associated with such suppression will be low enough for the suppression to be morally allowable. The more M is raised in an attempt to make the prerogative more robustly reflective of the moral independence of the personal point of view, the greater the social gain from coercing individuals (who would otherwise exercise their prerogative) into the performance of the relevant optimal actions and the less likely that any special costs associated with coercing individuals into performing the optimal actions will be too high to allow that coercion. The more the prerogative is strengthened in an attempt to protect the moral independence of the personal standpoint, the more systematically the resulting hybrid morality will say that others are allowed to coercively block individuals from the exercise of that very prerogative.

Furthermore, under a hybrid morality, any suppression of Rebekah's exercise of her prerogative that is allowable to another agent will be morally required of that agent unless abstention from the suppression would be allowed under that agent's prerogative—that is, unless the agent has a considerable personal stake in Rebekah's remaining alive or having a satisfying vacation. So friends of Rebekah and her trading partners will not be required to promote the impersonally low-cost transfer of her organs or her vacation fund to the other three individuals. But all who are not her friends or trading partners will be morally required to suppress Rebekah's exercise of her prerogative.

Suppose, however, that I have miscalculated in my account of the hybrid theory's teaching. Suppose that the hybrid theory does not as pervasively inform other agents that it is morally allowable and even morally required that they intervene against Rebekah as I have argued it does. Would this weaken the conclusion that the hybrid theory thoroughly fails to liberate Rebekah from the impersonal standpoint vis-à-vis its teaching about what may or must be done to her by others? The answer is no. For in every instance—however many there may be—in which according to correct hybrid calculations it is not allowable for Joshua to intervene to prevent Rebekah from exercising her prerogative and, hence, not required of Joshua that he intervene, intervention will fail to be allowable because of its impersonal costs. In every such instance, the case that Rebekah would have to make against the intervention being allowable would have to consist in showing that the additional impersonal costs of imposing the sacrifice upon her were too high. She would have to show that, due to these additional impersonal costs and contrary to initial appearances, the intervention would not really serve the overall good. This reveals that, whether or not in a particular instance hybrid morality proclaims that others may or even must suppress Rebekah's exercise of her prerogative, whether or not others may or even must so act is entirely a deliverance of the impersonal point of view. No matter how often it turns out—according to hybrid calculations more subtle than those I have offered—that others are to allow Rebekah to exercise her prerogative, these dispensations will still indicate that Rebekah's conduct is hostage to, not liberated from, the impersonal standpoint.²⁷

The impersonal standpoint threatens the moral independence of the personal point of view in two ways. First, it threatens to require that Rebekah submit to its directives, sacrificing even her most important projects and commitments if that is the way the impersonalist calculus works out. Second, it threatens to morally allow or even to morally require that others submit Rebekah to its directives and impose on her the sacrifice of even her most important projects and commitments if that is the way the impersonalist calculus works out. Scheffler's tendency to ignore this second threat is revealed by the fact that when he speaks of how, in the case of a given individual, the directives of the impersonal standpoint undermine the personal point of view, he speaks entirely in terms of that individual's adherence to those directives; he does not speak or think at all of the undermining of the moral independence of the personal point of view vis-à-vis what may or must be done to that individual by others in their adherence to these directives. Since there are these two dimensions along which the personal point of view can be subjugated to or liberated from the impersonal standpoint, and since the prerogative only deals with one of these dimensions, and since the rationale for the prerogative is to liberate the personal standpoint from subordination to the impersonal standpoint, the introduction of the prerogative cannot by itself satisfy the rationale for its introduction.

Within a preliminary phase of his discussion of hybrid morality, Scheffler focuses on integrity rather than the moral independence of the personal point of view. At that point, he envisions the introduction of a prerogative into morality for the purpose of recognizing or protecting the importance or value of integrity.²⁸

Our concern here is not with the plausibility of this specific claim about integrity. Rather, it is with the plausibility of a parallel claim about the moral independence of the personal point of view that Scheffler might attempt to advance. Scheffler could counter the argument I have offered if he could plausibly maintain that a morality will only threaten the moral independence of the personal standpoint if it requires the individual herself (“directly”) to strictly follow the impersonalist calculus in her decisions about how she will act. This would be to maintain that no matter how systematically the impersonalist component of hybrid morality demands that others prevent individuals from exercising their prerogative—a prerogative that has been introduced into morality in order to secure the moral independence of the personal point of view—this morality cannot be said to unduly subordinate individuals to the impersonal standpoint.

This counterclaim is not plausible. A morality that decrees in the name of the impersonally best that individuals may be or even must be systematically forced to forgo personally rewarding actions—even those rewarding actions that an individual herself is allowed to choose under the morality's prerogative—subordinates individuals to the impersonal standpoint. Its subordination of individuals to the impersonal standpoint is comparable to, albeit different in kind from, the subordination involved in morally requiring an individual herself to decide in favor of the optimal action. Furthermore, it is worth noting how little protection is provided to the individual by a morality that forswears directly requiring that individual to decide how she will act entirely on the basis of the impersonalist calculus.

Since any hybrid morality incorporates some personal prerogative, it is true of any hybrid morality that it does not always directly require individuals to forgo personally rewarding actions and to choose the impersonally optimal action; hybrid morality does not directly require this sacrifice as long as the sacrifice by the individual would be sufficiently great. It is easy to see, however, that this exclusion of direct requiring does not preclude highly intrusive interventions by others, for example, the government, to prevent an individual from exercising her prerogative. Suppose that Rebekah has two possible actions before her. One is personally rewarding action p, which she is morally allowed to perform under the prerogative. The other is impersonally optimal action o. Moreover, there is only one low-cost intervention on the part of the government that will bring it about that Rebekah performs o rather than p. This low-cost intervention works by causing a “decision” within Rebekah to perform o rather than p. A painless microinjection of some mind-controlling chemical causes Rebekah to “choose” o rather than p. The impersonalist component of hybrid morality requires the government to engage in this low-cost intervention. No prerogative that merely allows Rebekah not to decide directly on behalf of the optimal action will preclude the permissibility of this low-cost intervention. All that follows from Rebekah having such a prerogative is that, if she manages to decide herself on behalf of the more personally rewarding action and against the optimizing action, she will have acted permissibly. But this does not preclude its being permissible for others—for example, the government—to prevent her from so deciding. If it were true that the impersonally best outcome would be achieved by an enlightened despot microinjecting everyone else so as to make them each “choose” the optimal alternatives before them,³¹

In the course of his rejection of restrictions, Scheffler presents the reasoning of someone who would disagree with him—in particular, someone who thinks that the very rationale for the inclusion of a prerogative in morality calls for the inclusion of restrictions. This advocate of restrictions maintains the following:

Unfortunately for Scheffler, this sounds exactly right. Any canon of impersonal optimality threatens the personal point of view in two distinct ways—along the two dimensions I have previously cited. It threatens by way of its demand that individuals themselves decide how they will act entirely by working through the impersonalist calculus, and it threatens by way of allowing or even requiring others to treat individuals in whatever ways yield the impersonally best overall outcome. Any such canon directs Rebekah to enslave herself—if the impersonal benefits of her enslavement are great enough. But it also directs others to enslave Rebekah—if her enslavement would be an impersonal improvement. What Rebekah needs in the first instance to be morally insulated from these external demands is a prerogative that allows her to give special weight to her own concerns and commitments in deciding how she will act. What Rebekah needs in the second instance to be morally insulated from these external demands is for others to be restricted in how they may treat her in the course of promoting the good. The restriction on others that seems to be the natural companion of a given prerogative is a restriction against suppressing Rebekah's exercise of that prerogative.

Why does Scheffler miss the obvious plausibility of the plea for restrictions that he himself articulates? He misses its plausibility because of his odd understanding of this plea. He takes the proposed restrictions not to be restrictions against others devoting Rebekah to impersonal optimality but, rather, restrictions on Rebekah against devoting herself to the impersonally best. He imagines that the proposed restrictions have the purpose of further protecting Rebekah against her self-enslavement to the impersonal standpoint. He takes the idea behind the plea to be that Rebekah will be somewhat protected against self-enslavement by a prerogative that allows her not to self-enslave, but she will be more protected against self-enslavement by a restriction that forbids self-enslavement. He then argues that there is no point to adding this prohibition to Rebekah's already ascribed prerogative. For this prerogative already provides all the protection Rebekah needs against impersonalist demands for her self-enslavement: “The permission not to produce the best states suffices to free individual agents from the demands of impersonal optimality, and thus to prevent them from becoming slaves of the impersonal standpoint.”³³

The rationale for the Schefflerian prerogative—to liberate individuals as occupants of their own personal standpoint from the demands of the impersonal standpoint—is not satisfied by the introduction into morality of a bare prerogative. Thus, some additional element that protects individuals from subordination to the impersonal standpoint needs to be included within morality. However, it might be suggested that this additional element need not be deontic restrictions against suppression of the exercise of the prerogative. A seemingly natural alternative candidate for inclusion would be a maxim calling for the minimization of acts of suppression against exercises of the prerogative. Such a maxim would be an alternative to deontic restrictions precisely because the maxim would endorse an agent's suppressing a given individual's exercise of her prerogative whenever that suppression would have the effect of minimizing the overall number of such suppressions. So, to complete my argument for the need to add accompanying restrictions in order for the rationale for the Schefflerian prerogative to be satisfied, I have to say why this minimizing maxim is not an appropriate candidate for the additional protective element.

The introduction of bare prerogatives leaves a crucial gap in the defense against the canons of impersonalism. This gap cannot be fortified with the minimizing maxim because the maxim is itself an impersonalist canon. The minimizing maxim reflects the ascription of impersonal disvalue to each suppression of an exercise of the prerogative. From this ascription we can infer that having fewer suppressions is always impersonally better overall than having more, and from this we can infer that, ceteris paribus, everyone ought to act so as to minimize these suppressions.³⁵

Concern about one sort of threat to the moral independence of the personal point of view—a concern about self-subordination—leads the hybrid theorist to favor the inclusion in morality of a personal prerogative for everyone. Concern about another sort of threat to the moral independence of the personal point of view—a concern about subordination by others—supports the inclusion within morality of restrictions against subordination by others, restrictions that morally insulate everyone against certain forms or degrees of subordination. In contrast, the minimizing maxim does not insulate everyone. It only insulates those individuals whose subordination is not impersonally expeditious—under the refined specification of the expeditious.³⁶

IV. The Rationale for the Individualist Prerogative

The argument that I have made points to a very general conclusion. To the extent that a prerogative is introduced into morality in order to accommodate the personal point of view, the rationale for the introduction of that prerogative will not be satisfied unless the prerogative is accompanied by restrictions against suppression of its exercise. Thus, it is always unacceptable for prerogatives that are introduced into morality in order to accommodate the personal point of view to be unaccompanied by restrictions. Indeed, an even stronger conclusion is indicated: The more robust the introduced prerogative is, the more robust the accompanying restrictions must be. The more readily the individual is allowed to choose personally rewarding, nonoptimal actions, the more extensively others will be required not to suppress actions of the individual, even if suppression would serve the overall good. A maximally robust prerogative would, it seems, need to be accompanied by maximal restrictions if the rationale for that maximal prerogative is to be satisfied.

A maximal prerogative—what I call the individualist prerogative—will always allow the individual to opt for her more personally rewarding course of action. It will always allow her to refuse to sacrifice her personal concerns and commitments on the altar of what is described as the impersonally best. This individualist prerogative is not based on the conviction that M is very high so that the multiplied weight of the individual's own concerns and commitments always overbalances the weight of the impersonally best. Rather, the individualist prerogative is based on combining an affirmation of the personal standpoint with a rejection of the impersonal standpoint. Since the impersonal standpoint is rejected, the individual needs no multiplication by M in order to be allowed to pursue her most rewarding path. With the rejection of the impersonal standpoint, we step outside of the framework in which we first affirm the impersonal standpoint and then think about how much dispensation from its demands is to be granted. We no longer think of the personal standpoint as a counterweight against the central and unquestioned weight and authority of the impersonal standpoint. This makes the case of the individualist prerogative somewhat special and deserving of some separate discussion.

My primary task for the remainder of this essay is to defend the claim that if it is rational to introduce the individualist prerogative into morality, then it is also rational to introduce restrictions against suppressions of its exercise. This claim, like the general conclusion it instantiates, is conditional. It is not part of the main task of this essay to justify the antecedent claim that the individualist prerogative ought to be introduced into morality. Nor is it part of the main task of this essay to back up further in order to vindicate the rationale for introducing the individualist prerogative. Nevertheless, the conditional claim is only of interest if there is some decent prospect of justifying the individualist prerogative and its rationale. So, just as I provided some enhancement for Scheffler's case for the rationale for his prerogative, in this section I will provide some persuasive remarks on behalf of the more controversial rationale for the individualist prerogative.

The affirmation of the personal standpoint conjoined with the dismissal of the impersonal standpoint comes down to the affirmation of agent-relative values and reasons for action conjoined with the dismissal of agent-neutral values and reasons for action. To rehearse these notions briefly, let us consider the contrasting agent-relativist and agent-neutralist understandings of the value of a patch of Rebekah's sensorial pleasure and of the reason for action associated with this value. On the agent-relativist understanding, this pleasure has value for Rebekah in virtue of its standing in some special value-conferring or value-grounding relationship to Rebekah, for example, its being desired by her or being enjoyed by her. Its being desired by Rebekah or its simply being her experienced pleasure is essential to its value—which is its value-for-Rebekah. This value-for-Rebekah provides her with agent-relative reason to bring about the pleasure, reason that need not be shared by anyone else. Of course, Rebekah's pleasure may also have agent-relative value for other individuals—for example, Mary, who deeply cares about Rebekah. If Rebekah's pleasure has value-for-Mary, then Mary also will have agent-relative reason to promote Rebekah's pleasure. But this reason will not derive simply from the pleasure's value-for-Rebekah. Nor will it be the same reason that Rebekah has to promote the pleasure. Nor will any third individual who does not himself stand in some special value-conferring or value-grounding relation to Rebekah's pleasure have reason to promote it.

Let us add to the picture another condition that is understood as having agent-relative value, namely, a larger (i.e., more extensive or more intensive) patch of Joshua's sensorial pleasure, which has value-for-Joshua and provides Joshua with reason to promote it. And let us assume that Rebekah and Joshua have no personal concern for or commitment to one another of the sort that might make the other's pleasure valuable for her or him. Suppose that only one of these pleasures can obtain. On the agent-relativist understanding of these values, which pleasure's occurrence is better? The answer is that the occurrence of Rebekah's pleasure is better, more valuable, relative to Rebekah and the occurrence of Joshua's pleasure is better, more valuable, relative to Joshua. And that is the end of the story. We cannot say of either pleasure that its occurrence is overall best (nor that the occurrences would have equal value). We cannot say that there is more value in the occurrence of Joshua's pleasure than in the occurrence of Rebekah's, even though we have stipulated that there will be more pleasure if Joshua's pleasure occurs. All there is in prospect is value-for-Rebekah or value-for-Joshua, and these two values are incommensurable in virtue of their agent-relativity. It is because of the agent-relativity of the value of these pleasures that, to paraphrase Nozick, no moral balancing act can take place among the pleasures of Rebekah and Joshua; there is no moral outweighing of one of their pleasures by the other so as to lead to the more valuable, indeed optimal, overall outcome. If all value is agent-relative, there is no single value metric in terms of which the gains to some individuals can be measured against the losses to others so as to assess trade-offs among individuals and to rank alternative trade-offs. If all value is agent-relative, then all the deliverances of the so-called impersonal standpoint are spurious.³⁷

What is the contrasting agent-neutralist understanding of the value of Rebekah's sensorial pleasure and the reason for its promotion? If this pleasure has agent-neutral value, then the value of the pleasure is not merely value for Rebekah (or for Mary), who stands in some special value-conferring or value-grounding relationship to the pleasure. Although Rebekah may be the site of the pleasure, and although her desire, anticipation, or experience of it may fulfill a condition of its having value, namely, that someone desire, anticipate, or experience it, the resulting value of the pleasure is not merely value-for-Rebekah. The pleasure has value simpliciter. This value provides Rebekah with reason to promote the pleasure, but it also provides everyone else with the same reason to promote the pleasure. For what rationally beckons Rebekah is simply the pleasure's agent-neutral value, and this agent-neutral value equally rationally beckons everyone. (If the pleasure has agent-neutral value, then it is valuable for everyone in the sense that it beckons everyone, not in the sense that it has value-for-Rebekah, value-for-Joshua, and so on.) Let us add to the picture another condition understood as having agent-neutral value, namely, a larger patch of Joshua's sensorial pleasure. On the agent-neutralist understanding, although Joshua is the site of this pleasure and we may say that the pleasure is agent-relative, the value of the pleasure is not. The pleasure just has value, period. It provides Joshua with reason to promote it, but it provides every other agent with the same reason to promote it. Each is equally rationally summoned to the production of this pleasure.

Suppose that only one of these pleasures can obtain. On the agent-neutralist understanding of these values, which pleasure's occurrence is better? The answer is simple. The occurrence of Joshua's larger pleasure is better overall. These two values are commensurable in virtue of their agent-neutrality. This commensurability allows us to assess the trade-off of Rebekah's pleasure for Joshua's; it allows us to rank the two alternative outcomes. Although both Rebekah and Joshua have some reason—the very same reason—to promote Rebekah's pleasure, both have stronger reason—the very same stronger reason—to promote Joshua's pleasure. All things considered, whichever of them is in a position to choose which pleasure will occur has reason to choose Joshua's pleasure. The impersonal standpoint is nothing but the faculty of recognizing agent-neutral values, combining them in accordance with some favored formula (for example, pure aggregation or distribution-sensitive aggregation), and taking direction from the all-things-considered reasons for action that arise from the recognition and combination of agent-neutral values.

The following seems to me to be the strongest case for the existence of agent-neutral values and reasons for promoting those values:

1. Some conditions (for example, the pleasure experienced by Rebekah) are valuable, and someone has reason, not merely nonrational motivation, to promote these conditions.
2. For something to be valuable is for it to be valuable simpliciter. For instance, if the pleasure experienced by Rebekah is valuable and not merely the object of Rebekah's affection, it must be a good thing for this pleasure to obtain. That goodness is not itself relative to Rebekah.
3. For something to be a reason is for it to be a reason simpliciter. If anyone (for example, Rebekah) has reason to promote some condition (such as Rebekah's pleasure) and not merely nonrational motivation to promote the condition, then there must be reason to promote the condition. Rebekah has reason to promote the pleasure if and only if there is reason to promote it for Rebekah to glom onto. That reason is not itself relative to Rebekah.³⁸

   I take claims like 2 and 3 to be central to Thomas Nagel's position in Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). Nagel came to reject these claims in his more recent work, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), in which he seeks to affirm the existence of both agent-neutral and agent-relative values.

4. To have value is to have agent-neutral value; to be a reason is to be an agent-neutral reason. (This is derived from 2, 3, and the meaning of agent-neutrality.)
5. There are some agent-neutral values and agent-neutral reasons. (This is derived from 1 and 4.)

This strongest case rests on the idea—expressed in 2 and 3 and summarized in 4—that value and reason must be agent-neutral. But this key agent-neutralist idea has to be rejected by anyone who proposes the inclusion of a personal prerogative in morality, because any proposal to include a personal prerogative in morality involves some affirmation of agent-relative values and reasons and, hence, an acknowledgment that value and reason need not be agent-neutral.

Of course, even if we assume that value and reason need not be agent-neutral and that some values and reasons are agent-relative, it does not follow that no values and no reasons are agent-neutral. Some things may have agent-neutral value even though it is not essential to something having value that the value be agent-neutral. Some agents may have agent-neutral reasons even though it is not essential to an agent's having reasons that she have agent-neutral reasons. More specifically, even if some conditions can and do have agent-relative value, this does not preclude some of those conditions from also having agent-neutral value. While Rebekah's pleasure can and does have value-for-Rebekah, this does not rule out this pleasure also having agent-neutral value that beckons everyone to its production. (Rebekah gets beckoned and rebeckoned.) Still, the rejection of the key agent-neutralist idea on the grounds that there are, indeed, agent-relative values and reasons throws a heavy burden of proof on those who would assert that there are also some agent-neutral values and reasons. Here are some reasons why.

Once one recognizes the existence of agent-relative values and reasons for action, it is difficult not to see agent-neutral values and reasons as much more mysterious. Indeed, the often-noted mysteriousness of the value or goodness of this or that condition seems specifically to be a feature of agent-neutral value or goodness. It seems quite unmysterious that, in virtue of her career being the object of her aspiration or the fulfillment of her talents, Rebekah's career as a pianist should have value-for-Rebekah and that she should have reason to advance that career. Being the object of one's aspirations or the fulfillment of one's talents seems to be the sort of relational feature of an object that can make the object valuable for the person who stands in that relation, which would make the object beckon to the person in that relation. By definition, however, no comparable sense can be made of the claim that Rebekah's career is a value that stands above and beyond its value-for-Rebekah and that beckons everyone to bring it about.

The standard and seemingly minimally contentious view about an agent's rationality in the pursuit of ends is that this rationality consists in an agent's effective pursuit of her own ends, utility, or welfare. The most serious challenge to this view of rationality in the pursuit of ends comes from the key agent-neutralist idea that values and reasons must be agent-neutral. For if value must be agent-neutral, there is nothing special for any given agent about her own ends, utility, or welfare. We have just noted, however, that this agent-neutralist idea has to be rejected by the advocate of any prerogative. So, given that morality should contain some sort of prerogative, the strongest challenge to the standard view has to be dismissed. In our thinking about rationality in the pursuit of ends, we should at least start with the minimally contentious view. If we start with this view, however, it is very difficult to make a plausible case for going beyond it to the view that an agent's rationality in the pursuit of ends consists in her effective pursuit of some combination of her own ends, utility, or welfare and the ends, utility, or welfare of others. Indeed, a reliable formula for coming up with a bad argument in moral philosophy is: Come up with an argument that moves from the rationality of each agent's pursuit of her own ends, utility, or welfare to the rationality of each agent's pursuit of others' ends, utility, or welfare. Mill's argument from each person's happiness being the good for that person, and hence providing that person with reason for its promotion, to everyone's happiness being the good for everyone, and hence providing everyone with reason to promote the aggregate good, is only the most notorious testimony to the reliability of this formula.³⁹

Many arguments in support of impersonal demands are readily deconstructed once there is a recognition of agent-relative values and reasons. For instance, Mill's argument can be seen as first establishing the value of each individual's happiness on the basis of that happiness being desired by the individual and then inferring, by way of a failure to distinguish between agent-relative and agent-neutral value, that each individual's happiness has agent-neutral value. Another well-known argument begins by pointing out that nothing could be more rational than Rebekah's choosing a smaller pain at the dentist's office today so as to avoid a larger pain at the dentist's office next week. It is suggested that what makes this choice rational is simply the greater badness of the larger pain. It is then pointed out that the same choice between a smaller pain and a larger pain is present when a larger pain located within Joshua can be prevented by a smaller pain within Rebekah. Given the account of the rationality of the intrapersonal trade-off of a larger pain for a smaller pain, the interpersonal trade-off must also be rational. The agent-relativist deconstruction of this argument challenges its account of the rationality of the intrapersonal choice. What really makes it rational for Rebekah to go to the dentist today and not wait until next week is that next week's pain will be more bad-for-Rebekah than today's pain will be bad-for-Rebekah.

Here is one final consideration against the affirmation of agent-neutral values, given the affirmation of agent-relative values. If both agent-relative and agent-neutral values are affirmed, then in making ends-oriented decisions about how to act, each agent will have to weigh the overall agent-relative value of her most personally rewarding action against the overall agent-neutral value of her most agent-neutrally valuable action. On what scale of values is this weighing supposed to take place? It is not merely that it would be difficult to know exactly (or even roughly) what M is. The problem is that there is the same sort of incommensurability between value-for-Rebekah and value simpliciter as there is between value-for-Rebekah and value-for-Joshua. Suppose that both agent-relative and agent-neutral value are affirmed and that action p ranks highest in terms of value-for-Rebekah and action o ranks highest in terms of value simpliciter. No amount of flawless deliberation will get Rebekah beyond the utterly unhelpful conclusion that p is better on the scale of value-for-Rebekah and o is better on the scale of agent-neutral value.

V. The Individualist Prerogative without Restrictions Is Unacceptable

The rationale for the individualist prerogative is the complete moral liberation of the personal point of view as it is realized in each individual. Moral liberation from what? As the personal standpoint replaces the impersonal standpoint, as the former becomes (relatively) more and more weighty, until one arrives at the special case in which the personal is affirmed and the impersonal is rejected, the immediate source of threat to the moral independence of the personal standpoint as it is realized in a given individual shifts from the impersonal standpoint to the personal standpoint as it is realized in other individuals. As the threat of moral subordination to the impersonal standpoint is preemptively checked, the threat to the individual of moral subordination to the personal standpoint as it is realized in other individuals comes to the fore.⁴⁰

With the argument for the rationale for the individualist prerogative, we have arrived at the limiting case. The threat from the impersonal standpoint is entirely checked, so that all that is needed for insulation against subordination to the impersonal standpoint are reminders that this standpoint is spurious. At this point, the imminent threat to the moral independence of the personal point of view as it is realized in any given individual comes from the personal standpoint as it is realized in other individuals. “[T]he demand that [individuals] organize their conduct in accordance with some canon of impersonal optimality”⁴¹

Let us start with the way in which the individualist prerogative insulates Rebekah from self-imposed subordination to the demands that proceed from the personal point of view as it is realized in other individuals. If Rebekah performs action p, she will experience a patch of sensorial pleasure, but if she performs a different action, Joshua will experience a greater pleasure. Previously, we have spoken of this alternative action as action o, the impersonally optimal action. However, informed as he is about the dismissal of the impersonal standpoint, Joshua does not call upon Rebekah to perform this alternative action in virtue of its impersonal optimality. Rather, he points out how beneficial this action would be for him. He points out that Rebekah can readily see how valuable-for-Joshua this alternative action would be and how much reason Joshua has for favoring Rebekah's performance of it rather than action p. Joshua says:

Joshua here calls for Rebekah's self-imposed (“direct”) subordination to Joshua's personal standpoint.

The individualist prerogative performs the not very arduous task of insulating Rebekah against this moral self-subordination. The good that Joshua invokes is genuine, and the individualist prerogative protects Rebekah from the call that she serve this genuine good by advising her to look to her own concerns and commitments, her own ends, utility, or good. The reasoning behind this prerogative allows Rebekah to deconstruct whatever appeal Joshua's proposal might seem to have. It allows her to point out that she does recognize the great value-for-Joshua that a large patch of experienced-by-Joshua pleasure would have; she does appreciate the magnitude of that value. However, that value provides reason for Joshua to promote the pleasure and not reason for Rebekah. In taking this stance, Rebekah is not holding that her good is somehow cosmically more important than Joshua's. She simply takes her pleasure to be more valuable-for-Rebekah than Joshua's pleasure would be, just as she recognizes that Joshua's pleasure would be more valuable-for-Joshua than Rebekah's pleasure would be. The reasons behind the prerogative also remind Rebekah that there is no genuine agent-neutral value attached to Joshua's pleasure for Joshua to invoke in support of Rebekah's self-imposed sacrifice.

Consider now a morality that consists simply in this individualist prerogative. Following Scheffler's terminology, we can call this the “individualist hybrid.” Under the individualist hybrid, each individual is entirely liberated from the moral demand that she voluntarily sacrifice her good for the good of other individuals and, as a reminder, is also entirely liberated from the moral demand that she sacrifice for the overall good. Would this hybrid morality satisfy the rationale for the adoption of the individualist prerogative? At the outset of the previous section, I noted the general conclusion that is indicated by our examination of Scheffler's advocacy of hybrid morality. To the extent that a prerogative is introduced into morality in order to accommodate the personal point of view, the rationale for the introduction of that prerogative will not be satisfied unless the prerogative is accompanied by restrictions against suppression of its exercise. I also mentioned that an even stronger conclusion is indicated. The more robust the introduced prerogative is, the more robust the accompanying restrictions must be. Since the individualist prerogative is maximally robust, one would expect that the rationale for its introduction will not be satisfied unless it is accompanied by maximally robust restrictions—maximally robust restrictions against suppressions of the exercise of the individualist prerogative.

The crucial move in arriving at these conclusions was the recognition that the moral independence of the personal point of view can be threatened in two different ways, along two different dimensions. It can be threatened if a morality calls upon the individual to submit herself sacrificially to external demands—the demands of an impersonal calculus or the demands of another's individual good. And it can be threatened if a morality allows or even requires others to submit her sacrificially to their impersonal or personal demands. Thus, a morality can suborn Rebekah's personal point of view both by way of what it requires of Rebekah and by way of what it allows to or even requires of others in their treatment of Rebekah. Since there are these two dimensions along which the personal point of view (as realized in any given individual) can be subjugated to impersonal demands or to the personal demands of other individuals, and since the prerogative only deals with the first of these dimensions, the introduction of a prerogative cannot by itself satisfy the rationale for its introduction.

We have seen that with the adoption of the rationale for the individualist prerogative, the source of the threat to the moral independence of the personal standpoint as it is realized in a given individual shifts: whereas the threat once came from the impersonal standpoint, it now comes from the personal standpoint as it is realized in other individuals. The individualist prerogative insulates the individual against the first form or dimension of this threat by insulating her against the demand that she impose sacrifices on herself. But the individualist hybrid leaves the individual vulnerable to the second form or dimension of this threat. There are now all those other individuals, each of whom has been fully liberated from any requirement that he ever forgo personally rewarding actions because of the moral weightiness of the good of others. The individualist prerogative tells each individual that it is morally allowable for him to choose his most personally rewarding action. The affirmation of agent-relative values and the rejection of agent-neutral values tells each individual that, as far as end-oriented rationality is concerned, it is rational for him to choose the most personally rewarding action. As far as end-oriented rationality is concerned, his choice to advance his most personally rewarding alternative is both permissible and right.

So consider the moral position that the individualist hybrid puts Rebekah in vis-à-vis these other individuals. Just as Scheffler's hybrid morality (almost) always calls upon other individuals or the government to suppress Rebekah's exercise of her prerogative if doing so will be impersonally rewarding, the individualist hybrid always calls upon each individual to suppress Rebekah's exercise of her prerogative if doing so will be personally rewarding for that individual. Just as Scheffler's hybrid morally subordinates the personal standpoint as it is realized in Rebekah to the impersonal standpoint, the individualist hybrid morally subordinates the personal standpoint as it is realized in Rebekah to the now marauding personal standpoints of every other individual.

Someone might offer the counterargument that the individualist hybrid does not subordinate the personal standpoint as it is realized in Rebekah because it does not require Rebekah directly to choose the sacrificial alternative; it merely endorses the imposition of this sacrifice upon her by other individuals. But such a counterargument would be no more plausible than the response proposed by Scheffler—and disposed of in Section IV—that his hybrid morality does not subordinate the personal standpoint because it does not require Rebekah directly to choose the sacrificial alternative. Surely if a morality is said to subordinate the individual to external demands if it requires the individual to submit herself to those demands, then it must also be said to subordinate the individual to those demands if it endorses others' submitting her to those demands. Just as the inclusion in morality of Scheffler's bare prerogative fails to satisfy the rationale for the inclusion of that prerogative, the inclusion of a bare individualist prerogative in morality fails to satisfy the rationale for the inclusion of this prerogative. Just as the inclusion of the Schefflerian prerogative is unacceptable unless it is accompanied by restrictions against the suppression of its exercise, the inclusion of the individualist prerogative is unacceptable unless it is accompanied by restrictions against the suppression of its exercise.

Recall here another point made in Section IV. The point was that a morality will properly be said to subordinate Rebekah to the impersonal standpoint if, according to the morality, the government may proceed to suppress Rebekah's exercise of her prerogative whenever such suppression would be the impersonally most rewarding course of action. A morality that endorses the suppression of Rebekah's exercise of her prerogative whenever that suppression would serve the impersonal standpoint subordinates Rebekah to that standpoint even if, in fact, it is rarely the case that suppression of her exercise of her prerogative will actually promote the impersonally best outcome. Rebekah is, morally speaking, enslaved to the impersonal standpoint if she may be treated as a slave whenever that serves the impersonal standpoint—even if, in fact, treating her as a slave rarely serves that standpoint. Similarly, a morality will properly be said to subordinate Rebekah to the personal standpoints of diverse other individuals if, according to the morality, each of those individuals may proceed to suppress Rebekah's exercise of her prerogative whenever that suppression would be the personally most rewarding course of action for that other individual. A morality that endorses the suppression of Rebekah's exercise of her prerogative whenever such suppression would serve the personal standpoint of another individual subordinates Rebekah to that individual's standpoint even if, in fact, it is rarely the case that suppression of her exercise of her prerogative will promote an outcome that is personally best for the other individual.

We can dispose even more quickly here than we did in Section IV of the suggestion that the prerogative need not be accompanied by restrictions because it can instead be accompanied by a maxim calling upon individuals to minimize suppressions of the exercise of the prerogative. For, as we saw previously, this sort of maxim—whether it is aimed at minimizing suppressions of the Schefflerian prerogative or at minimizing suppressions of the individualist prerogative—reflects the ideas that each act of suppression is agent-neutrally bad, that fewer suppressions are agent-neutrally better overall than more suppressions, and that individuals ought to be guided by such judgments about agent-neutral value. There is, however, no room for such ideas within a morality grounded in the acceptance of agent-relative values and the rejection of agent-neutral values. Given this rejection, if there are to be fundamental limits on how the individual may be treated by others, those limits must take the form of deontic restrictions.

VI. Rights

Do not concomitant restrictions diminish the prerogatives they accompany? More on point, do restrictions on Rebekah against suppressing others' exercise of their individualist prerogatives diminish Rebekah's individualist prerogative? After all, there are actions that would seem to be allowed to Rebekah by the individualist prerogative yet are forbidden to her by these restrictions. However, if the accompanying restrictions do diminish the individualist prerogative, then, in the end, that prerogative is not maximal. This is troublesome. For it suggests that a morality with only an individualist prerogative (i.e., the individualist hybrid) would better protect the moral independence of the personal standpoint along the first, self-imposed subordination dimension than would a morality with an individualist prerogative accompanied by restrictions. This would leave the advocate of a morality with the prerogative and accompanying restrictions in the very uncomfortable position of having to say that he favors that morality over the individualist hybrid because overall, across the self-imposed and other-imposed dimensions, it does a better job of protecting the moral independence of the personal standpoint. This would be uncomfortable because it seems to involve comparisons across incommensurable dimensions.

Fortunately, however, the restrictions do not diminish the prerogative they accompany. More precisely, there is a natural initial understanding of the individualist prerogative such that no conduct on Rebekah's part that is sanctioned by her individualist prerogative is forbidden by her being subject to a restriction against suppressing others' exercise of their individualist prerogative. What is this natural initial understanding of the individualist prerogative? It is that each individual may especially devote herself (e.g., her personal resources, talents, and energies) to the promotion of her own valued ends. For each individual, her prerogative operates upon or ranges over a certain discrete set of resources: to begin with, the various resources for purposive action that constitute her person.⁴³

Why is this the “natural initial understanding” of the individualist prerogative? The answer to this question begins with recollecting that the introduction of any personal prerogative constitutes a departure from full consequentialism and, more specifically, from consequentialism's first implication: that each individual ought to devote herself to the promotion of the overall best. Any personal prerogative departure from this feature of full consequentialism is naturally understood as sanctioning each individual's devotion of herself, at least to some extent, to her own most valued outcomes. Moreover, essential to the appeal of any proposed prerogative is the anticipation that under it each individual will be warranted in devoting herself, at least to some degree, to her personally most highly valued ends. A proposed prerogative will have this appeal only if it is understood as not also sanctioning each individual's devotion of other individuals to her valued ends—a devotion that would interfere with the other individuals' own exercise of the proposed prerogative.

That the natural initial understanding of any prerogative is that it specifies some degree to which each individual may devote herself to her own personal ends is confirmed by noticing that we implicitly understand Scheffler's prerogative in precisely this way. In presenting his prerogative, Scheffler repeatedly speaks of an agent's allocation of “energy and attention.”⁴⁴

What, then, do the restrictions against suppressing exercises of the individualist prerogative add to a morality that already includes this prerogative? How do they block threats to the moral independence of the personal point of view? The restrictions morally prohibit Rebekah from devoting Joshua—that is, his energy, attention, bodily parts, and so on—to the promotion of her personal ends. They say that, in the exercise of her prerogative, Rebekah must not treat Joshua as though he is within the scope of the operation of her prerogative. Correlative to these restrictions is a right of Joshua to his own person and, hence, a right against being treated as though he is within the ambit of the operation of Rebekah's prerogative. It is this right that secures the moral independence of each person vis-à-vis his possible treatment by other individuals. The inclusion of these restrictions and correlative rights within morality also serves to make explicit the originally implicit understanding of the scope of the operation of the prerogative. If Rebekah must not treat other individuals as grist for her mill, then the scope of the operation of her prerogative should not be reinterpreted so that everyone is grist for Rebekah's mill. Proposals to move to a more expansive understanding of the scope of the operation of the prerogative—that is, proposals to go beyond the initial natural understanding of the prerogative—are to be rejected because such an understanding of the prerogative would bring it into conflict with the rights of individuals, which secure their moral independence vis-à-vis others' possible treatment of them. The addition of rights makes explicit and stabilizes the natural initial understanding of the scope of the individualist prerogative by ascribing to each person rights over what falls within the operation of her prerogative, namely, her own person.

Throughout the core of this essay, I have spoken of restrictions against the suppression of the exercise of one's prerogative. If we speak of restrictions in this way, then the correlative rights would be rights against the suppression of the exercise of one's prerogative. It is important to notice that this is not a right to the exercise of one's prerogative. If Joshua is unable to carry out activities that would be personally rewarding and others do not step forward to enable him to carry them out, Joshua's right against the suppression of the exercise of his prerogative has not been violated. What actions by others would violate Joshua's right? The answer again points to rights over specified sets of resources.⁴⁷