This book, translated from French, tells a remarkable development story. It draws on a lifetime of the work of authors who are the world's experts in their respective fields of Indochinese history. The book will join a small group of classics in Southeast Asian social and economic history. Although dealing with all of Indochina's components of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, the last (over four-fifths of Indochinese population) occupies much of the study. According to a note on authorship, Pierre Brocheux wrote the economic chapters and Daniel Hmery those more concerned with social and political history. Nevertheless, narrative and argument are seamless.
Indochina, as emphasized on the first page and at various points thereafter, was one of the world's great historical frontiers. For nineteenth-century Vietnam, however, that needs some modification. Vietnamese development was very much a tale of two deltas. Cochinchina in the south, encompassing the Mekong delta and with Saigon its main city, constituted Vietnam's frontier. Post-1870 globalization and a growing demand for rice in Europe and, even more, in Asia, led to rapid peasant in-migration and an expansion of rice cultivation in an essentially empty delta. Construction of canals allowed rice cultivation to expand from 315,000 hectares in 1836 to 3.1 million hectares by 1943. Rice exports grew from 58,000 tons in 1860 to 1,797,000 tons in 1928 and during these decades accounted for some two thirds of total exports.
The Tonkin delta, formed by the Red River in northern Vietnam, for which Hanoi, 1,745 kilometers from Saigon, functioned as a capital, had a person: land: subsistence relationship best described as Malthusian. Rice was, as in the south, the main crop. But in this delta, already quite densely populated by the early twentieth century, population continuously pushed against available food. Per capita calorie consumption was always inadequate. Only massive programs of hydraulic and delta planning allowed peasant living standards to remain around subsistence.
While rice exports from the Mekong delta drove a substantial increase in Vietnamese and so also Indonchinese GDP, per capita income gains appear to have been much less impressive. Growth chiefly depended on bringing more land under cultivation. Technological change in rice cultivation was minimal. Cheap labor discouraged it. In the 1930s in the south, daily unskilled industrial wages were around US$0.26 and much less in agriculture. Uncultivated frontier land acted as a further discouragement.
For Brocheux and Hmery, the decade of the 1930s is a turning point. By then, the ambiguous colonization of the book's subtitle—although long operative in a dialectic that underpins the authors' argument—was fully apparent: the colonial regime could not transcend its historical logic nor deliver genuine economic development. Economically, the south, like Southeast Asia's other vent-for-surplus areas, began to run up against the limitations of its extensive mode of growth. Although in Cochinchina uncultivated land, no less than 1.2 million hectares in 1939, still existed, rice yields had been falling for some time and population increase outpacing additions to cultivated area. Virtually no small cultivator had access to institutional credit—seen by the authors as a major development constraint—and rice growing increasingly moved toward a form of tenancy in which control concentrated in the hands of dien chu (big landowners) at the expense of ta dein (farmers). Pre-1930 relative southern prosperity fell victim to world oversupply of rice and the 1930s Depression. Between 1925 and 1934 rice prices dropped by 70 percent.
Difficulties in the south paled in comparison to those in the north. Here population had reached saturation. Less fortunate areas of Tonkin suffered famine. Raising agricultural productivity and a shift towards industrialization were obvious solutions, but no one seemed to have much idea of how either was to be achieved. Although Vietnam (though not Laos or Cambodia where large parts of the economies operated through barter) was among the most industrialized parts of Southeast Asia, industrialization was slight. Despite having probably Southeast Asia's largest spinning and weaving industry, half of Vietnam's consumption of textile derived from imports.
Politically and socially, colonization was ambiguous because it divided society between the mass of population and an elite in pursuit of its own (overwhelmingly economic) interest. The elite, necessarily for its very existence, incorporated a not insignificant share of the local population. These people identified with France and had along with French residents in Indochina (some 34,000 compared to 22.7 million Indochinese in 1940) to forge a social contract with the masses. Important in cementing this contract was that the masses were often beneficiaries of an export economy overseen by the colonial regime.
And yet the elements of modernization and advance stemming from colonialism contributed to its own downfall by giving rise to progressive, educated, anticolonial constituents in society. Two things, Brocheux and Hmery stress, were crucial to the rise both of a liberal, nationalist middle class and radical social elements. One was the 1930s Depression; the other the World War II Japanese occupation. The book does not clearly separate the relative importance of the two. This reviewer could not escape the feeling that, contrary to what the authors seem to suggest, had it not been for the war, unrest might have settled. Given a recovery in the global economy, Indochina, if increasingly uneasily, would have continued under French colonialism for a number of decades. That counterfactual is not explored.
As it happened, World War II “tolled the death knell of French imperialism” (p. 281). France clung to Vietnam until Dien Bien Phu in 1954. At that point, the United States —having already supported the French militarily including the delivery of fighter planes to Saigon—took over. One is of course suitably cautious about any lessons of history. But the book's riveting descriptions of late-nineteenth-century Vietnamese resistance to the extension of French rule seem to offer pointers to the outcome of America's later twentieth-century venture into Vietnam. Lengthy passages on resistance and nationalism are part of the book's richness of social and political analysis to which a short review like this cannot do justice.
Remarkably, little Southeast Asian economic history has been written and much remains to be done. For Vietnam, series for GDP currently being constructed by Jean-Pascal Bassino will fill an important gap. Brocheux and Hmery's work points to likely research agendas, for example on financial and fiscal systems. No doubt future research will modify and add to the scholarship of this book. But for some time to come, it is likely to remain the standard by which writing on Indochina's history is judged.
