The Victorian Society appealed against the chancellor's grant of a faculty for a re-ordering of a Grade I listed church which included the removal of a Bodley and Garner chancel screen to Hallaton church. The judgment at first instance was noted at (2015) 17 Ecc LJ 257. The Court took the opportunity to make certain observations augmenting the Duffield guidelines. First, the question of whether the proposals would cause harm to the significance of the building could not be answered without prior consideration of the special architectural and/or historic interest of the listed church. Secondly, in considering any harm and its seriousness the particular grading of the listed church was highly relevant. Thirdly, in determining how clear and convincing was the justification for the works, what mattered were the elements which comprised the justification, including justification falling short of need or necessity. Fourthly, the first, third and fifth questions in the Duffield guidelines are directed at the effect of the works on the character of the listed building, rather than the effects of alteration, removal or disposal of a particular article.

The Court also took the opportunity to make certain observations about church treasures: church treasures were defined as articles of particular (or special) historic, architectural, archaeological or artistic interest falling within the faculty jurisdiction. It was confirmed that, where the re-ordering of a listed church involved the disposal of a church treasure, regardless of whether that church treasure was a fixture of the church with its own intrinsic value or a movable chattel, the principles enunciated by the Court of Arches in Re St Lawrence, Wootton St Lawrence with Oakley [2015] Fam 27 applied.

The Court held that there were essentially three heads of appeal, namely: (1) that the chancellor failed properly to address the question of harm under the Duffield guidelines; (2) that he failed properly to address the question of justification; and (3) that by reason of these failures, in undertaking the balancing exercise he failed properly to address the presumption against change. In relation to the first ground, the Court held that the chancellor had failed to identify the chancel screen as having intrinsic value of its own and therefore of being a church treasure such that its removal would require strong justification. He failed to give reasons for why any harm caused by the removal of the screen would be insignificant and did not consider what the architectural or historic interest of the building was. This ground of the appeal was upheld. The appeal was refused in relation to the second ground on the basis that the chancellor's analysis of the needs of the church as justification for the proposals was sound. Under the third ground, the Court rejected the appellant's argument that the chancellor was not entitled to give any weight to the views of the Diocesan Advisory Committee and Church Buildings Council in support of the petitioners’ case as they had not given oral evidence at the first instance hearing. Chancellors could take account of advice and evidence given otherwise than through oral evidence, although the weight to be attached to such evidence might be affected by the lack of cross-examination of the witnesses. The third ground of appeal failed.

In his judgment the chancellor had raised concerns about the objectivity of the expert witness on behalf of the Victorian Society, referring to his evidence as ‘highly partisan’. No question of the expert's bias had arisen in the course of the first instance hearing and the Court of Arches held that, whereas chancellors are not bound by the opinion of experts, they are bound to give them considerable weight and it was not desirable or fair for chancellors to make derogatory comments about experts without them having been afforded the opportunity to defend their position. In this case the chancellor's criticisms were unfair and unjustified.

Having upheld the appeal, the Court went on to re-determine the petition. It was held that the removal of the screen would cause significant but not serious harm to the architectural and historic interest of the building, given the fact that much of the remaining Victorian interior would be unaffected. The justification provided by the petitioners for the proposed removal was impressive and provided a clear and convincing reason for the screen's removal, both in terms of the impact of the special interest of the building and the removal of a church treasure. On balance, a faculty would be issued for the removal of the screen on condition that the screen would not be removed until its introduction in Hallaton church had been confirmed within two years, in default of which the petitioners should seek further directions as to the future of the screen.

Arguments about costs were determined by the Court in a supplementary judgment. Whereas the court costs of the application for leave to appeal were to be met by the appellant, the court costs of the appeal would be met by the respondents, and each party would bear its own costs of each stage of the proceedings. The Court affirmed the approach in Re St Mary the Virgin, Sherborne [1996] Fam 63 and in the Ecclesiastical Judges Association's Guidance on the Award of Costs in Faculty Proceedings (July 2010). The court costs of an appeal should be met in most cases by the person seeking the faculty, on the basis that the appeal was part of the process for determining whether a faculty should be granted. This was only likely not to apply where some unreasonable behaviour had been shown. In relation to party costs on an appeal, there was no reason why a successful party should not recover their party costs, but in this case there was no simple winner and as such an order that each party should bear its own party costs was appropriate. [RA]

The Privy Council (Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Mance) refused the appellants' application for leave to appeal on 16 July 2015.