In 2010, Sir David Goodall wrote an article, ‘An agreement worth remembering’, in which he provided an abridged version of his recollection of the negotiations he was involved in that led to the Anglo-Irish Agreement (A.I.A.) of 1985. In this, he stated that Garret FitzGerald's All in a life ‘is by far the fullest and most detailed’ account of the discussions, believing that ‘no one on the British side has produced — or could produce — anything comparable’ (p. 155). Eleven years on, Goodall's own memoir, based on his ‘memory … [and] … entries in the short daily diary which I kept throughout the period’, has challenged his earlier assertion (p. 3). Indeed, with the posthumous help of Frank Sheridan, Goodall (who died in 2016) has left a detailed, incisive and highly accurate narrative of the discussions that matches, if not surpasses, the account of the former taoiseach.

Goodall's career as a British diplomat spanned over thirty years, during which he served in the Foreign Office and then, from May 1982, the Cabinet Office, where he worked under Robert Armstrong, then cabinet secretary. It was during this time that Goodall encountered the head of the Anglo-Irish section of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Michael Lillis, with whom he would work closely in the negotiation of the A.I.A. Lillis believed Goodall was ‘George Smiley incarnate’. This description becomes all the more intriguing when we note that David Cornwell — otherwise known as John le Carré — served alongside Goodall in Bonn, striking up a good friendship with him in turn.

One of the great strengths of Goodall's memoir is the colour he brings to extensive bureaucratic proceedings, providing an insight into the character of the indispensable officials involved in the Anglo-Irish negotiations of the early 1980s. For example, Armstrong is said to have been ‘motivated by a desire to make amends for Britain's ill-treatment of Ireland down the centuries’, a desire that Goodall shared, distinguishing the pair as British officials who appeared to be genuinely sensitive to Irish nationalist grievances (p. 11). Lillis was a key voice for such grievances during their talks, and is described by Goodall as ‘a strong Irish nationalist … extremely intelligent and persuasive’, whilst the Irish ambassador to the U.K., Noel Dorr, is labelled as being ‘one of the fairest-minded and most thoughtful people I have ever met’ (pp 7, 8, 25).

From this, it is clear that Goodall admired his Irish counterparts, a feeling that is reciprocated in Irish recollections of the negotiations, including those of Irish government secretary, Dermot Nally. The upshot of this is that Goodall and Nally agreed that the long, intensive negotiations created a mutual respect between the officials involved, leading to lasting friendships. This is not to say, however, that every meeting proceeded cordially. Disagreements did surface, but Goodall makes clear how ‘the mutual confidence and liking’ between the officials helped to keep the negotiations on track (p. 46).

By contrast, relations on the British side of the talks were volatile throughout the period in question. Indeed, Goodall's account captures the fractured nature of the British administration, with rival departments and officials engaging in a bitter struggle to influence the prime minister's thinking on Northern Ireland (pp 45, 86). An unwilling participant in the whole enterprise, Thatcher is shown by Goodall's memoir to have made bizarre, insensitive references throughout the discussions, including citing population transfer as a possible solution to the problems of Northern Ireland (p. 18). Goodall opposed this proposal by highlighting Oliver Cromwell's infamous legacy in Ireland, again showing his propensity to consider nationalist viewpoints, a strength that, incrementally, other British officials came to share as the intergovernmental process developed (pp 18–19).

However, in keeping with other narratives on this subject, The making of the Anglo-Irish Agreement portrays Thatcher as resistant to this sensitising effect, always prioritising British security above nationalist considerations. It was her preoccupation with this objective that ultimately convinced her to agree to the A.I.A. of 1985 in the hope of securing better security co-operation from the Irish government. Indeed, Thatcher believed throughout her premiership that Dublin was less than whole-hearted in combatting the Provisional I.R.A., implying that Irish territory was a ‘safe haven’ for the militant republican outfit during the Troubles.

Interestingly, Goodall's account challenges this interpretation with convincing evidence pertaining to visits he made to Royal Ulster Constabulary (R.U.C.) stations across Northern Ireland in May 1984. He recalls how the officers he met ‘agreed that … crossborder cooperation with the Garda was excellent’, adding that ‘at Strabane … the RUC Chief Inspector flatly denied that the Republic constituted a “safe haven”’ (p. 29). Goodall's overall impression was that ‘relations between the two police forces were a good deal better than was believed to be the case in London’ (p. 29). His account, thus, contradicts much of the arguments articulated by the Thatcher government in this period. This suggests that the Irish state's role in border security merits closer evaluation, with more emphasis being placed on using sources like that which Goodall provides.

Although Goodall overlooked the roles that the New Ireland Forum of 1983–4 and the Reagan administration played in encouraging talks between the British and Irish governments, his account provides an invaluable insight into the extensive negotiations of this period. The main struggles that took place in these were not so much between the British and Irish delegations, but more so within the British administration. This makes the achievement of Goodall and Armstrong — along with their Irish counterparts — all the more laudable. Together, they devised an accord that, as Goodall wrote in December 1985, ‘is intended to create a framework within which … both communities in Northern Ireland can feel secure and reconciliation between them may become possible’ (p. 131). By laying the groundwork for the later peace process, the A.I.A., and those who negotiated it, made great strides towards this end.