Given that there is no psychological difference between consciously according belief to a proposition and mentally imputing truth to it, the doxastic result is the same as if, having identified some propositions as truths you then proceeded, with complete success, to give credence just to those. On the other hand, no one ever is prompted to believe a proposition in view of considering it true, since, if one considers a proposition true, one is conscious of already believing it. And so, although no one ever does quite literally accord belief to a proposition as a means of believing that which is true on the question which it answers, truth is indeed believing’s inner telos or aim in a looser sense: believing the proposition, according to the believer, is the way to believe what is true on that question.
Whenever it comes to taking means to believe what is true, and not false, on some question, there is a right way of proceeding and a wrong way; and, as in other instrumental proceedings, to make a mistake is to do something wrong (even if it does chance to result in the aimed-at outcome). This is how the deontological language of right, wrong, and ought comes to be used in epistemological evaluation. A mistaken belief (even when it happens to be true) is wrong epistemically and ought not to be held in the circumstances.
And yet, given that “ought” implies “can,” it must be possible to help believing whatever ought not to be believed. But can a mistake always be helped?
Alvin Plantinga colourfully writes:
Suppose I develop a rare sort of brain lesion that causes me to believe that I will be the next president of the United States. I have no evidence for the proposition, never having won or even run for public office. …
Nevertheless, due to my cognitive dysfunction, the belief that I will be the next president seems to me obviously true. … Now: am I so situated that I can better fulfill my obligation to the truth by withholding than by accepting this proposition?Footnote 1
Hitler, we say, ought to have ordered a speedy retreat from Stalingrad so as to avoid encirclement. People who will readily agree that this ought expresses an instrumental requirement and not a requirement of righteousness will often still insist that the word “can,” at any rate, is univocal. So they either oppose the invoking of any epistemic “ought” or else deny that it does necessarily imply “can.” But Hitler really could have ordered a speedy retreat from Stalingrad, after all; it is only thanks to his having had that possibility that his failure to order a retreat was a mistake on his part. (“Hitler could have ordered a retreat.” That is, no impediment prevented him from doing that; only stubbornness did.) The case is similar, then, when believing something is a mistake epistemically (even if the proposition believed should chance to be true).
An epistemic ought, presumably, specifies a condition requisite for any belief, disbelief, or suspension of judgment to be in order epistemically. It identifies, if “rationalism” is right, a necessary condition for not being irrational. (“Rationalism,” let us say, is the epistemological position which opposes giving any more or any less credence to a proposition than reason dictates.)Footnote 2
No one will consider a belief (rationally) unjustified merely because the believer failed to take into account evidence beyond what was available — beyond what would have been brought to light by an inquiry conducted with as much diligence as the importance of the question under investigation demanded. That does look like an example of the “Ought implies can” maxim’s applicability.
But consider “invincible ignorance” due to ingrained prejudice, or failure to detect the fallacy in some argument due to limited intelligence. Surely the latter does not in itself count against a believer’s moral innocence; and neither should the former, at any rate in cases where what makes the prejudice in question so ingrained has nothing to do with unworthy motives on a believer’s part (such unworthy motives, e.g., as the selfish emotional gratification of being able to consider oneself entitled to the benefits attaching to membership in a superior race or gender). In the absence of any unworthy motives, to excuse such innocent irrational beliefs morally on the grounds that the believers “can’t help” thinking as they do seems quite consistent with continuing to call those beliefs, in the existing circumstances, epistemically unjustified (erring, not in order).
Arguably, though, the universality of the “Ought implies can” maxim’s scope is still defensible after all. When it comes to morally assessing individuals and their acts of commission and omission, surely all that matters is their exhibiting or not a good will and character. And so, that “inability to act differently” which is morally exculpatory will have been present just in those cases where in the existing circumstances it is false that the individual would have acted any better even given the best possible will in the worldFootnote 3. But you cannot, though, escape moral responsibility for uncaring inhumanity simply by having no conscientious objection to it personally. A corrupt conscience ethically committed, however sincerely, to evil ultimate principles will not excuse its possessor since it cannot, obviously, count as exemplifying the best possible will in the world; but misinformation that would be unavoidable even given such a will can suffice to excuse any resulting behaviour.
In the end, then, what moral duty requires is neither more nor less than that we be fully committed to right ethical first principles, whatever those are. Can we not say, similarly, something like the following? For its part, all reason demands of us is that we be fully rational, so that we are rationally unjustified in believing or failing to believe a proposition only if it is false that we “couldn’t help” in just this sense opining the way we do: viz., only if it is true that we would think differently were we fully rational; that is, if our thinking were fully in accordance with whatever the correct first principles of right reason are.
When it comes to first principles and the “strict liability” attached to respect for them, just as ignorance of the moral law is no excuse, so neither is ignorance of the law of reason. So far as concerns the basics, an erring conscience is not innocent, and honest unreason is not epistemically faultless.
Suppose, then, that lack of intelligence causes one innocently to overlook some fallacy or to draw a conclusion on the basis of too little evidence. Even so, if one’s thinking were fully rational, one wouldn’t be thinking like that; and accordingly it is not true, in the relevant sense, that one “couldn’t help” thinking like that. So the resulting belief can indeed count here as unjustified epistemically.
At that rate, when it is suitably interpreted, the universal applicability of “Ought implies can” can indeed remain unrestricted.
