Turkish migration to Belgium
In Belgium, the largest communities of residents from outside of the EU are Moroccan and Turkish. Labour migration from Turkey to Belgium started with a bilateral agreement between Turkey and Belgium in 1962. Although a moratorium on immigration was called in 1974, the Turkish population in Belgium has continued to grow steadily. There is still an annual inflow of roughly 3000 Turkish citizens a year.
Notwithstanding the official halt to immigration of 1974, there still remain several legal openings for Turkish citizens to enter Belgium, whether on a temporary or a permanent basis. Leaving tourism aside, five main patterns of legal migration characterize the post-1974 era. The majority of newcomers after 1974 came to Belgium on the basis of family reunion or family formation. Family reunion refers to the right of legally residing foreigners to bring in their spouse, and children under the age of 18. In certain specific conditions, other members of their family can be allowed too. We speak about family formation when a person enters the country with the purpose of marrying a person settled in Belgium. In this case the marriage takes place in Belgium. Both ways of entering Belgium are also called chain migration.
Chain migration is therefore one of the legal ways mentioned earlier for entering the country and to obtain a long-term residence permit. Initial chain migration applied exclusively to women and children who joined their husbands/fathers who were already in Belgium as gastarbeiter (‘guest workers’ or migrant labourers). Before 1974, economic migration was male, chain migration was female. In general, men chose to immigrate, while women and children merely followed their husbands or fathers. Gradually this pattern changed as a second generation, itself grown up in Western Europe, started to marry. If chain migration concerns the (re-)union of (future) spouses we refer to it as marriage migration.
Contrary to expectation, the tendency within Turkish (and also Moroccan) communities in Belgium to marry a partner that grew up in the country of origin remained. However, the pattern of Turkish marriage migration towards Flanders has gradually changed, and is nowadays as much male as female. On the basis of a dataset from the National Register of Belgium that consists of all married couples or couples living together in Flanders on 1 January 2004, and in which one of the partners has at some point had Turkish nationality (19.251 couples) we note that more than 60% of the men and women of the second generation (people who were born in Belgium to first-generation labour migrants or who arrived before the age of 7 as children of first generation labour migrants) marry a partner from Turkey. This means that six out ten youngsters with a Turkish background who are raised in Belgium opt for a partner from the country where their parents or grandparents came from.
The majority of Turks living in Belgium originate from one particular region, the district of Emirdag, in the province of Afyon. This district consists of about 70 villages, of which the town Emirdag (approximately 20,000 inhabitants) is the administrative centre. This town is situated in a poor, arid area that is greatly affected by emigration. Contrary to the majority of other regions in Turkey, economic growth in Emirdag stagnates, and there is only a slight growth in population. As may be expected, we found on the basis of data from the marriage register in Emirdag (January 2004–June 2005) that the majority (57%) of the couples who marry, emigrate to Western Europe.
Migration theories coping with marriage migration
For marriages in migrant communities much more is at stake than just love or the ambition to establish a harmonious household; it is often about the possibility of entering the ‘promised land’, about economic and social benefits for the family of the one who is marrying and moving to Western Europe, about reviving the bonds with the region of origin, about loyalties and debts between families who wish to improve their socio-economic position, and about young people that are dissatisfied with their current situation in society. Let us consider some migration theories in an attempt to explain the persistently high popularity of migration marriages within the Turkish communities in Western Europe.
Economic reasons?
In economic migration theories it is assumed that people leave their country to improve their socio-economic situation. In recent theories (New Economics of Labour Migration, NELM), migration is not regarded as an individual decision, but as a decision taken by a bigger unit of people such as a household. According to this theory, a household in a developing country will decide to assist one of its members to emigrate in order to compensate for a shortage in various markets and for the risk related to agricultural activities. Furthermore, such a decision is dependent on the relative status of the household in the community. The decision is therefore based on relative rather than absolute deprivation.
On the basis of previous research conducted in Emirdag, we know that people there feel that they are well informed about the economic differences between Emirdag and the Turkish communities in Belgium (2000). In conversations, the incomes of the Turkish residents in Belgium are a popular topic. People in Emirdag are convinced that Belgian Turks have an easy life of it. When forming this opinion, they take into account the spending habits of the Belgian Turks when the latter return to Emirdag. Turks living abroad own very nice houses in Emirdag, they drive expensive cars, they go on holiday in the popular Turkish tourist resorts, they hold costly weddings, and they give financial support to relatives left behind in Turkey. All in all, in Emirdag they see plenty of evidence that socio-economic conditions are better for Turks in Belgium.
However, there is a lot of evidence that the socio-economic situation of Turkish migrants in Belgium is problematic compared with that of mainstream Belgian society. Data from the Belgian National Health Survey 2001 indicate that 59% of the people of Turkish origin in Belgium live below the poverty line. Unemployment among people with a Turkish background is high, especially amongst young people. Research furthermore shows that ethnic minorities – mostly Moroccans and Turks – meet with considerable discrimination,Reference Martens, Ouali, Van de Maele, Vertommen, Dryon and Verhoeven1 in addition to their under-representation in the labour market due to their poor educational background.Reference Timmerman, Vanderwaeren and Crul2 On the basis of previous research, we are confident in saying that Turkish marriage migrants, on average, marry Belgian residents (mostly Belgian Turks) with a low socio-economic status.3 Our study proves that for marriage migrants coming from the southern and eastern rim of the Mediterranean, one out of three of the partners residing in Belgium is unemployed, compared with one out of ten in the general population. It is evident that the socio-economic situation of the Turkish community in Belgium into which Turkish marriage migrants marry is rather problematic.
Sometimes, respondents in Emirdag indicated that they were aware that the lifestyle their European compatriots flaunted in Emirdag is not representative of their lifestyle in Belgium. They confirmed that they were aware of the economic hardships many of their compatriots encounter in Belgium: unemployment, low-skilled employment and the high cost of living in Belgium. Although this information, then, is available in Emirdag, it seems generally to be ignored or at least not taken into consideration.
On the other hand, in Turkey itself, the socio-economic situation has been improving drastically over the last few years, even if it is still lagging behind Western Europe. Turkey’s economy continues to expand. According to World Bank data, Turkish Gross National Income per capita between 2000 and 2005 rose from US$2980 to US$4750. Turkey still trails the rest of the OECD countries, but its GNI/c is higher than that of Bulgaria and Romania – two EU members – and continues to rise. Compared with other important non-European immigration countries, such as Morocco, for example, the economic situation of Turkey is remarkably good. Turkey’s GNI/c is nearly three times (2.7) higher than that of Morocco.
Although economic reasons remain relevant for local people in Emirdag as a cause for emigration, the improving economic situation in Turkey as well as the feeble economic condition of the Turkish communities in Belgium must be acknowledged, specifically for those who enter Belgium on grounds of marriage migration. This leaves us with the question: why does emigration, and especially marriage migration towards Western Europe, remain so popular.
Transnationalism?
It is fascinating to see how daily life in Emirdag is closely interwoven with that of the Turkish community in Belgium. The majority of houses in Emirdag belong to people living in Western Europe. Local business is strongly interconnected with the Turkish communities in Western Europe and much oriented to the needs of European Turks who spend their holidays in their region of origin. Several businesses (shops, restaurants, travel agencies) have branches in both Emirdag and in Turkish neighbourhoods in Belgium. Most importantly, the majority of families have relatives living in Western Europe with whom they maintain close relations.Reference Timmerman4
More recently, we also see that Turkish migration can no longer be regarded as a move from one fixed point to another. Instead, it is more a process of ongoing movement and of interactions between several locations across different countries.Reference Soysal5 Many Belgian Turks, particularly those who have retired and business people, spend considerable time in Emirdag. Transport businesses (especially air and bus companies) play on the specific demands related to migration. This phenomenon of transnational communities enables the maintenance of vibrant relations between the migrant society and the country of origin.
In the Turkish case, it is evident that nationalism, both secular and religious, is also an important factor when considering the strong ties between emigration areas and the Turkish diaspora.Reference Kandiyoti and Tekeli6 With Turkey coming closer to the EU, Turkish national sentiment remains more salient than ever within the Turkish diaspora. The commitment to Turkey that is evident in Turks living abroad is great, and considerable effort is made by Turkey itself to maintain close ties with its expatriates.
The existence of transnational Turkish communities is an asset that facilitates migration, but cannot solely explain the high popularity of marriage migration from Turkey.
A culture of migration?
In Emirdag, everything reminds one of migration. From their earliest years, young people are familiar with the phenomenon of migration. Migration is always envisaged as an option when people make plans for the future. Migration became, in a sense, ‘a habit’, a project in which people often engaged because ‘everyone is emigrating’. Over the last 40 years this omnipresence of migration has influenced local economic and socio-cultural life intensely.
Migration, more specifically the lavish lifestyle and conspicuous spending (in Turkish, the word ‘gosteric’ is used), of the Turkish migrants who spend their summer holidays in Emirdag, left in Emirdag an image of Europe as the land of milk and honey, a region with greater social justice, fairer chances for the poor, unlimited economic possibilities, greater socio-cultural diversity, greater political freedom, and a modern way of life, although this last element is often also evaluated rather negatively. This rosy picture of Europe is an important element in the existing culture of migration in Emirdag. This image of Western Europe sharply differs from the very boring and even depressing picture that young and especially educated youngsters paint of Emirdag. In Emirdag young people are generally dissatisfied with the socio-cultural possibilities and with the rigid social control in this little town. In line with our findings from earlier research, young people in Emirdag see getting a higher education as the most important tool, especially for girls, with which to fight these obstacles.
In a previous study, in which we examined attitudes and expectations of aspirant emigrants, we found that while many are eager to emigrate to Western Europe, few have any concrete idea of the life that awaits them there. The prospective newcomers have no specific conception of Belgium, and Flanders in particular.Reference Timmerman7 They only have an image of ‘Europe’, which is shaped by migrants who return home for their summer holidays. As already mentioned, we found that the negative information coming from migrants who already live in Europe is often ignored or even denied. Prospective immigrants appeared to be heading for a ‘mythical’ destination where all their worries would be resolved. Obstacles such as learning a foreign language, non-recognition of academic degrees, irrelevant work experience and a hostile society are, on the whole, taken lightly. In fact, few gave these obstacles any serious consideration at all.
In Emirdag, it is evident that we can speak of the existence of a ‘culture of migration’. The positive image they have of it, as well as the ‘tradition’ of migration to Western Europe, greatly appeals to people that dream of improving their socio-economic or socio-cultural position. It is also clear that the substantial emigration out of Emirdag has lots of effects – positive and negative – on daily life in Emirdag.
As stated before, family, and more specifically marriage migration, is the most popular emigration regime in Emirdag, and has been so for more than 40 years now. In order to understand the dynamics of this migration culture in Emirdag, it is necessary to look more closely at marriage migration in particular. We know that over the last few years half of the marriages contracted in Emirdag were migration marriages (see above). Therefore, we assume that the institution of marriage is influenced significantly by this phenomenon. As Bailey and BoyleReference Bailey and Boyle8 state, it is necessary to theorize more closely the concept of the family in order to understand ‘family migration’.
Let us therefore examine in more detail this specific area of Emirdag’s ‘culture of migration’: namely marriage.
Changing patterns of marriage in the Emirdag ‘culture of migration’
Traditionally, Turkey is a patriarchal society, with a clear segregation between the world of men and of women. Local Islam is seen as legitimating the existing gender roles and underpinning family values. Marriage is first of all an alliance between two families. As a consequence, the parents are the main actors in the arrangement of the marriage. Traditionally, in marriage, the bride leaves her family to join the family of her husband. She will be incorporated into the family of her husband who now becomes responsible for her and her conduct. Spouses are expected to fulfil properly the tasks related to their gender role, and to ensure the continuity of the family. Men must support their family and represent them in the public space. Women are in charge of the household and the children. They are responsible for giving birth to a male heir. Namus (mostly translated as sexual honour) is a central concept for understanding traditional family values. Women and girls are the object of namus, but men are responsible for it. A family with namus is a family where the women behave according to the expected social code, especially in reference to sexuality. Girls enter marriage as a virgin, girls and women only interact in a familiar way with men that are excluded as potential sexual partners (i.e. family members); if women enter the ‘outside’ world they have to behave as modestly as possible, preferably wearing a headscarf, and behaving so as to avoid any doubt concerning their chaste behaviour (see also Ref. Reference Delaney9).
The impact of migration on marriage in the region of Emirdag and in the Turkish communities in Belgium is considerable. This influence is noticeable in every stage of the arrangement of a marriage, in the modalities of the marriage, and in the changes in traditional wedding rituals and practices.
In Emirdag, there is a consensus that migration marriages are contracted too fast. The young people and mothers interviewed were very negative about the rush in which most migration marriages are arranged. During our fieldwork we noticed that, in the case of migration marriages, it is not unusual that only a few days elapse between the decision to marry and the wedding itself. The different stages that normally precede the wedding are also treated differently when migration is involved. This can partly be explained by the constraints that Western migration policy imposes on marriage. For example, after being married it can take up to a year before a groom/bride from Emirdag gets his/her visa to enter Belgium. To cope with this long waiting period, people often use the occasion of the engagement to get formally married at the municipality. Although the small ceremony at the town hall makes them officially man and wife, the community still considers them as engaged youngsters, with all the restrictions that this implies. They continue to live with their parents (one in Belgium, the other in Turkey) until the day of the wedding ceremony. During our fieldwork it became clear that the public ritual that made a couple ‘man and wife’ was not the civic wedding at the municipality, nor the ‘Islamic’ wedding ceremony conducted by the imam, but the wedding feast; a feast where gifts are given to the couple, where at least some drinks are served, where music and dance play a central role and where representatives of both families are present.
On the basis of our fieldwork, we found that gifts associated with migration marriages also have a different meaning. First of all it is expected that when a partner from a West European country is involved, the gifts are much more substantial, often several times the value of what is given in the case of local marriages. Traditionally, the bride receives gold. The amount of gold jewellery that is given to a bride from a migration marriage may be so large that the bride is not able to wear it all at the wedding. These gifts, or mehr, are meant for the bride herself and have to be distinguished from the ‘bride prize’. In the context of migration marriages, we observed that the outdated practice of a ‘bride prize’ – a financial gift from the family of the groom to the family of the bride, for compensating the loss of a daughter – was re-introduced.
Marriage migration also involves changes in traditional patterns. Traditionally, it is the bride who leaves her family to join the family of her husband. In the context of a migration marriage between a man from Emirdag and a girl from Belgium, this pattern is reversed. The groom will leave his family to join his wife in Belgium. Although we see that the majority of these couples establish an independent household, it is evident that the bride’s parents will be geographically much closer than the groom’s parents who stay behind in Turkey. We can therefore speak of a real reversal in traditional patterns.
These changes in wedding rituals and patterns have several consequences that contribute to the construction of a specific ‘culture of migration’.
Why marriage migration?
In Emirdag, young people associate the advantages of marriage migration specifically with living in a modern, democratic and prosperous country. Men are particularly motivated to emigrate in order to improve their socio-economic situation. They are confident that earning a living will be much easier in Western Europe. This also applies to girls. But the latter often stress the broader advantages of living in a democratic, prosperous country with a sound social security system: access to health care, more social rights for women, better financial provisions in case of sickness, unemployment, retirement and also more socio-cultural opportunities. In other words, for young people in Emirdag it is actually the factors external to the marital relation as such that are evaluated positively within migration marriages. At the same time, they are rather sceptical about the different attitudes, values and socio-cultural practices young people in Belgium are supposed to have. They have doubts as to whether young Belgian Turks are still suitable ‘marriage material.’
In contrast, an important reason in favour of marriage migration given by our single respondents in Belgium is that they assume that the quality of a marriage will be better with someone from their homeland than with someone from their own Turkish community in Belgium. They resort to this option since the alternative, marriage with a partner from their own Turkish community in Belgium, is often rejected due to the generally bad reputation of youngsters from the second and following generations. There is a feeling within the Turkish community in Belgium that many Turkish boys have gone astray and that many Turkish girls are too liberated. HooghiemstraReference Hooghiemstra10 came to the same conclusion in her study conducted in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands too, the so-called ‘too-Western’ and decadent attitude of the local Turkish youth was said to be a reason for preferring partners from the region of origin instead.
One can argue that young Turkish people in Belgium are longing for more ‘authentic’ Turkish partners. They assume that the ‘homeland’ is a better place for finding such a partner. These findings are in line with theories on ethnicity that stress that immigrants go to great lengths in order to reaffirm their ethnic identity in a foreign environment, in which keeping in touch with the original homeland is an important element. Several theories stress the importance of the choice of the marriage partner in the construction of an ethnic identity.
However, in our interviews, Turkish youngsters in Belgium also had their doubts about the success of migration marriages. There was suspicion about the motivation of marriage immigrants from Turkey. The former were afraid that the latter often opted for a migration marriage solely for economic reasons and with the illusion of becoming very rich very quickly. Our respondents in Belgium also indicated that marriage immigrants are confronted with a lot of problems: language barriers, joblessness, a strange environment, and loss of status for the men. All these elements were seen as obstacles to a harmonious marriage. Once again, in this discourse, the marriage partner coming from Turkey remained desirable, even though one could not be certain about his/her sincere love.
Although marrying a man from their region of origin in some ways goes against prevailing marriage customs, Turkish girls in Belgium see several other advantages in marrying such a man. Next to the more ‘authentic’ character of the groom from Emirdag, these advantages are all linked to possibilities for acquiring greater independence within their marriage. Indeed, it is most probable that the parents of the bridegroom will remain in Turkey, which considerably diminishes their ability to interfere in the young household and to control their daughter-in-law. This demonstrates that migration marriages are also used as an emancipatory strategy, which might enhance the socio-cultural position within the community.
Conclusion
Migration marriages prove to be the creative intersection between traditional frames of reference and contemporary opportunities arising from globalisation. In the ‘Emirdag connection’, ambitions related to migration are easily accommodated into existing socio-cultural traditions regarding marriage. However, under the specific circumstances of migration marriages, conceptions of marriage undergo interesting modifications.
It is argued that the institution of marriage as conceived within migration marriages is central to the construction of a specific migration culture in and between both communities (Emirdag and Flanders). While framing migration marriages within the established socio-cultural traditions of the community, they provide for a much needed feeling of continuity. At the same time, migration marriages are able to cope with and accommodate significant changes linked to the internationalization of the communities involved.
Christiane Timmerman has a PhD in Social and Cultural Anthropology. She is currently director of the interdisciplinary research group CeMIS (Centre for Migration and Intercultural Studies) of the University of Antwerp. She is also Director of Academic Affairs of UCSIA (Academic Centre St – Ignatius Antwerp).
