I. Did Hegel see himself as a historian?

My first point concerns a central element in Chapter 2. Sedgwick, along with most commentators, identifies what Hegel calls ‘philosophical history’ with Hegel’s own practice in order to understand the project of Hegel’s philosophy of history: the philosophy of history would be nothing other than philosophical history, a historical narrative written from Hegel’s philosophical point of view. This identification seems debatable to me, both for external reasons (regarding what was called ‘philosophical history’ in the eighteenth century) and for reasons internal to Hegel’s philosophy. I will concentrate here on the latter. Should we think that Hegel considered himself a historian? Should we read the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History as a historical narrative that would fall into the category of philosophical history?

This reading seems perfectly natural if our starting point is the text of the Philosophy of History, edited by Eduard Gans and Karl Hegel in the 1830s, and hardly modified by Johannes Hoffmeister in 1955. But things look different when we examine the new edition of the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, edited as part of the Gesammelte Werke (GW: 27, 1; 27, 2; 27, 3; 27, 4).Footnote ¹ The classification of three kinds of historical writing (original history, reflective history and philosophical history), far from being a permanent feature of Hegel’s philosophy of history, in fact only appears in the first lecture course on the topic given by Hegel, in 1822–23. In subsequent lecture courses (1824–25, 1826–27 and 1830–31), this classification disappeared altogether. In his analysis of the Weltgeschichte, Hegel quickly gave up defining his object by reference to the different practices of historians. It should be noted that the expression ‘philosophical history’ (philosophische Geschichte) is used only once more in the 1824–25 lecture course, not to describe Hegel’s project, but on the contrary to describe the practice of certain French and English historians (GW: 27, 2: 472) whom Hegel intends to criticize. And it no longer appears at all in the lectures of 1826–27 and in the lectures of 1830–31. In other words, it seems that the first editors of the philosophy of history, shortly after Hegel’s death, took the decision to compile the lecture notes available to them by organizing them on the basis of a distinction which Hegel had used in his very first lecture course, but which he had already abandoned by the second lecture course on this topic. This remark raises two questions: a) can we try to explain why Hegel quickly abandoned this categorization in his lectures on the philosophy of history? And b) does this difficulty change anything in our understanding of Hegel’s philosophical project? I would like to suggest a few hypotheses related to a work in progress.

In an attempt to understand why Hegel ceased to explain the subject of the philosophy of world history by reference to the three kinds of historical writing, it can be useful to note another difference in the presentation of the lecture course, which appears in comparing the handwritten introduction of 1822 and that of 1830. The latter contains a remark that was not in the former:

Hegel now asserts—something he did not do, or at least not explicitly, in 1822—that a social group is only historical, only enters into a process of transformation that can be described as a history, on the condition that it produces historical narratives. This condition is not the only one, since Hegel adds that the political structure of a state is also necessary for there to be history: without the state, the actions of the members of a social group remain governed by the logic of the family, of traditions, etc. The appearance of the state changes the meaning of individual actions (the individual can behave as a citizen), which provides one of the other conditions for a group to undergo a transformation that qualifies as history from Hegel’s perspective. It seems that Hegel became aware of the importance of a clearer distinction between history in the sense of a series of historical events that marks the transformation of a group, on the one hand, and history in the sense of a historical account of these transformations (or part of them), on the other.

The fact is that, in the lecture course of 1822–23, Hegel defined the subject of the lectures on the philosophy of world history by reference to forms of historical narratives. It was his reflection on the work of historians that enabled him to define what his lectures were about. In the next three lecture courses, however, Hegel no longer defined his subject in this way: instead, he then attempted to define what history is in the sense of a series of transformations experienced by a social group, by questioning the conditions under which the historicity of such a social group is possible (the two main conditions being the constitution of a state and the production of historical narratives). It should therefore be acknowledged that Hegel did not lose interest in historical narratives after 1823. But he began to give them a different role: the existence of historical narratives became one of the conditions for a social group to be active in world history (and they must be historical narratives of a certain type, since Hegel refuses that legends or simple chronologies play such a role; they must be narratives with a claim to objectivity). Hegel’s 1822 classification of three kinds of historical writing seems to have been a starting point, helpful enough for a first characterization of the subject of the lectures on the philosophy of world history, but not strong enough to be used again by Hegel in the following years.

In what way was this categorization inadequate? My hypothesis is as follows: explaining the project of a philosophy of history on the basis of a distinction between original history, reflective history and philosophical history creates a risk of confusion, in this case of leading us to believe that Hegel would place himself on the same ground as historians, would conceive of his own work as that of a historian. The risk is that we might believe that the philosophical examination of history consists of nothing more than for philosophers to rewrite history, than the production of another kind of historical narrative. But what did Hegel say in 1830?

Hegel’s project in his analysis of world history cannot be understood as the work of a ‘professional historian’. Does this mean that he radically rejects the form of a narrative? No, and it is quite clear that Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of world history have a narrative dimension. But they are not a historical narrative in the strict sense of the word—rather, they are a rational consideration based on and nourished by the work of historians. In other words, my hypothesis is that Hegel increasingly made clear a point that remained uncertain in 1822: the relationship of speculative philosophy to the positive sciences (in this case, to historical writing as a discipline). The speculative consideration of history is not itself a work of history: both because it reflects on the distinction between history as a process and history as a historical narrative, and because it stays at a certain distance from the historical narratives that are nonetheless its material and its starting point. Or to use a comparison: just as the philosophy of nature is constantly nourished by the work of the various positive sciences of nature, without itself being a positive science, so the philosophy of history is constantly nourished by the work of historians, without the speculative philosopher himself being a historian. The account of history given in the lectures on the philosophy of world history is, so to speak, a second-order account, a philosophical analysis that borrows the form of a narrative from what it is based on, while itself remaining speculative.

This also means that the ‘thinking consideration (denkende Betrachtung) of history’ (GW: 18: 138) claimed by Hegel in 1830 is not itself the task of a historian, and therefore does not exactly overlap with what Hegel called ‘philosophical history’ in 1822. Hegel seems to have realized the distance between his own project and that of the philosophische Geschichtsschreiber mentioned in 1824–25. The philosophy of history must neither take the form of an ‘a priori history’ (GW: 18: 139), in which the philosopher would impose his thoughts on historical material, nor take the form of a narrative that would directly be the work of a historian. The philosophy of history keeps an equal distance from these two pitfalls, because it is based on a ‘single thought (einzige Gedanke)’ (GW: 18: 140): ‘the simple idea of reason, that reason dominates the world, that things also have gone rationally in world history (es also auch in der Weltgeschichte vernünftig zugegangen ist)’ (GW: 18: 140). The philosophy of history thus consists of an examination of world history from the standpoint of philosophy, not from the standpoint of historians. The material produced by historians is not discarded, but it is taken up and reordered from a speculative perspective. It is a question of ‘apprehend[ing] the historical faithfully (das Historische getreu auffassen)’ (GW: 18: 143), not in the sense that Hegel would conceive of himself as a ‘professional historian (Historiker von Fach)’ (GW: 18: 142), but in the sense that the speculative philosopher must respect the material provided by experience and preexisting forms of knowledge. The philosophy of history takes up and takes into account the work of historians but does not replace it.

The fact that Hegel claims to ‘proceed historically, empirically (historisch, empirisch zu verfahren)’ (GW: 18: 142) means that Hegel does not claim to deduce rationally the history of the world itself, that it is necessary to take it ‘as it is (wie sie ist)’ (GW: 18: 142), based on the empirical elements gathered by historians, but not that Hegel himself would be a historian (it may be worth noting that it is in the sentence immediately following that Hegel distances himself from professional historians). Another change between the 1822 and 1830 versions of the lectures, in the very first sentence, is also telling: ‘The subject of these lectures is philosophical world history (Der Gegenstand dieser Vorlesungen ist die philosophische Weltgeschichte)’, said Hegel in 1822 (GW: 18: 121), whereas he explained in 1830 that ‘The subject of these lectures is the philosophy of world history (Der Gegenstand dieser Vorlesungen ist die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte)’ (GW: 18: 138). It is not just the title of the lecture course that has changed, but the way in which Hegel defined its subject.

II. The changing relationship between history and historical narrative

Another series of arguments, drawn from parts of the corpus other than the philosophy of history, can be brought to bear on the idea that Hegel does not conceive of his own work as that of a historian. It seems that (it is at least what I have tried to argue (Authier Reference Authier2023)) that the relationship between history and historical narrative varies from one part of the system to another, or more precisely that the relationship between history and historical narrative is not to be understood in the same way depending on whether we are talking about nature, subjective spirit, objective spirit or absolute spirit (and even depending on whether we are talking about art, religion or philosophy).

In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, and in the context of his analysis of the ‘consummate religion’ (vollendete Religion), Hegel wonders to what extent we can talk about a history of God. He points out that the idea of history, regarding religion, only makes sense in two contexts: in so far as the point of view of ‘representation’ (as opposed to that of the concept properly speaking) is involved, and in so far as the development of the ‘divine idea’ involves ‘the history of finite consciousness itself’ (PhiRel 3: 91). Hegel goes so far as to assert that ‘all temporal determinacy is to be eliminated, whether in terms of duration or of the now; and only the thought, the simple thought, of the other is to be held fast’ (PhiRel 3: 88). Hegel thus arrives at what at first sight appears to be a paradox: there is indeed a divine history, but that history is not in itself temporal, because time only comes into play with representation. The process by which the absolute manifests itself constitutes a history (a series of differentiated aspects), even though it is not in the strict sense temporal (although it is legitimate to represent it in a temporal manner). It is only in ‘world history’ that we are dealing with a ‘succession of stages’ that takes place ‘in time’ (PhiRel 3: 144).

A similar paradox arises in relation to philosophy: every philosophical thought occurs in time and in a context that is at the same time temporal and historical, but if we consider philosophy in its history, we are dealing with a history in a seemingly strange sense of the term, a series in which the terms are in some way contemporary with each other, or as Hegel puts it, ‘a history that is at the same time no history’ (HistPhi 1: 62). It is a history that paradoxically exhibits a form of eternity. This does not mean that philosophy would only be apparently historical. By comparing these texts with Hegel’s characterization of time in the Philosophy of Nature, I have proposed the following interpretation: depending on whether Hegel is talking about the history of the objective spirit, the history of art, the history of religion or the history of philosophy, history does not have the same relationship to natural time. To put it briefly: the history of the world is still very much marked by natural time (i.e., by successivity and irreversibility), whereas the history of the absolute spirit (the history of art, religion and philosophy) is less and less so (it is a history that is less and less successive and less and less irreversible, although there always remains something successive and irreversible, even in the history of philosophy). Hegel does not limit the use of the term history to what we are accustomed to calling history (the history of societies and states, what Hegel calls Weltgeschichte), but on the contrary conceptualizes other forms of historicity, each with a slightly different relationship to natural time.

Natural time is characterized for Hegel by constant succession and irreversibility. History, on the other hand, is characterized by a form of accumulation, by the fact that not everything is over, but that some things last (and Hegel, in his Philosophy of Nature, contrasts duration with natural time; PhiNat 1: 231–32). To be historical is not to be immediately past, but to last (on the scale of world history, or on the scale of the history of art, religion or philosophy) is to be preserved and integrated into the structures of the spirit. There are therefore variations in historicity: irreversibility (or, as Hegel puts it, the ‘before and after’ that characterizes natural time; PhiNat 1: 207) is less powerful in the history of the absolute spirit than in the history of the objective spirit. In the Weltgeschichte, there is a movement of birth, life and death of states; in the history of philosophy, there is indeed birth and life, but no real death, in the sense that every true philosophy remains true (HistPhi 1: 45–46, 58–60).

This is not unimportant for examining the relationship between history and historical narrative. One of the consequences of Hegel’s thesis, it seems to me, is that the form of the historical narrative, although appropriate for describing the history of the world (at the level of the objective spirit), is only imperfectly applicable to art, religion and philosophy. Of course, in all cases there are historical narratives. But the successive nature of those narratives is more or less adapted to their subject. In the case of world history, the philosopher relies on narratives to understand an object that is successive and chronological (the manifestation of the world spirit over time, on the scale of social groups). In the case of the history of art, religion and philosophy, the object of philosophy is only indirectly chronological (the manifestation of the spirit, admittedly in time, but not in the form of an irreversible succession).

In my opinion, this explains why Hegel describes the history of philosophy as ‘a history that is at the same time no history’ (HistPhi 1: 62). Here too, it is important to refer to the recent edition of the Gesammelte Werke. The Hoffmeister edition mentions the phrase ‘Geschichte, die zugleich keine ist’ (EGesch: 166). The Garniron and Jaeschke edition corrects this to ‘Historie, die zugleich keine ist’ (VGesch 1: 230). The more precise quotation in the Gesammelte Werke is as follows:

The history of philosophy is fully a history in the sense of a Geschichte (it is a series of differentiated terms that marks the manifestation of sprit), but it is not fully a history in the sense of Historie, historical narrative.

In other words, we must acknowledge that Hegel’s conception of reason is the conception of a historical reason, rooted in history. But it is not always a question of world history. Weltgeschichte is only one of the possible forms of historicity. In the few places in his corpus where Hegel defines historicity properly speaking, or attempts to characterize what it is to be historical, and in particular at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit, he stresses the need to conceptually distinguish historicity from natural temporality (even though all observable phenomena are rooted in natural temporality): one can only conceptualize history if time is abolished or set aside (PhG: ¶¶461–62, ¶¶466–67). Hegel’s concept of history only partially overlaps with our ordinary concept of history (the latter corresponds roughly to Hegel’s Weltgeschichte). Our reason is always historical; but depending on whether we are engaged in the history of the world, the history of art, the history of religion or the history of philosophy, we do not distance ourselves from natural time and its characteristic irreversibility in the same way.

III. Speculative discourse and progressive narratives

Can we then return to the question of the narrative form, or more or less narrative form, taken by Hegel’s texts? Should we consider all his texts as narratives? Sedgwick points out that even the Science of Logic is about a development (especially in the Concept, which is ‘unfolding in stages’ (TH: 1)). Her main argument is that ‘for Hegel, thinking—whatever its object—is neither purely observational nor purely rational’ (TH: 10) and therefore that all forms of thought ‘carry a debt to temporality’ (TH: 146). This seems to me to be a perfectly fair argument. From Hegel’s perspective, thinking necessarily implies that an object has been given to us in experience: ‘it must be said that nothing is known that is not in experience, or, as it can be otherwise expressed, nothing is known that is not available as felt truth’ (PhG: ¶462). In this sense, every thought has a temporal dimension. But it is no less true that Hegel theorizes the need to abolish or set aside time: not in the sense that anyone could think outside time, but in the sense that, in order for us to engage in certain forms of thought, the object of thought must acquire an autonomy from the spatial-temporal context from which it arose.

Does this mean that all of Hegel’s texts are narratives? It all depends on the exact meaning we give to the term. If we take the term narrative in the sense in which Hegel uses the word Erzählung, the answer is negative. Hegel never speaks of Erzählung in relation to his own texts, reserving it for productions that fall under the category of representation: the works of historians, biblical narratives, myths, etc. The reason seems to me to be the following: a simple narrative cannot constitute a philosophical production in the strict sense of the term, because the ‘development’ that Hegel sees as the constant object of philosophy (be it logic, nature or spirit) is not a simple succession of facts (whether real or fictional). As Sedgwick rightly points out, ‘any approach that adopts chronology as its main ordering principle is not truly philosophical or scientific’ (TH: 86). But the main argument is that Hegel explicitly refused to allow philosophy to fall into the category of narrative:

It is only when we are talking about representation, only when we are talking about thought in so far as it has not yet taken the form of rigorous philosophical knowledge, that we can find a narrative.

How, then, are we to understand the status of Hegel’s texts? The Phenomenology of Spirit, an account of the evolution of an ideal consciousness partly inspired by the literary genre of the Bildungsromam, has undoubtedly a narrative dimension, but it is only, according to Hegel himself, ‘a partly narrative exposition (zum Teil erzählenden Exposition)’ (GW: 9: 41). And it is not a historical narrative: it is only in the ‘Spirit’ section that the narrative coincides with the chronology of world history. The Science of Logic does indeed present a development: but is this enough to speak of a narrative? Probably not, since the category of narrative seems to presuppose a chronological dimension. The exposition of the Science of Logic undoubtedly ‘carries a debt to temporality’ (TH: 146). But this debt does not take the form of an Erzählung. The stages of the Science of Logic are not linked to each other by relations of chronological anteriority and posteriority, except for the reader (which is certainly an important dimension). To put it another way, the Science of Logic is the exposition in time (in the temporality always implied by the finite consciousnesses that we are) of determinations, the connections of which are not of a temporal nature.

As far as the Philosophy of Nature is concerned, it should be emphasized that here again we are talking about a development (the kind that is at work in the structures of nature), but not a temporal one: all natural beings are temporal, but the development of the concept throughout nature described in the Encyclopaedia is not temporal. However, the texts connected to the Philosophy of Spirit have a slightly different status, since their object develops in time (especially the objective spirit and the absolute spirit). This means that to understand them from the point of view of speculation, philosophy will have to rely on narratives. Philosophy only takes on a narrative form when it comes to the history of the world, the history of art, religion and philosophy, and in that case, perhaps philosophy is based on narratives or develops from previous narratives rather than itself constituting an Erzählung.

Hegel’s conception of reason does not separate the use of reason, the means of reason and the goals of reason from our historical situation. For Hegel, philosophical activity maintains a close link with history, and philosophers need narratives: but at what point? It seems to me that Hegel’s position amounts to saying that philosophy can, and sometimes must, be based on narratives, without itself being one. The Phenomenology of Spirit can therefore be considered as a kind of narrative (although not a historical one), even though it is not only a narrative. But the question is more difficult for the texts connected to the project of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences: they borrow certain features from narratives, depending on what their object is, without themselves being directly narratives. The fact that the object of philosophy is always a development does not require it to take the form of a narrative, although it does require it to reflect on the type of development in question.