In traditional international law, it is generally acknowledged that there are five modes for acquiring territorial sovereignty between existing members of international society. Although some may argue that these have been superseded by modern law or are useless in the contemporary world, these modes are nevertheless invoked by parties to territorial disputes, and the international tribunals that settle such disputes must consider these modes in arriving at a decision. They are therefore not outmoded or useless as research subjects.
This article will not discuss each mode in detail nor the traditional law on the five modes as a whole nor the modern law governing acquisition. It will instead focus on this question: Does acquisitive prescription constitute a mode for acquiring territory in traditional international law? This is a controversial question.
For example, Brownlie has written “an epitaph”Footnote 1 for acquisitive prescription, while in another place he had listed it as one of the “roots of title”.Footnote 2 Jennings regarded prescription as difficult and complicated, and stated that while it was universally accepted in municipal law, international law scholars have disputed its position in international law even if state practice clearly endorses its validity.Footnote 3
Answering the stated question requires applying the tests of theory and practice. In theory, two criteria can be applied: distinctiveness and definiteness. If the notion of acquisitive prescription refers to a distinct situation, that is to say, where the object for prescriptive acquisition is definitely not terra nullius so that it differs from the mode of occupation, and, where the acquisition of territory does not involve the threat or use of force so that it differs from conquest or cession, then the test of distinctiveness is met. Meanwhile, the criterion of definiteness requires definite conditions to be applied to specific disputes. Only when these two tests are met can acquisitive prescription be regarded as a legal means for acquiring territorial sovereignty. The practical test usually yields a result consistent with the theoretical tests. But to test this hypothesis and to investigate whether judicial practice does indeed support a prescriptive title, this article will analyze the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
I. The Test of Distinctiveness
Many writers have used the notion of acquisitive prescription to describe various situations concerning territorial acquisition. I denote them below.
A. Immemorial Prescription
Many writers endorse a title by immemorial possession. Grotius said, for instance, that immemorial possession—or what he defines as “possession beyond the limits of memory, not interrupted nor called in question by appeal to courts”—is invaluable to preserving peace among nations.Footnote 4 And according to Vattel, while immemorial possession may impose a legal presumption, it is in fact founded on natural law.Footnote 5
Undoubtedly, immemorial possession, or “that which has lasted for such a long time that it is impossible to provide evidence of a different situation and of which anybody recalls having heard talk”,Footnote 6 is a valid title to territory. But the basis of this title is the inability of the adverse parties to support their claim substantially: omnia praesumuntur riter esse acta.
That the basis of this title must be the general opinion of international society at a certain historical moment is understandable. As the Sovereignty over Pedra Branca case showed, both “the general understanding at the relevant time of the extent of Johor” and the fact that “possession of the islands by the old Sultanate of Johor was never challenged by any other Power in the region” aided the Court in resolving this dispute.Footnote 7 Moreover, title by immemorial possession is usually claimed by parties to a dispute for a particular historical time. Because immemorial possession must in fact be a possession during a certain time, “immemorial” is only a convenient term to describe a possession of unknown origin. And indeed, the concept of a “historical title” may be more adequate for describing these types of situation.
B. Displacement of Sovereignty
Acquisitive prescription has also been used to describe a situation of abandonment of territorial sovereignty without express agreement.Footnote 8 That the abandonment of sovereignty should be a legally recognized possibility is, as explained by Vattel, essential to securing peace and happiness, which would be threatened by allowing the property and security rights of sovereigns to be easily questioned or challenged.Footnote 9 Taking a slightly different approach on the matter, Grotius explains that the firm establishment of governments, insofar as it is of utmost benefit to mankind, should be viewed favourably and supported.Footnote 10
At every point in time in history, in a nod to the central importance of the stability and certainty of territorial sovereignty in international relations, the abandonment of territorial sovereignty should be allowed and the long-continued and peaceful possession of a territory should not be easily disrupted in law. These tenets must hold true even if not specified in a treaty. However, the real basis of the newcomer's title, in cases where the legal title obviously belonged to a previous sovereign, is the tacit agreement between the newcomer and the previous sovereign.
As the ICJ stated in the Sovereignty over Pedra Branca case, this may be manifested in the following ways: treaty, conduct of the parties, and the failure of a state to display sovereignty when challenged to it by another state such that this omission of action may be equated to acquiescence.Footnote 11 Here, the Court awarded territorial sovereignty to Singapore, based on “a convergent evolution of the positions of the Parties regarding title to Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh”.Footnote 12
While a displacement of territorial sovereignty is possible with or without an express agreement, the basis of this displacement is an agreement in one form or another. Without an express agreement, the transfer of territorial sovereignty must be based on a tacit agreement. It has nothing to do with the lapse of time, and unilateral activities can never be the legal basis for a territorial change. As opposed to “prescription”, therefore, “tacit agreement” more accurately describes this situation.
C. Acquisitive Prescription and Conquest
The notion of acquisitive prescription is sometimes entangled with that of conquest. The status of conquest as a legal means to acquire territory in traditional international law has been invoked by some advocates of the prescriptive doctrine as a reason for granting acquisitive prescription formal status.
According to Vattel, for instance:
If any nation has kept [its] silence through fear, and as it were through necessity, the loss of her right is a misfortune which she ought to patiently bear, since she could not avoid it: and why should she not submit to this as well as to have her towns and provinces taken from her by an unjust conqueror, and to be forced to cede them to him by treaty?Footnote 13
Similarly, Johnson pointed out that a state which did not fight for its rights, but contented itself with making diplomatic protests, could lose its territory.Footnote 14
This argument should definitely be refused. If unjust war is a legal way to acquire territory, then there will be no reason to prohibit the recovery of the territory lost in an unjust war. Moreover, the purpose of the doctrine of acquisitive prescription will not be achieved in this legal context, as the maintenance of the status quo will be solely decided by the balance of power. The concept of treaty of cession or occupation of terra nullius may be useful, however, in providing a standard or a formality for states in dealing with their territorial relations.
In a different vein, some writers also endorse a notion of “adverse possession”, which may be identical to conquest as a legal way to acquire territory. In discussing this theory, for example, Hall prioritizes the practical advantage of maintaining international order by essentially linking ownership to length of time possessed, instead of preserving ultimate rights to property.Footnote 15
As there seems to be no difference between conquest and adverse possession, there is no reason for the co-existence of these two modes in traditional international law. Conquest as a mode for “sanctioning a wrong” is enough.
That Vattel and Hall opine as they do is understandable. In an epoch where war is a legal instrument for states, persuading states to accept the loss of territory may be a useful, albeit unjust, way of alleviating international tensions. Under the Charter of the United Nations, the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any state is forbidden and the acquisition of territory by these means is illegal and invalid, as only the consent of the states concerned can be the basis for a legal title. To embrace a notion of prescriptive title irrespective of the consent of the state concerned may therefore be a method of endorsing a historical injustice, either completed or ongoing. In this respect, it is worth noting that no states have been willing to claim a title by historical conquest before the ICJ. And this holds true although conquest has, through the principle of inter-temporal law, been recognized as a legal way to acquire territory for centuries before the era of the United Nations.
D. Necessity of Deconstructing the Notion of Acquisitive Prescription
There may be situations other than those referred to by the modes of occupation, conquest, and cession, where the notion of acquisitive prescription might have a role to play.
Let us assume that there are two states—A and B—in a territorial dispute and that there are two critical dates in the case—t1 and t2. We take t2 to be the date of the crystallization of the dispute and later than t1. Let us further assume the following: State A claims that she has an immemorial title over the disputed area and never abandons it until t2, and State B claims that she occupied the disputed area at t1 and has subsequently controlled it until t2. The dispute is brought for adjudication, and the international tribunal is required to deal with the question of whether the disputed area belonged to State A at t1.
If the title of State A at t1 cannot be established, then the tribunal would proceed to deal with the question of whether the disputed area belonged to State A or B in the period from t1 to t2. Whatever the answer is, the tribunal concerned will regard the disputed area as terra nullius before t1.
On the other hand, if the title of State A at t1 can be established not by occupation, cession, or conquest but by the general opinion of international society at that time, then this is a type of situation which some writers label as immemorial prescription. The correct label is, however, “historical title”. “Time immemorial” is not an accurate concept because any title has to be established by relevant facts happening in a particular moment or period, which is why “historical title” may be a more appropriate concept for describing this situation.
Furthermore, if the title of State A at t1 can be established by the tribunal concerned, then for the period from t1 to t2, three issues remain. First, if State A continued her sovereignty over the area concerned, then State A is still the holder of title. Second, if State B conquered the area concerned, then State B got the title by conquest. And third, if State A abandoned the area concerned, then State B is the title-holder by a process of displacement of the original title. The last situation is also referred to by some writers as “acquisitive prescription”. But, as previously explained, the more accurate term is “tacit agreement”, because this process involves, first, the abandonment evidenced by acquiescence or lack of action by State A, and second, the effective control exercised by State B.
The Chamber of the ICJ gave a judicial guidance for the application of the principle of uti possidetis:
Where the act corresponds exactly to law, where effective administration is additional to the uti possedetis juris, the only role of effectivité is to conform the exercise of the right derived from a legal title. Where the act does not correspond to the law, where the territory which is the subject of the dispute is effectively administered by a State other than the one possessing the legal title, preference should be given to the holder of the title. In the event that the effectivité does not co-exist with any legal title, it must invariably be taken into consideration. Finally, there are cases where the legal title is not capable of showing exactly the territorial expanse to which it relates. The effectivités can then play an essential role in showing how the title is interpreted in practice.Footnote 16
This guidance can also be applied to cases involving other forms of original title.
Therefore, international law really needs concepts for describing situations other than occupation, cession, and conquest, and the doctrine of acquisitive prescription may be considered a response to this need. But the notion of acquisitive prescription should be broken into two parts—historical title and tacit agreement—for the basis of the former is the general opinion of international society and that of the latter is the congruence between the abandonment of the previous sovereign and the effective control of the newcomer. It is useless and misleading to put these two substantially different situations into one notion. In this respect, Brownlie said that “[if one excludes adverse holding or negative prescription] the situations described under the rubric of prescription by the writers, on analysis, fall into three categories: cases of immemorial possession; competing acts of sovereignty (Island of Palmas case); and cases of acquiescence.”Footnote 17 This statement goes in the right direction, but a few words need to be said.
First, the concepts of “historical title” and “tacit agreement” may be more accurate than “immemorial possession” and “acquiescence”, respectively. Second, the category of “competing acts of sovereignty” should be excluded. There cannot be contemporaneously competing acts of sovereignty, because if sovereignty belonged to one party in a given time, then the other party's acts on the territory must be regarded as illegal. And if sovereignty belonged to none, then both parties’ acts are legal but not sovereign, and the area concerned must be regarded as terra nullius. The so-called “acts of sovereignty” is merely a claim by one or both parties, which is to be judged by the tribunal concerned, and not real “acts of sovereignty” that are to be automatically adopted as facts by the tribunal. As the ICJ noted in the case concerning sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, “while the Parties both maintain that the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan were not terra nullius during the period in question in the present case, they do so on the basis of diametrically opposed reasoning, each of them claiming to hold title to those islands”.Footnote 18
In opposition to this view, Jennings has espoused a combination of immemorial possession and adverse possession. He stated that since both result in the acquisition of a good title and can originate in one of the dispute matters, “there is inevitably a tendency to lump them together so that the difference between them becomes one of degree rather than of kind”.Footnote 19
As stated above, although the origin of a possession may be disputed by the parties to a dispute, the tribunal concerned is nevertheless obliged to establish the legal position of the disputed area for a given time—it cannot refuse to decide the matter because of unclear law or facts—and, if the disputed area in fact and in law belongs to no state, then the tribunal concerned will assign the status of terra nullius to the relevant territory. Furthermore, the result of such a decision might be insignificant for outsiders, but shall surely be very significant for the tribunal concerned and the losing party to a dispute, as these two parties would surely demand that the decision must be logical and reasonable. Therefore, even though we adopt “adverse possession” as a legal way to acquire territory, the notion of acquisitive prescription is an inadequate combination of historical title and tacit agreement, and should be broken into two parts.
II. The Test of Definiteness
There are two other problems for the advocates of the notion of acquisitive prescription: establishing the length of time necessary for a prescriptive title, and identifying who has the power to abandon territorial sovereignty.
A. The Problem of Establishing the Length of Time
This problem involves two aspects: the length of time required to establish the intention of the original title-holder, and the length of time required to establish the effectiveness of the actions of newcomer.
Regarding the former, Grotius explains that the time period that goes beyond what man can remember can be practically equated to infinity, which is why abandonment of ownership can be implied by a silence the duration of which goes beyond what can be remembered.Footnote 20 However, I find that Grotius is wrong in this regard: the period of existence of a state as a public person is completely different from that of a natural person. For the purpose of international law, a state's existence should be regarded as limitless, just like the life of a company is regarded as limitless in accounting law in almost all municipal law systems. In practice, for instance, the state outlives the death of governments; and the memory of states is recorded in history books.
For the effectiveness of a newcomer's control, however, the limitless existence of states is a difficult problem. Grotius said that while a statutory definition of the length of time necessary for acquiring sovereignty may exist, “in a transfer of sovereignty, the people could express its will as to the manner and time in which the sovereignty might be lost by failure to exercise it”, and this expression should be honoured even by a king.Footnote 21 While Grotius is right in pointing out that the people's will is the final determinant for the transfer of sovereignty, the people's will is difficult if not impossible to know. Even an express statement given by a government may in fact be overturned by a later government.
Vattel gave a solution a little different from that of Grotius. Specifically, he advocated both adopting a treaty that would settle the number of years necessary for a lawful prescription and honouring customs that are relevant to the matter.Footnote 22 The solution of Vattel is, however, a tautology. States can by treaty adopt any rule on any subject. The problem here is the very existence of such customs.
Lastly, the solution of Johnson was to treat the number of years necessary for a lawful prescription and the effects of actions preventing such a prescription as questions of fact and to leave their resolution to international tribunals charged with resolving such disputes.Footnote 23 But before a tribunal can act, states must first consent to its jurisdiction. While we may reiterate that the states concerned can adopt any rule on any subject, the question lies in the existence of consent on the part of the relevant states.
If we break the notion of acquisitive prescription down into two parts, the problem of the length of time can be easily solved. For historical title, no such problem is involved, as the basis of this title is the general repute at a given time. For tacit agreement, the length of time may be relevant but not decisive—the basis of this title is the common intention of both parties to a dispute as implied in their actual acts.
B. Who has the Power to Abandon Territorial Sovereignty?
There is an even more difficult problem for advocates of the notion of acquisitive prescription—identifying who has the power to abandon territorial sovereignty. This complicated issue has been expressed by Grotius as follows: “whether those not yet born can tacitly lose their right by such an abandonment.”Footnote 24 Vattel raised a similar question and stressed the difference between the power of the ruler of a state and the national rights of the state. Specifically, while state rulers may abandon property through their silence, they ultimately have no power to alienate the property of the state or to affect the rights of their successors; and as such, the question shifts to whether the nation itself has either countered or participated in the silence of its rulers.Footnote 25
The answer given by Grotius is that “the fact must be recognized that a person who is not yet born has no rights, just as a thing which does not exist has no attributes”.Footnote 26 This answer may sufficiently address relations between natural persons, but for international relations it is not a perfect answer. In practice, governments may be displaced by other governments, but the state remains the same. An agreement concluded by a government that concerned itself only with the interests of narrowly based ruling groups should be reconsidered in some circumstances by a new government that represents more broad-based national interests. Moreover, the other parties to the agreement must respect this reconsideration if they wish to maintain friendly relations with the new government in accordance with the principle of justice.
Vattel's answer to this question might be a little arbitrary. He essentially stresses that peace, safety, and happiness would be best served by making the rights of nations as stable as possible, which is why prescription based on length of possession should be allowed to produce valid property titles.Footnote 27 To maintain truly stable international relations, however, justice should prevail.
C. The Necessity of Deconstructing the Notion of Acquisitive Prescription
The above-mentioned problems cannot be perfectly solved even if we break the notion of acquisitive prescription into two parts, but doing so will enable a more thorough resolution to the problems.
For historical title, no abandonment is needed, as there is no competing claimant. For tacit agreement, the essence lies in the common intention of both parties. The acquiescence of the previous sovereign may be relevant but is not necessary. As shown in the Sovereignty over Pedra Branca case, Singapore's installation of naval communication equipment may not have been known by Malaysia—which means that Malaysia possibly did not acquiesce to this act—but the ICJ considered this act as a factor for “a convergent evolution of the positions of the parties”.Footnote 28 Furthermore, the unilateral exercise of state authority is necessary but not sufficient for the establishment of a tacit agreement. Where the original title has been found by a competent tribunal, the exercise of state authority without the consent of the original title-holder must be regarded as illegal. For the competent tribunal, all acts or lack of action of both parties should be considered in establishing the existence of a tacit agreement.
But regarding the problem of identifying who may abandon territorial sovereignty, this two-part approach does not work perfectly. The existence of a tacit agreement for a transfer of sovereignty must be found by an international tribunal, but the jurisdiction of the international tribunal is based on the consent of the state concerned. Without consent to jurisdiction, no dispute would be settled, and no title can be found by any tribunal. In this respect, it is submitted that state parties to a territorial dispute should accept as reasonable the possibility of a transfer of sovereignty, and be encouraged to refer the dispute to judicial settlement if necessary. The precondition is of course that the international law be just—law as “a sanction for wrong” will not easily be trusted by all civilized peoples.
III. The Jurisprudence of the ICJ
In some cases concerning territorial disputes, the ICJ considered the notion of acquisitive prescription. We may draw some ideas from the following cases.
A. Acquisitive Prescription as an Alternative Submission
In some cases, the claim of displacement of original legal title is raised as an alternative submission. An example here is the Certain Frontier Land case, where the Netherlands submitted that even if a convention may have established a legal title over disputed territory, certain acts of sovereignty had nevertheless displaced such a legal title.Footnote 29 Classifying this case as a “claim to sovereignty in derogation of title established by treaty”—with such derogation being rooted in the alleged non-acquiescence of Belgium to acts of sovereignty on the part of the NetherlandsFootnote 30—the Court examined the facts and decided in favour of Belgium and against the Netherlands.Footnote 31
Similarly, in the Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia) case, Malaysia claimed title to Ligitan and Sipadan by treaty, but in the alternative claimed title through “continuous peaceful possession and administration, without objection from Indonesia or its predecessors in title”. Having found that neither of the parties had a treaty-based title, the Court considered these effectivités independently and separately.Footnote 32
In more cases, though, parties seek no support from the notion of acquisitive prescription. An example of this is the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), where Thailand explicitly admitted that she did not obtain the Temple by acquisitive prescription if Cambodia had acquired title to the temple by settlement, but instead asserted that its acts constituted “conduct as sovereign”.Footnote 33
B. Acquisitive Prescription as Not Clearly Adduced
In the Sovereignty over Pedra Branca case, whether Singapore claimed title by prescription was not clear. Indeed, Singapore claimed that agents of the British crown had taken lawful possession of Pedra Branca during 1847–51, and that they and then Singapore continued to exert their authority over the territory.Footnote 34 But obviously, if the Court found that the title in the period 1847–51 belonged to Johor, the argument of “lawful possession” would have been invalid. In this respect then, did Singapore claim a prescriptive title?
Judge Dugard found it strange that Singapore chose not to argue explicitly for a prescriptive title even as he observed that Singapore's claim was very much like that based on prescription.Footnote 35 Judge Rao, on the other hand, affirmed Singapore's decision not to bring a claim by prescription, as such a claim would have been inconsistent with its argument that the British possession of Pedra Branca was lawful.Footnote 36 In any case, both of these judges noted that Singapore did not claim a prescriptive title.
But on this point, Judge Simma and Judge Abraham had different opinions, as they had their own notion of acquisitive prescription. In a joint dissenting opinion, they said that “[o]ne may, however, wonder whether the more relevant concept regarding the transfer of territorial sovereignty—rather than tacit agreement or acquiescence—is acquisitive prescription, which in a way encompasses the other two notions and which regrettably the Judgment does not mention”.Footnote 37 These two judges also thought that without actually using the term, Singapore was in effect asking the Court to apply acquisitive prescription, as prescription was the only way for Singapore to establish its sovereignty.Footnote 38
In this case, the Court clarified that it had rendered the notion of prescription irrelevant to the case because Singapore had claimed that Malaysia had not proven historical title to Pedra Branca.Footnote 39 As such, the notion of acquisitive prescription was not in any way indicated as the basis for the transfer of sovereignty.
C. The Agreement of the Parties
In one case, both parties agreed to the condition for a prescriptive title, but the Court did not state its approach to the status of this notion.
In the case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Namibia argued that if its title to the Kasikili Island could not be based on the 1890 Treaty, then Namibia nevertheless had a prescriptive title to the territory “by virtue of continuous and exclusive occupation and use of Kasikili Island and exercise of sovereign jurisdiction over it from the beginning of the century, with full knowledge, acceptance and acquiescence by the governing authorities in Bechuanaland and Botswana”.Footnote 40
The Court struck down this alternative submission on the basis that the proof of state authority that Namibia had adduced in support of its claim of a prescriptive title was insufficient.Footnote 41 Furthermore, the Court stated that while it did not need to investigate the status of prescription in international law for the purposes of resolving the dispute,Footnote 42 the Special Agreement reached between the parties did not preclude the Court from doing so, inasmuch as it explicitly referred to prescription as part of international law.Footnote 43
While prescription was understood to be part of international law, two points should be noted. First, the parties themselves agreed to include acquisitive prescription in their understanding of international law, and further specified the conditions under which such a prescription would be found.Footnote 44 Thus, the Court's examination of arguments relating to prescription was only an acceptance of or non-opposition to both parties’ common position in this matter. Second, in this case, the Court considered itself authorized by the Special Agreement to apply generally “rules and principles of international law” agreed to by them. Therefore, if there is no such authorization, the Court's examination of arguments relating to prescription that are put forward by only one party may be regarded as ultra vires.
D. Conclusions for the Case Study and Deconstructing Work
In almost all territorial disputes, the Court considers the historical title claimed by one party or by both. The subsequent acts of sovereignty or other facts alleged by the parties will be considered in the context of establishing the historical title.
Historical titles have been established in the few cases where one party has claimed a prescriptive title before the Court as an alternative submission or where both parties have agreed to the existence of such a title. But otherwise, no such title has ever been found by the Court. Where no original title at a critical date has been found by the Court, the subsequent activities alleged by both parties will be equally considered, and where one party's activities may be regarded as sovereign acts, the other party's acquiescence or lack of action may be relevant for the establishment of the former's title. When the original title at a critical date has been found by the Court, who has also found no acquiescence or lack of action on the part of the holder of the original title, then the alleged sovereign acts cannot be the basis for legal title, and the title essentially rests on illegal or invalid activities. The displacement of the original title is possible only in a situation where a tacit agreement has been reached between the parties. The sovereign acts of one party and the acquiescence or lack of action on the part of the other are both necessary.
Therefore, the concepts of historical title and tacit agreement are useful for the decisions of the ICJ, and the notion of acquisitive prescription has played no role in the same.
For the reasons given above, the notion of acquisitive prescription should be excluded from the sphere of international law. It is useless in practice and confusing in theory. Although it is sometimes invoked by parties to a territorial dispute, the ICJ has never accepted acquisitive prescription as a rule of law, and no other international tribunal has expressly endorsed it as such.Footnote 45 The notion of acquisitive prescription actually refers to two substantially different situations: historical title and tacit agreement. If we break this portmanteau into two parts, the traditional five modes of acquisition can be rearranged as six modes: conquest, occupation, cession, accretion, historical title, and tacit agreement. As previously explained, the jurisprudence of the ICJ supports this rearrangement.
Deconstructing the notion of acquisitive prescription will be helpful in understanding territorial disputes and will enable international law to play a positive role in their peaceful settlement. Further studies could be done in this direction. The next section illustrates how deconstructing acquisitive prescription could possibly lead to a peaceful solution of the Diaoyu Islands dispute.
IV. Implications for the Diaoyu Islands Dispute
The two-pronged deconstruction of the notion of acquisitive prescription will be helpful in understanding the Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan. A clear and correct exposition of this part of international law will indeed help both parties take the correct policies towards the dispute.
A. A Brief Review of the Positions of the Two Parties
Both China and Japan have stated their legal positions concerning the disputes over the Diaoyu Islands. China has said, inter alia:
The Tiaoyu and other islands have been China's territory since ancient times. Back in the Ming dynasty, these islands were already within China's sea defence areas; they were islands appertaining to China's Taiwan but not to Ryukyu, which is now known as Okinawa. The boundary between China and Ryukyu in this area lies between Chihwei Island and Kume Island and fishermen from China's Taiwan have all along carried out productive activities on the Tiaoyu and other islands. During the 1894 Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese Government stole these islands and in April 1895 it forced the government of the Ching Dynasty to conclude the unequal “Treaty of Shimonoseki” by which “Taiwan, together with all islands appertaining to Taiwan” and the Penghu Islands were ceded. Now the Sato government has gone to the length of making the Japanese invaders’ act of aggression of seizing China's territory in the past a ground for claiming that Japan has the so called “title” to the Tiaoyu and other islands. This is sheer and outright gangster logic … The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China hereby solemnly declares: Tiaoyu Island, Huangwei Island, Chihwei Island, Nanhsiao Island, Peihsiao Island, etc. are islands appertaining to Taiwan. Like Taiwan, they have been an inalienable part of Chinese territory since ancient times.Footnote 46
This is basically a claim of historical title.
On the other hand, Japan has said, on 8 March 1972, inter alia:
From 1885 on, surveys of the Senkaku Islands had been thoroughly made by the Government of Japan through the agencies of Okinawa Prefecture and by way of other methods. Through these surveys, it was confirmed that the Senkaku Islands had been uninhabited and showed no trace of having been under the control of China. Based on this confirmation, the Government of Japan made a Cabinet Decision on 14 January 1895 to erect a marker on the Islands to formally incorporate the Senkaku Islands into the territory of Japan …
The fact that China expressed no objection to the status of the Islands being under the administration of the United States under Article III of the San Francisco Peace Treaty clearly indicates that China did not consider the Senkaku Islands as part of Taiwan. It was not until the latter half of 1970, when the question of the development of petroleum resources on the continental shelf of the East China Sea came to the surface, that the Government of China and Taiwan authorities began to raise questions regarding the Senkaku Islands. Furthermore, none of the points raised by the Government of China as “historic, geographic or geological” evidence provide valid grounds, in light of international law, to support China's arguments regarding the Senkaku Islands.Footnote 47
This is basically a claim of occupation of terra nullius. Japan also sought support from the acquiescence on the part of, and lack of action from, China.
B. Critical Dates
The concept of critical dates is a useful technique for identifying the gist of this dispute. It was defined by Goldie “as the temporal element in the point of convergence of distinct sets of facts or concatenations of events each of which are put forward in the same dispute”.Footnote 48 In his opinion, this doctrine helps to zero in on the legal relation between parties by identifying a specific time around which to arrange the relevant facts.Footnote 49 This approach, however, is most helpful if just one critical date is identified. Jennings, indeed, pointed out that the identification of more than one critical date—which he defines as “a date after which any actions of the parties are ineffective to change the[ir] position”—makes the identified dates only “relatively critical”.Footnote 50
In the Diaoyu Islands dispute, from the positions stated by the parties and based on the deconstruction approach advocated in this article, there are at least two critical dates, each of which can help us evaluate the status of the disputed area at the critical moments. One is the year 1895, and the other is the period 1971 to 1972. For the claim of occupation by Japan, the year 1895 is critical because if the Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands belonged to China at that time, then the claim of a title by occupation will be defeated. For the claim of ancient title by China, 1895 is also critical because even if it can be established that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China in the period of, or prior to, the Ming dynasty, it might still be necessary for her to establish her sovereignty in 1895, as abandonment before then is not impossible. Thus, the year 1895 is the point of time when both the alleged right-creating acts of one party and the alleged right-maintaining acts of the other party converges.
In this dispute, even if the historical title can be established, there may still be a possibility of a transfer of sovereignty after 1895. During 1971–72, when the dispute arose, both China and Japan declared their legal positions on the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands/the Senkaku Islands. After this date, nothing could change the legal position of the disputed area. Thus the 1971–72 period is the second critical date in this dispute, in the sense that it is when the dispute was crystallized.
C. The Result of a Judicial Settlement will be Uncertain
There is currently no sign of a pacific settlement. On the one hand, it seems that both parties are confident of their title, which makes it difficult for either to negotiate a compromise. On the other hand, it seems unacceptable for both parties to lose the disputed area in any form of judicial settlement. A stalemate thus prevails.
As far as the judicial settlement is concerned, we may try to raise a hypothetical question: If the Diaoyu Islands dispute is submitted to an international tribunal, how will the dispute be dealt with? Both parties are sure to raise various claims in the pleadings, but for the purpose of this article, and based on the analysis given above, we may expect that the tribunal will have to deal with two main issues. First, did the disputed area belong to China in 1895? And, if the answer is affirmative, then was there a transfer of sovereignty during the period 1895 to 1971?
For the first question, the principle of inter-temporal law should be observed. In the Sovereignty over Pedra Branca case, the Court did not accept that a “continuous and peaceful [in relation to other states] display of territorial sovereignty” should be satisfied in order to establish a historical title. The views of Judge Rao, indeed, seemed unacceptable to the majority of the Court.Footnote 51
For the second question, in the absence of an express agreement for a change of sovereignty, the presumption is that sovereignty rests with the historical title-holder, and this presumption must not be easily overturned.Footnote 52
As expressed by the ICJ, it must also be noted that if there was no acquiescence by the previous sovereign in the abandonment of its title in the area in favour of the newcomer, the so-called sovereign acts adduced by the newcomer should be regarded as illegal acts, and accordingly “preference should be given to the holder of the title”.Footnote 53
If these principles are rigorously observed, prima facie, then China's claim is stronger. But the result of a judicial settlement is unpredictable. Chinese title to the disputed area might not be recognized by an international tribunal, and the possibility of a transfer of sovereignty cannot be excluded.
D. The Helpful Role of International Law
Some writers have lamented what they perceive to be the unhelpful, and perhaps even impeding, role of international law in dealing with the Diaoyu Islands dispute. Ramos-Mrosovsky, for instance, states that the customary international law that places a premium on displays of sovereignty and on reactions, as opposed to acquiescence, to the same may lead to an escalation of conflict, especially when territorial disputes are contextualized by intense nationalism.Footnote 54
Such a point of view may, however, be a misunderstanding of international law. The value placed on displays of sovereignty must be weighed in a particular legal context. If we recognize all displays of sovereignty as creating title, we are surely encouraging all forms of opportunistic policies and at the same time discouraging tolerant and peace-loving ones. This would lead to more military competitions between disputing states, which would then lead to more military alliances and an increase in international tensions. International law would thus collapse upon itself. International law should therefore absolutely deny so-called effective control obtained with illegality as a means of gaining legal title to territory. But at the same time, the long history of international relations makes it impossible to deny the possibility of a transfer of sovereignty.
If the parties to the Diaoyu Islands dispute take these two aspects of law—that historical title should be respected and its displacement not lightly regarded, and that a transfer of territorial sovereignty is possible in some circumstances—into consideration, they may be more reasonable in dealing with their mutual relations in general and with the dispute in particular. China might think that her historical title will not necessarily and automatically continue indefinitely, while Japan might think that so-called effective control of the disputed area may be regarded as illegal or invalid. Thus, China may not think it necessary to invest in more displays of sovereignty to maintain her historical title, while Japan may not rely upon her display of sovereignty to be title-creating in the disputed islands. From here, both parties may be more willing to seek a negotiated compromise, a judicial settlement, or other pacific means of their choice based on the correct understanding of the rules of international law governing the acquisition of territorial sovereignty.
This would, indeed, do credit to the great people of both China and Japan, who should do their best to be responsible for the maintenance of regional and international peace and security in a friendly and co-operative way.
