Philosophers and economists are pre-dominantly contentious. If 30 distinguished economists write to The Times expressing a view that view will be rejected in a letter the following day by a different 30 equally distinguished economists. In philosophy, whereas there is a tradition of the soul meditating with itself, the dominant tradition is that of debate with the assumption that truth will emerge from the clash of ideas. The Infidel and the Professor (hereafter IP) makes a convincing case for the importance of friendship rather than meditation or contention as a basis for creativity and mutual development. The author, Dennis C. Rasmussen, points out that friendship has been a key factor in the development of philosophy from its Greek origins, and that Hume and Smith clearly concurred. He notes that Hume held that ‘friendship is the chief joy of human life’ and Smith that the esteem and affection of one’s friends constitutes ‘the chief part of human happiness’ (5). In the case of Smith and Hume the friendship was both personal and intellectual.
The personal side to their relationship is reflected in their letters. In addition to the exchange of ideas the letters discuss friends, family, health, travel and express a constant desire for meeting. Their openings move from ‘Dear Sir’ to ‘Dear Smith’ and finally to ‘My Dearest Friend’. There are extant fifteen letters from Smith to Hume and forty-one from Hume to Smith. Rasmussen makes use of these letters to provide fresh insights into the characters and thoughts of each.
The earliest influence of Hume’s ideas on Smith is to be seen in an early work written while Smith was at Balliol where, as he said, the professors had given up ‘even the pretence of teaching’ (38). The work is entitled The Principles which Lead and Direct Philosophical Ideas. It contains three essays of which the first and most important offers a philosophy of science much influenced by Hume’s Treatise. Basically it argues that scientific theories are neither true nor false but are accepted because in a given period they satisfy the imagination. We engage in science in the hope of ‘soothing the imagination’ by accounting for the ‘chaos of jarring and discordant appearances’ (41). The argument is clearly influenced by Hume’s claim that feeling is the dominant influence not just in poetry but in science. ‘It is not solely in poetry and music we must follow our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy’ (Treatise 1 III VII). Again, many of the essays in Hume’s Political Discourses anticipate some of Smith’s in The Wealth of Nations (WN), such as the view that the true source of a nation’s wealth is not its gold or its positive balance of trade but its productive citizenry. In addition to its sympathetic exposition of the two aspects of the friendship between Hume and Smith – the personal and the intellectual – the book has two other themes: it places the writings for which they are best known in the wider context of all their writings, and it places their writings in the context of their times.
There was a period in the 20th century when the study of Hume was confined to Book 1 of his Treatise. This very limited approach failed to see that Book 1 simply sets out the method of his ‘science of human nature’ which was then applied to other areas of human life – in morals, politics, economics, literature and history. In other words, Hume was one of the literati and his philosophical interests, in our contemporary sense, were just one aspect of his broader interests. Indeed, he was himself in his day seen more as a historian than a philosopher in our sense. Rasmussen very plausibly places Hume’s philosophy in that wider context of his many other interests. In a similar way Smith was one of the literati. WN is very much a work of political economy, a discipline broader in its scope than the narrow number-crunching discipline economics has become at the present time. In other words, the WN places economics in the context of Smith’s much wider moral and social interests. Writing just before the Industrial Revolution got going (the Carron Iron Works were opened in 1776) he nevertheless shows awareness of the bad effects of industrialisation (171–3). And the fundamental moral/political belief underlying the WN, a belief with which Hume strongly concurred, is that nations are helped rather than hindered by flourishing trading partners. The mercantilist view, that commerce is a kind of war, stems, he argues, from ‘national prejudice and animosity’. Indeed, Hume’s essay of 1758, Of the Jealousy of Trade has lessons for our negotiators with the EU. As a British subject he prays for the prosperity of Germany, Spain, Italy, and, yes, ‘even France itself’ (167).
These wide intellectual interests and writings are themselves reflections of and reactions to the context in which they lived. The social context was one in which the Christian religion dominated. Hume was of course notorious for his writings on religion and Rasmussen makes it a central theme in his book – as reflected in his title – The Infidel and the Professor. The advice which Smith gave to Hume on this issue brings out one aspect of the personal side to their friendship. Smith’s own religious views are not known, because he possessed a degree of prudence on expressing them which Hume lacked. Indeed, Hume showed a lack of awareness of the controversial nature of his stance on religion when he applied for the Chair or Moral Philosophy in Edinburgh. He expresses surprise and hurt when Hutcheson would not support his application. Hutcheson saw Hume’s approach to moral philosophy – ‘an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects’ – as lacking warmth in the cause of virtue, whereas Hutcheson saw the moral philosopher as a ‘friend to virtue’. It was therefore not surprising that Hutcheson would not support Hume’s application for the Chair.
The most controversial aspect of the friendship between Smith and Hume concerns the posthumous publication of Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Smith was appointed literary executor of Hume’s works but refused to oversee the publication of the Dialogues. (They were finally seen through the press by Hume’s nephew in 1779.) Subsequent commentators have commented adversely on Smith and suggested that the refusal tarnished their relationship. Rasmussen surveys the evidence and argues that it does not suggest that the friendship was damaged. I suggest that the present-day commentators who throw around criticism of Smith – ‘disloyal’, ‘act of betrayal’, ‘leaves a bad taste’ – might like to conduct this thought experiment. Suppose a well-known thinker were to write a detailed philosophical criticism of Islam including the occasional ironical comment and asked you to have your name associated with it, would you agree? Not if you wanted, like Smith or indeed Hume himself, to have a quiet life! Dominant orthodoxies change and the religious views of the past are an easy target for contemporary liberals. In any case, Smith did publish a letter to William Strahan to be included with Hume’s My Own Life. The concluding words of the letter brought Smith a great deal of criticism from his religious contemporaries. The words are worth repeating because they illustrate the depth of the friendship:
‘Upon the whole, I have always considered him, both in his lifetime and since his death, as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit’ (1).
Rasmussen’s book has many merits. First, it is very readable. As he says in his Preface it is written for anyone interested in learning more about the lives and ideas of these two giants of the Enlightenment, and about what is arguably the greatest of all philosophical friendships. It is readable because he has a clear prose style and his chapters are neatly sub-divided. Secondly, the theme of friendship also brings out the human side to abstract ideas. For example, he devotes a chapter to the quarrel between Hume and Rousseau, and notes Smith’s gossipy interest in the outcome: ‘What has become of Rousseau? Has he gone abroad, because he cannot continue to get himself sufficiently persecuted in Great Britain?’ (144). Thirdly, Rasmussen provides a clear and accurate account of the main ideas of both Hume and Smith and their contexts. For example, Hume’s Histories were important to him and were influential at the time but they are not well-known in contemporary philosophical circles. Rasmussen discusses their content and importance to Hume. Contemporary commentators on Hume’s philosophy should note their relevance to a picture of Hume’s total outlook. Fourthly, the book is one of breathtaking scholarship, of both primary sources and secondary literature.
As a reservation, I wondered if Rasmussen underestimates the influence of Francis Hutcheson on both Hume and Smith. Smith of course attended Hutcheson’s lectures in Glasgow, and would be aware not only of his moral philosophy but his lectures on economics. Hutcheson’s discussion of economic questions is to be found both in his System of Moral Philosophy and in his Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, but the greater concentration of economic discussion is in chapter XII of Book II of the System. In particular there is a discussion of value by which Smith has clearly been greatly influenced. No less an authority than Edwin Cannan has claimed in his Introduction to his edition of the WN: ‘Probably it is in this chapter that the germ of the WN is to be found.’ Certainly Smith himself acknowledges his debt to Hutcheson. For example, in his letter to the Principal of Glasgow University on accepting the post of Lord Rector he writes of his appointment to the Chair of Moral Philosophy, ‘to which the abilities and virtues of the never to be forgotten Dr Hutcheson had given a superior degree of illustration’ (37). Hume also was much influenced by Hutcheson. For example, he was influenced by Hutcheson’s idea that moral judgments are not based on rational insight or evidence but on feeling, as I have already suggested. According to Norman Kemp Smith it was this idea which ‘opened up to him a new scene of thought’ which transported him beyond measure. Kemp Smith claims that the new scene of thought was that this idea could apply also in the theoretical domain (The Philosophy of David Hume, 12–20). But this is a minor quibble – Rasmussen is concerned with the friendship between Hume and Smith and its beneficial effects on both men rather than on other influences on them. He has written an excellent book which offers a clear account of the ideas of Smith and Hume, and celebrates the importance of philosophical friendship.
