Debra Satz's new book is a welcome addition to the long-standing debate about the ethical nature of markets and their effects in society. The book's main claim is that some goods should be shielded from the operation of the market. In particular, Satz concentrates on the existence and functioning of “noxious” or “toxic” markets, that is, markets that “evoke widespread discomfort and, in the extreme, revulsion” (p. 3). Examples of this type of market, which are referred to in Part III, are markets in women's reproductive labor and sexual labor, in child labor, in human kidneys, and in voluntary slavery or bondage.
Part I is devoted to an explanation of the role and function of markets in general. Part II is devoted to the criticisms and defenses of that institution from different perspectives in economic theory, namely, the classical political economics school (Ricardo, Marx, Smith) and the welfare economics school. Satz tirelessly emphasizes that her rejection of noxious markets revives heated debates that took place among the classical political economists in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries about the weakness of markets. As Chapter 2 shows, these thinkers all explored ways in which the market can operate on the basis of arbitrary relationships of power among people. The labor market at the factory level is a pristine example of how exploitative and cruel the market could be and, importantly, of how it could shape people's preferences and conceptions of themselves. For the classical tradition, “a worker's preferences and capabilities are shaped by the organization of work…. In the labor market workers make not only pins and widgets but they also make aspects of themselves” (p. 45). Satz wishes to reject the later turn toward welfare economics which, arguably, is completely oblivious to the negative social repercussions of markets on people's autonomy, due to its emphasis on individual preferences as a factor external to markets.
Even though Satz's overall goal is laudable and her arguments persuasive, I would like to point out some internal logical inconsistencies that hamper the soundness of her claims in the case of some of the noxious markets analyzed. My criticisms, however, are informed by a view of emancipation similar to hers.
Noxious markets, Satz argues, (p. 98) are detrimental to society because they are compatible with extreme servitude, they arise from weak agency (lack of information), they exploit vulnerabilities (lack of acceptable alternatives to entering them), and they harm individuals by robbing them of physical security and independence.
After rejecting views that see reproductive labor as fundamentally different from that of labor in general, Satz argues that the reason why surrogacy markets are morally condemnable is gender power inequality. Contract pregnancy “reinforces … a traditional gender hierarchical division of labor. Under very different background conditions, such contracts would be less objectionable. For example, in a society in which women's work was valued as much as men's and childcare was shared equally, pregnancy contracts might serve as a way for single persons, disabled persons and same sex families to have children” (p. 131). One way pregnancy contracts contribute to gender inequality, she claims, is by “reinforcing negative stereotypes about women as baby machines” (p. 130).
The reasoning on gender inequality presented by Satz reflects a common inconsistency in feminist thought, namely, the contradiction implied in arguing that women's work is as valuable as men's. It also reflects the argument that much of women's fate is traceable to society's unfairly attributing to females characteristically female capacities (i.e., stereotypes) that explain and justify an unequal division of labor between the sexes. These two contentions cannot go together because they are mutually exclusive, yet they seem to do so in Satz's book. If the problem with surrogacy contracts is that they reinforce stereotypes, this means that the author would seem to favor the idea that reproductive work is not characteristically valuable for being done mostly by women. But if this is so, how can she argue that in a world in which women's work is more valued, surrogacy markets would then be acceptable? This inconsistency highlights the need to clarify what the “ontological” status of domestic work really is. Importantly, Satz is oblivious to the possibility that when society lets women profit from traditionally female and unremunerated work, it values their labor more—something conducive to gender equality, one would assume. But this option would imply not assuming that women are perceived as “baby machines” when getting paid for renting out their wombs. The argument of remuneration resonates strongly in discussions about the value of domestic work; hence, it should receive more attention in this specific case.
Satz's discussion of the nature of prostitution markets reflects similar problems. Her argument is not that “there are good reasons for thinking that prostitution is by itself especially morally troubling. What would remain morally troubling would be the often miserable and unjust background circumstances in which much prostitution occurs” (p. 136). For Satz, the wrongness of prostitution turns “on its relationship to the pervasive social inequality between men and women” (ibid). In this logic, it is the vulnerability of women as a social class that explains why (female) prostitution markets are detrimental to freedom and justice. This idea is intuitive but, on further inspection, does not hold water. Women's vulnerability and exploitation is also reflected in the pornography industry and in much more “benign” businesses such as advertising, which exalt sexually objectified visions of womanhood. Under the logic that women are placed as subordinates to be enjoyed by men, these last two markets should also be considered morally suspicious. If they are not, or not to the same extent as prostitution markets are, what explains the difference? It has to be the nature of live sex and its degrading effects when commercialized, especially on those in no position to refuse the transaction. The argument of vulnerability is valid, but it is not unaccompanied. Essentialists do seem to have a point: Objectifying women is wrong per se, because it “silences” them, despite the compounding effects of inequality.
It is hard to disagree with Satz's objections against child labor markets and bondage. However, there is one theoretical point that could be made. Libertarians like Locke would surely reject the idea that freedom allows the individual to sell him- or herself into slavery. Extreme libertarians would disagree with Locke, but that does not mean they are correct. In the Lockean libertarian view, the most noxious markets would still be considered immoral. Satz apparently fails to draw a helpful distinction in terms of the degree of noxiousness that markets can present.
Lastly, the author's reference to Ronald Dworkin's link between the market and egalitarianism is illuminating. She suggests that Dworkin's idea of an original auction legitimizes the market in ways that are not necessarily the most desirable. However, Satz appears to fail to notice that Dworkin's idea “that individuals should be treated as equals” (p. 66) can conceptually serve as a limit to some of the noxious markets she objects to in her book. Dworkin's imaginary auction is not meant to overlook the injustice of specific markets necessarily, especially if these markets are detrimental to equal respect among citizens, a value he emphasizes as central to his theory of equality.
Beautifully written and well organized, Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale makes a valuable case for a more humane and just society. It brings back to the fore the fundamental idea that markets can shape people in ways that justice should attend to. This book should be welcomed by all those concerned with protecting the dignity of human life, irrespective of political and theoretical distinctions.
