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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 May 2004
In the fall of 2001, Baxter International, Inc., was faced with a crisis after more than 50 people died using Baxter dialyzers. In this interview, Harry M. Jansen Kraemer, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Baxter, and Sally Benjamin Young, Vice President, Communications, discuss how the company managed this emergency situation.
In the fall of 2001, Baxter International, Inc., was faced with a crisis after more than 50 people died using Baxter dialyzers. In this interview, Harry M. Jansen Kraemer, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Baxter, and Sally Benjamin Young, Vice President, Communications, discuss how the company managed this emergency situation.
Thomasine Kushner: Given that you were faced with every company's worst nightmare, how did you go about deciding what to do?
Harry M. Jansen Kraemer, Jr.: The way we responded to the dialyzer situation is so intertwined with our corporate culture that they cannot be separated. Some of what I am going to say will sound obvious because it is obvious. At Baxter we have a culture of shared values in which 50,000 people in more than 100 countries, two-thirds of them outside the United States, understand that our actions are going to be guided by the 3 Rs of Respect, Responsiveness, and Results. Being part of the Baxter team means understanding that we are not interested in having people who are tied up in “being right.” Instead, we want to instill a commitment for “doing the right thing.” The message we try to get across is “We are going to do the right thing when things are going well, and we are going to do the right thing even when they are not.”
Obviously, when things are not going well it is very tempting to look for excuses or for someone else to blame, but I think there is enough underlying traction in these values that implementation becomes very straightforward. I know this sounds simple, but three or four times a day I quote Mark Twain, “Everything is common sense; the problem is that ‘common sense’ isn't common.” For example, I cannot imagine an organization that thinks of itself as a healthcare company not responding immediately to a situation that adversely impacts people's lives.
Sally Benjamin Young: Although we learned about the first death in late August 2001, we did not know until early November that our product was possibly linked with some of those deaths. So, there was a period of time when we were engaged in a lot of activity trying to understand what was going on. We had people on a plane immediately going to the hemodialysis clinics where the deaths were reported and meeting with the ministries of health to understand what was happening. The commitment was there throughout this difficult period, even though we did not know why the patients had died.
HK: It is worth noting that, at the time we were first notified of the deaths, we were also hearing from the physicians all the reasons they did not think the deaths were related to this particular Baxter dialyzer. It would have been easy to say, “This is not something we need to worry about because the physicians themselves are saying it's not the dialyzer.” However, if you take being a responsible corporate citizen as seriously as we do, whether or not you have all the facts, you have no choice but to do the right thing.
We had hundreds of people across multiple functions, businesses, and geographies trying to figure out what happened. We were totally focused on trying to resolve the issue. We said from the beginning, “We're going to take the high road. We're going to move as fast as we can. We're going to try to act in a very coordinated manner. And we're going to make sure that we have the best people involved to get it resolved.”
SBY: The reason that the physicians did not point to the dialyzer initially was because what happened was not typical of a dialyzer reaction that can happen with these patients. The dialysis treatment itself is quite complicated, with many components and variables involved—any one of which may contribute to an adverse reaction to the treatment. However, instead of saying, “We've never seen this before with a dialyzer, therefore it's not our issue; we won't look any further,” we immediately had investigators on the ground. We recalled the product in that country and implemented a global distribution around the world. We were not taking any chances, and we were determined to find out what was happening.
TK: Historically, how did events unfold?
SBY: We found out in late August that there were about 10 deaths in Spain. One common element—at the time we did not know whether it was the only common element—was one model of our dialyzers. We immediately began conducting internal testing of our product using the International Standards Organization (ISO) test for toxicity to see if there was anything that would implicate the dialyzers. Our test results came back clean, but we decided we should not rely only on ourselves. We also engaged a third-party independent organization, the TUV Product Service, that acts as the certifying body for the European Union, to conduct their own tests in accordance with the same ISO standards. Again the results came back clean with respect to the dialyzer. We presented those findings to the Ministry of Health in Spain and, along with the TUV, conducted a press briefing.
On October 9, we released the distribution hold because it looked like the dialyzer was not at issue. Four days later, we heard reports of 23 deaths in Croatia. We immediately sent a cross-functional team of clinical and technical experts to Croatia to launch an investigation, meeting with the centers and the Ministry of Health. Even though we did not understand what was going on, with a potential cluster of patients in a second country we instituted a broader global recall.
Also that week we learned of two patient deaths in Texas, and we dispatched a team of investigators there. Concurrently, we established an independent panel of experts to conduct a separate investigation. One of the biggest challenges we had was getting enough clinical information out of Spain and Croatia to help in the investigations. We were much more successful in Texas, but in addition to our own efforts at Baxter, we wanted the backing of an independent team carrying out a completely separate investigation.
TK: When did you begin to put the pieces together that the dialyzer was, in fact, involved, and what was your next step?
SBJ: The investigations continued, and finally on the weekend of November 2 our tests pointed to a likely cause. There was a trace amount of manufacturing fluid used for testing that remained in a very small number of these dialyzers, all of which were made at the same manufacturing facility. Although the fluid was nontoxic, the chemical residue should not have been in there after the product was produced, and it was that trace amount that appeared to be a probable link with patient deaths.
HK: We seemed to be living through a Sherlock Holmes investigation. At Baxter we are blessed with a lot of really bright people, and they eventually figured out that the manufacturing fluid was at fault. But this took a lot of sleuthing. Most of the dialyzers did not have this fluid in them, and when we did a recall and tested the product the solution was not there.
SBJ: Adding to the mystery was that this particular fluid is labeled “nontoxic” and also that it evaporates so rapidly it might have been undetectable even if it had been present.
Next, we decided that we needed to let the world know about this finding as quickly as possible. Over the weekend we contacted competitors who might use the same fluid or a similar manufacturing process. We also contacted the FDA and tried to reach out to as many ministries of health officials as we could find over the weekend. We alerted the manufacturer of the fluid, and, at the start of business on Monday, we made a pubic announcement and conducted media briefings in Europe and the United States.
HK: That same morning, Al Heller, President of Baxter's global renal business, and I flew to Washington, D.C., to meet with the head of the FDA and all of his top lieutenants. We explained what we knew, what we did not know, and, based on the information we had, why we were making the decisions we were. We wanted to ensure as much clarity as possible.
TK: Were there any internal dissenting voices as to how you were proceeding?
HK: When you really are focused on doing the right thing, you never have all the information you wished you had. Consequently, there will always be well-intentioned folks who say “Maybe we should wait until we get more information,” or “Let's wait until there is a higher probability that the dialyzer is at fault,” or “Perhaps we should take the time to look at the potential financial and/or legal impact.”
The beauty of a team approach like ours is that, although these kinds of questions are inevitably raised, the response comes back, “These unknowns are interesting, and, understandably, some functions would like to have more information, but as a company there is a sufficiently high probability that (1) there is a serious issue and (2) our manufacturing processes and products were involved. Therefore, the faster we can make everyone aware of what we know—even if it isn't complete—that's where we want to go.” For me, that is what leadership and doing the right thing is all about.
TK: How did you weigh transparency against vulnerability?
HK: It would have been incredibly easy, and some would say tempting, to take a different tack altogether. One response might have been, “We didn't actually make that solution, and there's a really big company that made that solution and didn't tell us that this could happen. Somehow they could be responsible.” Or, rather than going upstream, you could point out the very well defined set of procedures stipulating that, before one of these dialyzers is used on a patient in a clinic, the product is supposed to be flushed out. If followed, this process should have eliminated any trace of solution even if it had been present. Therefore, “Maybe we can really go after these people.”
Then you step back and say, “Forget about blaming everybody else. We made the thing. The solution should not have been in the dialyzer. So, why not just step up and take responsibility for it?” Which is what we did.
If we are really going to be true to our values, the process becomes not “easy” but “simple.” I intentionally separate those two terms. There will be ramifications. We are going to have to explain this to shareholders, investors, and litigators. However, at this point I believe everything comes down to clear and constant communication. It is our responsibility to make sure everyone on the team and in the sales force is kept informed of what the situation is: what we know and what we do not know; what avenues we are investigating and what we think we are learning; as well as what we are going to do about it. Our overriding thought has to be “Let's have enough transparency so we can let people know.”
SBJ: In addition to the critical internal communication Harry describes, another important element is the fact that we were also actively communicating externally. Beyond the recall letters that are required from a regulatory perspective, the day we issued recalls our sales force was personally on the phone or in the customer's office talking with them or collecting the product. We posted the information on our website, we put together patient communications which we posted on our patient website, and we interacted with the media with total transparency and openness. We wanted to basically show everyone, “We will tell you what we know as soon as we know it, even if we don't know everything right this minute.”
TK: There were a lot of stakeholders involved. How did you balance corporate responsibilities with your wider social commitments?
HK: Part of human nature seems to make us want to label each other, and I often see this attitude with regard to people's initial perception of a large company like Baxter. We are not some impersonal, heartless entity. The public loses sight of the fact we are made up of 50,000 employees—people who have families. They are sons, daughters, and parents themselves, whose children depend on them to protect their future world. Most of them spend 12–14 hours a day dedicated to trying save people's lives. It would make no sense for us to take an attitude of “Let's sell out and make as much money as possible, even if it means polluting the environment and ignoring our social responsibilities.”
Academic institutions and nonprofit organizations all deserve great credit for their work in contributing to better healthcare, but I also think at Baxter we also have the potential to make an enormous difference because we are running one of those entities that is trying to make products in a socially responsible, environmentally friendly way.
In response to critics who are skeptical about our commitment, I tell them, “Yes, we are a publicly traded company, and of course we have shareholders.” The misperception arises because commonly people equate “shareholders” with “institutional investors.” I point out that most of those institutional investors are people who are managing “our” money—our mutual funds, savings accounts, and insurance premiums intended for our children's education, our retirement, and caring for our parents. The fact that we are going to earn a return for people who are trying to do something worthwhile in their lives strikes me as a good thing to do; but certainly we are not going to do it in a way that is socially or environmentally irresponsible. Like everything else in life, it is a balance—and determining a reasonable balance takes constant effort and attention.
TK: How was the situation with the families handled? How did the negotiations take place?
HK: The response to the families took place on multiple levels. We began with the position that we wanted to get to as many people as quickly as we could to express our sincerity. We wanted to make sure they realized that we were taking responsibility and wanted to fairly compensate the families. Although we could not reverse what had happened, we could try to ensure that compensation would not be hung up for years in the legal system.
We succeeded in setting up a meeting in Washington, D.C., with the Ambassador to Spain. I explained that Baxter has been a healthcare company for 71 years and our mission is to save lives. I told him exactly what happened and that we had made a serious mistake for which we were assuming responsibility. I said also that we wanted to fairly compensate the families as quickly as possible and would be willing to meet with them personally to let them know. The result was that, instead of the enormous fight that the families had anticipated, within a few weeks we were able to settle with virtually every affected family in Spain.
Not all settlements went as smoothly as the ones in Spain. It happened that, the week after September 11, the President of Croatia came to the United States to meet with President Bush at the United Nations. I was able to arrange a meeting with the President and his entourage to offer apologies on behalf of our whole company. Initially, the atmosphere was very tense, but I told him everything we knew, how terrible we felt, and our desire to make quick and fair settlements with the families. He responded through the translator by saying, “I very much appreciate what you have done and what you are trying to do; but it is also fascinating for us to see how your legal system works. I will talk to our Minister of Health and do everything I can to try to help the settlement process, but you need to understand that there are American lawyers running around my country at this very moment trying to file claims.” He added ironically, “I didn't know that lawyers from New York and San Francisco even knew where Croatia was.”
TK: Where do matters with the families stand now?
HK: We have reached settlements with most of the families of patients who died. The government criminal investigations in Spain and Croatia have been closed without the initiation of any criminal action against the company.
TK: What about press coverage in general? Did you think it was fair?
SBJ: First of all, we made ourselves available on a 24/7 basis. It did not matter when the press wanted to talk to us, evening, weekend, or holiday. The press had total access to us whether they were from Span, Croatia, Sweden (where we had our manufacturing facility), or the United States. For extended periods we set a team up in Croatia to be on hand to answer questions personally because that is the way they preferred to work.
As to the way we were treated, I think our transparency and openness served us well because the press did not think we were trying to hide something. To be honest, it was much more challenging in Spain and Croatia. We talked to those reporters almost on a daily basis, but the media operate somewhat differently. The coverage was much more sensationalized, and it became difficult to counter that emotionality with facts that carried very much weight. We were better able to get our points across when we held our press briefings. Reporters consistently crowded our briefing rooms in both Spain and Croatia. We initiated these briefings as soon as possible; for example, the first Monday after we learned about the Croatian deaths, we were in the country holding a press briefing.
HK: In the face of all the criticism aimed at the media, I still believe most journalists are well intentioned. As part of our policy of open communication we try to make sure they understand our culture of transparency and continuous improvement. I find that, more often than not, if you take the time to walk them through the details as to what you are doing and why, the press will better understand where you are coming from and how you are operating, and they will give you the benefit of the doubt. A case in point is an interview I did with a reporter who has a reputation for taking CEOs to task. People said I was crazy to agree to see him. I told him, “I know this may sound old-fashioned, but we really are trying to do the right thing.” I proceeded to lay out what happened, and the resulting piece was fair and balanced.
Another totally unexpected example related to our decision regarding 2001 bonuses. In 2001, Baxter had a great year from a financial perspective. At a time when most stocks had declined, our stock was up 23%. Typically, it would have been a year when the management team would have had generous bonus payouts. However, in talking to the senior team, we said, “Although the company had a good year by some standards; in other ways it was an absolutely terrible year. Lives were lost because of something we did.” We decided to recommend that, no matter how well anyone on the team did, there would be a significant cap on the officers' bonus rates; and because the buck stops at the CEO, my bonus would be capped at an even lower rate. Every corporate officer agreed. As required, a brief discussion of this was included in our proxy. A number of media outlets picked the story up and reported it. If the media were as terrible as they are often made out to be, there would have been no reason for them to cover what we thought was an internal matter. But apparently they thought that this was a good, tangible example of how we were living our shared value and putting our money where our mouth was.
TK: In looking back over the dialyzer situation, would you have done anything differently? Were there lessons learned?
SBY: We did not do anything new. However, before the crisis much of our thinking was theoretical—in other words, “This is what we would do if faced with a situation.” The crisis only reinforced the things we always said we believed in. It also brought to our attention that the plans needed to be institutionalized across the whole company. We not only saw that we could manage this situation; we had the opportunity to develop a blueprint for future responses.
From the dialyzer crisis, a certain procedural “manifesto” emerged. For example:
From our experience, the overarching message for others is commit to continuous learning. Make use of the value of debriefings, and share that information with others not only in your own organization but also throughout the industry. We are not hiding from our crisis. If others can learn from what we went through, maybe there is a silver lining.