Disciplinary perspectives cut the same realities in different ways, and so it is with philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, inter alia. At times, these disciplined languages cross their linguistic barriers and reach out to systematize knowledge at a level that supersedes the specific limitations imposed by their indigenous language and competence. And, even then, the particular slice of reality that we focus upon is conditioned by presuppositions about the nature of the beast we are examining.
The shared circuits model (SCM) provides a tour de force of portraying a multilayered account of social cognition, which is somewhat specifically grounded on imitation, whereby imitative learning is seen as a sophisticated form of social cognition. While social cognition appears to be a central construct for the SCM, the entire model is focused on an analysis at the individual level. It is this aspect of the SCM that we intend to complement in our commentary by drawing attention to the importance of distributed processes taking place between two or more individuals and the emergent quality of social cognition. Indeed, much of what is presented with the SCM has convergences with a social cognition model we advanced (Semin & Cacioppo, in press a; in press b), although the social cognition model we have advanced is cast in a different mold, in particular with respect to the distributed processes taking place between two or more individuals.
However, the SCM relies on reception, namely, the construction of inner neural representations based on observed behavior. Second, social cognition is restricted to a reproduction metaphor (e.g., empathy, resonance, imitation, shared representations, or mindreading). Finally, the model attempts to provide an answer as to how intersubjectivity is achieved. However, the model remains at a purely representational level, neglecting the reciprocal nature and co-regulation of social behavior. The three R's (reception, reproduction, and representation) are conceptual consequences of relying on an individual-centered paradigm. There is a problem when social cognition, especially social cognition that emphasizes imitation, is centered on the individual, however. Cognition evolved for the control of adaptive action, and social cognition evolved for the control of adaptive interaction in response to evolutionary demands for the organism's survival and reproduction, which for humans always takes place in a social context (Caporael Reference Caporael1997; Fiske Reference Fiske1992), and involves the co-regulation of action. Imitation of a parent by an infant is not a solitary event in the service of social cognition. Instead, the infant's imitative behavior elicits an imitative or nurturant response by the parent, which not only reinforces the infant's imitative response but also establishes a connection and constitutes a co-regulation of action by the parent and infant. Any depiction of the social cognition of imitation that ignores the interaction and emergent information between individuals is incomplete.
Thus, social cognition is not driven entirely by inner processes and representations as the SCM suggests, but relies on resources that are distributed across neural, bodily, and environmental features (e.g., Agre Reference Agre1997; Brooks Reference Brooks1999; Hutchins Reference Hutchins1995; Kirsch Reference Kirsch1995) with the social and physical environment supporting social action and interaction (Smith & Semin Reference Smith and Semin2004). As this example illustrates, two or more individuals are capable of (a) joint work to perform a feat that supersedes their individual capabilities, and (b) co-cogitation and co-regulation to achieve this joint feat. Co-regulation encompasses qualitatively different forms of co-action. The first is entrainment and is exemplified by periodic co-action and occurs in cycles. This can be illustrated with the example of rhythmic clapping (e.g., Neda et al. Reference Neda, Ravasz, Brechet, Vicsek and Barabasi2000). The second form is non-periodic co-action illustrated by mimicry or imitation (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh Reference Chartrand and Bargh1999). The third case is exemplified when people have to perform a complex task requiring interfacing each other's actions (as in open-heart surgery or playing tennis). The third case entails the execution of complementary actions, namely coordination, in the pursuit of accomplishing a task (e.g., successful surgery, winning in tennis).
Entrainment, mimicry, and coordination can obviously all occur simultaneously and to different degrees during social interaction. Take, for instance, a dialogue. Any dialogue features a variety of instances of multimodal coordination, entrainment, and mimicry. A dialogue can simultaneously manifest coordination as in the case of turn taking in a conversation (e.g., Sachs et al. Reference Sachs, Schegloff and Jefferson1974), or introducing a new topic, at a syntactic level (e.g., syntactic priming; Bock Reference Bock1986; Reference Bock1989; Bock & Loebell Reference Bock and Loebell1990) or at an affective level (e.g., mood contagion; Neumann & Strack Reference Neumann and Strack2000). Simultaneously, it is possible to see cyclically occurring instances of affective facial expressions (e.g., Dimberg et al. Reference Dimberg, Thunberg and Elmehed2000) and breathing movements (e.g., Furuyama et al. Reference Furuyama, Hayashi, Mishima, Heft and Marsh2005). Coordination and entrainment can converge when joint behavior is goal driven (e.g., playing tennis versus choral singing): It can be consciously accessible or escape conscious access (two people moving a heavy object versus emotional contagion), or a combination of both.
If the aim of the SCM is to fully understand the bases of emergent social cognition and behavior, then it has to incorporate a level of analysis of interacting dyads and beyond.
