Scholars have advanced a prolific literature on the effects of macroeconomic policy initiatives by international institutions (Patrick Conway, Journal of Development Economics, 1994; Adam Przeworski and James Vreeland, Journal of Development Economics, 2000; Axel Dreher, Applied Economics, 2006, to name a few) on economic growth and development. As the widespread implementation of the tenets of the Washington Consensus has receded into the historical background, there is an increased demand for development and assessment of alternative strategies by which institutions may jumpstart economic growth in low-income countries. In the poststabilization and pro-“governance” context in which scholars and policymakers alike find themselves, the works under review evaluate the potential for international institutions to affect economic development through microeconomic and public-sector reform. Although they differ in their intended audience, methodological approach, and scope, both books under review evaluate how international institutions can loosen the domestic political constraints that often impede economic growth.
In Cutting the Gordian Knot of Economic Reform, Leonardo Baccini and Johannes Urpelainen explain why and, more importantly, when leaders of developing countries participate in international institutions. Relying on Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal’s (International Organization, 2001) definition of institutions as formal arrangements that “prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior,” the authors focus on a leader’s decision to participate in legally binding, primarily bilateral institutions of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). As the title suggests, the book untangles the conundrum that leaders face in passing liberal economic reform when doing so threatens their political survival. By elucidating the conditions under which leaders can benefit from participation in PTAs, they argue that international institutions make microeconomic reform possible because they lend credibility to leaders and they can provide benefits and incentives to constituencies. International institutions, specifically PTAs, are likely to lead to microeconomic reforms (including intellectual property rights or service liberalization) when leaders expect political or economic benefits from liberalization but face domestic opposition to the pursuit of such reforms.
In the empirical analysis, the authors assert that new leaders in recently democratized states are particularly likely to initiate preferential trade agreements with a major power for two reasons: Democratization creates demand for economic reform, but new leaders also face particular difficulty in building political coalitions to advance such reforms, which may adversely affect entrenched and politically organized sectoral interests. The formation of PTAs with the United States or the European Union creates a binding agreement that lends credibility to a leader’s promises of reform, while also providing additional benefits to constituencies that may otherwise suffer from liberalization, and thus oppose it. The logic is that of a two-level game, wherein the leader’s participation in an international institution shifts the calculus of a constituency that would otherwise oppose economic reform—thereby sweetening the deal and requiring such interests to reject specific beneficial policy packages if they reject the broader package of economic liberalization.
To evaluate this theory, the authors conduct a statistical analysis of an original data set of preferential trade agreements, testing both the conditions under which leaders initiate PTAs and whether PTAs actually have the expected effects on economic reform. To supplement the statistical analysis and provide a grounding narrative, the authors then develop a comparative case study of the effects of international institutions on economic reform, first in the ideal cases of Croatia and South Africa where new leadership followed democratization, and then in the established democracies of Chile and Colombia where domestic demand for economic reform emerges for reasons other than democratization.
With seamless rigor, Baccini and Urpelainen magnify the intersection of domestic politics of economic reform and international institutions. They both specify the conditions and incentives for participation in international institutions, and elucidate how this type of institution can shape the domestic politics of economic reform. The result serves as a reminder of the extent to which analysis and understanding of the emergence of and participation in international institutions in isolation from the domestic political context is untenable. The implications for the potential scope of applicability of PTAs give one pause, however. As the authors note, the effectiveness of PTAs is contingent on the participation of a great power. However, until African economies present a more attractive market opportunity for the EU or United States, PTAs with African countries are unlikely to emerge—even if new leaders in new democracies are interested in pursuing reform and face domestic opposition to doing so (thus meeting the conditions for empirical application). Consequently, countries where the potential economic benefits of PTAs are likely to have the greatest effect, particularly given the lingering effects of socialism across much of Africa, are the least likely to participate, given disinterested major powers. While this may limit the potential of PTAs as a tool for development through economic reform in the poorest countries, it does not threaten the significance of the authors’ contribution, as they elucidate the incentives for and effectiveness of poststabilization efforts in developing countries and the role of international institutions in shaping them.
In contrast, Working with the Grain is a sort of expert policymaker’s handbook for contextualizing governance reform strategies for economic development. Brian Levy defines and evaluates different trajectories of economic development and the potential for “good governance” (as often advocated by the World Bank) to be a solution to stalled economic growth. Governance has long been a touted solution by policymakers for remedying the economic ills of underdeveloped countries, but what it means, and when and how to achieve it, requires a better understanding of the developmental context and how it provides windows of opportunity for implementation, so as to identify strategies that best fit those windows.
In order to characterize these windows for implementation, Levy constructs a typology of dynamic development trajectories along two dimensions: 1) the encompassing degree of institutions (derived from Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast’s analytical framework of personal, informal institutions, and impersonal, formal institutions; in Violence and Social Orders, 2009), and 2) the nature of political settlements. For Levy, institutional differentiation is realized in the functioning of the bureaucracy of the state and the effectiveness of checks and balances, while the political settlement reflects the emergent equilibrium that reflects the commitment required for opponents to mount a credible challenge to the status quo. Building on these dimensions, he describes a dominant trajectory akin to Chalmers Johnson’s “Developmental State,” and a competitive trajectory of development in which successive leader turnover or a continued threat to leader survival characterize the political settlement. Countries move among combinations of political settlements and encompassing institutions, yielding dynamic development trajectories. In doing so, Levy seeks to elucidate the domestic political constraints on economic growth in a specific developmental context, allowing for the identification of appropriate micro-level approaches to governance improvement. As a result, development strategies aimed at governance reform need to take into consideration the development trajectory of the country in which they are employed.
Levy demonstrates how this typology is borne out, the challenges of directing institutional evolution, and the ways in which the momentum in these cases is sustained in a comparative case analysis of Korea and Ethiopia (dominant trajectories), Bangladesh, Zambia, South Africa, and the United States (competitive trajectories). Some cursory descriptive statistics associate patterns of growth and governance (rule of law, corruption, and government effectiveness) in countries in each typological category along its trajectory. Levy skips eloquently between levels of abstraction and practicality, turning in the final sections of the book to micro-level governance strategies aimed at easing governance constraints resulting from the trajectories laid out in earlier chapters. Ultimately, the author argues that policymakers should choose from a menu of comprehensive, incremental, or multistakeholder strategies of reform to fit the constraints implied by each development trajectory, and the kinds of conditions under which micro-level governance interventions can succeed.
Conceiving of economic development trajectories as a “knife edge” wherein once growth is sparked, it has the potential for virtuous circles fed by the interaction between governance and growth, Levy builds on a relatively recent advance in development economics thinking championed by scholars and practitioners at the Center for Global Development such as Ben Ramalingam and Owen Barder: the use of complexity theory for understanding economic development. Levy’s typology of development trajectories builds on the processes elucidated in complexity theory, processes such as path dependence, cumulative change, and interdependence of component parts. He covers significant ground in the book, but the reader is left occasionally wondering about the broader geopolitical context in which this set of development processes takes shape. Still, Levy unpacks and significantly demystifies the panacea of “governance reform” that has captivated policymakers and practitioners in the development industry since the waning of the Washington Consensus. While the multitude of combinations of stages and orderings of development typologies yielding a dynamic trajectory render the theory a challenging one to test, the author’s experience at the World Bank provides a fertile source of case-based evidence in which to trace his theoretical claims.
Ultimately, the books under review evaluate the role of international institutions in advancing economic development through micro-level economic reforms. While they differ in the types of international institutional solutions under consideration, together they constitute a new momentum toward understanding how international institutions can leverage existing domestic political incentive structures to affect economic development. For Baccini and Urpelainen, PTAs, relative to macroeconomic efforts by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, afford developing countries, and particularly their leaders, more agency and flexibility in affecting economic reform. For Levy, the institutions and individuals that compose the World Bank retain a role in affecting governance for development, but should do so when domestic political economic incentives provide windows of opportunity for best-fit micro-level governance solutions. Levy offers a rigorous yet sweeping theoretical approach firmly ensconced in positive political economic theory aimed at development policy analysts and World Bank practitioners, whereas Baccini and Urpelainen speak with precision and clarity to scholars of international institutions and international political economy in the language of rational choice.
Although the perspectives of scholars and practitioners are rarely so interlaced as they are in the analysis and institutionalized practice of economic development, these books offer vastly different but important approaches to evaluating the role of international institutions in economic development. Both scholars and practitioners of economic development alike can take much away from them.
