Look to the Constitution for guidance on our current legal battles over immigration, and you will come up empty handed. The Constitution is silent on the issue of immigration. Article I refers to “migration” in the context of the international slave trade and also gives Congress the power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.” Yet there are no instructions on who should regulate the entry of foreigners, what rights they have relative to citizens, and on what grounds they may be removed from the country.
It took more than a century for the Supreme Court to address these questions. The 1889 case of Chae Chan Ping v. United States, the first of the Chinese Exclusion Cases, established that Congress had the authority to pass restrictive immigration laws not from any particular provision of the Constitution, but as an inherent part of sovereignty. A few years later, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Supreme Court affirmed that this power included deportation. Known as the “plenary power doctrine,” a divided Supreme Court ruled that the political branches (meaning Congress and the president) had full, complete, and unrestricted power over immigration, and that the courts would step back and defer to them in that area. As one critic put it, the plenary power doctrine gave the political branches “the judicial equivalent of a blank check to regulate immigration as they see fit.”Footnote 1
Since President Trump's travel ban of citizens from seven Muslim-majority nations, the plenary power doctrine has been back in the news. Some have predicted, or demanded, an end to unrestricted plenary power over immigration matters. After all, Chae Chan Ping was a product of the same era as Plessy v. Ferguson, and the language of the decision was permeated with racist, anti-Asian animus. Justice Stephen J. Field called the Chinese “vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us” who “remained strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages of their own country. It seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our people. …”Footnote 2 Our current Supreme Court has decided that this remains good law.
Whatever the future holds for the plenary power doctrine, it is important to understand its past. In Expelling the Poor, Hidetaka Hirota locates the inspiration for plenary power in the methods of immigration control employed by state governments prior to 1882, the year that Congress passed both the Chinese Exclusion Act and the first comprehensive federal immigration law. New York and Boston are “sanctuary cities” today, but in the nineteenth century, they led the nation in devising new exclusionary policies. Both were port cities where nativist locals denounced an influx of Irish paupers, leading to state legislation that limited the entry and even allowed for the deportation of immigrants on economic grounds. There were differences between New York and Massachusetts: New York's laws often stemmed from humanitarian concerns and were enacted at the point of entry, while those of Massachusetts were harsher, more punitive, and included deportation. Eventually, these state policies and practices became the model for immigration laws on the federal level and set the stage for the rise of the plenary power doctrine.
Expelling the Poor is a myth-busting book, with insights that ought to change the way that we think about immigration history. Studies of American immigration law that begin in 1875 or 1882 implicitly suggest that the first century of the nation's existence was characterized by unrestricted immigration. Hirota conclusively puts this “open borders” fallacy to rest. In fact, he traces state restrictions all the way back to British poor laws enacted during the colonial era. Legal historians such as Gerald Neuman and Kunal Parker have called for this type of reperiodization of immigration history, but Hirota is the first scholar to produce a book-length study of early state and local legislation.Footnote 3
Besides challenging the periodization of American immigration law, Hirota interprets familiar events in new ways. In his narrative, the Know-Nothing Party was not a temporary but ineffective moment of hysteria, but rather a deeply influential movement that spurred a more hostile treatment of aliens in New York and deportations on an unprecedented scale in Massachusetts. Expelling the Poor also shifts our geographic focus. Instead of looking to the West Coast to understand the nativist sentiment that gave rise to federal restrictions, Hirota concentrates on the eastern seaboard. He finds that the laws of New York and Massachusetts were far more aggressive and influential than those of other important coastal states, like Pennsylvania, Maryland, Louisiana, and California.
Hirota emphasizes economics over race as the driving motive behind early immigration restriction. The Irish Potato Famine of the 1840s, which sent 1.5 million immigrants to the United States, heightened the belief that the Irish were poorer than other groups. Some of these immigrants’ journeys were paid for by the British government or by landlords and local workhouses in Ireland. This phenomenon, known as “assisted emigration,” furthered the conviction that the Irish were being “dumped” on American shores, were not self-sufficient “free labor,” and were undeserving of public charity. It was in this context that the category of “likely to become a public charge” first originated, a classification that would later give federal authorities enormous latitude to determine the fate of an immigrant. Yet nativism on the basis of economics cannot entirely be separated from race. The Irish were targeted in part because they were seen as racially distinct and unassimilable due to their Catholicism. Likewise, the Chinese were later attacked for a combination of racial and economic reasons.
Expelling the Poor helps us understand why federal immigration policy evolved the way it did in the 1880s and 1890s. Hirota argues that the policies of New York and Massachusetts toward Irish paupers throughout the nineteenth century set the precedent for the coercive treatment of immigrants and the unrestrained power of officials under federal law. In a sense, Supreme Court cases like Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting did not create the government's plenary power over immigration—they affirmed what was already happening on the state level. For decades, the entry of immigrants in New York and Massachusetts had depended on state officials’ subjective judgment. Indigent aliens—and even sometimes citizens—were largely powerless to protest or appeal their removal. In creating federal legislation, policy makers looked to New York and Massachusetts and “simply codified what had become the norm in the actual enforcement of immigration exclusion and deportation” (204).
This is a fascinating argument, but Hirota only spends the last chapter exploring the pivotal transition from state to federal law. Clearly, there were similarities between the two, but his argument would be strengthened with more direct evidence that Congress consciously modeled its immigration policies on those of New York and Massachusetts. Hirota might also have looked at state laws that banned convicts and people with contagious diseases, or antebellum regulations that restricted the movement of free blacks into states. Nevertheless, by reminding us to pay attention to state legislation, Expelling the Poor is timely and important. There is a widespread assumption today—both popularly and in the historical literature—that regulating immigration is inherently a federal activity. Yet it should be obvious that state laws affect immigrants’ lives too: one need only think of Arizona's controversial 2010 “show me your papers” law (SB 1070).
Torrie Hester's Deportation picks up where Expelling the Poor ends: in the 1880s, at the moment of transition from state to federal control over immigration matters. Hester shows the evolution over time of the deportation regime that we know today—one where noncitizens are forever vulnerable, and their ability to stay in the United States precarious. This system did not emerge, fully formed, after Fong Yue Ting but took about four decades to reach its modern shape. Hester meticulously traces the steady expansion of the federal government's power to deport, the national and international regimes under which deportation took place, and the changing definition of who was deportable. Making skillful use of Bureau of Immigration and State Department papers, this book is a welcome addition to the existing literature on deportation, such as Daniel Kanstroom's Deportation Nation and Deirdre Moloney's National Insecurities.
First, Hester describes the evolution of deportation proceedings. Because the Supreme Court ruled in Fong Yue Ting that deportation was not punishment for a crime, deportees faced an administrative hearing that was distinct from the traditional court system. These hearings lacked many of the due process rights of criminal trials and put the burden of proof on the immigrant. From 1882 until 1917, there were two different deportation policies: one for Chinese immigrants and another for everyone else. Surprisingly, it was actually easier for Chinese deportees to appeal their cases to federal courts, where judges tended to give them more due process rights. Hester estimates that about 90 percent of Chinese defendants won their appeals and were allowed to stay in the United States. In contrast, non-Chinese immigrants could only appeal on procedural grounds, and 90 percent of those cases resulted in deportations. In 1917, the Chinese system was discontinued and folded into the general immigration policy.
Over time, the courts determined that noncitizens had fewer civil liberties than citizens, and immigrants without legal residence had the fewest rights of all. John Turner, a British anarchist, was the first person deported under the Anarchist Exclusion Act of 1903. He was detained after publicly lecturing about his political views while in the United States. His subsequent deportation had a chilling effect on immigrants’ speech, as it affirmed that foreigners did not have the same First Amendment protections as American citizens. Noncitizens could even be deported for changing jobs. Because he was a merchant, Chan Leong Hee was granted entry into the United States in 1909 despite the Chinese Exclusion Act. But after his business failed and he became a laborer, his change of occupation altered his status under the law and made him subject to deportation. This would later be the case with Mexican guest workers as well.
One of the most controversial aspects of deportation policy today is the ability of federal authorities to deport noncitizens convicted of crimes, even minor crimes, committed after entry into the United States. The government's power to deport for “post-entry infractions” developed in the context of the early twentieth-century panic over prostitution and white slavery. The logic was that “fallen” immigrant women could best be rehabilitated back in their home communities. Until 1910, immigrants could only be deported within three years of entry, but the Mann Act erased the time limit in cases of prostitution or procurement. In 1917, in the midst of the First Red Scare, the time limit was removed for political radicals as well, and immigrants could be deported for beliefs developed within the United States. Finally, Hester addresses deportation on economic grounds under the “likely to become a public charge” (LPC) provision. She finds that the LPC was often used as an excuse to deport non-white immigrants on the basis of race.
Deportations by U.S. officials do not occur in a vacuum; they are bilateral affairs that involve foreign relations with other countries. One of Hester's most innovative chapters contextualizes national deportation policies within a larger international system. The United States was not the only country carrying out deportations—it had to coordinate its own deportations with receiving countries and accept Americans deported from abroad. Over the course of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the United States signed multiple treaties to streamline this process. But when diplomatic relations were tense, deportation could become complicated. In 1919, the United States wanted to deport 249 immigrant radicals, including Emma Goldman, to Russia on the ship Buford. The problem was that the United States did not recognize Soviet Russia, and thus could not formally ask for permission to deliver the deportees. Eventually a solution was devised to deport through a third country, but this was an imperfect remedy that only worked temporarily. Hester also recognizes the practice of extraterritoriality, whereby governments like China's could not deport Americans even if they wanted to.
Though largely a top-down policy history, Deportation pays particular attention to the ways that immigrants facing deportation defended themselves. The strategies of people who faced deportation were creative and ended up changing enforcement practices. Through their lawsuits, immigrants themselves pushed the development of immigration law—though not always to their advantage. Asian immigrants were particularly significant shapers of American immigration law, far more important than their actual numbers relative to European immigration might suggest.
Hester calls the period between 1882 and 1924 “the first, most formative decades of the deportation regime” (1). This was the time, she claims, that the policy and legal regimes for modern-day deportation were developed by Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Bureau of Immigration. Hirota would disagree with this start date, but one might also question Hester's decision to end the book in 1924. Certainly, deportation today hardly looks like the practice a century ago. Hester mentions that, of the roughly fifty million immigrants that the United States has deported, almost 95 percent have been since 1970. Did the quantitative shift over the last 47 years lead to a qualitative shift in deportation policy as well? One need only look to today's headlines to see stories of child deportees systematically separated from their parents. While many features of the current deportation regime had been set by 1924, there has been enough change since then to provide plenty of new ground for studies by future scholars.
While Hirota and Hester concentrate on policy making at the state and federal levels, Julian Lim's Porous Borders zeroes in on a local borderlands community and uncovers how immigration regulations transformed the lived experiences of individuals on the ground. Focusing on the El Paso-Ciudad Juárez area, Lim demonstrates how immigration laws and an increased federal presence at the border divided a multiracial populace. Using binational sources, she argues that exclusionary immigration laws represented an attempt to police the nation's racial boundaries and suppress multiracial diversity—not only in the United States, but in Mexico as well.
Lim's early narrative challenges both Hirota's and Hester's conceptions of “immigration laws.” Immigration regulation in North America did not originate with the U.S. government, state or federal. Apaches, Comanches, and other indigenous groups had their own “immigration policies” monitoring the moves of “foreigners”: they “regularly admitted, excluded, and ejected outsiders”—their own form of “border control” (25). Thus, in 1848, American cartographers surveying the U.S.-Mexico border carried papers to allow them to traverse Comanche territory. Conversely, Indian removal might be considered a form of deportation—the use of state power to move people outside certain borders.
Arriving in 1881, the railroad transformed El Paso both economically and demographically. It linked the town to major metropolitan centers in the United States and Mexico, facilitating cross-border networks of capital, trade, and migration. The newcomers who streamed into El Paso included not only Anglo-American settlers targeted by boosters, but also Mexican, Chinese, and African American migrants looking for alternatives to the restrictive regimes and practices of the Porfiriato, Chinese Exclusion, and Jim Crow. By 1900, 38 percent of El Paso's population was non-white. While segregation was technically the law, it was not strictly enforced. In addition to shared work, recreational, and public spaces, there was substantial residential mixing in the southern neighborhood of Chihuahuita. Not surprisingly, this resulted in many mixed-race marriages and children. Mixed Mexican-black families were so common in El Paso that they were known as “negro-burros.”
Other borderlands studies have tended to look at these racial groups separately or have omitted African Americans from their narratives. Mario García's Desert Immigrants, a classic study of El Paso in the same time period, focuses primarily on the Mexican residents. Lim's greatest innovation is to consider different races together, as members of a single community. While Lim makes it clear that late nineteenth-century El Paso was far from a multiracial utopia, she does emphasize the economic opportunities, political rights, and social freedoms that Chinese and African Americans had in El Paso, relative to the rest of the United States.
But Anglo reformers who wanted to turn El Paso into a “modern American city” were alarmed by what they considered racial “disorder.” Concerned with racial purity, these elites called for more active federal policing of the border. The Chinese were the first target, amidst a panic about Chinese immigration from Mexico in violation of the Chinese Exclusion Act. Yet it was not so easy to detect Chinese immigrants crossing the border, especially if they spoke some Spanish or were dressed in Mexican clothing. Many Chinese had, in fact, lived and worked in Mexico for years. The challenge for immigration inspectors was to make border crossers racially “legible,” to use the language of James Scott—to draw lines that carved the multiracial population into separate and more easily regulated racial groups.
The federal immigration apparatus did not arrive at El Paso all at once. If Chinese Exclusion was one important moment on the time line, the Mexican Revolution was another. Federal policing of the border became a national security concern; by the summer of 1916, 65,000 troops had been sent to El Paso. Lim provides a new perspective on Pershing's Punitive Expedition by focusing on the black soldiers, Apache scouts, and Chinese peddlers that accompanied the American soldiers. Rather than facing a closed border, some of these migrants made their way into the United States by articulating their relationship to the nation-state in new ways. Mexicans called themselves “laborers,” the Chinese defined themselves as “refugees” fleeing anti-Chinese violence in Mexico, while blacks pointed to their military service to assert their claims to citizenship. Perhaps the most successful were a group of a few hundred Chinese immigrants who assisted Pershing and then later volunteered at a base in San Antonio. Their semi-military service led to permanent legal residency in the United States—though, of course, they were still racially ineligible for citizenship.
It was after the Mexican Revolution, in the 1920s and 1930s, that racial politics in both the United States and Mexico caused the once-porous border to harden. Mexico, whose new national identity was centered on Spanish-Indian mestizaje, had no room for blacks or Asians, and heightened its border control to keep out African Americans and expel Chinese residents. The United States, of course, passed restrictive immigration laws in the 1920s and also developed stricter border control policies and exclusion programs that targeted Mexicans. On both sides of the border, racial mixing was “problematic and dangerous to the nation and national identity.” Policies of exclusion, expulsion, and deportation were “designed to minimize the multiracial proportions of the body politic and diminish opportunities for racial mixing” (200). U.S. and Mexican immigration policies converged at the border to form a broader transnational immigration regime, a shared venture between both states.
Because her thesis focuses on race, Lim pays less attention to other causal factors driving immigration restriction, like economics, gender, or political beliefs. And yet, as much as the border hardened, the multiracial borderlands never really went away. The El Paso region has hardly been static or segregated since the 1930s, nor has the border stopped being porous. In her epilogue, Lim reminds us not to fall for the progress narrative that we are headed for a more inclusionary, multiracial society. Using a contemporary example, she points out that Barack Obama's 2008 election (which some hailed as the dawn of a “postracial” society) was followed just a few years later by the resurgence of a white supremacist movement. Likewise, the multiracialism of El Paso in the late nineteenth century gave rise to nationalist projects of separation and racial purity, codified in immigration law and policy.
Together, these three excellent books on American immigration law have new things to teach historians and policy makers about the origins of plenary power, the evolution of the modern deportation regime, and the effects of restrictive immigration laws on local communities. They show that the plenary power doctrine did not arise out of thin air in 1889, nor did the scope and character of federal power over immigration remain static over subsequent decades. As Congress and the courts expanded the categories of who could be denied entry and who was deportable, individual lives and entire localities were—and continue to be—transformed in the process.
