(a) Elkhan Chiragov

19. Mr Elkhan Chiragov, born in 1950, who is married and has four children, had two teaching jobs in Chiragli. In the application to the Court, submitted in April 2005, he declared that, following his displacement, he received his teacher's salary and a monthly government supplement of 25,000 manat (presumably Azerbaijani “old” manat, AZM; the amount equalled approximately 5 US dollars (USD)) for each member of his family as well as some assistance in the form of food, tents and warm clothes. He also submitted a copy of his employment record, where it was noted that, on 1 September 1993, he had been hired as a teacher at a school in Baku. In June 2016 he stated that he had not been able to work as a teacher in Baku because the school where he had found a job was located far away and he could not travel that far due to health problems.

20. In his claim for pecuniary damages, Mr Chiragov asserted that the size of the plot of land mentioned in his technical passport in reality was 6,500 sq. m, after enlargements, but that only 1,200 sq. m had been registered. Nevertheless, the value indicated in his claim concerned only the 1,200 sq. m area. In addition, he had a second plot of 10,000 sq. m, for which he claimed the estimated loss of rental income. Further to the dwelling-house and storehouse described in the technical passport, he also owned a cattle shed and a second storehouse. He requested compensation for the full value of the buildings. He also sought compensation for the full value of the household items that his family had left behind in 1992, including five handmade carpets. Mr Chiragov and his family had cultivated the land and kept bees and livestock; in 1992, they had had 70 fruit trees, 55 beehives, 3 horses, 9 cows, 80 sheep, 120 hens, 60 turkeys and 40 geese. He claimed the full value of the trees, horses and poultry as well as lost income from sales of fruit, potatoes, honey, calves, milk, lambs and wool. He also wished to be compensated for lost salary from his teaching jobs and for the family's living expenses in Baku.

21. In total, Mr Chiragov's claim for pecuniary damages for the 14-year period between April 2002 and June 2016 amounted to 1,573,180 Azerbaijani “new” manat (AZN; approximately EUR 790,000), divided into the following amounts per category: land (value and rent income) 100,000; houses (value) 260,000; household items (value) 71,480; farming and stockbreeding (sales income as well as value of fruit trees and livestock) 906,500; teacher's salary 100,800; increased living expenses 134,400.

(b) Adishirin Chiragov

22. Mr Adishirin Chiragov, born in 1947, who is married and has three children, used to work as a teacher in Chiragli. According to the application to the Court, he received the same type of government support as the first applicant, that is, a salary, a government supplement and some material assistance. In June 2016 he submitted that the total monthly amount of salary and pension was approximately AZN 700 for his whole family.

23. In his claim for pecuniary damages, Mr Chiragov alleged that the size of the plot of land mentioned in his technical passport in reality was 7,500 sq. m, after enlargements, but that only 1,200 sq. m had been registered. The value indicated in his claim concerned the full actual area. In addition, he had a second plot of 12,000 sq. m of farmland, for which he claimed the estimated loss of rental income. As described in the technical passport, he had a dwelling-house with a storage area and a separate storehouse. He stated, however, that the size of the latter was 120 sq. m, rather than 90 sq. m as indicated in the passport. He requested compensation for the full value of the buildings. He also sought compensation for the full value of the household items that his family had left behind in 1992, including six handmade carpets, and for the second-hand value of a Niva car. Mr Chiragov and his family had cultivated the land and kept bees and livestock; in 1992, they had had 90 fruit trees, 20 beehives, 9 cows, 2 oxen, 65 sheep, 150 hens, 70 turkeys and 50 geese. He sought compensation for the full value of the trees and poultry as well as lost income from sales of fruit, potatoes, honey, bees, calves, milk, lambs, wool and cheese. He also wished to be compensated for lost salary from his teaching job and for the family's expenditure for renting a flat in Baku in 1992-94.

24. In total, Mr Chiragov's claim for pecuniary damages came to AZN 926,240 (approximately EUR 465,000), divided into the following amounts per category: land (value and rent income) 213,500; houses (value) 129,000; household items (value) 45,950; car (value) 10,000; farming and stockbreeding (sales income as well as value of fruit trees and livestock) 465,390; teacher's salary 50,400; increased living expenses 12,000.

(c) Ramiz Gebrayilov

25. Mr Ramiz Gebrayilov, born in 1960, who is married and has four children, used to work as an engineer in Lachin. In the application to the Court, he stated that he was retired for health reasons and received the equivalent of USD 25 per month in pension and an additional USD 5 per month in government support for each member of his family. In submissions to the Court in June 2010, he mentioned that he had seen a video of Lachin, recorded in 2001, from which he had recognised that his house had been burnt down; according to neighbours, this had occurred a few days after he had left Lachin. In June 2016 he stated that he had continued to work and earned an income in Baku. However, he had since retired, receiving a monthly pension of AZN 115. The family also received about AZN 600 monthly from his children's salaries and government support.

26. In his claim for pecuniary damages, Mr Gebrayilov contended that the size of the plot of land mentioned in his technical passport in reality was 5,000 sq. m, rather than 480 sq. m, as indicated in the passport. Basing himself on an estimated current square metre price of land, AZN 40, he claimed the value of the full actual area. Further to the dwelling-house and storehouse described in the technical passport, he also owned a storehouse, a cattle shed, a garage and a natural spring. He requested compensation for the full value of the buildings and the spring as well as the loss of rental income during the summers when the family used to leave Lachin and rent out the house. He also sought compensation for the full value of the household items that his family had left behind in 1992, including 16 handmade carpets. Mr Gebrayilov and his family had cultivated the land and kept livestock; in 1992, they had had 81 fruit trees, 12 cows, 8 calves, 200 sheep and 170 lambs. He sought compensation for the full value of the livestock as well as lost income from sales of fruit, vegetables, milk and other dairy products, meat and wool. He also requested that he be compensated for the full value of his “Auto Service” business, comprising 5,000 sq. m of land, a building, tools and machinery.

27. In total, Mr Gebrayilov's claim for pecuniary damages for the period between April 2002 and June 2016 amounted to AZN 1,849,555 (approximately EUR 925,000), divided into the following amounts per category: land (value) 200,000; buildings and spring (value and rent income) 222,000; household items (value) 29,455; farming and stockbreeding (sales income as well as value of livestock) 1,168,100; “Auto Service” business (value of land, facilities and machinery) 230,000.

(d) Akif Hasanof

28. Mr Akif Hasanof, who was born in 1959, used to work as a teacher in Aghbulag. In the application to the Court, he stated that he received a teacher's salary and a very small government supplement as well as some material assistance. He could hardly support himself and the five members of his family. In June 2016 he submitted that, after leaving Lachin, he had worked in various jobs with a very low income. He had not been able to find employment as a teacher or a school director in Baku.

29. In his claim for pecuniary damages, Mr Hasanof stated that the size of his land had reached 8,200 sq. m, as opposed to 1,600 sq. m registered in his technical passport. Nevertheless, he sought compensation for only the registered part of the land; as he did not know its current market value, he requested the estimated loss of rental income. Further to the dwelling-house and storehouse mentioned in the technical passport, he also owned a barn and an additional large building with a garage. He requested compensation for the full value of the buildings as well as the loss of rental income for parts of the dwelling-house which were rented out throughout the year. He also sought compensation for the full value of the household items that his family had left behind in 1992, including 20 handmade carpets, and for the second-hand value of a Niva car. Mr Hasanof and his family had cultivated the land and kept bees and livestock; in 1992, they had had 141 fruit trees, raspberry bushes, 50 beehives, 3 horses, 16 cows, 100 sheep, 50 turkeys and 50 geese. He sought compensation for the full value of the bees, horses, cows and sheep as well as lost income from sales of fruit, vegetables, honey, bees, calves, milk, lambs, wool, cheese and goose quill. He also wished to be compensated for lost salary from his teaching job and for the family's living expenses in Baku.

30. In total, Mr Hasanof's claim for pecuniary damages for the period between April 2002 and June 2016 came to AZN 2,621,490 (approximately EUR 1,300,000), divided into the following amounts per category: land (rent income) 84,000; buildings (value and rent income) 320,000; household items (value) 91,440; car (value) 12,000; farming and stockbreeding (sales income as well as value of bees and livestock) 2,017,650; teacher's salary 50,400; increased living expenses 46,000.

(e) Fekhreddin Pashayev

31. Mr Fekhreddin Pashayev, born in 1956, who is married and has three children, used to work as chief engineer for the Ministry of Transport in Lachin. According to the application to the Court, he received a total of 125,000 manat (again, presumably, “old” manat) per month for his family in government support for displaced persons; in addition, his wife received a monthly pension of 170,000 manat. In 2010 he submitted a copy of his employment record where it was noted that, on 1 April 1993, he had been appointed to his previous position as chief engineer which, following the occupation of the district of Lachin, had been relocated to the ministry's winter deposit at Aghjabedi (about 300 km west of Baku). His employment there had been terminated in January 2003. In June 2016 he stated that, after leaving Lachin, he had not been able to find employment as chief engineer in Baku.

32. In his claim for pecuniary damages, Mr Pashayev sought compensation for the full value of his land, as described in the technical passport, based on an estimated current square metre price of AZN 200. He also claimed an amount for the rent that could have been collected for that plot of land during the 14-year period between April 2002 and June 2016. As described in the technical passport, he had a dwelling-house, another small house, used as a “summer house”, and a small storehouse. He requested compensation for the full value of the buildings as well as the estimated rent that could have been collected for the dwelling-house. He also sought compensation for the full value of the household items that his family had left behind in 1992, including ten handmade carpets and jewellery of a value of AZN 96,000. Mr Pashayev and his family had cultivated one hectare of land in his native village of Kamalli and kept bees and livestock; in 1992, they had had 500 fruit trees, 20 beehives and 20 cows. He sought compensation for the full value of the bees and cows as well as lost income from sales of fruit, honey, bees, calves and milk. He also wished to be compensated for lost salary from his job as chief engineer and for the family's living expenses in Baku, including the rent paid for a house during the first three years after their leaving Lachin.

33. In total, Mr Pashayev's claim for pecuniary damages amounted to AZN 2,224,090 (approximately EUR 1,100,000), divided into the following amounts per category: land (value and rent income) 107,860; buildings (value and rent income) 252,000; household items (value) 134,630; farming and stockbreeding (sales income as well as value of bees and livestock) 1,494,800; engineer's salary 201,600; increased living expenses 33,200.

(f) Qaraca/Sagatel Gabrayilov

34. Mr Qaraca Gabrayilov, born in Lachin in 1940, who was married and had five children, died on 19 June 2005. His application was pursued by his son, Mr Sagatel Gabrayilov, born in July 1970.

35. In his claim for pecuniary damages, Mr Sagatel Gabrayilov stated that the farmland in his family's possession in reality had measured 8,000 sq. m, after gradual enlargement, rather than the total of 753.6 sq. m mentioned in the technical passport and the allocation decision submitted to the Court. The value indicated in his claim concerned the full actual area. Further to the dwelling-house described in the technical passport, the family also owned a cattle shed, a storehouse and a water reservoir. He requested compensation for the full value of the buildings and the reservoir as well as the loss of rental income for parts of the dwelling-house which, due to the size of the house, could have been rented out throughout the year. He also sought compensation for the full value of the household items that his family had left behind in 1992, including 26 handmade carpets. The family had cultivated the land and kept bees and livestock; in 1992, they had had 66 fruit trees, 40 beehives, 16 cows, 150 sheep and 80 hens. Mr Gabrayilov claimed the full value of the bees and livestock as well as lost income from sales of fruit, honey, calves and lambs as well as products from the cows, sheep and hens. He also requested compensation for the lost income from the family's carpet-weaving and bread-making businesses. Finally, he wished to be compensated for the living expenses that the family would have had in Lachin. However, since they were not living there during the period in question, this amount must be deducted from the total claim.

36. Thus, in total, Mr Sagatel Gabrayilov's claim for pecuniary damages came to AZN 2,752,835 (approximately EUR 1,400,000), divided into the following amounts per category: land (value) 60,000; buildings and reservoir (value and rent income) 452,000; household items (value) 54,475; farming and stockbreeding (sales income as well as value of bees and livestock) 2,051,960; other business activities (sales income) 134,400.

(a) Introductory remarks

43. When reserving the question of just satisfaction for a later stage in the principal judgment, the Court referred to the exceptional nature of the present case (§ 224).

44. That exceptional nature is owing to a number of features. One is that the present case relates to an ongoing conflict situation. The active military phase in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict took place in 1992-94 but, despite a ceasefire agreement concluded in May 1994 and negotiations conducted within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group, no peace agreement has been reached (for a more detailed description of the background and current situation, see §§ 12-31 of the principal judgment). Twenty-three years later, breaches of the ceasefire agreement continue to occur. As both parties have pointed out in their observations on just satisfaction, violence has recently escalated along the Line of Contact, most notably during the military clashes in early April 2016.

45. Another particular aspect of the case is that, whereas the events that led the applicants to flee their property and homes occurred in May 1992, the respondent State, the Republic of Armenia, ratified the Convention ten years later, on 26 April 2002. Having thus no jurisdiction ratione temporis over events pre-dating 26 April 2002, the Court concluded that the applicants still had valid proprietary rights to land and houses in the district of Lachin (§ 149 of the principal judgment). From the date of entry into force of the Convention, it found Armenia responsible for continuing violations of the applicants' rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as well as Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention (§§ 201, 207-208 and 214-215).

46. The Court is thus dealing with a continuing situation which has its roots in the unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories and still affects a large number of individuals. More than one thousand individual applications lodged by persons who were displaced during the conflict are pending before the Court, slightly more than half of them being directed against Armenia and the remainder against Azerbaijan. The applicants in these cases represent just a small portion of the persons, estimated to exceed one million, who had to flee during the conflict and have since been unable to return to their properties and homes or to receive any compensation for the loss of their enjoyment.

47. In this connection, the Court considers it appropriate to emphasise once more the principle of subsidiarity. In the present case it has both a political and a legal dimension.

48. As to the political dimension, the Court has already referred to the undertakings given by Armenia and Azerbaijan prior to their accession to the Council of Europe, committing themselves to the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (§ 87 of the principal judgment). By now, some fifteen years have passed since the ratification of the Convention by Armenia and Azerbaijan without a political solution of the conflict being in sight. The Court can only underline that it is the responsibility of the two States involved to find a solution on a political level (see, mutatis mutandis, Kovačić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], nos. 44574/98 and 2 others, §§ 255-256, 3 October 2008; and Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (dec.) [GC], nos. 46113/99 and 7 others, § 85, ECHR 2010).

49. Coming to the legal dimension, the Court reiterates that the principle of subsidiarity underpins the Convention system (Kurić and Others v. Slovenia (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 26828/06, § 134, ECHR 2014, and the cases cited therein). This principle is embodied in Article 1 of the Convention, according to which the Contracting States shall secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention to everyone within their jurisdiction, while, according to Article 19, it is for the Court to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the States in the Convention and the Protocols thereto. Furthermore, the principle underlies the requirement for applicants to exhaust domestic remedies pursuant to Article 35 § 1 and the corresponding obligation for States under Article 13 to provide effective remedies for breaches of the Convention (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, § 65, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV; and Demopoulos and Others, cited above, § 69). The principle of subsidiarity also guides the Court's approach in dealing with systemic violations of the Convention when applying the pilot judgment procedure developed under Article 46 (see, for instance, Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 60642/08, § 143, ECHR 2014).

50. Moreover, as it has done in other cases arising out of unresolved conflict situations or in cases revealing systemic violations, the Court cannot emphasise enough that it is not a court of first instance. It does not have the capacity, nor is it appropriate to its function as an international court, to adjudicate on large numbers of cases which require the finding of specific facts or the calculation of monetary compensation  –  both of which should, as a matter of principle and effective practice, be the domain of domestic jurisdictions (see, mutatis mutandis, Demopoulos and Others, cited above, § 69; and Ališić and Others, cited above, §§ 142-143).

51. It is precisely the Government's failure to comply with its accession commitments as well as its obligations under the Convention which obliges the Court in the present case to act as a court of first instance, establishing relevant facts some of which date back many years, evaluating evidence in respect of property claims and finally assessing monetary compensation. All this is to be seen against the background that the present application is examined as a leading case while hundreds of similar cases against Armenia are still pending before the Court.

52. Without prejudice to any compensation to be awarded as just satisfaction in the present case, the effective and constructive execution of the principal judgment calls for the creation of general measures at national level. Guidance as to appropriate measures has been given in the principal judgment, where the Court stated, inter alia, that, “pending a comprehensive peace agreement, it would appear particularly important to establish a property claims mechanism, which should be easily accessible and provide procedures operating with flexible evidentiary standards, allowing the applicants and others in their situation to have their property rights restored and to obtain compensation for the loss of their enjoyment” (see further § 199 of the principal judgment).

(b) General principles on just satisfaction

53. The Court reiterates its case-law according to which a judgment where the Court finds a breach generally imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach (Kurić and Others,cited above, § 79). The Contracting States that are parties to a case are in principle free to choose the means whereby they will comply with a judgment in which the Court has found a breach. The discretion as to the manner of execution of a judgment reflects the freedom of choice attaching to the primary obligation of the Contracting States pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention to secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed. If the nature of the breach allows for restitutio in integrum, it is for the respondent State to effect it, the Court having neither the power nor the practical possibility of doing so itself. If, on the other hand, national law does not allow  –  or allows only partial  –  reparation to be made, Article 41 empowers the Court to afford the injured party such satisfaction as appears to it to be appropriate (Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece (Article 50), 31 October 1995, § 34, Series A no. 330 B; and Kurić and Others, cited above, § 80, and the cases referred to therein). In this connection, the role of the Committee of Ministers, under Article 46 § 2 of the Convention, to supervise the execution of the Court's judgments should be emphasised (see Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2)[GC], no. 32772/02, §§ 84-88, ECHR 2009). Nevertheless, the Court is mindful of the fact that some situations  –  especially those involving long-standing conflicts  –  are not, in reality, amenable to full reparation.

54. As regards claims for pecuniary loss, the Court's case-law establishes that there must be a clear causal connection between the damages claimed by the applicant and the violation of the Convention. In appropriate cases, this may include compensation in respect of loss of earnings (Kurić and Others, cited above, § 81).

55. In regard to losses related to real property, where no deprivation of property has taken place but the applicant has been denied access to it and therefore the possibility to use and enjoy it, the Court's general approach is to assess the loss suffered with reference to the annual ground rent, calculated as a percentage of the market value of the property, that could have been earned on the properties during the relevant period (Loizidou, cited above, § 33).

56. A precise calculation of the sums necessary to make reparation in respect of the pecuniary losses suffered by the applicant may be prevented by the inherently uncertain character of the damage flowing from the violation. An award may still be made notwithstanding a large number of imponderables involved in the assessment of losses, though the greater the lapse of time involved, the more uncertain the link becomes between the breach and the damage. The question to be decided in such cases is the level of just satisfaction in respect of pecuniary losses that it is necessary to award to the applicant, the matter to be determined by the Court at its discretion, having regard to what is equitable (Kurić and Others, cited above, § 82).

57. Furthermore, the Court reiterates that there is no express provision for non-pecuniary or moral damage. In Varnava and Others v. Turkey ([GC], nos. 16064/90 and 8 others, § 224, ECHR 2009) and Cyprus v. Turkey ((just satisfaction) [GC], no. 25781/94, § 56, ECHR 2014) the Court confirmed the following principles which were gradually developed in its case-law. Situations where the applicant has suffered evident trauma, whether physical or psychological, pain and suffering, distress, anxiety, frustration, feelings of injustice or humiliation, prolonged uncertainty, disruption to life, or real loss of opportunity can be distinguished from those situations where the public vindication of the wrong suffered by the applicant, in a judgment binding on the Contracting State, is an appropriate form of redress in itself. In some situations, where a law, procedure or practice has been found to fall short of Convention standards, this is enough to put matters right. In other situations, however, the impact of the violation may be regarded as being of a nature and degree as to have impinged so significantly on the moral well-being of the applicant as to require something further. Such elements do not lend themselves to a process of calculation or precise quantification. Nor is it the Court's role to function akin to a domestic tort mechanism court in apportioning fault and compensatory damages between civil parties. Its guiding principle is equity, which above all involves flexibility and an objective consideration of what is just, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case, including not only the position of the applicant but the overall context in which the breach occurred. Its non-pecuniary awards serve to give recognition to the fact that moral damage occurred as a result of a breach of a fundamental human right and reflect in the broadest of terms the severity of the damage.

58. Finally, the Court observes that, depending on the circumstances of the case, it may be appropriate to make an aggregate award for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage (see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 222, ECHR 2012).

(c) Award of damages in the present case

(a) The applicant

9. The applicant, an ethnic Armenian, born in 1929, was married and had four children. The family lived in Gulistan, in the Shahumyan region of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (present-day Goranboy region of the Republic of Azerbaijan), where the applicant had a two-storey house, outhouses and 2,160 sq. m of land of which 1,500 sq. m was a fruit and vegetable garden. He derived his income from his salary as a secondary school teacher and from farming and stock-breeding on his land. His wife, Lena Sargsyan, worked at the village's collective farm. The applicant and his wife had lived in Gulistan for most of their lives and their four children grew up there. They had to flee in June 1992 when the village came under attack during the military phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Subsequently, the applicant and his wife lived as refugees in Yerevan. The applicant obtained Armenian citizenship in 2002. He died on 13 April 2009 (see §§ 29 and 34-40 of the principal judgment).

10. In his submissions of 21 May 2012, prior to the hearing on the merits, the applicant had requested restitution of his property, including the right to return to his property and home in Gulistan, compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and reimbursement of costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Court (see § 281 of the principal judgment). In his observations following the delivery of the principal judgment he maintained his claims for compensation but noted the practical impossibility of a return to the village on account of the recent fighting and fragile ceasefire. He added that amounts calculated in American Dollars (USD) had been converted into euros (EUR) at the rate applicable when the initial submissions were made and asked the Court to take the considerable evolution of the exchange rate between these two currencies into account when making its final assessment.

11. The applicant claimed a total amount of EUR 374,814 as compensation in respect of pecuniary damage suffered as a result of his forced displacement from Gulistan in June 1992 and his inability to return to his property.

12. The claim for pecuniary damage was composed of compensation for the loss of his house and auxiliary buildings (EUR 16,654), loss of furniture (EUR 12,824), loss of livestock and fruit trees (EUR 1,644), loss of savings deposited in the Savings Bank of Azerbaijan on his and his wife's accounts (EUR 1,564), loss of income (EUR 151,260 for the years 1992 to 2012, namely loss of his and his wife's salaries and his pension of EUR 3,388 per year and loss of income derived from his land in Gulistan of EUR 4,175 per year) and reimbursement of additional rental and living expenses incurred (in a total amount of EUR 99,447 for the years 1992 to 2012), offset against the monies received in pension and family allowance from the Armenian Government. Furthermore he claimed loss of future income and future living costs of his wife Lena Sargsyan (EUR 91,421).

13. In respect of the house, the applicant referred to the Court's findings in the principal judgment according to which his house still existed (ibid., §§ 197-198). He provided three different valuations: firstly, the valuation in USSR roubles contained in the technical passport of the house dated May 1991, converted into USD at June 1992 rates; secondly, an estimation provided by Lena Sargsyan based on the argument that owing to the devaluation of the USSR rouble in 1991, the cadastral value in the technical passport converted into USD at June 1992 rates did not accurately reflect the house's value and thirdly, a valuation by the Real Estate Cadastre at the Government of Armenia provided in April 2012 comparing the applicant's house with similar houses in a comparable village in Armenia estimating its value at USD 21,403 (or EUR 16,654 at the time of submission of the claim in May 2012).

14. In respect of the loss of income derived from his land in Gulistan, the applicant indicated that he used to keep livestock and to grow fruit and vegetables on his land. Part of the produce was for the family's own consumption and part of it was sold. He estimated the loss under this head at EUR 4,175 per year by converting the value of the produce from USSR roubles to USD and then to EUR. In respect of additional rental and living expenses incurred, he submitted a number of receipts for the payment of housing fees for an apartment in a dormitory in Yerevan. According to the statement of Lena Sargsyan, attached to the submissions of 21 May 2012, that apartment had been allocated to the applicant and her in 2001 by the Armenian Refugee Committee and they had later been able to privatise it. In addition the applicant submitted bills for electricity and water and a list provided by the Armenian social services concerning the payment of pension and family allowance from 2003 to 2012. In respect to other heads of pecuniary damage, the applicant also provided details as to the method of calculation and a number of supporting documents.

15. Furthermore, the applicant noted that the Court had also provided guidance as to the method and principle for redressing the pecuniary damage suffered by individuals in his situation by referring to relevant international standards, in particular the “United Nations Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons” (“the Pinheiro principles”) and Resolution No. 178 (2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on “Solving property issues of refugees and displaced persons” (§ 238 of the principal judgment).

16. In respect of non-pecuniary damage, the applicant's next of kin, who are pursuing the application after his death, stated that that claim was made on their own behalf and on behalf of the applicant. They claimed a total amount of EUR 190,000, referring to anguish and feelings of helplessness and frustration experienced by themselves and by the applicant over the many years during which they were unable to enjoy their property and home in Gulistan and to visit the graves of their relatives there.

17. Finally, the applicant contested the Government's view that the impossibility to have access to his property and home was due to the occupation by Armenia of significant parts of Azerbaijani territory, noting that this view was at variance with the Court's findings in the principal judgment (ibid., §§ 134-137 and 151).

(b) The Government

18. For their part, the Government argued that restitution was not possible. They referred to the Court's finding that the applicant still had a house in Gulistan (§§ 197-198 of the principal judgment) but underlined that according to the Court's assessment the refusal to grant the applicant, or any civilian, access to the village was justified by the security situation (ibid., § 233). They could therefore not provide restitution of the applicant's property but had to take alternative measures to secure his property rights (ibid., § 234).

19. The Government, referring to the Court's finding in the principal judgment according to which the practical difficulties in exercising their authority in Gulistan had to be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of the acts and omissions complained of (ibid., § 150), argued that a similar approach should be taken in respect of just satisfaction. Compensation sums awarded should be in a reasonable proportion to the degree of their responsibility in regard to the infringement of the applicant's property rights. In addition, the measures taken by the Azerbaijani authorities in favour of a huge number of internally displaced persons had to be taken into account in the assessment of the applicant's claims.

20. In respect of pecuniary damage the Government submitted that part of the applicant's claims related to facts which fell outside the Court's competence ratione temporis. In particular, they argued that they could not be held responsible for the applicant's displacement in June 1992 or any damage to the house or to his other belongings during the armed conflict.

21. On the basis of these main propositions, the Government contested the applicant's claims under the various heads of pecuniary damage in detail. They argued in particular that the applicant had claimed compensation for the value of the house itself but, in their view, he had failed to submit claims in respect of the continuing violation of his property rights due to the loss of use of his property in Gulistan.

22. As to the claim for loss of income, the Government noted that Lena Sargsyan, the applicant's widow, had not herself been an applicant before the Court. Consequently, the loss of her income could not be validly claimed. Moreover, the claims for loss of the applicant's income could not be pursued beyond his death. The Government also contested the claim for reimbursement of additional rental and living expenses and future living expenses, pointing out that according to Lena Sargsyan's statement which was attached to the applicant's submissions of 21 May 2012, she and the applicant had been provided with an apartment in Armenia in 2001 and had received a pension and family allowance from the Armenian Government.

23. In respect of non-pecuniary damage, the Government considered that the finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction. They conceded that refugees suffered non-pecuniary damage due to the impossibility to have access to their property, their homes and their relatives' graves. However, in the present case, that impossibility was intrinsically linked to the occupation of a significant part of Azerbaijani territory and to the resumption, in April 2016, of hostilities along the Line of Contact, involving heavy shelling of towns and villages inter alia in the Goranboy region, in which Gulistan is situated.

24. In addition, they questioned the surviving family members' standing to seek an award in respect of non-pecuniary damage on their own behalf and expressed the view that any claim for non-pecuniary damage on the applicant's behalf had become extinguished with his death.

(a) Introductory remarks

25. When reserving the issue of just satisfaction for a later stage in the principal judgment, the Court referred to the exceptional nature of the present case (ibid., § 283).

26. That exceptional nature is owing to a number of features. One is that the present case relates to an ongoing conflict situation. The active military phase in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict took place in 1992-94 but, despite a cease-fire agreement concluded in May 1994 and negotiations conducted in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group, no peace agreement has been reached (for a more detailed description of the background and current situation, see §§ 14-28 of the principal judgment). Twenty-three years later, breaches of the ceasefire agreement continue to occur. As both parties have pointed out in their observations on just satisfaction, violence has recently escalated along the Line of Contact, most notably during the military clashes in early April 2016.

27. Another particular aspect of the case is that, whereas the events which led the applicant to flee his property and home occurred in June 1992, the respondent State, the Republic of Azerbaijan, ratified the Convention ten years later, on 15 April 2002. Having thus no jurisdiction ratione temporis over events pre-dating 15 April 2002, the Court concluded that the applicant still has valid proprietary rights to a house and land in Gulistan (§§ 198 and 205 of the principal judgment). From the date of entry into force of the Convention, it found Azerbaijan responsible for continuing violations of the applicant's rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention (ibid., §§ 241-242, 260-261 and 273-274).

28. The Court is thus dealing with a continuing situation which has its roots in the unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories and still affects a large number of individuals. More than one thousand individual applications lodged by persons who were displaced during the conflict are pending before the Court, slightly more than half of them being directed against Armenia and the remainder against Azerbaijan. The applicants in these cases represent just a small portion of the persons, estimated to exceed one million, who had to flee during the conflict and have since been unable to return to their properties and homes or to receive any compensation for the loss of their enjoyment.

29. In this connection, the Court considers it appropriate to emphasise once more the principle of subsidiarity. In the present case it has both a political and a legal dimension.

30. As to the political dimension, the Court has already referred to the undertakings given by Armenia and Azerbaijan prior to their accession to the Council of Europe committing themselves to the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (§ 76 of the principal judgment). By now, some fifteen years have passed since the ratification of the Convention by Armenia and Azerbaijan without a political solution of the conflict being in sight. The Court can only underline that it is the responsibility of the two States involved to find a solution on a political level (see, mutatis mutandis, Kovačić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], nos. 44574/98, and 2 others, §§ 255-256, 3 October 2008, Demopoulos and Others, v. Turkey (dec.) [GC], nos. 46113/99 and 7 others, § 85, ECHR 2010).

31. Coming to the legal dimension, the Court reiterates that the principle of subsidiarity underpins the Convention system (Kurić and Others v. Slovenia (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 26828/06, § 134, ECHR 2014, and the cases cited therein). This principle is embodied in Article 1 of the Convention, according to which the Contracting States shall secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention to everyone within their jurisdiction, while according to Article 19, it is for the Court to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the States in the Convention and the Protocols thereto. Furthermore, the principle underlies the requirement for applicants to exhaust domestic remedies pursuant to Article 35 § 1 and the corresponding obligation for Contracting States under Article 13 to provide effective remedies for breaches of the Convention (Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, § 65, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV; Demopoulos and Others, cited above, § 69). The principle of subsidiarity also guides the Court's approach in dealing with systemic violations of the Convention when applying the pilot judgment procedure developed under Article 46 (see, for instance, Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 60642/08, § 143, ECHR 2014).

32. Moreover, as it has done in other cases arising out of unresolved conflict situations, or in cases revealing systemic violations, the Court cannot emphasise enough that it is not a court of first instance. It does not have the capacity, nor is it appropriate to its function as an international court, to adjudicate on large numbers of cases which require the finding of specific facts or the calculation of monetary compensation  –  both of which should, as a matter of principle and effective practice, be the domain of domestic jurisdictions (see mutatis mutandis, Demopoulos and Others, cited above, § 69, and Ališić and Others, cited above, §§ 142-143).

33. It is precisely the Government's failure to comply with its accession commitments as well as with its obligations under the Convention which obliges the Court in the present case to act as a court of first instance, establishing relevant facts some of which date back many years, evaluating evidence in respect of property claims and finally assessing monetary compensation. All this is to be seen against the background that the present application is examined as a leading case while hundreds of similar cases against Azerbaijan are still pending before the Court.

34. Without prejudice to any compensation to be awarded as just satisfaction in the present case, the effective and constructive execution of the principal judgment calls for the creation of general measures at national level. Guidance as to appropriate measures has been given in the principal judgment, where the Court stated, inter alia, that “pending a comprehensive peace agreement, it would appear particularly important to establish a property claims mechanism, which should be easily accessible and provide procedures operating with flexible evidentiary standards, allowing the applicant and others in his situation to have their property rights restored and to obtain compensation for the loss of their enjoyment” (ibid. § 238).

(b) General principles on just satisfaction

35. The Court reiterates its case-law according to which a judgment where the Court finds a breach generally imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach (Kurić and Others,cited above, § 79). The Contracting States that are parties to a case are in principle free to choose the means whereby they will comply with a judgment in which the Court has found a breach. The discretion as to the manner of execution of a judgment reflects the freedom of choice attaching to the primary obligation of the Contracting States pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention to secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed. If the nature of the breach allows for restitutio in integrum, it is for the respondent State to effect it, the Court having neither the power nor the practical possibility of doing so itself. If, on the other hand, national law does not allow - or allows only partial - reparation to be made, Article 41 empowers the Court to afford the injured party such satisfaction as appears to it to be appropriate (Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece (Article 50), 31 October 1995, § 34, Series A no. 330-B; Kurić and Others, cited above, § 80, and the cases referred to therein). In this connection, the role of the Committee of Ministers, under Article 46 § 2 of the Convention, to supervise the execution of the Court's judgments should be emphasised (see Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2)[GC], no. 32772/02, §§ 84-88, ECHR 2009). Nevertheless, the Court is mindful of the fact that some situations  –  especially those involving long-standing conflicts  –  are not, in reality, amenable to full reparation.

36. As regards claims for pecuniary loss, the Court's case-law establishes that there must be a clear causal connection between the damage claimed by the applicant and the violation of the Convention. In appropriate cases this may include compensation in respect of loss of earnings (Kurić and Others, cited above, § 81).

37. In regard to losses related to real property, where no deprivation of property has taken place but the applicant has been denied access to it and therefore the possibility to use and enjoy it, the Court's general approach is to assess the loss suffered with reference to the annual ground rent calculated as a percentage of the market value of the property, that could have been earned during the relevant period (Loizidou v. Turkey (Article 50), 28 July 1998, § 33, Reports 1998-IV).

38. A precise calculation of the sums necessary to make reparation in respect of the pecuniary losses suffered by the applicant may be prevented by the inherently uncertain character of the damage flowing from the violation. An award may still be made notwithstanding the large number of imponderables involved in the assessment of future losses, though the greater the lapse of time involved, the more uncertain the link becomes between the breach and the damage. The question to be decided in such cases is the level of just satisfaction, in respect of both past and future pecuniary losses, that it is necessary to award to the applicant, the matter to be determined by the Court at its discretion, having regard to what is equitable (Kurić and Others, cited above, § 82).

39. Furthermore the Court reiterates that there is no express provision for non-pecuniary or moral damage. In Varnava and Others v. Turkey ([GC], nos. 16064/90 and 8 others, § 224, ECHR 2009) and Cyprus v. Turkey ((just satisfaction) [GC], no. 25781/94, § 56, ECHR 2014) the Court confirmed the following principles which were gradually developed in its case-law. Situations where the applicant has suffered evident trauma, whether physical or psychological, pain and suffering, distress, anxiety, frustration, feelings of injustice or humiliation, prolonged uncertainty, disruption to life, or real loss of opportunity can be distinguished from those situations where the public vindication of the wrong suffered by the applicant, in a judgment binding on the Contracting State, is an appropriate form of redress in itself. In some situations, where a law, procedure or practice has been found to fall short of Convention standards this is enough to put matters right. In other situations, however, the impact of the violation may be regarded as being of a nature and degree as to have impinged so significantly on the moral well-being of the applicant as to require something further. Such elements do not lend themselves to a process of calculation or precise quantification. Nor is it the Court's role to function akin to a domestic tort mechanism court in apportioning fault and compensatory damages between civil parties. Its guiding principle is equity, which above all involves flexibility and an objective consideration of what is just, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case, including not only the position of the applicant but the overall context in which the breach occurred. Its non-pecuniary awards serve to give recognition to the fact that moral damage occurred as a result of a breach of a fundamental human right and reflect in the broadest of terms the severity of the damage.

40. Finally, the Court observes that, depending on the specific circumstances of the case, it may be appropriate to make an aggregate award for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage (Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano, v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, §§ 218-222, ECHR 2012).

(c) Award of damages in the present case