The question that drives Raging Against the Machine compels attention: how can opposition to an authoritarian regime persist over decades without visible success in abolishing the regime or even diminishing its autocratic character? Holger Albrecht's answer is that the Egyptian regime prior to 2011 cultivated opposition for its own purposes, and the opposition managed a set of small but significant accomplishments by trapping the regime into compliance with rules and procedures it embraced without enthusiasm. Opposition turned out to be functional for the maintenance of a “liberalized autocracy.” In the author's view, none of the strands of mainstream Egyptian opposition before 2011 imagined overthrow of the regime.
Opposition long served four functions in Egypt, according to Albrecht. First, much as in a democratic setting, it represented interests and perspectives not otherwise reflected in the governing structure. Second, the opposition contributed a measure of legitimacy to the regime, both internally and externally. Third, the opposition channeled dissent into identifiable streams that the regime could easily observe and control. Fourth, offering even small opportunities for participation and reward, organized opposition groups served to moderate demands bubbling up from society.
By using the opposition in these ways, the regime also exposed a number of its vulnerabilities. One is what the author calls the “litigation trap.” The regime's emphasis on legality as a source of legitimacy permitted opposition to challenge decisions through the judiciary. By penetrating representative bodies designed to generate a veneer of democracy, the opposition pursued an “institutional entrapment strategy.” By definition the regime's effort to co-opt elements of the opposition provided some leverage for internal challenge. “Discursive challenge,” which came in the form of mild criticism in the public domain, was a further cost to the regime of cultivating and protecting opposition.
Albrecht writes of government and opposition: “The intimate dance of two schizophrenic personalities ultimately explains their cohabitation over time. Whereas liberalized authoritarian regimes remain torn between coercive power maintenance and pluralism, political oppositions challenge incumbents while complying with the overall rules of the political game” (p. 22).
With thoroughness and acuity, Albrecht separates the opposition into “loyal,” “tolerated,” and “anti-system” groups, devoting a chapter to each. In still another chapter he looks at the way in which those groups interacted with political institutions: elections and parliament; labor unions, professional syndicates, and “dialogue organizations”; the judiciary; and the religious establishment. In these empirical chapters the writer draws upon extensive interviews and thorough knowledge of secondary literature. He dissects oppositional elements one by one, leader by leader, as if he had worked within each and every one of them. While some of these organizations have undergone serious study—the Muslim Brotherhood, the Wasat party, the radical groups—those in the “loyal” and “tolerated” categories have received less scholarly attention.
To argue as Albrecht does that the Egyptian regime under Mubarak deserves to be called a “liberalized autocracy” is to suggest that it offered freedoms that distinguished it from other authoritarian states, such as “China, the military regimes in Latin America of the 1960s and 1970s, the traditional monarchies in the Gulf states, or some ethnic autocracies in sub-Sahara Africa” (p. 170). Yet the author argues that Mubarak's “liberalized autocracy” remained “thoroughly authoritarian” (p. 14), that is, cynical in its efforts to liberalize and intent on consolidating power. The regime did not intend liberalization as a step toward democracy.
Albrecht argues that the term “opposition” may be as misleading as “liberalized authoritarianism.” He asserts that only the most radical groups, viciously suppressed in the 1990s, intended to bring down the regime. Even the so-called anti-system forces, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, had a stake in the status quo and did not seek fundamental change, their rhetoric notwithstanding. When protests erupted in Tahrir Square in January 2011, none of the groups analyzed in this book initially participated. For Albrecht, this absence corroborated his point about collaboration. What happened in 2011 represented a sharp departure from the Egyptian past.
To infer intent of either government or opposition on the basis of outcomes is problematic. As an undergraduate many years ago, I recall hearing a professor argue that the Democrats had nominated Adlai Stevenson to oppose Dwight Eisenhower in 1952 because they knew they would lose that election. I doubt that delegates to the Democratic Convention reasoned that way. And I imagine that at least some influential members of the Egyptian regime under ʿAbd al-Nasir, Sadat, and Mubarak—perhaps even the presidents themselves—believed that they were moving the country toward liberal democracy. Could these opposition groups have maintained morale and membership without believing some of what they said about the need for change and democratization? That they did not succeed in achieving such goals does not prove hypocrisy. The harsh judgments about intent seem unnecessary to the argument of the book.
Albrecht says opposition can contest a government at three levels: “singular policies executed, or planned to be executed, by the incumbency; the basic rules and procedures of the regime; and singular members of the political elite, that is, the incumbency [italic in the original]” (p. 9). There he differentiates regime and incumbency, but, perhaps because he does not think even the Islamists represented a genuine challenge to the regime, he tends to use the words “incumbency” and “regime” almost interchangeably in the rest of the book. Often it is not clear whether “incumbency” refers to the inner circle around the president or to a larger group, such as the ruling party. It is sometimes unclear whether “incumbency” means the military regime as constituted since 1952 or just those holding office under Mubarak.
Unfortunately, the quality of writing and editing makes the book much less accessible than it could be. The switching of verb tenses constitutes a serious impediment to clarity. Written or revised after the fall of Mubarak, the text sometimes refers to happenings of the Mubarak era with the simple past tense, but sometimes it employs the present perfect as if the regime and its practices continue. That may well be the case, but the seemingly haphazard choice of tenses leaves the reader wondering what the author meant. A second problem relates to sequence: the reader encounters “on the other hand” without being able to find “on the one hand,” or finds himself searching backward for “first” once “second” and “third” are mentioned. Misuse of prepositions is frequent. And then there are misspellings and typos of the sort that have become all too common in contemporary academic publications. The book includes a guide to acronyms, a small glossary, and an index, all of which are helpful.
With this book, flawed though it is, Albrecht establishes himself as one of the most astute observers of the contemporary political scene in Egypt. He makes a significant contribution to the understanding of authoritarianism in one country and to the understanding of that phenomenon more broadly. The study is theoretically sophisticated and empirically solid.
