The breakthrough of the populist radical right (PRR) across the world has attracted significant scholarly attention. Over the years, several seminal works have delineated demand-side and supply-side explanations for the electoral success of these actors (e.g. Hawkins et al. Reference Hawkins, Read, Pauwels, Rovira Kaltwasser, Taggart, Ochoa Espejo and Ostiguy2017; Mudde Reference Mudde2007; Muis and Immerzeel Reference Muis and Immerzeel2017; Rydgren Reference Rydgren2007). Nevertheless, what remains underexplored in the literature is the internal perspective; namely, how PRR parties interpret and explain their success at the polls. Adopting an insider perspective is particularly relevant because it can reveal how these actors interpret the external drivers of success highlighted in the literature – such as globalisation or ideological convergence between traditional mainstream parties – and how they translate these interpretations into political strategies – for example, investing in specific competitive agendas or solid organisations.
This article seeks to address this gap through 21 qualitative semi-structured interviews conducted between September 2023 and February 2024 with 21 representatives of Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia, FdI). FdI is a paradigmatic instance of PRR success: after a decade spent on the opposition benches and with a modest electoral performance, it achieved a remarkable result in the 2022 Italian general election, becoming the most voted-for party in the country. After the elections, the leader of FdI, Giorgia Meloni, became prime minister, a first for the PRR in Western Europe. For these reasons, FdI represents a particularly relevant case for investigating how PRR actors interpret their own success.
Through this insider perspective, the article aims to shed light on both self-perceptions of success and the political strategies party representatives identify as central to achieving it. More fundamentally, however, an insider perspective matters analytically for three additional reasons that go beyond confirming or adding another empirical angle to existing explanations. First, drawing on the constructivist turn in the study of political representation, the way party elites explain their own success is itself a ‘representative claim’ (Saward Reference Saward2010), that is, a performative act through which actors portray themselves as the legitimate interpreters of a constituency, staging what kind of party they are, what kind of people they speak for and why they deserve trust. Second, insider narratives are central to the process of PRR normalisation and de-demonisation (Valentim Reference Valentim2024), showing how PRR elites manage the tension between radicalism and respectability. Third, even if retrospective interviews cannot establish the causal drivers of electoral outcomes, they can illuminate the strategic self-understandings that inform PRR elites’ subsequent actions, from coalition choices to public image construction. We therefore treat these narratives as analytically meaningful objects of analysis in their own right, keeping them distinct from scholarly explanations of electoral success.
The findings show that, in narrating their own success, FdI representatives selectively draw on themes that resonate with (but are not equivalent to) the main explanations identified by the literature, while reorganising them into a distinctive story of agency. First, FdI representatives emphasise the importance of a typical PRR ideological profile that addresses popular demands rooted in feelings of insecurity associated with globalising trends (Hawkins et al. Reference Hawkins, Read, Pauwels, Rovira Kaltwasser, Taggart, Ochoa Espejo and Ostiguy2017; Inglehart and Norris Reference Inglehart and Norris2016). Second, party representatives highlight the FdI’s strategic effort to normalise its image by dissociating itself from extremist positions, thereby appearing as a more credible and acceptable political actor in the eyes of voters (Halikiopoulou Reference Halikiopoulou2018), and stressing the importance of building a strong party organisation on the ground (Albertazzi et al. Reference Albertazzi, van Kessel, Favero, Hatakka, Sijstermans and Zulianello2025). Finally, our analysis shows that FdI has consistently invested in emphasising its valence attributes (Greene and Haber Reference Greene and Haber2015) – most notably, coherence – exploiting political opportunities by consistently remaining in opposition to a series of different governments, particularly the grand coalition led by Mario Draghi. Crucially, valence attributes emerge as being so important from the perspective of FdI insiders that we define them as competitive amplifiers that, in their accounts, boosted the party’s appeal in the electoral market.
The article is structured as follows. The next section provides a concise overview of the literature on PRR success. Subsequently, the methods and data are discussed. The main findings from the insider perspective are then presented, focusing first on the interplay between ideology and the demand-side and the external supply-side, then the role of party organisation and leadership, and finally the crucial importance of valence attributes. In the concluding section we argue that our research contributes to the literature by providing a unique insider perspective on how PRR actors perceive and explain their own success.
The success of the PRR
The main explanations for the success of the PRR can be broadly categorised into demand-side and supply-side factors (Mudde Reference Mudde2007; Rydgren Reference Rydgren2007). Demand-side explanations focus on voters and their context, while supply-side explanations examine the broader environment in which parties operate as well as their own specific features. These two dimensions are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, they are deeply interconnected and should be analysed together (Mols and Jetten Reference Mols and Jetten2020). The following literature review summarises the main theories explaining PRR success, with particular attention to party-related explanations. The empirical analysis of our study will be discussed against this background, which offers the conceptual repertoire for interpreting how FdI representatives construct narratives about their success, and situates our findings within the existing academic debate.
Demand-side explanations
Explanations for voter demand for PRR parties are explored at three interconnected levels: macro, meso and micro (Eatwell Reference Eatwell, Merkl and Weinberg2005; Mudde Reference Mudde2007). Meso-level analyses investigate contextual factors informing individuals’ choices, such as the rural/urban divide (e.g. Crulli Reference Crulli2024), while micro-level studies examine individuals’ attitudes, such as populist orientations (e.g. van Hauwaert and van Kessel Reference van Hauwaert and van Kessel2018) or PRR voters’ psychological traits (e.g. Galais and Rico Reference Galais and Rico2021). As these explanations primarily address individual behaviours and socio-demographic patterns, they can be linked to party strategies and discourses only indirectly and are therefore not examined further.
Conversely, macro-level accounts seek to explain party politics in general by examining how electoral competition is shaped by structural economic, historical and political trends at the national and supranational levels (Mudde Reference Mudde2007). In the case of the European PRR, these parties’ rise has often been interpreted as a response to the transformations associated with globalisation and post-industrial change. Early studies emphasised the mobilisation of the ‘losers of modernization’ (Betz Reference Betz1994; Minkenberg Reference Minkenberg2000), pointing to a new political cleavage between the winners and losers of globalisation (Kriesi Reference Kriesi2014). This thesis relates to the sense of insecurity generated by modernisation in both socio-cultural and economic domains, for example, as a reaction against post-materialist values (Ignazi Reference Ignazi1992), perceived economic threats from immigrants (Lubbers et al. Reference Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers2002) or economic globalisation (Swank and Betz Reference Swank and Betz2003). Taken together, this literature identifies two broad mechanisms linking these transformations to PRR support: cultural counter-reactions centred on identity, and economic grievances rooted in material insecurity (Rydgren Reference Rydgren2007).
More recent debates build on this twofold distinction, refining and nuancing these early accounts. Some studies espouse the ‘cultural backlash’ thesis, such as Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris (Reference Inglehart and Norris2016: 50), who argue that ‘the rise of populist parties reflects, above all, a reaction against a wide range of rapid cultural changes that seem to be eroding the basic values and customs of Western societies’. Others, instead, contest the predominant view that defines culture as the primary driver of PRR demand, observing that, although identity issues remain relevant, ‘this does not mean that culture necessarily and always matters more […] than the economy’ (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas Reference Halikiopoulou and Vlandas2020: 19; emphasis in the original). Additionally, as the PRR performed strongly even after the 2008 financial crisis, economic factors appear relevant not only for those negatively affected by globalisation, but also for more affluent voters experiencing relative gratification (Mols and Jetten Reference Mols and Jetten2017). More generally, the literature shows that the distinction between cultural and economic concerns is not always so clear-cut, neither in the eyes of voters nor as explanatory factors, as elements such as nativism can well manifest in economic and welfare chauvinist forms (Betz Reference Betz2019).
Supply-side explanations
Supply-side explanations point to two different sets of factors: the external supply-side concerns how the broader environment influences the success of the PRR, while the internal supply-side focuses on the features of PRR actors themselves. External factors refer to the ‘political opportunity structure’ for PRR parties (Muis and Immerzeel Reference Muis and Immerzeel2017): while institutional factors such as electoral systems play no crucial role (Mudde Reference Mudde2007), the political context appears more relevant, especially ‘the competition that a radical-right party faces from other parties’ (van der Brug et al. Reference van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie2005: 548). PRR parties benefit from the convergence of mainstream left and right parties towards the political centre (Kitschelt and McGann Reference Kitschelt and McGann1995; Mudde Reference Mudde2007), also in the form of grand coalitions (Arzheimer and Carter Reference Arzheimer and Carter2006), which creates a ‘representation gap’ by leaving segments of the electorate feeling unrepresented (Berman and Kundnani Reference Berman and Kundnani2021). Hence PRR parties thrive by filling this space and establishing ownership of issues that traditional mainstream parties have either ignored, mismanaged or converged on – most notably immigration (van Spanje Reference van Spanje2010), but also Euroscepticism (Vasilopoulou Reference Vasilopoulou and Rydgren2018).
Internal supply-side explanations relate to party strategies, and can be divided into ideological and structural (i.e. leadership and organisation) features. First, PRR parties respond to voter demand through their ideological supply centred on nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde Reference Mudde2007). Complementing the convergence thesis, the PRR’s ideological core appeals to voters seeking a radical political agenda yet challenging the liberal-democratic consensus from within (Koch et al. Reference Koch, Meléndez and Rovira Kaltwasser2023). To this end, PRR parties have long pursued a strategic distancing from more extremist views to appear more reliable and acceptable to the public (van Kessel Reference van Kessel2015). This allowed for the development of a ‘new winning formula’ (Halikiopoulou Reference Halikiopoulou2018), based on de-demonisation: shedding an extremist reputation while retaining a radical ideological core (Akkerman Reference Akkerman, Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn2016; Zulianello Reference Zulianello2025a). Consequently, PRR parties engage in ‘strategic mainstreaming’, presenting their agenda as more acceptable so as to facilitate normalisation and expand electoral support (Valentim Reference Valentim2024).
Apart from these socio-cultural positions defining the PRR’s ideological core, the stances of PRR parties on other political issues, such as the economy, are not so clearly defined. Initial attempts to distil the radical right’s socioeconomic positioning into a specific ‘winning formula’ – combining authoritarianism with neoliberal policies (Kitschelt and McGann Reference Kitschelt and McGann1995) – have been disproved over time (de Lange Reference de Lange2007; Mudde Reference Mudde2007). While maintaining an authoritarian and nativist profile, the positions of the PRR in relation to the economy tend to be deliberately ‘blurry’ to attract voters with divergent economic preferences across social classes (Rovny Reference Rovny2013). Although specific economic policies vary and remain contingent, other scholars observe that the PRR’s macro-economic agenda is shaped by its ideological core (Otjes et al. Reference Otjes, Ivaldi, Jupskås and Mazzoleni2018). Indeed, these parties typically promote ‘welfare chauvinism’, supporting a generous welfare state but only for the ‘native’ population (Betz Reference Betz2019), ‘welfare producerism’, which prioritises benefits for people deemed deserving (Abts et al. Reference Abts, Dalle Mulle, Van Kessel and Michel2021), and ‘economic sovereigntism’, which champions national interests against supranational institutions such as the European Union (EU) (Ivaldi and Mazzoleni Reference Ivaldi and Mazzoleni2020).
Finally, several works have explored structural elements. Although having a charismatic leader used to be regarded as of paramount importance (e.g. Eatwell Reference Eatwell, Merkl and Weinberg2005), more recent work suggests this is not (or no longer) essential to PRR parties’ success (Favero Reference Favero2022; McDonnell Reference McDonnell2016). Nevertheless, credible and effective leadership is often seen as a decisive ingredient for PRR support (e.g. Angelucci et al. Reference Angelucci, Baldini and Tronconi2025; Puleo et al. Reference Puleo, Carteny and Piccolino2025), especially in the initial phase (Mudde Reference Mudde2007). In the long term, however, party organisation clearly emerges as a significant factor (de Lange and Art 2011). As Antonis Ellinas (Reference Ellinas2009: 216) underlines, parties ‘that set up solid organisational structures after their early successes were able to sustain and expand their electoral base’ while those ‘which failed to use their newly-gained resources to build robust organisations, failed to sustain their early gains, and quickly collapsed’. In this respect, recent works have highlighted that several PRR parties in Europe tend to invest in the ‘mass party model’, which allows them to improve organisational functioning and ensure survival over time (Albertazzi et al. Reference Albertazzi, van Kessel, Favero, Hatakka, Sijstermans and Zulianello2025).
Methods and data
As the previous section highlights, extensive research has sought to explain the success of the PRR. However, to the best of our knowledge, no attention has been paid to how PRR party elites interpret this success. Therefore, we focus on a paradigmatic case of PRR success: FdI. As a single-case study, we do not claim that these narratives are generalisable to other PRR parties. Rather, the FdI case illustrates the analytical value of an insider perspective in identifying mechanisms – such as the conversion of opposition into a valence-based claim of distinction – whose relevance beyond FdI remains an empirical question for future comparative research.
The existing literature categorises FdI as a PRR party, displaying ‘all the ideological features ascribable to the populist radical right at the core of its ideology’ (Puleo and Piccolino Reference Puleo and Piccolino2022: 378). Over time, FdI has established a reputation for reliability and consistency, maintaining a steadfast position of opposition to the various governments that have held power over the past decade, acting as a paradigmatic case of a challenger party (de Vries and Hobolt Reference de Vries and Hobolt2020). The 2022 general election resulted in a clear victory for FdI, which obtained 26.0% of the vote and 119 seats, outperforming the other PRR party in the Italian context, the League (8.8% and 66 seats). The growth registered by FdI in 2022 is remarkable, especially when compared to the previous 2018 election, when it obtained only 4.3% (Baldini et al. Reference Baldini, Tronconi and Angelucci2022). The outcome of the 2022 general election was the establishment of the Meloni cabinet, the first government led by the PRR in Western Europe. For all these reasons, FdI is an exemplary case of PRR success that motivates our choice to focus on this party.
As outlined above, to explore how party elites interpret the success of their own party, we relied on qualitative semi-structured interviews. This method is particularly suitable for our research objectives, as it provides in-depth access to ‘elite attitudes, values, and beliefs’ (Aberbach and Rockman Reference Aberbach and Rockman2002: 675). While we acknowledge that interviews entail potential biases related to motivated political reasoning or retrospective interpretations (Lodge and Taber Reference Lodge and Taber2013), such biases do not undermine the validity of the data. On the contrary, since the article explicitly aims to examine how PRR actors interpret voter expectations and their own electoral success, and how they translate these interpretations into political strategies, these narratives constitute the very object of analysis rather than a methodological limitation. Accordingly, the fact that these accounts are partial, self-serving or retrospectively constructed does not undermine their analytic value: rather, it is precisely what makes them interesting as forms of strategic self-presentation and representative claim-making. While explaining why respondents construct their success in specific ways lies beyond the scope of the study, our research provides added value by revealing how PRR actors perceive success and strategically highlight the political elements they consider decisive, such as normalisation and de-demonisation strategies. Similarly, we acknowledge that interviewer positionality (in our case, academic researchers) may have encouraged ‘on-record’ formulations of the party’s official self-understanding. However, we read this not as a bias to be corrected, but as a feature of the phenomenon under study: the ‘on-record’ version of success constitutes precisely the ‘representative claim’ that party elites seek to stabilise and transmit.
The fieldwork was carried out between September 2023 and February 2024, resulting in 21 in-depth semi-structured interviews (further details on participants and the recruitment process can be found in the Supplementary Material). We recruited participants using a purposive sampling strategy (Patton Reference Patton2002), a technique intended to select respondents likely to provide pertinent and in-depth information regarding the topic of inquiry (Kelly Reference Kelly, Bourgeault, Dingwall and de Vries2010). Our primary contacts were party representatives, with the initial pool then expanded via snowball sampling with consenting interviewees. To ensure privacy, all respondents have been de-identified, and the recruitment process concluded once we achieved theoretical saturation (Hennink et al. Reference Hennink, Kaiser and Marconi2017).
As part of a larger project, the interview guide also covered topics beyond the scope of this article. For the purposes of this analysis, the questions and probes of primary interest were the following, although relevant insights occasionally emerged in other parts of the interviews. It should be noted that the first question was asked at the very beginning of the interview, allowing respondents to speak freely without any prior hints.
• In your opinion, what are the motivations that lead people to choose FdI?
• What is the role of identity and cultural issues?
• What is the role of socioeconomic issues?
• What is the role of globalisation?
• What are the main ideas of FdI?
• What are the main differences compared to the League?
These macro-topics, informed by the conceptual repertoire identified in the previous literature review, were designed to elicit the representative claims through which FdI actors explain the party’s success.
Once the interview phase was completed, all recordings were transcribed verbatim and analysed using MAXQDA through qualitative content analysis, ‘a method for systematically describing the meaning of qualitative data’ (Schreier Reference Schreier and Flick2014: 170). Following an iterative, retroductive analytical process, the material was first coded in its entirety to capture all elements relevant to our research objectives. During this phase, the coding scheme was developed inductively, grounded in the explanations for FdI’s success as articulated by interviewees. To obtain an initial picture of the main perceived reasons for voting for FdI, we followed Daniele Albertazzi et al. (Reference Albertazzi, van Kessel, Favero, Hatakka, Sijstermans and Zulianello2025) and coded each interview holistically, assigning a value of 1 when a category was present and 0 when absent (see Table 1). Intra-coder reliability was assessed by comparing two coding rounds conducted at different points in time, showing a high level of consistency (α ≥ 0.80; Krippendorff Reference Krippendorff2004). Then, drawing on theories about the PRR (e.g. its ideological core, normalisation, organisation), we re-analysed retroductively the interviews, linking existing theoretical frameworks to actors’ perceptions and strategies, as narrated by FdI representatives.
Insider narratives as representative claims
As outlined, the interview guide explicitly prompted respondents on identity and cultural issues, socioeconomic issues and globalisation, whereas other themes – most notably party organisation, leadership and coherence – emerged spontaneously (and significantly) either in response to the general opening question or during the conversation. Frequencies across these categories are therefore not directly comparable as indicators of salience. Accordingly, Table 1 provides a structured overview of the interview content, rather than a measure of the relative weight respondents assigned to different themes.
Perceived Reasons for Voting for FdI According to Party Representatives (n = 21)
Table 1 Long description
Frequencies and percentages are reported for perceived reasons for voting for FdI, based on whether each of 21 interviewees mentioned each category. Socio cultural issues: frequency 20, 95.2 percent. Populism: frequency 7, 33.3 percent. Economy: frequency 10, 47.6 percent. Globalization: frequency 17, 81.0 percent. Party organization and grassroot activism: frequency 13, 61.9 percent. Leadership: frequency 17, 81.0 percent. Coherence: frequency 17, 81.0 percent.
Note: The figures report, for each category, the number and percentage of the 21 interviewees who mentioned this as a perceived reason for voting for FdI (holistic coding: 1 = category present in the interview; 0 = category absent).
More importantly, we do not treat the interviews as neutral descriptions of the drivers of electoral support, but as representative claims constitutive of the political identity a party projects into the competitive space. Accordingly, throughout the three analytical sections that follow – ideology and normalisation, organisation and leadership, valence attributes – the analytical focus shifts from the actual reasons for success (which cannot be established through interviews) to the elements that are foregrounded to explain success, how they are linked to each other and what political work they perform, especially in terms of distinction from competitors, self-legitimation and normalisation within the party system. In other words, the analytical task is to interpret how the insider perspective is constructed to cohere into an overall ‘representative claim’ in Michael Saward’s (Reference Saward2010) sense. Where we echo the vocabulary of the existing literature (demand-side, supply-side, opportunity structure, valence), we do so to locate respondents’ narratives within the conceptual terrain of PRR scholarship, rather than to treat them as empirical confirmation of the causal accounts that this vocabulary was originally designed to support.
The strategic response to voter demands and political opportunities: balancing radicalism and normalisation
Clear positions on the socio-cultural core
The success of the PRR is often attributed to its ability to craft a political agenda that addresses popular grievances rooted in feelings of insecurity and disorientation generated by globalising trends (Hawkins et al. Reference Hawkins, Read, Pauwels, Rovira Kaltwasser, Taggart, Ochoa Espejo and Ostiguy2017; Inglehart and Norris Reference Inglehart and Norris2016). This has been described as a structural cleavage between globalisation ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, successfully mobilised by right-wing populists (Kriesi Reference Kriesi2014). Several interviewees echoed this analysis, noting that ‘some of the failures of globalisation, or the fact that it hasn’t been properly regulated and governed, have certainly led those who instead argue that globalisation must be governed by politics to have success’ (I-12), and that ‘voting for FdI […] is a way of expressing dissent against certain excesses of globalisation’ (I-13; also in I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4, I-6, I-7, I-9, I-10, I-11, I-18, I-20). To counter these disruptive excesses – specifically, rapid cultural changes – the PRR has typically adopted a nativist and authoritarian ideological profile. Consistently, all respondents mention ‘identity’, expressed first and foremost in socio-cultural terms, as the key ingredient of the party’s profile. While globalisation seeks ‘to erase people’s identities’, right-wing voters ‘seek identity-based references, and I believe that, for our party, the defence of national identity is clear and evident’ (I-2).
In practice, this translates into clearly articulated socio-cultural positions. FdI is ‘not ashamed to represent Italy […]; to carry forward our traditions, the values of homeland, the values of loyalty, the defence of the flag – values that have always distinguished us’ (I-10), or ‘the defence of Christian values, while guaranteeing a plurality of religions’ (I-14; also in I-15, I-16, I-21). These issues pointing to identity and emphasising national and cultural belonging are often expressed through nativist positions. Although negative references against immigrants are rare, several respondents mention the defence of national borders and control of migration flows as explicit goals (I-4, I-5, I-6, I-12). Notably, they advocate for the primacy of Italian culture within the country, adopting a cultural pluralist perspective and embracing symbolic nativism (Betz Reference Betz2019): ‘What’s important is not to surrender our identity to that of others’ (I-15) and ‘respect for our cultural roots’ (I-2; also in I-8, I-17, I-20).
Identity remains a central theme even within the European context, shaping the party’s approach to European integration. Respondents generally do not describe FdI as a party aiming to break with the EU. Rather, they affirm their commitment to the EU – seeking to appear as a reliable actor in the international arena – while stressing the party’s focus on defending national sovereignty and identity. As one interviewee explains:
[Meloni] is not anti-European […]: she simply seeks to reaffirm the identity of our nation. This has always been one of FdI’s core principles, and I believe she will never abandon it. We are in Europe, but we are there to make ourselves count. (I-18)
Notably, EU-related issues are rarely cited as a specific reason for voting for FdI. However, as discussed elsewhere in the interviews, FdI embraces a form of ‘soft’ Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak Reference Taggart and Szczerbiak2004) and Euro-ambivalence (Lorimer Reference Lorimer2021). Although critical of specific aspects of the EU, party representatives view FdI as willing to operate within its framework, unlike ‘the League, [which] has taken a different path, adopting a more radical opposition to the European dimension’ (I-13; also in I-2, I-17). Several respondents evoke the idea of a ‘Europe of Nations’, referring to ‘a different vision of Europe: one where nation-states are not completely excluded from decision-making’ (I-4; also in I-2, I-17, I-20). At the same time, FdI distances itself from those parties perceived as overly compliant with Brussels. While centre-left parties – and even the centre-right Forza Italia (I-1) – are said to have accepted EU diktats (I-16), FdI presents itself as defending the national interest – a key slogan for the party – and striving to ‘restore Italy’s role in the European and international context’ (I-10; also in I-9, I-11, I-12, I-13, I-19, I-21).
More generally, respondents see the unambiguous right-wing worldview as a strong driver of electoral support. Virtually all interviewees stressed the importance of having a clear agenda that voters can easily understand. FdI is viewed as ‘a party that has very precise ideas, a vision’ (I-15), with ‘values rooted in the right-wing [history]’ (I-19). Accordingly, ‘Italian citizens have chosen FdI [also] for their adherence to a worldview, to some core values that the party has always represented’ (I-12). In sum: ‘There is an ideological factor. We will never be left-wing people, and I say that proudly. […] We have a clear position within everything we take part in’ (I-9).
In this sense, the party’s success is explained also by mentioning historical continuity with the Italian right, including its roots in the extreme-right Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) and a broader right-wing identity. As one respondent put it, FdI represents those who ‘never lost that beacon, that light: the old voters of the Social Right [destra sociale] who perhaps simply needed a party that could carry those ideas forward and contextualise them within the current political landscape’ (I-7; also in I-3, I-4, I-8, I-20). In this respect, several interviewees contrast this historical and ideological consistency with its PRR competitor, the League, arguing that FdI is ‘a party that obviously has a much more patriotic and nationalist vision’ (I-2), and ‘ha[s] never been secessionist’ (I-4). As interviewee (I-17) explains:
What is the big difference between the League and FdI? That FdI has a history: it was born with the MSI, it carries forward the ideal of a nation and of a people proud of itself, and today it looks to the future.
This helps explain the loyalty of voters attached to the socio-cultural core of FdI’s ideology and its historical legacy; however, ‘this may be of limited importance’ for the average voter (I-5), thus requiring an additional effort to normalise the party and attract a broader electorate, as discussed below.
Building a reputational shield to normalise the party
The key ideological move that allowed many PRR parties to gain substantial electoral support was their dissociation from more extremist and racist positions, which made them appear as more credible and acceptable political actors within the democratic system (Halikiopoulou Reference Halikiopoulou2018; Mudde Reference Mudde2007). While keeping symbolic links with its controversial past – presumably to retain the loyalty of long-standing members (for example, the tricolour flame within its symbol; Cheles Reference Cheles2023) – FdI has simultaneously sought to project a more moderate image to attract broader electoral support pursuing, to some extent, a de-demonisation strategy. In respondents’ accounts, distancing the party from extremism is consistently foregrounded as a deliberate move through which they themselves explain the party’s broadening appeal. On the one hand, FdI tries to adopt less aggressive political stances compared to its PRR competitor, the League, presenting a less divisive face. For instance, on the issue of immigration, respondents claim to have an intermediate position, ‘which does not necessarily mean “Italians first”, as we have seen in other parties’ – that is, the League (I-8; also in I-4, I-6, I-10). This stance is also translated into a more moderate communication style (see Melito and Zulianello Reference Melito and Zulianello2026), which appeals to a broader audience: ‘We try to talk to the people’s hearts and minds, while the League sometimes speaks to their gut’ (I-18).
On the other hand, interviewees are keen to portray the party as reliable, democratic and legitimate, identifying liberal democracy as the only acceptable form of government. Significantly, they try to avoid any association with fascism: ‘FdI is not a backward-looking party’ (I-3; also in I-4, I-8, I-21) and ‘the legacies and ties to the past are no longer part of our movement’ (I-2). These answers, rather common across all respondents, signal the explicit attempt to build a reputational shield to distinguish FdI from extremist actors, perceiving an ambiguous image as potentially counter-productive. In addition, attempts to avoid stigmatisation concern, in some cases, representatives’ private lives, with a respondent lamenting that ‘being involved in right-wing politics is much more difficult because there is always the stereotype that if you’re on the right, you must be a fascist, Nazi, racist, ugly and evil’ (I-17). This is seen as a lingering shadow over the party, ‘a prejudice that might push voters away’, therefore something FdI actively seeks to avoid (I-4). Accordingly, while FdI’s clear radical right agenda has emerged as a key ingredient for its success, party representatives distance themselves from extremist positions and try to overcome stigmatisation by building a reputational shield, especially to broaden their electoral appeal. This also suggests that FdI deliberately aims to be perceived as a PRR party, rather than a generic and more controversial ‘far-right’ party (cf. Zulianello Reference Zulianello2025a).
Populism as a (thin) facilitator
Similarly to other PRR parties, populism serves as a (thin) element that supplements the (thick) ideological core, helping to frame and convey their message. Consequently, we kept populism as analytically distinct from the PRR socio-cultural core, as it refers to a ‘populist mode’ of displaying a radical right ideology (Mudde Reference Mudde2007: 26).Footnote 1 In the case of FdI, populism appears to have only a limited role in its electoral success, although it was also important for the party to emphasise its democratic credentials by distancing itself from extremism (see the previous section). The emphasis on the people and popular sovereignty is sometimes cited as a relevant factor for FdI success. Various interviewees perceive the party as being able to attract voters due to its ability to maintain a meaningful connection with grassroots communities and to demonstrate its responsiveness and accessibility through local representatives (I-1, I-5, I-17), unlike those parties that are seen as closer to ‘the elites’. According to one respondent, Meloni avoided ‘the kinds of dynamics that have often shaped more structured parties – more structured until now – influenced by lobbying and closed circles. In my view, she has managed to connect with the people’ (I-18).
In particular, the weight placed on local embeddedness and closeness to citizens, in contrast to elite political manoeuvring, alludes to popular sovereignty and the centrality of the people. The success of FdI was interpreted by an interviewee in these terms: ‘voters turned to FdI because they saw a party that prioritised the interests of the people over political interests’ (I-17). This stance was facilitated by the broader Italian political context prior to the 2022 election, notably the existence of the grand coalition led by the technocrat Mario Draghi – considered a stereotypical member of the elite – and supported by all major parties except FdI. Respondents narrate this external political configuration as an opportunity that FdI deliberately seized: they draw a stark rhetorical distinction between a potential Meloni ‘political government’ (I-5), depicted as representative of and elected by the Italian people, and the various technocratic governments that came to power in the last decade, which they portray as lacking a popular mandate or as constituted by ideologically heterogeneous parties through post-election agreements (I-5, I-9, I-12, I-17, I-18). Whether this opposition generated votes is a separate empirical question our data cannot settle; what is clear is that such an opposition is central to the construction of FdI’s representative claim.
Over the past few years, politics offered Italian citizens political programmes that were ultimately not upheld because the will of the voters was often overridden by backroom deals. […] [Our coherent attitude, instead,] has given Italian citizens the opportunity to have a great deal of confidence in FdI’s political project. (I-12)
As discussed below in the relevant section, such an emphasis on coherence emerges as a key valence attribute of FdI that decisively contributes to explaining its success, while populism often remains implicit in the interviews. Only occasionally do populist themes emerge clearly, particularly in critiques of elite dominance and calls to restore popular sovereignty:
[A reason for its success is] the perception that it is a party that is on the side of the people rather than the elite […]. FdI is one of the few parties that has preserved this root, this popular character. (I-1)
As a Senator put it: ‘FdI is not the party of economists, the one from Davos’ (I-9).
The (limited) role of economic factors
The party’s claim to represent broad segments of society is reflected in a multifaceted, at times ambiguous, economic message (I-20). As one interviewee noted, ‘[among] FdI’s voters, there is a spectrum that ranges from liberals to those closer to the Social Right’ (I-7). As a result, this ideological breadth is echoed in divergent assessments of how much economic issues influence electoral choices, spanning from ‘a marginal role’ (I-17) to ‘a fundamental one’ (I-16). At the same time, economic proposals as such do not define or characterise FdI’s identity, as the party lacks a consistent economic doctrine, resulting in a platform that is often perceived as reactive and contingent. Notably, this is consistent with the findings of scholars arguing that the PRR’s positions on the economy tend to be ‘blurry’ (Rovny Reference Rovny2013) and try to attract both low-income and affluent voters (Mols and Jetten Reference Mols and Jetten2017). This inconsistency is evident in this excerpt from the same response given by an interviewee: ‘We differentiate ourselves from Forza Italia [and the League] in terms of pure and hard liberalism, with a minimum of state intervention […]. [Although] it’s more about identitarian and family traditions’ (I-4).
This ambiguity does not signal a lack of interest in socioeconomic issues or their complete irrelevance for choosing FdI. By contrast, several respondents suggested that voters may have rewarded certain specific proposals, such as the emphasis placed by the party on the need to create synergies between businesses and workers (I-14, I-19) or its proposal to abolish the Citizens’ Income introduced by the Five Star Movement (I-10, I-14), which is seen as ‘charity from the state’ (I-18). Significantly, FdI’s stance on the Citizens’ Income aligns with producerism that typically characterises the PRR (Abts et al. Reference Abts, Dalle Mulle, Van Kessel and Michel2021). Others, instead, view the party as the voice of less affluent people (I-1, I-12, I-18), filling the representational void left by traditional left-wing parties and echoing the ‘losers of globalisation’ thesis: ‘FdI had the instinct, the luck, the intelligence and the shrewdness to reclaim a kind of politics [that once belonged to the Italian left], and was thus able to win over the lower classes, the less well-off’ (I-21). Nevertheless, economic positions appear to shift depending on context, as FdI’s ideological foundations in this area remain flexible. As a party representative puts it:
In socioeconomic terms, the right has never fundamentally believed that the economy is central to the political identity of a right-wing party […]. It can easily shift, since it is not ideologically fixed in economic terms. […] It is not a core principle, but something that depends on the specific circumstances. (I-6)
Thus, aside from flagship proposals (such as the abolition of the Citizens’ Income), clearer socioeconomic policies were articulated only after FdI entered government (I-8). This further supports the idea that socioeconomic issues are not perceived by party representatives as central to voters’ motivations for supporting FdI, and that the economy ‘is not the decisive factor in choosing the party’ (I-20). Instead, the economic agenda appears to be subordinated to or entrenched in FdI’s broader claim of defending the nation and the national interest (cf. Ivaldi and Mazzoleni Reference Ivaldi and Mazzoleni2020).
Party organisation and leadership
Effective organisation on the ground
The literature has identified the existence of an effective and robust organisational structure as a key factor in guaranteeing the long-term survival and, eventually, success of the PRR (e.g. Albertazzi et al. Reference Albertazzi, van Kessel, Favero, Hatakka, Sijstermans and Zulianello2025; Ellinas Reference Ellinas2009). In this respect, FdI has developed an organisational model with a solid structure, combining elements of activist and mass parties (Melito and Zulianello Reference Melito and Zulianello2024). As in the previous section, our interest here is not in evaluating how ‘well-organised’ FdI objectively is, but in interpreting how references to party organisation and leadership are mobilised in respondents’ narratives of success. In particular, how organisational strength and the figure of Meloni are discursively linked to claims of authenticity, rootedness and distinctive elite identity, as respondents see the construction of a robust organisation as a significant element to achieve success: ‘probably, an important aspect [for choosing FdI] is that it is one of the parties that is still a party; it operates with structures, tools and occasions for participation, having many branches on the ground’ (I-1). By building a centralised yet well-rooted party, FdI seeks to reinforce its credibility. As an MP explains:
the charisma of the leader is important [for choosing this party] but she is not alone […]. She is a party leader who has turned the party structure into a foundation to build on, a point of reference. I think people see that and, […] therefore, trust this leader. (I-9)
Given her political background as an activist from a young age, Meloni is portrayed as a leader emerging from the grassroots and local branches who, therefore, has fostered activism within local communities: ‘I believe that the main reason [to choose FdI] is that, from the very beginning, Meloni aimed to build a strong connection with local communities and the grassroots’ (I-18; also in I-1). Even as prime minister, she is said to have ‘maintained a deep attachment to the local dimension, to her Roman identity […]; she has always kept a low profile in her relationship with local communities and her roots, and I believe people have noticed that’ (I-21).
Consequently, some explain FdI’s success by emphasising that ‘it is a party with a real popular grounding’ (I-1), strengthened by its ‘presence on the ground, the human contact with people, and the ability to listen’ (I-3); factors widely seen as key to attracting voter support. Although, like any other contemporary party, digital activism plays a major role, the party is said to favour in-person activism, with local branches promoting convivial activities and events within their communities. According to interviewees, this grassroots activism offers several advantages, granting the party visibility and fostering an image of engaged, hard-working members. As an interviewee explains, ‘our activities show that the party is active and alive, which means we’re less likely to be perceived as a short-lived phenomenon’ (I-4). This creates a bond with citizens, ‘making [them] feel that they could place their confidence in us’ (I-8).
Local activists further argue that this grassroots engagement conveys the impression of genuine commitment and dedication towards achieving the party’s goals, functioning as a key driver of electoral support: ‘at least in [our town], people are drawn to FdI because they see in its representatives, that is, in us, a genuine openness and a readiness to serve them’ (I-17; also in I-10, I-19, I-20). Beyond attracting new voters, this ‘activism on the ground, [of those] people who chose the party when it was truly a gamble for the future’ is described as having been vital during periods of modest electoral performance in keeping the party alive (I-19; also in I-9, I-20, I-21). Echoing David Art’s (2011) findings, FdI’s sustained grassroots presence enhanced its credibility and political coherence, yielding electoral capital that was seized when favourable political opportunities emerged, as recently shown by a work on this party by Francesco Melito and Mattia Zulianello (Reference Melito and Zulianello2024).
The leadership of Giorgia Meloni
While the party’s organisational strength is a key asset, Giorgia Meloni’s leadership is regarded as a decisive factor, with many respondents citing her as a crucial reason for voting for FdI. Meloni guaranteed the political coherence of the party, emerging as a trustworthy political leader (I-2, I-9). Leadership and consistency become virtually synonymous in the expression ‘the coherence of our Prime Minister’ (I-3; see also I-2, I-5, I-6, I-10, I-12, I-13, I-14, I-15, I-16, I-19, I-21), and together they are identified as the primary explanation for the success of FdI (see also next section): ‘Giorgia Meloni has been able to project an image of seriousness and coherence in her actions […] and this has contributed to the party’s growing support in recent years’ (I-6).
In addition to her political skills, Giorgia Meloni is also frequently praised for her personal qualities, such as ‘her charismatic leadership, [which] has certainly drawn people closer to the party’ (I-4). She is described as an authentic figure who maintains a direct and sincere connection with her electorate through her communication style (see also Trillò and Starita Reference Trillò and Starita2025), and ‘does not appear as the typical distant leader’ (I-10) because ‘her approach is so natural, so genuine, so uncommon […] so immediate – and that’s captivating’ (I-16). Beyond the party’s PRR agenda, Meloni acts as a catalyst, ‘capable of attracting support or, at the very least, the sympathy of many people’ (I-2), including those segments of the electorate that were previously politically distant from FdI:
The strong charisma of the leader and her communication skills have paid off. As a result, even centrist voters, those who would normally choose other political groups, have given their support [to FdI], and this is, for us, a major success. (I-16)
Giorgia Meloni thus appears to be a strong point of attraction not only for the electorate but also for party members themselves. This is exemplified by a party representative who left Forza Italia to join FdI ‘because I saw in the leader, Giorgia Meloni, a serious, consistent and humble person, who had worked her way up and went somewhat against the grain, against the usual standards of politics’ (I-21; also in I-16). In this respect, she is described as a role model that party members need to follow, the underdog that achieved success thanks to her work (I-13, I-14): ‘she is the party’s driving force par excellence […] so each of us tries to be a small Meloni’ (I-18). As a Senator put it, ‘she is the human prototype […] of the right’ (I-13), suggesting that Meloni is perceived as the embodiment of the party’s message. Most notably, respondents narrate Meloni’s leadership less as an autonomous cause of the 2022 outcome than as a vehicle through which valence-laden self-descriptions – seriousness, authenticity, consistency – are conveyed and rendered credible. It is this specific narrative role of the leader, rather than charisma in the abstract, that we further expand upon in the next section.
Connecting the dots: valence attributes as competitive amplifiers
The insider perspective discussed so far shows how FdI representatives construct a coherent self-interpretation of their victory, attributing it to its capacity to project a clear ideological profile, an effective organisation and a charismatic, trustworthy leadership. These features are perceived as enabling FdI to leverage favourable demand-side and external supply-side conditions and attract voters. However, like any party, they need to ‘sell’ these qualities in the electoral market, which requires showcasing competence and coherence, while avoiding perceptions of internal division (Greene and Haber Reference Greene and Haber2015). In this regard, interviewees identify valence attributes as central to explaining FdI’s 2022 success, functioning as competitive amplifiers for both the party and its leader. Valence attributes refer to features on which all voters hold identical positions (e.g. Clark Reference Clark2009). More specifically, for the present purposes, we focus on ‘character-based’ evaluations (Abney et al. Reference Abney, Adams, Clark, Easton, Ezrow, Kosmidis and Neundorf2013), reflecting interviewees’ perception that voters chose the party because FdI and/or its leader Meloni possessed ‘desirable characteristics such as honesty, skills, trustworthiness, unity, competence, coherence, reliability, commitment to public service, and capacity to govern’ (Zulianello Reference Zulianello2025b: 118). While the perceived possession of these attributes depends on subjective evaluations, they may also be actively constructed by political actors seeking to project a positive image.
As the party had never held government positions before the most recent election, competence is not frequently cited as a reason voters choose FdI. Some highlight the positive impact of FdI’s local administrators described as having ‘contributed most to the growth of the party […] [as] pragmatic, concrete individuals, with a deep knowledge of the local context’ (I-5; also in I-4, I-8, I-17), although this seems to be a distinctive feature of certain areas where the party had already performed well. In terms of valence considerations, a paramount emphasis is instead placed on coherence; that is, the maintenance of a consistent political positioning that signals internal party unity (Ceron et al. Reference Ceron, Berloto and Rosco2025). Coherence appears as the keyword used by almost all respondents as the main reason to choose FdI and, as noted earlier, is typically indissolubly linked to the image of Meloni: ‘What, in my view, led citizens to place their trust in FdI was above all Giorgia Meloni’s strong ability to remain coherent’ (I-12). As discussed above, respondents retrospectively frame the party’s refusal to support the grand coalition led by technocrat Mario Draghi as a decisive source of political credit, at times mobilising populist frames (see above) to articulate this claim. However, beyond the populist aspect – portraying FdI as an outsider that has always criticised mainstream parties closer to the elites – coherence is elevated as a crucial valence attribute. Many representatives stress that FdI ‘ha[s] never entered into broad, opportunistic coalitions simply for the sake of power’ (I-17), taking pride in having refused government positions without first securing electoral legitimacy (I-14, I-16, I-20). In this sense, coherence extends to the party’s ideology, which is seen as rooted in a long-standing political path (I-9): ‘Among the main reasons [for choosing FdI] […] is the fact of having well-established ideas and roots’ (I-7). Consequently, the party is also presented as internally cohesive and without internal factions, under the undisputed leadership of Giorgia Meloni (I-6, I-13, I-14).
Respondents claim that the ideological and political coherence of the party helped build a ‘reputation of seriousness and coherence’ (I-6): ‘What led people to trust and place their confidence in FdI was primarily the party’s coherence, its constant presence, and determination in pursuing its political path’ (I-20). As one interviewee argues, ‘a new way of doing politics based on coherence, taking a stance, clearly defining it, and above all, consistently maintaining it over time, […] proves most rewarding’ (I-14). Accordingly, voters are perceived as having appreciated FdI’s political consistency, differentiating itself from other Italian parties, including its PRR competitor: ‘In my opinion, the ideas of the League are less clear than those of FdI. It has tended to follow the waves, the trends … and above all, it hasn’t had the consistency of FdI’ (I-15). More generally:
FdI demonstrated coherence over the years in its political proposals, which contributed to increasing trust in the leader Giorgia Meloni, and in the party’s structure. As a result, it managed to establish itself as a consistently credible and reliable party, unlike what happened with the parties voters had previously supported. (I-5; similar references to coherence can be found in almost all interviews)
Two caveats are necessary when interpreting this pervasive emphasis on coherence. First, one might reasonably object that any successful party has an interest in describing itself as ‘coherent’, ‘serious’ and ‘reliable’: such attributes are generic ingredients of any self-flattering account of victory. Second, and more importantly, the interviews cannot establish that coherence caused the 2022 electoral outcome. Rather, what emerges is a more specific and analytically relevant pattern. The coherence narrative articulated by FdI representatives is closely tied to a particular political context: a highly volatile Italian party system (Vampa Reference Vampa2024) where most competitors, including FdI’s direct PRR rival, the League, had joined successive grand coalitions, most notably the technocratic government led by Mario Draghi. Read through the lens of challenger-party theory (de Vries and Hobolt Reference de Vries and Hobolt2020), coherence becomes less a generic and universal virtue and more a device of distinction, strategically narrated against rivals’ alleged opportunism; it functions as a strategic claim deployed to set FdI apart from parties that entered grand coalition governments, and to convert opposition into a positional asset, strengthening FdI’s anti-establishment posture. Following Saward (Reference Saward2010), this constitutes the representative claim advanced by FdI elites: to stand for voters disaffected with a cycle of grand coalitions, and to embody a kind of politics chiefly defined by its refusal to compromise.
Conclusions
This article set out to identify the ‘winning formula’ of the PRR by moving beyond established ‘external’ analyses in the literature and adopting a novel insider perspective. Through in-depth interviews focused on the case of FdI, we examined how its representatives perceive and explain their own electoral success. The findings show, on the one hand, that FdI’s elite interprets demand-side and external supply-side dynamics as having created a window of opportunity for the party. On the other hand, respondents portrayed FdI as having actively seized this opportunity, supplying a radical political agenda responsive to voter demand; constructing a solid party organisation with a strong and recognisable leadership; and investing in and communicating valence attributes, which respondents narrate as competitive amplifiers boosting the PRR’s electoral potential.
Accordingly, FdI representatives interpret their success as the result of a deliberate strategy. At its core is a dual ideological approach: a firm and clear embrace of socio-cultural issues typical of the PRR with a conscious effort to normalise the party’s image by distancing it from extremist labels. In their accounts, this balancing act is portrayed as a deliberate effort to broaden the party’s appeal without alienating loyal supporters. In the same narrative, this ideological project is further reinforced by references to a robust, grassroots party organisation and to the credible leadership of Giorgia Meloni. Notably, interviewees consistently emphasised that the party’s deep local roots provided an image of authenticity and commitment, while Meloni’s leadership was seen not merely as charismatic, but as a role model and the embodiment of FdI’s political goals.
Crucially, in this self-interpretation these elements are narrated as being fused and amplified by a prolonged and deliberate investment in a key valence attribute: coherence. Against the backdrop of a highly volatile Italian political landscape, FdI’s consistent refusal to join broad coalition governments – particularly the grand coalition led by the technocrat Mario Draghi – is framed by respondents as the party’s most distinctive competitive asset. In the eyes of its representatives, this steadfastness is described as having enabled the party to construct and communicate a reputation for seriousness, reliability and ideological clarity that they set in stark contrast to the perceived opportunism of their rivals. This narrative of coherence, attached to the party as well as to its leader Meloni, is the thread that ties their entire account of success together: in the respondents’ own words, it is what converts ideological positions and organisational strength into a persuasive and ultimately winning electoral offer.
Overall, this study makes a significant contribution to the literature on the PRR. By providing an empirical account of the self-perceptions of PRR actors, it shows how PRR elites construct and narrate their success as a product of deliberate agency rather than as a passive consequence of demand-side or favourable external conditions. Party actors actively interpret the demand-side and the structure of political opportunity, link them to their ideological project, and reinforce this narrative through references to organisation, leadership and valence-laden self-descriptions. Drawing on Saward (Reference Saward2010), these insider accounts can be read as ‘representative claims’ in which PRR elites stage themselves as the legitimate interpreters of popular demands and as coherent agents within a volatile party system. Whether such self-interpretations reliably capture the causal drivers of the 2022 electoral outcome is beyond what interview data can establish; what they do reveal, however, is the narrative and strategic work through which PRR success is rendered intelligible, defensible and politically usable by those who claim ownership of it. To conclude, this article demonstrates that to fully comprehend the rise of the PRR, it is important to complement the traditional ‘external’ perspective adopted in the literature with an ‘insider’ perspective, so as to identify how PRR success is perceived by PRR parties themselves.
Supplementary material
The supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2026.10064.
Data availability
The data supporting the findings of this study consist of qualitative interviews with party representatives. To protect the anonymity of the participants, the interview transcripts have been de-identified and are not publicly available.
Ethics statement
The research was conducted in line with established good practice for qualitative research involving human participants: prior to each interview, participants received an information sheet detailing the aims and scope of the study, were informed about data protection procedures and their right to withdraw at any point, and gave their consent to being recorded. All interviewees have been de-identified to protect their privacy, and all data were stored in secure, encrypted cloud storage accessible only to the authors.
Artificial intelligence
AI tools were used solely for language editing and translation purposes. All translated content was then revised and verified by the authors to ensure accuracy.
Disclosure statement
The authors report that there are no competing interests to declare.
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