On the negative side, the pragmatic movement is developed by various deadlocks into which modern thought has run, thereby necessitating a reconsideration of fundamental premises. On the positive side, it grows out of the development of experimental methods and of genetic and evolutionary conceptions in science. [Dewey Reference Dewey and Boydston2008 [1908]: 253]
The Darwinian Revolution posed a radical challenge not only to biological thought but also to cosmogonical narratives, religious dogmas, and human self-conceptions. It triggered a break in intellectual history that also affected philosophy, psychology, and the social and cultural sciences. This was especially true in the United States, where the reception of Darwin’s work was much more diverse than it may often seem in retrospect. Of course, Darwin’s work was interpreted as being proof of racist and eugenic outlooks, and he was declared to be the patron saint of social Darwinism, which became particularly popular in the United States in the last three decades of the 19th and early 20th centuries. However, various alternative interpretations of Darwin’s thought rivaled social Darwinism from the beginning. In particular, proponents of American Progressivism took the perspectives that Darwin’s work was proof of the plurality of life-forms, that intelligence and rationality develop in the course of evolution and that emancipatory change and social progress were possible. Footnote 1
As in other intellectual movements that took their forms in the second half of the 19th century, pragmatism can be seen as the result of a specific interpretation of Darwin’s theory of evolution. Darwin’s work was a seminal influence for Charles Sanders Peirce and William James just as it was for John Dewey and George Herbert Mead—not only intellectually but also biographically. Each of the classical pragmatists perceived Darwin’s thought as the climax of a fundamental scientific revolution, which irretrievably destroyed traditional ways of thinking.
The main claim of this paper is a historical one. I will argue that the genesis of the pragmatist conceptions of history, action, and sociality can only be understood if we take their connection to the scientific debates of the time into account, especially in terms of evolutionary theory and biology. Several pragmatists already became familiar with scientific developments within the family. For all of them, scientific training was an important part of their educational biographies, and the constant dialogue with the life sciences remained a major influence on their thinking. Footnote 2 Darwinian evolutionary theory was of special importance in this context since it served as a kind of “intellectual funnel.” This “funnel” not only allowed each of the pragmatists to synthesize various theoretical insights and personal beliefs but it also contributed to intellectual convergence among the different pragmatists. Such a convergence was in no way predictable since the classical pragmatists adhered to different philosophical doctrines, identified with different disciplines and research topics, and differed in their moral and political outlooks. Footnote 3 Because of this “funnel effect,” Darwin’s reception seems to be an ideal guideline that can allow us to understand the genesis of pragmatism. Footnote 4
In the following text, I will reveal this historical claim in three steps. First, I will show why Darwin’s theory was so attractive to the classical pragmatists, and how their view on natural evolution and historical contingency was affected by their reading of Darwin (first section). Second, I will outline how the pragmatist understanding of individual agency was influenced by contemporary discussions in evolutionary theory, physiology, and psychology (second section). Third, I will illustrate how the pragmatists used evolutionary theory to develop a naturalist and non-reductionist account of the emergence of an autonomous sociocultural level of historical openness. I will argue that on all of these three levels—natural evolution, individual agency, and sociocultural history—the pragmatist understanding of evolution differs radically from both the social Darwinist and progressivist perspectives. In addition, I will show how these three levels of change are connected in pragmatist thought. Individual agency and sociocultural history emerge not only as relatively autonomous processes in the course of evolution. Moreover, the evolution of cultural forms of thought has finally led to the self-reflexive understanding of evolution. This is to say that biological evolution has led to the emergence of self-reflexive agency and cultural history, while self-reflexive agency and cultural history have allowed for the development of an awareness of evolutionary change (third section). Footnote 5
The reconstruction of pragmatist evolutionary thought that will be presented in this paper not only aims to achieve a better historical understanding but also implies a systematic and theoretical claim. As I will argue in the last section, the continuing relevance of pragmatism is largely due to the fact that it took shape in a transdisciplinary context and remained an “empirically responsible” theory [Kilpinen Reference Kilpinen2013: 9]. While this transdisciplinary orientation retreated into the background during substantial parts of the reception of pragmatism, Footnote 6 it has been rediscovered in recent years. Currently, various developments in psychology, the cognitive sciences, neurophysiology, and ethology are connected with pragmatist arguments. A positive as well as critical reception of these developments can pave the way to an updated version of pragmatism (final section). Footnote 7
Evolution, contingency, and intellectual liberation
In 1909, fifty years after the publication of Darwin’s groundbreaking work, Dewey wrote that On the Origin of Species not only “marked an epoch in the development of the natural sciences” but also “embodied an intellectual revolt and introduced a new intellectual temper” [Dewey Reference Dewey, Hickman and Alexander1998 [1909]: 39]. The very title of Darwin’s book pointed towards the shocking implications of his theory. “Species” were characterized as the (intermediate) products of natural history. This constituted a fundamental break in Western intellectual history, which had considered species as given, unchangeable, and timeless since antiquity [Dewey Reference Dewey, Hickman and Alexander1998 [1909]: 39; Mead Reference Mead1936a: 161]. Footnote 8 If one examines the writings of the pragmatists, it becomes obvious that they interpreted Darwin’s theory as containing a liberating potential, which could help them overcome the intellectual traditions that were perceived as paralyzing, constrictive, and sterile. By taking an evolutionary view, it seemed, old problems could be left behind and new perspectives could be opened up. Footnote 9
Unlikely Darwinism
The fact that Darwin’s model of evolution is today one of the best substantiated theories in science should not obscure the fact that the pragmatists’ enthusiasm for Darwin’s writings was exceptional. Of course, the idea of evolution itself was by no means new at the time. It had already been debated during the decades before the publication of On the Origin of Species [Mayr Reference Mayr1982: 343-393]. This discussion intensified in the United States in the years after the Civil War due to the publication of Darwin’s study. Historical studies agree that in the middle of the 1870s, the bulk of natural scientists in the US were convinced that evolutionary processes had occurred. However, the discussions on Darwin’s book did not lead to an acceptance of Darwin’s theory. Footnote 10 Already in 1871, Chauncey Wright—a childhood friend of Peirce and James and co-founder of the Metaphysical Club—described the emerging paradox:
Orthodoxy has been won over to the doctrine of evolution. […] Mr. Darwin has won a victory, not for himself, but for Lamarck. Transmutation, it would seem, has been accepted, but Natural Selection, its explanation, is still rejected by many converts to the general theory, both on religious and scientific grounds [Wright Reference Wright1877 [1871]: 126, 128].
In fact, not only Lamarckist but also theistic, orthogenetic, and saltationist theories of evolution were interpreted as being compatible with the traditional religious narrative of natural history. However, the same did not apply to Darwin’s model of natural selection. Because it implies an irreducible element of chance, natural selection was considered to be inconsistent with a directed and planned development of species [Pfeifer Reference Pfeifer and Glick1988: 182; 191f.; 201ff.]. Footnote 11 The result of this peculiar reception of Darwinian evolutionary theory in the United States was that, until the turn of the century, few scientists could be characterized as defenders of Darwin and proponents of the Darwinian theory of evolution [Numbers Reference Numbers1998: 43f.]. Footnote 12
Against this background, it is remarkable that William James and Charles Peirce decidedly sided with Darwin. For example, as early as 1865—at the age of 23—James wrote mostly positive reviews of texts written by Thomas Huxley and Alfred Wallace [James Reference James, Burkhardt, Bowers and Skrupskelis1987a [1865]; 1987b [1865]]. Already in these reviews—his very first publications—his support for Darwin can be discerned [Skrupskelis Reference Skrupskelis, Burkhardt, Bowers and Skrupskelis1987: xxii]. In subsequent publications, his Darwinian stance was substantiated [James Reference James, Burkhardt, Bowers and Skrupskelis1987 [1868]; 1950b [1890]: 683ff.]. Darwin’s theory was also an intellectual turning point for Charles Sanders Peirce. In his eyes, it initiated “the greatest mental awakening since Newton and Leibniz” [Peirce cited in Brent Reference Brent1998: 60]. In Peirce’s highly complex theoretical framework, evolution is a far-reaching concept that synthesizes cosmological, logical, semiotic, and biological considerations. Therefore, his evolutionary thinking cannot be identified with a Darwinian position alone. On the biological level, however, Peirce, like James, was an early proponent of the primacy of natural selection. Also, Peirce regarded Darwin’s theory as making a significant contribution to the transition from deterministic to probabilistic theories [Apel Reference Apel1975: 274; Brent Reference Brent1998: 60]. Finally, Peirce based his evolutionary epistemology, according to which the perception of the world is the result of the long-term selection of psychological mechanisms, on Darwin’s theory [cf. e.g., Peirce 1992 [1878]: 181f.].
Several characteristics specific to James’s and Peirce’s generation and milieu certainly contributed to their early and determined support of Darwin. Footnote 13 Like other members of the Metaphysical Club, Footnote 14 during the early debate on Darwinism, James and Peirce were part of an emerging generation that did not have to abandon any beliefs that were deep-seated or even constitutive to their identities by supporting Darwin. Footnote 15 Moreover, they grew up in a New England environment that can be understood as liberal in the sense that the reconciliation of science and religion was regarded as desirable. Plausible scientific insights were not overlooked in favor of religious doctrines. The development of James’s and Peirce’s anti-institutionalist and idiosyncratic interpretations of Christianity was also made possible within this milieu. Footnote 16
In addition, we have to factor in a specific local effect. Paradoxically, it seems as though the important Swiss-American biologist Louis Agassiz—“the most famous of the many enemies of Charles Darwin” [Menand Reference Menand2001: 95]—contributed to Peirce’s and James’s Darwinism. Agassiz taught both James and Peirce at Harvard University [Perry Reference Perry1996 [1948]: 67ff.; Richards Reference Richards1987: 424f.; Menand Reference Menand2001: 97ff., 156ff.]. The intense and highly critical examination of Darwin’s theories that took place in Agassiz’s lectures and classes, it seems, played an important role in inducing his students to take an evolutionary perspective.
Prodded at first by Agassiz’s encouragement to study the Darwin question—in order to help show, as one student reported, “what is right and what is wrong in our pure and beloved science”—zoology students at Harvard soon began debating Darwinism. About 1862 Alpheus Hyatt, an invertebrate paleontologist, became the first of Agassiz’s students to embrace the new theory [Numbers Reference Numbers1998: 32; see also Fisch Reference Fisch1947: 358].
Hence, different factors can be identified that made the acceptance of an evolutionary framework by the generation of the early pragmatists more likely. However, in most cases, this acceptance did not mean that Darwin’s theory was recognized as the most convincing. That James took such a strong Darwinian stance and made Darwin’s work the starting point of his psychology, therefore, is remarkable. The same holds true for Peirce who designed an innovative cosmological theory that built upon Darwin’s works in essential respects. But why did the pragmatists interpret Darwin’s theory as an unprecedented opportunity rather than as a danger, as many others had?
The end of the “block universe”
By accepting the Darwinian doctrine, the pragmatists were confronted by the question of how a philosophy could be developed that would deal with the challenges of evolutionary theory in a convincing way. For the first two generations of pragmatist thinkers, the obvious candidate to develop such a philosophy was Herbert Spencer. More than any other thinker of his time, Spencer tried to systematically uncover the implications of evolutionary theory with respect to the entire spectrum of contemporary knowledge—from philosophy and psychology to sociology, ethics, and political theory. Even more than in his native England, Spencer’s work had an enormous intellectual influence in the United States [Hofstadter Reference Hofstadter1955: 31ff.; Francis Reference Francis2007: 8]. Of course, Spencer did also influence the pragmatists. However, his influence was mainly a negative one, and Spencer became pragmatism’s primary “whipping boy” [Fisch Reference Fisch1947: 364] for decades. This criticism of Spencer provides important insights into the pragmatist understanding of evolution.
Spencer, in the eyes of the pragmatists, was the first thinker to recognize that the notion of evolution left no intellectual sphere untouched. However, he interpreted evolution differently from Darwin and, hence, presented a characterization of it that was erroneous, at least from a pragmatist perspective. Not only did Spencer describe the evolutionary process as teleological but he also tried to integrate it into a closed and axiomatic philosophical system, which, from a pragmatist standpoint, ran counter to the very idea of evolution. From a pragmatist point of view, Spencer’s work could be characterized as a philosophy of evolution that did not allow for the evolution of philosophy. Because of his deterministic and universalistic outlook, the pragmatists did not consider Spencer to be a genuinely evolutionary thinker. For example, according to Dewey, Spencer’s system can be interpreted as a translation of 18th century ideas into the language of the 19th century. Physical and astronomical laws, faith in nature, and theories of social progress were reformulated using biological and evolutionary vocabulary [Dewey Reference Dewey and Boydston2008 [1904]: 200ff.]. Thus, despite its evolutionary terminology, Spencer’s philosophy appeared to be a new form of the “quest for certainty”. Spencer, in short, did not leave the “block universe” [James Reference James1909: 310].
For the pragmatists, Spencer’s work appeared as the conclusion of an intellectual development, while Darwin’s work represented a scientific breakthrough that opened up new intellectual paths. In the historical narratives of the pragmatists, the Darwinian revolution does not appear to be an abrupt breach but the culmination of a whole series of scientific and mathematical innovations that took place in the 19th century. Peirce, for example, described the years before the publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species as “the most productive period of equal length in the entire history of science from its beginnings until now” [Peirce 1992 [1893]: 358]. Thereby, Peirce referred to
the great strides made through the use of observational and statistical, experimental and mathematical methods in physical, biological, and social sciences after 1845, resulting in the discovery of fundamental theories: the conservation of energy, the kinetic theory of gases, the second law of thermodynamics, the evolution of the earth’s crust and the fossils found therein, the stages of embryological developmental, the principles of domestic breeding, Quetelet’s, Comte’s, and Buckle’s sociological generalizations, Tylor’s laws of the development of primitive societies, Maine’s theory of the passage from status to contract, and the Malthusian law of population growth (which Darwin said suggested to him the idea of the struggle for survival) [Wiener Reference Wiener1972 [1949]: 8].
The developments described by Peirce were not only of decisive importance in forming Darwin’s line of thought but also paved the way for the later acceptance of his claims [Mayr Reference Mayr1982: 379ff., 477ff.]. In contrast to Spencer, these innovations did not promote a mechanical interpretation of nature. Instead, from a pragmatist point of view, they made such an interpretation impossible. In the light of these developments any object appeared as a snapshot of an open process of change, revealing the radical historicity, processuality, and contingency of history. At the same time, however, historicity, processuality, and contingency were not considered as rendering processes of change unintelligible. Rather, their scientific interpretation was understood as a new challenge which could be met, for example, by replacing deterministic with probabilistic or model-based explanations [cf. e.g., Peirce 1992 [1877]: 111; Dewey Reference Dewey1929: 197f.]. Footnote 17
Because scientific innovations render philosophical reconstructions necessary from a pragmatist perspective, the Darwinian revolution must also change the character of philosophy significantly [Dewey Reference Dewey2004 [1920]: 43f.]. In contrast to astronomy, physics, or chemistry, which dominated scientific discourses in the 17th and 18th centuries, Darwin precipitated a systematic break with the “predisposition of philosophy towards the universal, invariant, and eternal” [Dewey Reference Dewey1929: 20]. Accordingly, Mead argues that philosophy must follow the lead of evolutionary theory in taking the processuality of reality as its starting-point [Mead Reference Mead1936a: 164]. As a consequence, many traditional philosophical questions appear in a different light or disappear completely. According to Dewey, the Darwinian revolution led to an insight into the voidness of long-standing questions that held the sciences captive for thousands of years (e.g., purpose vs. chance, mind vs. matter). Only after Darwin did it become possible to ask new, more relevant questions. “Doubtless the greatest dissolvent in contemporary thought of old questions, the greatest precipitant of new methods, new intentions, new problems, is the one effected by the scientific revolution that found its climax in the Origin of Species” [Dewey Reference Dewey, Hickman and Alexander1998 [1909]: 45].
It now becomes clear that, for the pragmatists, Darwin’s theory was much more than an important biological innovation. As the “climax” of a broad scientific revolution, it marked the beginning of a fundamentally new way of thinking. Hence, Darwin’s approach, which started out as an explanation of the emergence of new species, became a kind of “intellectual crowbar” that made it possible to step out of a rigid and timeless “block universe” and into an open and changeable “pluralistic universe” instead, which—although inherently unpredictable—could be subjected to intelligent control and rational reconstruction. Thus, the Darwinian revolution transformed the understanding of natural history, the development of the natural sciences, and the prospects and limits of philosophy.
Evolution, psychology, and human agency
In the wake of the Darwinian revolution, not only the anatomy and physiology of organisms but also their psychical faculties appeared in a new light. As was the case for bodily characteristics, psychological competencies now had to be understood as functional adaptations (i.e., as products of evolution that enabled the organism to cope with the challenges posed by their environment). As early as 1859, Darwin claimed that his theory would place psychology on “a new foundation” [Darwin 1998 [1859]: 367]. With the publications of The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex and The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals in the early 1870s, this claim was explicitly expanded to the mental faculties of man. Hence, it became increasingly clear that the theory of evolution would alter the understanding not only of the bodily features but also of the activities and minds of human beings.
Darwin’s mind in a German body
In order to understand psychological capacities as evolutionary products, they had to be linked to concrete physical processes––to a kind of material basis that could be altered by natural selection. For such an understanding of the mind, Darwin only provided a theoretical framework. What was missing, however, was the knowledge of how the mental processes were implemented in the body. This is why the rapid advances in anatomy and physiology, which paralleled the debate on the theory of evolution, became immensely important––especially in the German-speaking world [Farr 1996: 17ff.]. The rapid strides taken in anatomy and physiology initiated a materialization of the mind which turned psychological processes into things that were tangible and could be manipulated.
These developments were also of great importance in terms of the history of American psychology. Among the approximately 10,000 American students who came to Germany between 1865 and 1914 to complete their studies were the pioneers of American experimental psychology. Wilhelm Wundt, in particular, influenced a large number of American students. Some of these later became founding figures in the field of American psychology and institutionalized the first psychological research laboratories based on the Leipzig model [cf. Ben-David and Collins Reference Ben-David and Collins1966: 456ff.; Farr 1996: 18, 35f.].
One of these students was William James, who studied in Dresden and Berlin for 18 months, starting in the spring of 1867. In a letter to Thomas Ward, which was sent from Berlin in November 1867, James wrote:
It seems to me that perhaps the time has come for psychology to begin to be a science—some measurements have already been made in the region lying between the physical changes in the nerves and the appearance of consciousness […] (in the shape of sense perceptions), and more may come of it [James cited in Stern Reference Stern and Buck1965: 176].
In these lines, one can sense the euphoria that was triggered by the advances made in physiological psychology [Perry Reference Perry1996 [1948]: 81ff., 106ff.]. This euphoria suffused James for many years and ultimately led him to become one of the founders of American psychology. James summarized the results of his research in his groundbreaking work The Principles of Psychology, which was published in 1890 after years of work (and with a 10-year delay) [Perry Reference Perry1996 [1948]: 186ff.].
In the same vein, in an article published in 1884, the 25-year old John Dewey wrote that “the rise of this physiological psychology has produced a revolution in psychology” [Dewey Reference Dewey and Boydston2008 [1884]: 53]. During his graduate studies at Johns Hopkins University, greatly influenced by G. Stanley Hall, Dewey acquired an in-depth expertise in psychology over a short period of time [cf. Coughlan Reference Coughlan1975: 48f.]. In the years to follow, he strove to combine these insights with his early beliefs in neo-Hegelianism [Westbrook Reference Westbrook1991: 23ff.; Kloppenberg Reference Kloppenberg1986: 42ff.].
A similar goal was pursued by the young George Herbert Mead. During his three-year research stay in Germany, he delved into the current research in physiological psychology and decided to specialize in this area. Footnote 18 Mead’s close friend Henry Castle, who was with Mead in Leipzig at this time, wrote to his parents in February 1889:
George thinks he must make a specialty of this branch, because in America, where poor, bated, unhappy Christianity, trembling for its life, claps the gag into the mouth of Free Thought, […] he thinks it would be hard for him to get a chance to utter any ultimate philosophical opinions savoring of independence. In Physiological Psychology, on the other hand, he has a harmless territory in which he can work quietly without drawing down upon himself the anathema and excommunication of all-potent Evangelicalism [Henry Castle cited in Cook Reference Cook1993: 21].
These lines did not primarily describe Mead’s enthusiasm about a promising field of research but emphasized his hope that he could escape the theological constrictions of American philosophy. Footnote 19 Following Hans Joas, one can say that Mead used physiological psychology as a “consciously chosen means to disguise philosophically rebellious ideas” [Joas Reference Joas1985 [1980]: 17]. Moreover, like other members of his generation, Mead hoped to find a new and more open-minded intellectual home within the emerging field of psychology [Ben-David and Collins Reference Ben-David and Collins1966: 465; Coughlan Reference Coughlan1975: 123f.].
During the course of the institutionalization of psychology as an independent discipline, traditional psychological perspectives which focused on conscious processes and introspection increasingly became perceived as unscientific. At the same time, more and more members of the field argued for an empirical and experimental foundation for psychology. This position can also be identified in the work of James, Dewey, and Mead who, by drawing on Darwin and physiological psychology, developed a functionalist form of psychology. Hence, Edwin Boring’s well-known claim, which was formulated in 1929, could also be applied to the pragmatists: “By 1900 the characteristics of American Psychology were well defined. It inherited its physical body from German experimentalism, but it got its mind from Darwin” [Boring cited in Campbell Reference Campbell1995: 32]. However, this should not obliterate the fact that the insights of Darwin’s theory as well as of physiological psychology were interpreted in vastly different ways. Therefore, we need to examine in what respects the functional approach to psychology, which was developed by the pragmatists, differs from other psychological theories of the time.
Living automata?
One possible interpretation of the implications of evolutionary biology and physiological psychology can be found in the “automaton theory,” prominently put forth by the famous British biologist Thomas Henry Huxley (also known as “Darwin’s bulldog”). In his essay “On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and Its History,” published in 1874, Huxley uses the development of physiological research since Descartes as the starting point of his argument. From Huxley’s perspective, the fact that the neurophysiological structures and processes in humans and in other vertebrates are essentially the same implies that consciousness cannot be a human-specific feature [Huxley Reference Huxley1898 [1874]: 239]. Accordingly, Huxley broke up the human monopoly of consciousness granted by Descartes and ascribed consciousness to all vertebrates. However, in doing so, Huxley argued that we are forced to admit that all vertebrates—including humans—are living automata. Huxley described consciousness as simply the by-product of a physiological process, within which consciousness itself plays no causal role. This claim found expression in Huxley’s metaphor of the “steam whistle” [Huxley Reference Huxley1898 [1874]: 240]. The steam whistle is activated by the activity of the train’s engine, but its activation does not affect the locomotive’s mode of operation. Thereby, Huxley formulated an important early variant of the theory of epiphenomenalism, which—according to the principle of evolutionary continuity—applies to both non-human and human animals: “It seems to me that in men, as in brutes, there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the matter of the organism” [Huxley Reference Huxley1898 [1874]: 243f.].
The pragmatists, and especially James, protested vehemently against such an account of human psychology. As early as 1878, James asserted the evolutionary function and causal efficacy of the mind [James Reference James and Burkhardt1988 [1878]]. Over the following years, he presented this thesis in more detail. James denied that reflexive and affective processes were “a mere collateral product of our nervous processes, unable to react upon them any more than a shadow reacts on the steps of the traveler whom it accompanies” [James Reference James1879: 1]. If this were really the case, James argued, it would be inexplicable why they were produced by natural selection. Therefore, a certain advantage had to be connected with reflexive and conscious processes [cf. esp. James Reference James1950a [1890]: 138ff.]. For James, this advantage consisted in the possibility of highly developed animals reacting to the contingencies of their unstable and changing environments in a flexible and intelligent way. The weakening of instinctive control, the increase in the inhibition and uncertainty of behavior, and the development of more complex and energy-consuming neural processes turned out to be effective and successful evolutionary strategies only against this background. “We may thus lay it down as an established fact that the most perfected parts of the brain are those whose actions are least determinate. It is this very vagueness which constitutes their advantage” [James Reference James1879: 5]. Consciousness, therefore, does not serve a “meditative” purpose originally. Rather, it is an evolutionarily advantageous, highly functional, and effective “fighter for ends” [James Reference James1950a [1890]: 141].
The “fighter” is not always present but comes to the fore only in specific situations. Conscious action-planning begins when a situation is unclear, and the habitual patterns of behaviors break down [James Reference James1950a [1890]: 142]. In such situations, consciousness becomes functional. Its emergence makes an alternative, non-habitual regulation of behavior and the development of a new plan of action possible. Therefore, James felt that to deny any efficacy to consciousness would be impossible. By developing this argument, James believed that he had found a way to reconcile the findings of evolutionary biology, physiology, and psychology with the conviction that something like autonomy and moral agency existed. Footnote 20
James criticized Huxley, the staunch Darwinist, by applying Darwinian evolutionary theory to psychology—thereby creating a new kind of functionalist psychology. The functionalist approach adheres to Darwinian gradualism and the principle of continuity [James Reference James1950a [1890]: 130] but it rejects the automaton theory. Consciousness is conceived as having a crucial function within the practical interactions with the environment. Footnote 21 This is why it only occurs in specific situations. Thus, functionalist psychology does not interpret consciousness as a mere epiphenomenon. However, neither is it conceptualized as the “standard mode” of experience. This marks a crucial difference between pragmatism and traditional conceptualizations of consciousness, which held on to introspective methods. Footnote 22 The pragmatist “naturalization” of mind, thus, rejects both extremes—the elimination and the absolutization of consciousness.
Pragmatism emerged at a time which, to quote Charles Taylor, witnessed the constitution of the “secular option.” Footnote 23 Religion was now no longer conceived as self-evident. Instead, it became necessary not only to decide which denomination one wanted to belong to but also to answer the question of whether or not one believed in God at all. In the wake of the Darwinian revolution, the choice between agnosticism and faith was increasingly regarded as identical to the choice between science and religion. James’s criticism of Huxley must be seen within this context. Theories such as Darwin’s or Huxley’s raised the fundamental question of whether the human species, which was formed by the process of evolution and which functions according to biological laws, could be regarded as an autonomous and, hence, morally-responsible individual. Because they doubted whether this question could be answered in the affirmative, authors such as James and Mead fell into extended periods of severe depression. Footnote 24 Therefore, when discussing evolutionary or physiological insights, much more was at stake than philosophical or psychological problems. Rather, these insights were related to deeply personal issues because they challenged religious and moral beliefs that were of vital importance. Footnote 25 Because it presents a naturalist account of the possibility of autonomy, moral agency, and the plurality of experience, functionalist psychology can be interpreted as an attempt to avoid the (seeming) dilemma between science and religion. Footnote 26 Obviously, then, the interpretation of scientific insights is interlaced with the underlying cultural and biographical contexts.
The ordinary man as the protagonist of pragmatist theory
So far, it has become clear that pragmatism does not conceptualize man as a biological automaton whose consciousness, feelings, and experiences are nothing but “organic waste heat.” Nor does it conceive of man as a kind of “ever conscious philosopher” who is detached from concrete problem situations. Instead, the pragmatists choose the “ordinary man” [Dewey Reference Dewey2004 [1920]: 3] as the “protagonist” of the pragmatist theory of action. By focusing on the “ordinary experience of the common man” [Dewey 1998b [1930]: 205], the pragmatists stress the importance of the bodily, affective, and practical dimensions of human life and emphasize that action is always entangled in environmental interaction. Hence, by referring to the ordinary man, the pragmatists not only adopt a concept that is deeply rooted in American cultural history, Footnote 27 but also choose a specific theoretical perspective.
The pragmatist reference to the ordinary man should not be misinterpreted as a kind of philosophical populism or intellectual elitism. Neither does the concept aim to glorify the “simple” and “down-to-earth,” and degrade the “idle talk of the intellectuals”; nor does it imply the elitist contempt for the “common man.” Instead of strengthening these distinctions, the reference to the ordinary man is intended to undermine the dualisms between the physical and the spiritual, the practical and the theoretical, the habitual and the reflexive, and the simple and the complex. In this sense, all men are ordinary. According to the pragmatic principle of continuity, Footnote 28 ordinary experience has to be understood as a predominantly bodily, emotional, and a largely pre-reflective or even unconscious process that is oriented towards the fulfillment of certain wishes and hopes in practical action [cf. e.g., Dewey Reference Dewey2004 [1920]: 3f.]. “Higher” mental processes are not to be considered as detachable from this primary form of experience. What is more, from a pragmatist perspective, conscious and speculative thinking must be understood as being functionally dependent on bodily, habitual, and affective processes.
The concept of the ordinary man is used by the pragmatists as a corrective to the intellectualism of philosophy and the continuous danger of the “psychologist’s fallacy”. Footnote 29 The concept creates awareness for the specific and partial character of reflexive––and especially scientific––experience and, hence, helps to do justice to the varieties of experience. Footnote 30 The functionalist reconstruction of scientific experience does not, however, lead to a degradation of science or philosophy. Instead, the reciprocal dynamics are highlighted. The pragmatists not only claim that scientific thought is functionally dependent on ordinary experience but also emphasize the potential for the rational reconstruction of ordinary experience through the workings of rational scientific discourse [Jung Reference Jung2014: 3ff., 25]. Footnote 31 In pragmatism, science, therefore, does not aim at the elimination of subjectivity as an explanatory variable. Nor does it constrict experience to one specific mode. Rather, it strives for an understanding of the evolution of the plurality of experience up to the point of self-consciousness and the realization of the evolutionary process itself. The pragmatists identify the conditions for this increasing reflexivity of experience in the specificities of human sociality. This brings us to the next level of pragmatist evolutionary thought.
Evolution, sociality, and historical openness
After the American Civil War, the United States underwent a process of profound social change. This was especially obvious in urban areas such as Chicago, which became an emblem for radical social transformation. Between 1870 and 1930, the city’s population exploded from around 300,000 to 3.4 million people, leading to a great deal of unplanned urban development. Ethnic and extreme economic differences became reflected in the city’s structure. Different ethnic neighborhoods developed, and only a few kilometers separated the suburbs of the new middle class, the slums of the poor, and the neighborhoods of the wealthy. These disparities led to social friction and eventually severe and violent conflicts. In short: it was an “era of urban chaos” [Pacyga Reference Pacyga2011: 69].
These transformative processes stimulated scientific reflection, and it seemed evident to many social scientists that these problems had to be interpreted within the framework of evolutionary theory, which dominated the intellectual debates. Hence, evolutionary theory became the foundation of a variety of sociological and political perspectives; social Darwinism turned out to be especially important. For many, social Darwinism even appeared to be the consequential “translation” of Darwin’s thought into the social sciences [Francis Reference Francis2007: 189].
The openness of evolution and the evolution of openness
In the eyes of Spencer and other social Darwinists, the disruptions and pathologies resulting from social change constituted a kind of necessary suffering. They represented the price that needed to be paid for evolutionary progress. Accordingly, the task of sociology was limited to understanding the laws of social evolution. Every effort to ease the disruptions constituted an intervention in the inevitable course of evolution and was considered, thus, to expose the naiveté and ignorance of reform-minded approaches [Hofstadter Reference Hofstadter1955: 43]. Hence, social Darwinism characterized the natural process itself as rational. Social hardships needed to be accepted because they made progress possible.
Social Darwinism was not alone in connecting social change with a teleological conception of evolution. Important representatives of early American sociology, such as Lester Ward and Edward Ross, who were part of the progressivist reform movement, also identified an evolutionary development towards progress [Degler Reference Degler1991: 13ff.]. In contrast, the classical pragmatists did not conceptualize evolution as a teleological process that leads towards a final and morally desirable outcome. Instead, from a pragmatist perspective, Darwin’s theory revealed the irreducible contingency of history. Unlike Spencer, the pragmatists considered this contingency to be the condition that allowed for the possibility of the intelligent reconstruction of society. Unlike the progressivists, the pragmatists emphasized the fragile, fallible, and temporary character of social reconstruction. Therefore, with reference to the relationship between evolution and social change, the pragmatists did not only disagree with social Darwinism but also with its progressive opponents—although they agree with the latter with respect to important political and reformist objectives.
The differences do not end here, however. According to pragmatism, both Spencer and the progressivists misconstrued evolution in yet another way, because they did not distinguish between the different levels of evolutionary change. As they equated natural evolution with social progress, they arrived at a biologistic and basically genetic definition of progress. This is why many progressive thinkers, despite their criticism of social Darwinism, associate social progress with “genetic improvement.” Depending on which evolutionary mechanism was considered to be plausible, this led to two different reform strategies. Those progressive thinkers who followed a Lamarckist theory of evolution, like the early sociologist Lester Ward, called for the improvement of the social environment. According to this “Lamarckist progressivism,” changes in the environment would automatically bring about favorable genetic changes, thus, leading to the socially-desirable abilities and behavior of individuals [Hofstadter Reference Hofstadter1955: 67ff.; Degler Reference Degler1991: 21f.].
After Weismann’s refutation of Lamarckist evolutionary theory in the late 1880s, an increasing number of progressive social scientists subscribed to an alternative, Darwinist argument instead. Because they not only connected biological evolution with social progress but also rejected the heritability of acquired characteristics, they considered that there was only one other way to improve the biological make-up of the population: the direct shaping of the gene pool. For this reason, many advocates of progressivism in the United States as well as in Europe not only supported eugenic or racist theories but also accepted their political consequences [Geiss Reference Geiss1988: 176ff.; Degler Reference Degler1991: 16ff.].
In contrast, the classical pragmatists did not consider the question of how the development of society affects the genetic make-up of human beings (and vice versa) to be significant because they connected cultural change with evolutionary processes in a fundamentally different way. Footnote 32 Evolution, from a pragmatist point of view, is an open-ended process that, over time, has produced two qualitatively new forms of openness.
Three levels of openness
“Chicago,” John Dewey wrote in a letter to his wife Alice in 1894, “is the place to make you appreciate at every turn the absolute opportunity which chaos affords—it is sheer Matter with no standards at all.” The city appeared to him as “hell turned loose, and yet not hell any longer, but simply material for a new creation” [Dewey cited in Westbrook Reference Westbrook1991: 83f.]. As these quotations show, the pragmatists retained their confidence in the rational reconstruction of their social environment even in the face of “urban hell.” This perspective differs markedly from that of Spencer and the Progressivists. It can be understood only against the background of the pragmatist conceptualization of evolution, which distinguishes between three levels of change.
The first level is that of biological evolution. As I argued in the first section of the paper, the pragmatists understood natural history (according to the Darwinian paradigm) as an open-ended and contingent process that—by means of natural selection—brings about genuinely new life-forms. This basic biological idea, in turn, facilitated a fundamentally new understanding of all historical processes. The second level of openness is that of individual action. As shown in the second section, the pragmatists insist that individual experience and agency must not be “swept” under the “evolutionary carpet.” According to the pragmatists, individual agency and creativity are not refuted by evolutionary theory. Instead, within the framework of functional psychology, consciousness and reflexivity are presented as effective evolutionary adaptations that fulfill essential functions in human conduct. However, the question of the emergence of these adaptations has not yet been addressed. The question, therefore, is how and why, over the course of evolution, the experience of organisms changed in such a way that it did not remain in a pre-reflective mode but became increasingly reflexive and finally self-reflective.
From a pragmatist perspective, the genesis of human self-reflexivity results from crucial changes in the way that the interactions among organisms and environment are organized. According to this view, the behavior of “lower organisms” is guided by instinct and does not depend on learning or reflection. In contrast, “the human being differs from the lower animals in precisely the fact that his native activities lack the complex ready-made organization of the animals’ original abilities” [Dewey 2002 [1922], S. 107]. Instead of being guided purely by instinct, human behavior is based on learning, habits, and self-reflection. While James and Dewey regarded self-reflexivity as a direct result of the increasing reduction of instincts over the course of human evolution, Mead argued that the question of the reduction of instincts and emergence of self-reflexivity needed to be connected to the evolution of new forms of social interaction and communication. Footnote 33 Self-reflexivity, Mead argued, depends on the capability to look at oneself through the eyes of another person (or group), that is, on the ability of perspective-taking. The ability to take a perspective, in turn, developed over the course of social evolution because it allowed for a new form of group coordination that was no longer purely based on instinct but also on habitual and symbolic interactions. Because humans can view themselves from another perspective, they can examine their own activities objectively and coordinate their actions with those of others in a reflexive way. According to Mead, the ability of perspective-taking improves over the course of ontogeny. Particularly by acquiring language, humans internalize the specific perspectives, practices, and knowledge of their group. At the same time, each individual becomes a medium for the transmission of these cultural artefacts, thereby allowing for the third level of openness—cumulative cultural history. Footnote 34
According to the pragmatists’ “cultural naturalism” [Dewey Reference Dewey and Boydston1986 [1938]: 28], biological evolution has led to the emergence of a qualitatively new level of historical change that follows its own logic. Compared to biological evolution, this mode of historical change operates on a completely different time scale, which is why an unprecedented degree of innovation is possible. Unlike other animals, humans are able to “rehearse” their actions; that is, they can control their future activity by imagining, reflecting, and evaluating its “anticipated consequences (forecasts)” [Dewey Reference Dewey and Boydston1986 [1938]: 63, 113]. Footnote 35 Thus, on the third level of openness, ideas mostly “die,” rather than organisms. Moreover, in contrast to genetic innovations, the “surviving”, successful, or favorable ideas can be “passed on” directly. Hence, one could say that the process of Darwinian evolution gave rise to a new—cultural—mode of historical change that, to a certain degree, follows Lamarckist principles since it allows for the “inheritance of acquired competencies and knowledge.” However, unlike Lamarckism, the environment is not alone in inducing change because humans can adapt their environment to meet their own needs in a variety of ways. Thus, to use an example of Mead’s [1936a: 365], humans no longer have to “wait” through long periods until they evolve a stomach that can break up the cellulose covering of grains. Instead, humans can construct a mill that grinds the grain “for the stomach.”
The interaction with the physical environment is not the only thing that has changed fundamentally. In addition, the emergence and widening of the ability of perspective-taking makes it possible for individuals to arrive at a “nonpersonal, objective power of intelligence” [Dewey Reference Dewey and Boydston1894: 208]. Mead captures this widening of perspective by means of his well-known concept of the “generalized other” [cf. esp. Mead Reference Mead and Morris1967 [1934]: 152ff.]. By taking the perspective of the “generalized other,” whereby individuals are capable of distancing themselves from their own perspective, they can systematically integrate the perspective of other individuals as well as the collective into the course of their own activities. This is a crucial step that leads to the emergence of morality and politics in the widest sense. So, once again, it becomes clear that the pragmatist reading of Darwin does not lead to amoral biologism. Rather, the pragmatists try to formulate a socio-anthropological theory of moral agency and social self-reflectiveness that identifies the conditions of possibility of scientific objectivity, self-criticism, and social reform. In a way, the psychological and socio-anthropological arguments allow the pragmatists to conceptualize their own thoughts and actions by pragmatist means. Accordingly, their commitment to social reform can be seen as an attempt to use human-specific forms of environmental control to deal with new environmental challenges by taking diverse and generalized forms of perspectives into account. Footnote 36
Against this background, it is easier to understand why the pragmatists did not interpret Darwin’s insight into the radical contingency of history as a profound threat to morality and rationality. Despite the fact that they understood the historicity of seemingly timeless certainties, truths, and values, they did not succumb to what Richard Bernstein calls the “Cartesian anxiety,” that is, “the fear or apprehension that if there are no such basic constraints, no foundations, no determinate ‘rules of the game,’ then we are confronted with intellectual and moral chaos where everything goes” [Bernstein Reference Bernstein and Wachterhauser1986: 344]. For pragmatists, the fact that it seemed impossible to base philosophy on solid epistemic ground neither led to moral relativism nor to the call for the institutional fixation of the “unfixed animal” or to the flight into an irrational and fascist “philosophy of action.” Footnote 37 From a pragmatist standpoint, history does not become irrational because of its contingency [Dewey Reference Dewey1929: 202ff.]. Rather, the possibility of rationality results from the evolution of experience. That it was the result of a contingent process does not mean that rationality is in any way less necessary or important. By acknowledging this fact, pragmatism, according to Karl-Otto Apel, became one of the few philosophies (besides Marxism and Existentialism) that
have taken up as a topic of thought the great problem of humanity thrust into an unfinished world, the mediation of theory and praxis with regard to an uncertain future. Each in its own way has recognized that in a world that is not a finished cosmos, in a life that, as Kierkegaard says, “must be lived in terms of the future,” and in a social situation that can be changed, philosophy cannot be self-contained [Apel Reference Apel1995 [1975]: 1].
Consequently the pragmatists considered contingency not as a wellspring of fear but as a condition and resource of social change and rational reconstruction.
Just like social and political reflexivity, science can be understood as the result of a cultural history of experience and reflection. Mead considered science to represent the highest form of reflexivity because, with the development of science, the cultural evolution of human experience had reached a point at which it could become aware of its own origins: “What I wish to point out is that the scientific method, as such, is, after all, only the evolutionary process grown self-conscious” [Mead Reference Mead1936a: 364]. Thus, at this point, the circle of the pragmatist argument is completed: the third (i.e., the sociocultural) level of historical openness leads to an understanding of its own genesis on the first (i.e., biological) level of change.
The preceding discussion shows that the Darwinian revolution shaped pragmatist thought on all levels. The pragmatist notion of cosmic and historical change was as profoundly influenced by evolutionary theory as the understanding of human and animal physiology or the conception of individual experience and agency. Darwin’s doctrine fundamentally influenced pragmatist social and political theory and challenged pragmatists’ confidence in their moral and religious beliefs. Finally, Darwin’s arguments encouraged them to revise their conceptions of the possibilities and limits of philosophy and science. This evolutionary analysis, however, did not lead to a “theoretical clumping.” In other words: by giving a fundamental role to the process of evolution within their conceptual framework, the pragmatists did not perceive evolution as a macro-actor, which affected all areas of life in the same way. Rather, by advancing a sort of “transdisciplinary non-reductionism,” which combined insights from the humanities as well as the social and natural sciences, the pragmatists strove to achieve an understanding of the evolutionary emergence of social, cultural, and individual processes that followed their own logic.
Moreover, the discussion illustrates that the context in which pragmatism emerged was highly transnational, transdisciplinary, and conflict-ridden. Within this context, the pragmatists repeatedly made fundamental decisions that ran counter to the scientific, cultural, or political mainstream ideas of the time: the pragmatists supported Darwin very early on, opposed social Darwinism, rejected eugenics and fought for the radical-democratic reconstruction of society. Hence, the discussion proves how misguided interpretations that characterized pragmatism as the consequential philosophical result of an opportunistic, superficial, and money-grubbing American culture were. Footnote 38 In contrast to such clichéd interpretations, it must be emphasized that the historical context of pragmatism was far from homogenous. Also, it must be noted that the social context of theoretical innovations does not determine the intellectual outcome. Of course, that does not mean that the context is extraneous to intellectual development. Like any other theory, pragmatism itself can be considered from a pragmatist point of view, that is, as a conceptual struggle with the challenges, problems, and innovations of the time. Like any such struggle, the pragmatists had to build on the scientific knowledge and cultural interpretations available in their environment. Nevertheless, the theoretical conclusions drawn by the pragmatists remain innovative and creative achievements. Consequently, instead of being “determining” or “irrelevant,” the scientific and cultural contexts allowed them to make an intellectual reconstruction of a specific historical experience. Footnote 39
The ongoing evolution of pragmatism
The history of violence and oppression over the past centuries has been inextricably linked to social Darwinist, racist, and eugenic ideas. Understandably, this has led to widespread skepticism towards biological research in the social sciences. To a certain extent, this skepticism can be seen as an inversion of “the rapidly increasing prestige” that has been attributed to the natural sciences since the beginnings of industrialization, and which has made them a kind of “modern ersatz religion” [Geiss Reference Geiss1988: 171; my translation]. Moreover, disciplinary rivalries and boundaries further reduce the chances for a renewed interdisciplinary exchange. If a genuinely transdisciplinary dialogue is to be reestablished, it seems reasonable to go back to theoretical approaches that advocated a positive attitude towards the life sciences, but which had already rejected biologistic and now-discredited theories at the height of their popularity. Accordingly, pragmatism appears to be such a promising theoretical framework.
The classical pragmatists sought to establish a productive yet critical dialogue with the natural sciences. However, the development of pragmatism did not live up to this transdisciplinary claim for a long time. Not even after the beginning of the pragmatist “renaissance” Footnote 40 in the late 1970s was this shortcoming addressed promptly [Baldwin Reference Baldwin1986: 154f.; Franks Reference Franks2010: 1f., 2013, 139f.; Solymosi Reference Solymosi, Franks and Turner2013: 93]. Footnote 41 It is only in recent years that the momentum to renew the dialogue has increased. In the last section of the paper, I will illustrate that researchers from diverse fields such as psychology, the cognitive sciences, neurophysiology, and ethology are not only showing a marked interest in pragmatism but may also be making contributions that can be used to substantiate and update some of pragmatism’s key arguments.
Cognitive processes as functional and embodied phases of action
Studies in the psychology of perception, the cognitive sciences, and neurophysiology can be used to refine the pragmatist claim that psychological processes such as perception, attention, memory, or reflection can be understood as functional as well as embodied phases of action. For example, the functional character of cognition can be demonstrated by referring to the current research on perception. Studies in this area show that the enormous selectivity of perception can only be understood if we dismiss the “copy theory” [Mead Reference Mead1936a: 344] of perception and knowledge, which dominated philosophy and psychology for centuries [Loenhoff Reference Loenhoff2001, 77ff.; Noë Reference Noë2006, 35ff.]. Experimental research on perception illustrates that we only perceive a very limited part of our environment. This applies not only to elements in the environment that are not relevant for our current activity (“inattentional blindness”) but also to prominent, yet currently irrelevant changes in the objects of our focus (“change blindness”) [cf. e.g., Simons and Levin Reference Simons and Levin1998; Simons Reference Simons2000; Mack Reference Mack2003]. These experimental findings can be more clearly explained by conceptualizing perception not as a “mirror” or “photograph” of reality but as an actively constituted stimulus that enables the organism to cope with its current activity and situation. This was already emphasized in James’s psychology: “My experience is what I agree to attend to. Only those items which I notice shape my mind—without selective interest, experience is an utter chaos” [James 1950 [1890]: 402].
On a more general level, the pragmatists, thus, reject a psychological account that characterizes organisms as passive “receivers” of sense data and conceptualizes the processing of this data according to a one-way model, which describes the transfer of information from the perceptual periphery to the cognitive center and, finally, to the locomotor system. The pragmatist criticism of such a “dualism of peripheral and central structures and functions” [Dewey Reference Dewey1896: 357] converges with current studies on the embodiment and situated nature of cognition. Footnote 42 Instead of subscribing to the dualistic “sandwich” model of cognition [cf. Hurley Reference Hurley1998: 401ff.], both pragmatists and researchers that use embodied and situated approaches in cognitive science prefer to use a model in which perceptual, cognitive, and motor processes modify each other in a circular way.
Moreover, several scientific developments corroborate the pragmatist claim that our access to the environment is structured according to our bodily actions. This is to say that objects in our environment “invite” us directly to take certain actions [Mead Reference Mead and Morris1964 [1938]: 12]. Here, again, the pragmatists anticipate arguments that are currently being discussed within the cognitive sciences. Often, these studies do not mention pragmatists when discussing the embodied and action-oriented character of perception but refer to J.J. Gibson’s ecological approach in psychology [cf. Shapiro Reference Shapiro2011: Ch. 2]. According to Gibson, the elements of perception are neither visual raw data nor isolated objects in a geometrically-constructed space. Instead, we perceive “affordances”: “The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” [Gibson Reference Gibson2011 [1979]: 127]. These arguments can also be combined with important insights in the neurosciences. For example, neurophysiological research into so-called “canonical neurons” suggests that neuromotor processes do not coordinate movements but actions. Accordingly, similarities among patterns of neural excitation depend on the similarities among the objectives (e.g., grasping with the hand or grasping with the mouth), not on similar movements (e.g., gripping by hand or holding by hand) [cf. Gallese Reference Gallese2000: 30, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia Reference Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia2008: Ch. 2]. Against this background, it is not surprising that Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia [2008: 34ff.] not only draw on Gibson’s theory of affordances but also refer to Mead’s argument on the importance of the body and especially the hand for perception. For example, in his article “The Nature of Aesthetic Experience,” Mead writes: “Man lives in a world of Meaning. What he sees and hears means what he will or might handle. The proximate goal of all perception is what we can get our hands upon” [Mead Reference Mead1926: 382]. Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia update Mead’s argument by showing that:
the analysis of visuo-motor transformations […] indicates that the seeing that guides the hand is also (and above all) seeing with the hand, by which the object is immediately coded as a given set of invitations to act. […] In other words, these neurons appear to respond to the meaning the stimulus conveys to the individual, rather than its sensory aspect [Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia Reference Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia2008: 61].
Recent research in psychology, the cognitive sciences, and neurophysiology can be used to confirm and update pragmatists’ claims with regard to the process of perception and, perhaps, even cognitive processes in general. This research shows that perception can indeed be interpreted, first, as functional and, therefore, selective process, second, as being an active part of the bodily and cognitive interactions of the organism with its environment, and, third, as being constitutively structured by the patterns of bodily activities. However, not only the pragmatist account of the relationship between perception, action, and the body but also pragmatist social theory can be substantiated by drawing on recent empirical findings.
The evolutionary continuity of human sociality
If the pragmatist account of the evolution of human sociality is scrutinized in light of current empirical research, an important problem is revealed. Despite their emphatic advocacy of Darwin’s theory, the pragmatists are unable to transform the general principle of evolutionary continuity into a detailed and gradualist account of the genesis of the human life form. Dewey, for example, repeatedly emphasizes the continuous increase in behavioral inhibition, physical manipulation, or reflexivity over the course of evolution [cf. e.g., Dewey Reference Dewey and Boydston1986 [1938]: 30ff.; 1958 [1925/29]: 252ff.]. However, when it comes to the description of specific differences between non-human animals and humans with regard to communication, group organization, or social learning, Dewey (just as Mead) falls back on the ideal-typical and dichotomous opposition of “man” and “animal” that was (and is) typical for the vast majority of positions in philosophy and the social sciences. Footnote 43 At least in part, this important shortcoming can be traced back to the methodological pre-assumptions and methods of contemporary (animal) psychology as well as to the lack of systematic and detailed ethological knowledge. Footnote 44 Because of this interconnection between the empirical state of knowledge and the development of theoretical concepts, it seems consequential to review pragmatist key claims against the background of current research findings. Three of these key claims will now be reviewed.
Within the pragmatist account of the genesis of human-specific sociality, the evolution of communication plays a crucial role. In this respect, Mead develops the most detailed arguments. In different texts, he distinguishes between an instinct-regulated mode of gestural communication that he considers to be typical of non-human animals Footnote 45 and uniquely human communication that is characterized as flexible, symbolic, and potentially self-reflective. Footnote 46 Findings from current research on animal communication also emphasize the crucial importance of gestural interactions for the genesis of human-specific group coordination, self-reflexivity, and language. However, especially as primatological studies show, flexible, learned, and reflexive communication not only emerged with the genus homo. Rather, different primate species are able to adapt their communicative behavior according to the situation. For example, communicating individuals intentionally move into the perceptual field of conspecifics or inhibit typical gestures, so that others see (or do not see) their gestures [cf. Corballis Reference Corballis2003; Tomasello Reference Tomasello2008: Ch. 2, 5]. Findings from primatological research also suggest that the first forms of human-specific communication emerged from sophisticated forms of manual communication, which can also be found in recent ape species. Although these findings fit well with the pragmatist emphasis on the crucial role of the hand in human evolution, they run counter to Mead’s well-known claim that human language developed out of what he calls (following Wundt) “vocal gestures” (“Lautgebärden”) [cf. Nungesser Reference Nungesser, Huebner and Joas2016, Ofner 2016].
The fact that some non-human primates can flexibly adapt their communicative behavior to the social situation already suggests that not only the ability to communicate in a reflexive way but also to take the perspective of others can no longer be regarded––as in Dewey and Mead––as a human monopoly. In particular in competitive experimental designs, apes, but also other species such as dogs [cf. Kaminski et al. 2013), clearly display their abilities to take on the perspective of other individuals, at least with respect to their perceptions and goals. For instance, in various experiments, chimpanzees adapt their behavior so that their respective rivals do not see or hear them. They do so in a flexible and spontaneous way [cf. Hare et al. Reference Hare, Call and Tomasello2006; Kaminski et al. Reference Kaminski, Call and Tomasello2008]. However, other experiments have demonstrated that the abilities of apes to take the perspective of others are restricted in important ways. For example, they do not seem to be able to understand communicative intentions. This could be demonstrated through pointing experiments. Although the apes could follow the direction indicated by pointing the index-finger at the correct object (a box containing food), they did not use this information but chose an object at random [cf. e.g., Tomasello Reference Tomasello, Enfield and Levinson2006]. Footnote 47 Consequently, it seems as though the pragmatist concept of perspective-taking is too monolithic. It should be differentiated to allow for different forms and degrees of perspective-taking—from simple forms of anticipation to fully-fledged role-taking. Moreover, both the development of communication and of perspective-taking suggests a gradual evolutionary increase in inhibition and behavioral flexibility. Therefore, pragmatism needs to re-conceptualize the evolution of the second level of openness (i.e., self-reflexive agency) according to the principle of evolutionary continuity.
Finally, the pragmatist account of the evolution of human-specific sociality needs to be revised with respect to social learning. The classical pragmatists, especially Mead, excluded the possibility that non-human animals can learn through imitation [cf. e.g., Mead Reference Mead and Morris1967 [1934]: 51], because no observations to the contrary had (yet) been made. Thus, they seem to have inferred that, in general, no important processes of social learning exist among non-human animals—even though Mead himself implicitly mentioned alternative social learning processes in some passages [Mead 1980 [1922]: 160; 1967 [1934]: 52f.]. Hence, again, the pragmatists posited a deep gulf between the genetically-regulated and, in some cases, conditioned behavior of animals and the activities of human beings, which are considered to be structured by complex processes of social learning and cultural history. Yet, if one examines the findings of current ethological studies, diverse forms of social learning have been reported for non-human animals. First of all, processes of “local enhancement” and “stimulus enhancement” have commonly been observed in animal populations [cf. e.g., Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1999: 137ff.]. These forms of learning result from the simple fact that many animals belong to social groups. Through their involvement in group activities, they come into contact with places and objects which are crucial for their survival. Thus, the individual learns because its attention is “canalized” [Boesch and Tomasello Reference Boesch and Tomasello1998: 599] in a particular direction by the group. In addition, some species expand their behavioral repertoire by “emulation learning,” during which the animals learn by observing how other group members make use of the objects in their environment—by using stones as tools, for example. Footnote 48 In the case of emulation learning, the animal’s focus is placed on the consequences that other individuals generate by their activity in the environment. In contrast, in the case of “imitation learning,” the focus is also placed on the way these effects are generated, that is, on the relation between means and ends [cf. Tomasello Reference Tomasello2004: 52]. Whereas several species learn by means of emulation, whether or not non-human species are capable of imitation is still controversial. In any case, non-human animals seem to use imitation much less frequently than humans [cf. e.g., Tomasello Reference Tomasello, Laland and Galef2009: 215ff.; Boesch Reference Boesch2012: 37f.]. As the distinction between different forms of social learning shows, the social transfer of knowledge can be based on a much wider range of different processes than the classical pragmatists thought. Against this background, it becomes possible to give a much more detailed and less dichotomous account of the emergence of the third level of openness: from simple forms of stimulus enhancement and group learning to the protocultures of some animal species to the historical and cumulative cultures of humans [cf. e.g., Tennie et al. Reference Tennie, Call and Tomasello2009; Boesch Reference Boesch2012].
With respect to the renewed transdisciplinary discussion on pragmatism, the historical reconstruction of pragmatist evolutionary thought provided in this paper is instructive for at least two reasons. First, the historical perspective illustrates the scope and diversity of pragmatism. Against this backdrop, it becomes clear that various contributions to the recent debate do not make use of the full potential of pragmatism. For example, some studies that focus on problems of social theory have focused almost exclusively on Dewey but marginalized other relevant contributions such as Mead’s. Footnote 49 Second, the historical reconstruction of the transdisciplinary nature of pragmatism can serve as a bulwark against disciplinary reductionisms, which are creeping back, for example, into some neuroscientific appropriations of pragmatism [Goldman Reference Goldman2012: 20]. Only if the historical breadth and potential of pragmatism are combined with the findings of current research will the evolution of pragmatism give rise to further innovations.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Hans Joas, Stephan Moebius, Thomas Tripold, and the editors of the European Journal of Sociology for helpful comments and critical remarks. Also, I thank Sara Crockett for proofreading the manuscript.
