HETERARCHICAL POLITICAL FIGURATION AND COMPETING POWER GROUPS

The causes of ‘state fragility’ (Forrest Reference Forrest2003) in Guinea-Bissau are manifold. A coherent statehood that corresponds to the basic image and prerequisites of a modern nation-state (solid state infrastructure, state monopoly on the legitimate use of force) scarcely existed in colonial and post-colonial Guinea-Bissau. The violent and authoritarian Portuguese colonial regime left only rudimentary administrative infrastructures in a country with no pre-colonial experience of central state structures (Lobban & Mendy Reference Lobban and Mendy1997: 20–44). Against the Weberian state ideal, the contemporary African state is often qualified negatively as ‘failing’, ‘failed’, ‘weak’, ‘collapsed’, or ‘criminal’ (Bayart et al. Reference Bayart, Ellis and Hibou1999; Chabal & Daloz Reference Chabal and Daloz1999). In recent years other concepts have been developed. Aiming to overcome the mainly deficiency- and state-centred analysis, the idea of political order as ‘oligopolies of violence’ (Mehler Reference Mehler2004), as ‘hybrid constellations’ (Boege et al. Reference Boege, Brown, Clements, Nolan, Fischer and Schmelze2009), and the notion of ‘heterarchical figurations’ (Klute & Embaló Reference Klute, Embalo, Klute and Embalo2011: 6) were brought in as new conceptual tools.

The heterarchy concept is opposed to the ideal of the hierarchical representation of the state as standing above and disciplining other power groups within the society (for the notion of heterarchy see Chabal et al. Reference Chabal, Feinman, Skalnik, Grinin, Carneiro, Bondarenko, Kradin and Korotayev2004: 47ff.). Case studies on conflict settlement in Guinea-Bissau refer to the state and politics of independent Guinea-Bissau as ‘heterarchical figurations’ (Klute et al. Reference Klute, Embalo, Borszik and Embalo2008; Klute & Embaló Reference Klute, Embalo, Klute and Embalo2011: 6). The heterarchical figuration goes beyond the state-centred perspective of political order by considering competing claims to power and the coexistence of different logics of order (state/non-state, civil/military, local/national etc.). This approach can grasp the dynamics unfolding from the oscillating and competing distribution of power between groups, together with a mutable and unstable intertwining of state and non-state actors. It allows for the perception of fluid and changing relations within an entity whose components may divide and reunite in ever-changing constellations (Bellagamba & Klute Reference Bellagamba, Klute, Bellagamba and Klute2008: 8; Klute & Embaló Reference Klute, Embalo, Klute and Embalo2011: 7).

ARMED FORCES, POLITICAL ELITE AND DEMOCRACY

In the heterarchical figuration of Guinea-Bissau the military form a principal political actor with pronounced self-interests that may either converge with or diverge from those of civil power players. Although in most cases the soldiers return to their barracks and the military officially leave power to civil governments, their interventions create a climate of constant tension and hinder conflict management within democratic state institutions. The civil government needs to ensure military backing, while the armed forces seek to intimidate or eliminate civil state authority that threatens their interests, interferes with the inner structure of the military, or tries to impose democratic control over them (Sousa Cordeiro Reference Sousa Cordeiro2009: 12). Due to Guinea-Bissau's far-reaching economic dependence on international donor aid, as one of the poorest countries in the world (ranking 176 out of 187, HDI 2011), neither the armed forces nor civil policy makers can risk losing such aid. Thus, all actors must balance their hunger for power against international pressure to submit to formal democratic rule in Guinea-Bissau.

The dominant role of the political–military leader is represented at its best in the person of Nino – hero of the liberation war and four-star general – who held the highest constitutional office for twenty-two years (1980–98, 2005–9). Nino exemplifies the entwinement between the military and the civil political sphere. This strong anchoring of the political–military leader can be directly traced to the ‘guerrilla commander’ during and after the liberation war. The heterarchical figuration of Guinea-Bissau offers ideal conditions for a powerful politicised military. Notwithstanding the 1998/9 war, army interventions tend to be limited to only the highest reaches of the government. What makes the analysis of political order and civil–military relations in Guinea-Bissau particularly challenging is the great flexibility and ambiguity of this multi-ethnic society in short-term alliances. The notion of heterarchy, the idea of multiple competing and intertwined pools of power, representing a fragmented society, provides an approach suited to explain chronic political crisis, continuous high levels of violence and the lack of strategic national alliances in Guinea-Bissau.

Guinea-Bissau has as yet been unable to count on a true professional and modern national army. The military were not really transformed from ‘politicised guerilla’ (Barros Reference Barros2001) into national armed forces, able to fulfil their military duties and willing to cooperate with the civil authorities. The history of the liberation war is still used to legitimise military action and the ‘guerrilla politicians’ fear for their privileges. Leading military figures have in recent years participated in illegal activities with South American drug cartels and international criminal organisations, accumulating increasing economic and political autonomy. The political situation in Guinea-Bissau is certainly not comparable to countries engulfed in constant violence like the DRC or Somalia, where warlords and militias fight each other openly with high civilian casualties. But it is doubtful whether the type of electoral liberal democracy which was introduced to Guinea-Bissau in the early 1990s has brought profound change to the political structure of the country, basically built on militarism, an authoritarian and clientelist style of governance, and power competition among the opportunistic elite.

The political class of Guinea-Bissau is marked by great heterogeneity; it is characterised on one side by the different political pasts of its members/groups and on the other by the time each individual entered politics (Cardoso Reference Cardoso, Augel and Meyns2001: 237). The ruling elite which emerged after independence consists basically of two cohorts: first, the politico-military leaders of the liberation war – the first generation of Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) politicians who are often referred to simply as ‘veterans’; and second, the younger generation of politicians with higher formal (mostly Portuguese) education and a general modern and liberal political outlook. The latter often work as technocrats in the state bureaucracy; many left the PAIGC, frustrated by the deviation of the political praxis from the principles of Amílcar Cabral (Cardoso Reference Cardoso, Koudawi and Mendy1996: 154–8). Some of these dissidents founded their own parties and played an important role in the development of political opposition in the period of democratic transition. In their public discourse, they opt for democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, even though the personal morals and lifestyle of the ‘modernists’ often speak another language. They are blamed equally, with the rest of the ruling class, for corruption and extravagance. A significant number of them are descendants of the urban Creole-dominated elite of Bissau (ibid.: 161).

Since the democratic opening, the politico-military elite of Guinea-Bissau has taken advantage of the formal democratic system, its mechanisms and institutions in order to legitimise and sustain its power. During the one-party regime political legitimisation was built solely on the historical foundation of the liberation war and the legacy of Amílcar Cabral. In the multiparty system it is based on democratic elections and the decision of the people. In other words, the politico-military elite had to adapt to two competing logics of political legitimisation: liberation war vs ballot box or militarism vs democracy.

There was little reliable information on the internal structure of the army of Guinea-Bissau until the census of 2009. Its data confirmed that the officer corps is oversized and outdated. The census reports the total number of troops as 4,458, of whom 1,869 (41.9%) are senior officers, and 604 (13.5%) low-ranking officers; 1,948 (43.7%) of the troops are 20–40 years old, 2,257 (50.8%) are 40–60, and 5.4% over 60 (Kiermes Reference Kiermes2009; PNUD/Governo 2009). About 20% have served more than thirty years, another 20% more than twenty years. The overwhelming majority of them reside in Bissau (ibid.), their officers representing an important segment of the first generation of the politico-military elite. The war veterans (antigos combatentes) were registered later in 2009, with a total number of 5,680 veterans recognised by their former commanding officers (ibid.). Some still live in the garrisons, refusing to retire. They play a very important role in military circles and in society in general. Due to continuous pressure the antigos combatentes are now included in the newest reform plans (Ocante Reference Ocante2011).

Ethnic imbalances within the army are evident. The Balanta, about 25% of the population, were the principal component of Cabral's liberation army. No exact figures are known, but they provided the absolute majority of freedom fighters, albeit not in the command structure. After the repression and elimination of Balanta officers under President Nino (1985/6), they are today overrepresented in the senior officer ranks, to which other ethnic groups have had limited access in recent years. There has always been heavy competition for promotion to higher military ranks.Footnote ¹

THE LIBERATION WAR (1963–1974)

For Amílcar Cabral, the objective of the liberation struggle was not only to overthrow the colonial system, i.e. military victory, but also to satisfy the aspirations and wishes of the people of Guinea-Bissau for independence and better living conditions. Political education of the freedom fighters and their ability to mobilise moral and material support from the rural people were seen by Cabral as even more important than pure military qualifications (see Chabal Reference Chabal2002: 62). During the liberation war these young men acted as a policy-making force, not as military performing their profession mechanically. This approach revealed the attitude of submission of the military to the Political Bureau of the PAIGC (Sousa Cordeiro Reference Sousa Cordeiro2008: 4).

In 1964 the PAIGC Congress of Cassaca put an end to excesses of militarism and self-proclaimed PAIGC guerrilla groups that had characterised the early stage of the liberation war. The revolutionary leader condemned those guerrilla commanders who had fought to end violence and oppression by the white men but at the same time committed crimes against their own citizens in the liberated zones, abusing their power and behaving like little dictators (Cabral Reference Cabral1984: 158–9). Military attacks without political authorisation from party officials had been carried out, especially in the south by young Balanta guerrillas. Corrective action was decisive; some of the guerrilla commanders who resisted were executed (Chabal Reference Chabal2002: 76–8; Dhada Reference Dhada1993: 18–20). With the creation in 1964 of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (FARP), the organisation of the liberation war quickly improved. Some military commanders were incorporated into the upper decision-making hierarchy of the party. A close relationship was established between the PAIGC Political Bureau and the military branch of the liberation movement, in which political leadership predominated and military commanders could no longer act independently (Chabal Reference Chabal2002: 77–82).

In the view of Amílcar Cabral (Reference Cabral1980: 249), the armed forces should not have had much influence on the political and economic destiny of the country after liberation. He urged the party leadership to be close to the masses in the spirit of Leninist revolutionary democracy, and to facilitate the widest possible handover of power from the military to the masses so that the latter would be certain that the power was theirs. Article IV of the first constitution of Guinea-Bissau confirmed that power should emanate from the working masses in strict collaboration with the ruling party, PAIGC. But de facto this transfer of power to the people never happened, even in the period of democratisation.

In the midst of revolutionary visions, conflicts within the PAIGC were already evident. Most important and threatening for the party was the contradiction between the bi-nationalist project of one party encompassing both Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, and the political aspirations of the Bissau nationalists. Another partly overlapping contradiction was that between the interests of the politico-military elite and the revolutionary outlook of Amílcar Cabral. The revolutionary leader himself became the first victim of PAIGC's ideological crisis. He was assassinated in January 1973, probably by PAIGC dissidents. This tragic event was followed by radical purges in the movement, the shooting of ‘nationalist elements’, and the protection of ‘Creoles’ and their predominance in the party leadership and the state (Forrest Reference Forrest1992: 38; INEP Research 2011).

GUERRILLA ARMY AND ONE-PARTY REGIME (1974–1991)

What happened to the ‘guerrilla army’ after independence? The foundation and evolution of the state of Guinea-Bissau was strongly linked to the FARP. Consisting of former freedom fighters, the FARP was the political and military structure of the one-party state regime. At that early stage of nation-building the submission of the military to civil authorities was not on the party's agenda: everyone considered himself a politician. After independence the PAIGC shifted almost all personnel and operations to Bissau. Justified by pragmatic arguments related to the infrastructure and communication advantages of the capital, this step caused a deep gap between the revolutionary leadership and the rural population (Forrest Reference Forrest1992: 45). The FARP became part of the governing body of the one-party system. Power competition between civil political actors and the military can be traced back to these early years after independence. Even later, the role of the military was not thoroughly redefined (Mendes de Carvalho Reference Mendes de Carvalho2009: 2–3).

Elites during the armed struggle, those who were good fighters or good political commissars, had to perform governance and management functions after independence. These new political officials quickly focused on their administrative power and advantageous city life at the cost of losing close and informal contact with the rural environment (Forrest Reference Forrest1992: 45). Amílcar Cabral had not left much detail on how to construct the independent state, and most PAIGC cadres did not truly internalise his revolutionary theories. The main conflict emerged between the nationalist Guinean party faction in favour of political separation between Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, and the Cape Verdean/Creole party leaders who opted for two states under one ruling party, the PAIGC.

Violence was the only language of the militarised party towards its political enemies. No effort was made for national reconciliation: many commanders of the Guinean African troops were tortured and killed, and traditional chiefs accused of treachery were publically executed (Nóbrega Reference Nóbrega2003: 214–18). By the end of the 1970s Luís Cabral, Amílcar's half-brother, governed the country in an authoritarian style. He relied on the secret police to control the political opposition, while the elite became more and more absorbed with factional and interpersonal conflicts among different groups of party, government and military officials (Forrest Reference Forrest1992: 54–5).

In 1979 a standard hierarchy of ranks was imposed in the armed forces, eliminating the system of ‘soldiers and commanders’. Balanta soldiers who had been at the forefront of the liberation war demanded to be compensated for their sacrifices with higher positions, but Luís Cabral promoted trusted soldiers close to him into officer ranks in order to maintain civil control of the armed forces (Forrest Reference Forrest1992: 57). The soldiers were badly paid and not given any economic or other privileges. Nino Vieira, the famous army commander and Principal Commissioner (prime minister) under Luís Cabral, led the growing opposition within the party and the army (ibid.).

Claiming to return the party to ‘the revolutionary line’ (movimento reajustador) of Amílcar Cabral, Nino stood up against Luís Cabral. This first coup d’état on 14 November 1980 resulted in the direct occupation of the presidency, the highest constitutional office, by a military leader. A Revolutionary Council, formed predominantly by officers who supported the coup from the Balanta and Papel ethnic groups (Nino himself being a Papel), was installed as the highest governing body. What emerged was not a purely military regime, as the guidance of the ruling party (PAIGC) was not questioned, but the military gained ‘a much more significant political role than it had enjoyed under the previous regime’ (Forrest Reference Forrest1992: 58). President Nino was supported by the Balanta, his traditional allies from the liberation war. He immediately cut the strong links with Cape Verde and put a definite end to the ‘bi-nationalist’ project (ibid.: 59). Instead of returning the PAIGC to its original principles, President Nino governed the country in an authoritarian style, consolidating his power within the party, the army and the state at all costs.Footnote ² His widespread popularity and legitimacy among the soldiers for some time helped him to keep down their urgent political and economic demands, but he did not open high party and government positions to the Balanta officers who had long expected such posts (ibid.: 58–61).

The deteriorating economic situation of the soldiers and the president's refusal to grant privileges to the army laid the groundwork for military interventions in March 1982, June 1983, October 1985 and May 1987. All these coup attempts failed, and Nino did not hesitate to eliminate his (supposed) political enemies, one by one and faction by faction. The group he attacked first was his most faithful ally of the liberation war, the Balanta, who in his view had become too powerful. In 1985, most of the Balanta military elite were arrested, expelled from the armed forces or executed on charges of an attempted coup. The first vice-president, Paulo Correia, and former Attorney-General, Viriato Pan, both Balanta, were accused of intending to overthrow the government by violence; another fifty alleged accomplices were subsequently arrested, imprisoned and executed (Nóbrega Reference Nóbrega2003: 241–54). Socio-religious activities expressing cultural identity patterns of the Balanta in the Kiyang-yang movement, emerging in 1984/5, had gained popularity. They were considered a political threat, forbidden by the regime and its key actors imprisoned (Callewaert Reference Callewaert2000). In a very short time the Balanta lost their influential positions in the military, political and internal socio-cultural realms. This led to feelings of ethnic discrimination and to a self-perception as victims. Those who had sacrificed so much in the liberation war were eliminated instead of being rewarded for their patriotism. This broad attack on the Balanta provoked ethnic withdrawal and a break with the government and the ruling party. The liquidation of the Balanta elite has to be seen as a key event in the political making of post-colonial Guinea-Bissau: ‘The events of October 1985 had deeply shaken the image of the PAIGC … and the party lost many militants, mostly belonging to the Balanta ethnic group’ (Cardoso Reference Cardoso, Augel and Cardoso1996: 29–30, my translation).

By the mid 1980s, the president enjoyed a significant level of control over the government and party. This phase was characterised by increasing personalisation of power at the expense of party decision-making. All national power was concentrated within the office of the president, who became the head of a State Council, directly appointed and controlled by him, with two thirds party and one third military members (Forrest Reference Forrest1992: 60–1). Nino Vieira strengthened the position of officers from his own ethnic group. Due to the tense economic situation in the country, the fourth PAIGC Congress of 1986 opted for economic opening. State enterprises were privatised; the government gave up its rigid control of the economy, and signed a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) with the World Bank and the IMF. As in other African countries this economic liberalisation had mainly negative impacts on the rural population, poor city dwellers, civil servants and the military (Cardoso Reference Cardoso, Augel and Cardoso1996: 18–24; Bayart et al. Reference Bayart, Ellis and Hibou1999).

THE FIRST EXPERIENCES WITH DEMOCRACY (1991–1998)

The pressure from international donors brought about political liberalisation some years after the economic opening of Guinea-Bissau, the last Lusophone country on the continent to embark on democratisation. The democratic transition unfolding from the early 1990s was primarily controlled and manipulated by the political elite, especially the PAIGC (Ostheimer Reference Ostheimer1999: 36). Unfortunately it was not translated into an all-encompassing and genuine process of democratisation with broad mass support (Cardoso Reference Cardoso, Augel and Meyns2001: 241–6). The constitution of 1984 was revised in May 1991, and Article IV, which had defined the PAIGC as the exclusive political force, was suppressed, marking the end of one-party rule. After that, formal representative democracy and a multiparty system were gradually put into practice, with the recognition of individual freedom and rights in 1993, followed by the abolition of the death penalty and the recognition of freedom of the press.

The organisational structure of the quickly conjured parties was weak, and they had little social grounding in the population (Ostheimer Reference Ostheimer1999: 47ff.). The PAIGC could maintain a position of superiority and was de facto the only party with the necessary personnel and infrastructure to mount a nationwide election campaign for the first elections in 1994 (ibid.: 72f.). Francisco Fadul, a leading opposition figure and prime minister of the interim government in the war period, characterises parties in Guinea-Bissau as private enterprises that depend completely on their leader and his financing. People become party members only for power ambitions (Nóbrega Reference Nóbrega2003: 267). The opposition parties were incapable of developing serious political activities to sustain democracy, because of their weak economic basis and poor organisational structures as well as factional group interests and lack of political maturity. Their messages, if they had any specific content beyond the ‘development discourse’, were far from convincing.Footnote ³ Internal conflicts and divisions quickly came to dominate them (Cardoso Reference Cardoso, Augel and Cardoso1996: 66–70).

Finally in 1994 the first democratic elections with fourteen parties took place. PAIGC rule was confirmed and Nino Vieira kept the presidency. His principal opponent, Kumba Yalá,Footnote ⁴ was head of the Party of Social Renovation (PRS), founded in 1992 and based mainly but not exclusively on Balanta ethnic support. The armed forces had officially been removed from the PAIGC. Although theoretically republican, the army was never reformed and depoliticised. Its professionalism and working conditions were not significantly improved, nor were its senior members retired and paid appropriately, to diminish the risk of military intervention and make sure that the army could adapt to the new multiparty democratic context. During the presidential elections in 1994 Nino reportedly gave orders to military circles for massive repression, should he lose the election. Apparently, the military were willing and ready to intervene (Nóbrega Reference Nóbrega2003: 268). Members of the politico-military elite were accustomed to using the army and security services for their own ends to eliminate rivals, disrupt the democratisation process, and hide illegitimate operations.Footnote ⁵

Not only the opposition parties but also the PAIGC were unprepared to handle the democratisation process. Competition and increasing factionalism within the PAIGC were the most obvious results of the ‘new era of freedom’ after the long period of ‘democratic centralism’. The PAIGC was mainly divided along pro- and anti-Nino positions, and unable to generate consensus. Personal differences increasingly overshadowed this first democratic era of Guinea-Bissau (1994–8). The government of Prime Minister Saturnino, who belonged to the anti-Nino group, clashed with the president from the very beginning. The public sector was upset by intensive strikes, drastically delayed salaries and a government too weak to face the country's severe economic crisis (Nóbrega Reference Nóbrega2003: 273; Viegas & Koudawi Reference Viegas and Koudawi2000: 12–18).

Although the official connection between the army and the PAIGC was brought to an end by the elimination of Article IV of the 1984 constitution, true depoliticisation of the military did not take place. The army stuck to its name, FARP, thus maintaining a politicised status, and the war veterans rejected any change as a misrepresentation of their heritage. A solution that would demobilise the veterans and preserve their dignity could not be found. The antigos combatentes had been abandoned without any reintegration measures, provoking general frustration and deplorable economic and social conditions (INEP Research 2011). Since the 1980s a small group of influential veterans had emerged who were closely related to the PAIGC and top political power circles. However, the overwhelming majority remained in a ‘proletarian status’ (Koudawi Reference Koudawi2000: 154–5). After dismissing the Saturnino government in May 1997, President Nino worked to reconsolidate his position within the PAIGC. He distributed key party posts to his closest followers and had himself elected as the party's president, violating the constitution which does not permit the president of the Republic to be president of a political party as well (Frempong Reference Frempong2005: 4). In late January 1998 he suspended the military chief of staff, Ansumane Mané, accusing him of illegal sale of weapons to the Casamance rebels. A severe political crisis emanated from this turn against his commander-in-chief, who had good relations with the anti-Nino wing of the PAIGC (Viegas & Koudawi Reference Koudawi2000: 11–24).

With the introduction of the CFA franc currency in summer 1997, socio-economic conditions deteriorated. The military suffered enormously from poor and irregular payments. The local currency (peso) was replaced overnight by the CFA franc at an exchange rate of 65:1, resulting in social misery, as the price of a 50 kg sack of rice, the staple food in Guinea-Bissau, increased to 12,000 FCFA, which was more than a month's salary for ordinary soldiers and state employees at that time (INEP Research 2011). Many soldiers left their posts and returned to their villages or the neighbourhood of Bissau, looking for food and better living conditions, ready to resist and participate in the upcoming revolt of Ansumane Mané (Cardoso Reference Cardoso2000: 94; see below).

A special parliamentary commission investigated the charges of involvement of Mané and eventually the president himself in the arms trafficking. But before the democratic institution could publish its results, which implicated the president, Nino dismissed his commander-in-chief (Rudebeck Reference Rudebeck2001: 24). The omnipotent president obstructed the ability of the young and fragile democracy in Guinea-Bissau to resolve this political crisis within the framework of its democratic institutions.

THE WAR IN GUINEA-BISSAU, 1998–1999Footnote ⁶

Brigadier-General Ansumane Mané, a Gambian of Mandinga ethnicity, had been Nino Vieira's bodyguard during the liberation war and later became one of his closest allies, participating in the coup against Luís Cabral and the elimination of the Balanta elite (Gaillard Reference Gaillard2000: 231). However, he gradually became disappointed, as he was not nominated to the influential political positions that he expected under Nino's rule. Suffering from marginalisation and increasing economic pressure, the military tried to sustain themselves through self-financing mechanisms such as smuggling cannabis or arms from and to the Casamance. According to Mané, Nino had been the principal profiteer from the arms trafficking with the Casamance rebels (Ostheimer Reference Ostheimer2001: 2–3).

Mané mobilised about 90% of the troops previously under his command, while his rebellion was widely supported by war veterans and young volunteers, particularly from the rural areas (INEP Research 2011). The leadership named itself Junta Militar para a consolidação da democracia, paz e justiça (Military Junta for the consolidation of peace, democracy and justice). The Junta gained increasing support from civil society and the political opposition right at the beginning of the conflict, legitimising the uprising mainly by the argument that President Nino would never give democratisation a real chance. Mané promised to hand over power to a transitional government after victory, and demanded the improvement of living conditions of the military (van der Drift Reference van der Drift2000: 40–1). The causes of the military conflict were complex and the uprising soon became ‘a vehicle for popular protest’ (ibid.: 42). Repeated violation of the constitution by Nino Vieira and the impunity of corrupt officials had seriously harmed the legitimacy of the regime. The military were frustrated: lucrative smuggling and illegal trade were under threat from 1995, when Nino officially agreed with the Senegalese government to fight against the Casamance rebels (Frempong Reference Frempong2005: 5). Nino was supported by troops from neighbouring Senegal and Guinea-Conakry, and later by French weapons and advisers (EIU 2000: 32–3). The regional dimension of the conflict and French–Portuguese competition were evident. The foreign troops were seen as an invasion force, which reinforced the popular legitimacy and military support of the Junta (INEP Research 2011; Marut Reference Marut2000: 4).

Without any evident ethnic dimension, the uprising was foremost a conflict for and against Nino's authoritarian regime and the ruling PAIGC (Rudebeck Reference Rudebeck2001: 29). The broad support for General Mané reflected the socio-economic crisis of the army. During the war the political parties, civil society and parliament demonstrated a growing spirit of political responsibility, acting at different levels for a return to peace and the implementation of the Abuja Peace Agreement reached under the aegis of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on 1 November 1998. In the Abuja Treaty the Junta and the president agreed to install a mixed transitional government, prepare democratic elections, remove foreign troops, and supervise the execution of the peace treaty by a limited contingent of ECOWAS troops (van der Drift Reference van der Drift2000: 48; Rudebeck Reference Rudebeck2001: 32). The Junta started a final attack on Nino's troops in May 1999. Instead of disarming his guard as required in the Abuja Peace Agreement, the president had reinforced it with Papel men and his allies from the Bijagos Islands. Popularly known as aguentas (Ostheimer Reference Ostheimer2001:3), these were the first ethnic militias to emerge in Guinea-Bissau.

POST-CONFLICT CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS: 1999–2005

Guinea-Bissau witnessed eleven months of military conflict, which had as its final outcome the fall of President Nino Vieira and his exile in Portugal. The country lived in the euphoria of a victory, the armed forces stepping onto the scene as ‘saviours of the nation’. General Mané claimed that the Junta did not want to hold power directly and presented himself as the ‘guardian’ of democracy (Frempong Reference Frempong2005: 12). But it soon became obvious that state authority would depend largely on the Junta. The ‘Political Transition Pact’, signed between the interim government and the Junta on 21 May 1999, attributed to General Mané a very particular and far-reaching power position: he had the right to stand over the president by authorising some of his most important powers like dissolving parliament and dismissing the prime minister. The pact also referred directly to the Abuja agreement, which divided power between the president and the Junta commander (Article IV). Shortly before the legislative elections of 28 November 1999, the Junta declared itself prepared to take steps to ‘put things in their place’, should the winning candidate fail to meet the aspirations of the people (Rudebeck Reference Rudebeck2001: 33). The general went even further and proposed a Magna Carta (full text in Diario de Bissau 26.11.1999), giving the military close to absolute authority for a ten-year period. Mané claimed for himself extensive constitutional rights normally strictly reserved to the president. This was an unveiled attempt to impose military rule over the constitution and state sovereignty. The plan failed because of massive protests by the political parties and civil society, but the strong political role of General Mané and the Junta as an autonomous political counterweight to the president and government continued (van der Drift Reference van der Drift2000: 63).

The legislative elections of 28 November 1999 took place peacefully, with a heavy turnout. This essential step to restore constitutional democracy in Guinea-Bissau brought victory to the main opposition parties PRS and RGB–Movimento Bafata against the PAIGC. Finally, the 25-year-long hegemony of PAIGC rule was broken and the election results opened a new era for democratic rule in Guinea-Bissau. A week later the military entered the largest bank in Bissau and came out with boxes of banknotes, as if it were a self-service shop (Rudebeck Reference Rudebeck2001: 61). This incident made terribly clear who, despite the successful election process, actually held power in Bissau.

The PRS candidate Kumba Yalá won the presidential election on 16 January 2000 by the votes of a large number of the people of Guinea-Bissau, eager for change. Their decision was an explicit expression to break with the past, represented by the domination of PAIGC. But General Mané refused to renounce his self-declared position as ‘co-president’. Despite the efforts of President Yalá to integrate him and his military entourage into the civil government, ‘the burning question of the relationship between civil and military power still remained unanswered – in constitutional practice as well as in political reality’ (Rudebeck Reference Rudebeck2001: 69). The government apparently lacked the authority to assert itself as the only legitimate political power.

How much control over the army did President Yalá have at that time? The losses caused by the war were rapidly replaced by military material of Ukrainian and Chinese origin. The new Senegalese president, Abdoulaye Wade, received more weapons from France. By October 2000, President Yalá warned Casamance rebels to abstain from using Guinea-Bissau's territory for their guerrilla activities against Senegal (Marut Reference Marut2000: 7). Precisely at this point, however, Yalá brought the ethnic card into the power play. He took the all-or-nothing risk, following the authoritarian style of Nino Vieira, of dividing the military, by promoting Balanta officers who had felt underprivileged in regard to the distribution of the highest army posts ever since Nino's cleansings in 1985/6.

General Mané refused to accept these promotions, ordered the arrest of Veríssimo Seabra, the new general chief of staff, and instead promoted himself to this position. He also proclaimed himself ‘Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces’ (Ostheimer Reference Ostheimer2001: 15), an office exclusively belonging to the head of state. These steps were interpreted as ‘first moves in another coup attempt’ (ibid.: 5). Soon afterwards, Mané died under unclear circumstances, probably killed either in fighting or after capture by soldiers loyal to the government. This happened in the countryside, in the region of Quinhamel, some 50–60 km west of the capital, where he had fled with a group of followers after government troops had captured the main military base in Bissau (Rudebeck Reference Rudebeck2001: 97–8). Kumba Yalá, Senegal and France were relieved by his death due to Mané's relations with the Casamance rebels (Marut Reference Marut2000: 8). Some opposition parties and the PAIGC had expressed support for the Junta leader for his critical stand against the fragile governance of President Yalá. Some politicians were arrested, accused of having supported Mané's attempted coup (Rudebeck Reference Rudebeck2001: 96–8), indicating the strong linkages and mutual interdependence between military and civil power players, even after the formal return to constitutional democracy.

With the fall of General Mané the direct threat to democratic order decreased. The military had failed in their attempt to control the elected government and president as guardians of good governance in the post-conflict context. But many problems continued unresolved. By the end of the conflict the number of combatants had risen from 6,000 to 15,000 or even 20,000, many of them veterans of the liberation struggle. To pay and feed them all regularly and sufficiently and to respond to the veterans’ financial demands was far beyond the state's capacity. The risk of conflicts within the army grew as the military were more than ever divided along ethnic lines, and between veterans and younger more professional soldiers. The anti-Nino coalition, the pact between Balanta and Mandinga groups represented by General Mané, had quickly been torn to pieces.

While initially enthusiastic about the first democratically elected non-PAIGC president, the population grew increasingly dissatisfied as the country fell back into deep chaos and severe economic and political crisis under Kumba Yalá's rule. His prime ministers and governments changed continuously, the public administration was paralysed, salaries for public servants and the army remained unpaid for months. In November 2002 Yalá dissolved parliament and declared a government by presidential decree; in 2003 he postponed pending legislative elections three times. He had five prime ministers in three years and even arrested his defence minister in April 2003, claiming that he was preparing a coup (Frempong Reference Frempong2005: 14). Structural weakness of the democratic institutions helped President Yalá to stay in power despite his incapacity to rule. After three years, he ended up at war with his own party, the opposition, the judiciary, the military, the media and society as a whole (Frempong Reference Frempong2005: 15). Not surprisingly, the grievances escalated to a point where the government was toppled by the military on 14 September 2003. The commander-in-chief, General Veríssimo Seabra, explained ‘that he acted to put right a confused intolerable situation … We were in a country with no constitution, no judiciary, no parliament, a crazy country in other words’ (IRIN News, 17.9.2003). Once again, the military presented themselves as ‘saviours of the nation’.

The military's intention was to prevent further deterioration of an alarming political and economic situation, to isolate Kumba Yalá and postpone elections until maximum support for the army could be ensured. As there was little sympathy with President Yalá, reactions to the coup were rather supportive. Because of international pressure the military had to accept the creation of an ad hoc commission of political leaders, members of the civil society and officers which was chaired by the Bishop of Bissau, D. José Câmnate, a highly respected Lante N'dam (grand man) of the Balanta. General Seabra agreed to a civil transitional government with a respected and morally unsullied Bissau businessman, Henrique Pereira Rosa, as interim president. The transitional government did achieve some improvements regarding the rule of law and good governance. Free and democratic legislative elections in March 2004 were won by the PAIGC and its leader, Carlos Gomes Junior (Cadogo), was nominated prime minister. First steps for the recovery and normal functioning of national institutions were taken, but the democratic order remained very fragile, the most critical challenges being economic crisis, ethnic imbalances in the armed forces, non-payment of salaries, and the poor living conditions of the military (Casimiro Reference Casimiro2005: 9; IRIN News 11.6.2004).

Far from political stability, Bissau witnessed a military revolt on 6 October 2004, causing the death of General Seabra and other senior officers. The soldiers taking to the streets of Bissau were mostly Balanta, who belonged to the same ethnic group as the leaders whom they killed. Was this the first military coup in Guinea-Bissau based on intra-ethnic rivalries? Violent clashing of different army factions of the same ethnic group may give the power struggle in Guinea-Bissau a slightly different orientation. The October revolt probably sought to resolve internal political conflict among the Balanta military hierarchy over the control of military structures. The mutineers demanded their salaries for duty in Liberia as UN peacekeepers and better living conditions. They also protested against corruption in the military leadership and promotions based on personal relations (Diario de Bissau 8.10.2004: 3). The revolt was a severe setback for the transitional process of establishing democracy and the rule of law in Guinea-Bissau, and increased the danger of the polarisation of society along ethnic lines. With General Tagma Na Waie, a Balanta veteran of the liberation war climbed to the top of the military hierarchy. He defended a moderate position against Senegal and appointed close confidants of both Nino Vieira and Ansumané Mané to high offices. He achieved a certain balance in ethnic and political terms in the upper echelons of the armed forces, but the military command remained in the hands of the old generation from the liberation war (Frempong Reference Frempong2005: 18).

There are other interpretations of this rebellion, namely that it was a preparatory step for Nino's return to Bissau. The ex-president was suspected of standing behind the events strengthening Tagma Na Waie, although the relationship between the two men was far from friendly. But Nino would be unable to win the political battle against his arch-enemy Carlos Gomes Junior and present himself as a candidate for the 2005 presidential elections without massive support from the military. Because of his advanced age (late sixties) this would be the last chance for a political comeback and the recovery of his goods and investments in Guinea-Bissau (Casimiro Reference Casimiro2005).

The spectrum of interpretations of the 6 October events reveals the diversity of possible alliances and the extent of ambiguity that allows for such ‘unlimited’ arrangements, even as secret pacts between military and political leaders. It is exactly this intertwinement of military and civil power players that makes the political scene of Guinea-Bissau so complex, events largely unpredictable and likewise the country in great part ungovernable. These alliances are only possible because of the precarious moral and material situation of the armed forces (INEP Research 2011), and their very particular mixture of disillusioned war veterans from the liberation struggle with guerrilla mentalities and younger officers greedy after personal prestige and power.

NINO VIEIRA'S LAST PRESIDENCY (2005–2009)

The ex-president returned to Guinea-Bissau on 7 April 2005, aboard a military helicopter from Guinea-Conakry. General Tagma Na Waie gave the green light to this spectacular return against the pronounced will of the government which had demanded army support to block the airspace of Guinea-Bissau. But the military decided in favour of Nino Vieira, whom they had ousted six years earlier (Diario de Bissau 9.4.2005: 3). Tortured by Ninos' cohort in 1985, it is unlikely that General Tagma believed in reconciliation with the former president. Rather, common interests seem to be a plausible explanation for his support for Nino, who demonstrated – at a time when drug trafficking through Guinea-Bissau had not yet started – how easy it is in Guinea-Bissau to superimpose oneself on national sovereignty and penetrate the territories of one's homeland. Nino wanted military backing for fighting Carlos Gomes Junior, whom he accused of confiscating his goods in Guinea-Bissau. The ex-president had been confronted with serious difficulties in controlling the PAIGC ever since he was forced into exile in 1999. General Tagma needed guarantees for the non-interference of civil power players in military affairs. This seems to have been the basis for the fragile agreement between the two men (Alves Reference Alves2005; ICG 2009: 2–3).

Together with the ex-president, his military men and advisers returned. Thus the main protagonists of the 1998/9 war were back on stage in Guinea-Bissau. With the re-election of Nino Vieira as president in July 2005, in multiparty democratic presidential elections widely regarded as fair, the floor was open for a twofold battle: Nino succeeded in driving out Carlos Gomes Junior and put in his place a friendly government under Prime Minister Aristides Gomes in November 2005. Slow but steady corrosion of the PAIGC and further internal party struggle characterise the period from late 2005 until the legislative elections of 16 November 2008. The party demonstrated incapacity to govern against a strong PRS opposition. The hatred between Nino Vieira and Carlos Gomes Junior was reflected in a lack of party discipline and alliances between members of the PRS and Nino-loyal PAIGC dissidents (own observations).

President Nino and General Tagma had a very complicated and strained relationship. Aware of the fact that neither was able to oust the other, however deep their hatred, they tried to control one another as far as possible. There were de facto two parallel centres of power, civil (president) vs military (chief of staff). This polarisation was translated into the personalisation of power with strong interference in politics by the armed forces (Cardoso Reference Cardoso2009). The two centres of power shared certain temporary interests in the political sphere, and both were probably linked to drug trafficking. From 2006 Guinea-Bissau became increasingly important for the South American cocaine trade and developed into a major hub in West Africa for drug trafficking to Europe. The military were accused of facilitating the passage of ships and aircraft with drugs. Various scandals of drug trafficking via Guinea-Bissau have been reported, one of the most spectacular in July 2008, when an airplane landed at Bissau International Airport, allegedly with a cargo of medicines for the armed forces on board. Wanted by Interpol for drug trafficking, its pilot was released some weeks later by the Guinean authorities (Ultima Hora 1.9.2008: 7).

Political control of the military became extremely difficult. Leading officers felt free to do whatever they liked and a dangerous and unpredictable situation emerged in Bissau. In mid 2008 the PAIGC withdrew from the three-party alliance founded a year before, and Nino Vieira reacted by dissolving the parliament and appointing his own man, Carlos Correia, as prime minister. The answer from the military was prompt. Apparently tensions in the barracks had greatly increased because of the involvement of some officers in the facilitation of drug trafficking (INEP Research 2011). On 6 August 2008, a coup attempt by navy chief Bubo Na Tchuto against the president failed (Ultima Hora 1.9.2008: 3). The coup leader managed to escape to Gambia and the cards of the power poker between the military leadership and the president were reshuffled. The rest of the year was marked by increasing isolation of the president. Bubo Na Tchuto returned from Gambia by the end of 2009, contributing to further confusion and violent discord.

The military did not interfere (directly) in the legislative elections of 16 November 2008, which resulted in a two-thirds majority for PAIGC leader Carlos Gomes Junior (Cadogo). Bitterly disappointed with the constant intra- and inter-party quarrels dominating parliament and paralysing political decisions, the people probably would not tolerate any further disturbance in the democratic transition (own observations). Under Nino Vieira's last presidency, political actors had demonstrated incapacity to respond to the crisis situation (reconstruction needs, drug trafficking, militarism) of the country. As permanent opponent of the president, Cadogo was seen by many as an upright and integrative personality. People voted in favour of the distinctive personality of the PAIGC leader and for a government of social and political cohesion. For General Tagma, a government directed against his personal enemy, President Nino, could only be an advantage. Within the Balanta-dominated higher echelons of the army, two or more competing factions were emerging at this time, probably connected to drug trafficking and not completely under General Tagma's control (INEP Research 2011).

One week after the elections, another attempt to assassinate the president threatened democracy in Guinea-Bissau. The attack on the president's residence raised alarm over the personal security of the head of state. In private gatherings some people speculated that the attack had been contrived by the president to manoeuvre himself back to the political stage (own observations in Bissau). Whatever the truth may be, his position was significantly weakened. Tensions between the two power centres grew still higher with a ‘counter-attack’ against General Tagma in early January 2009 by the aguentas, the special presidential security guard. Local sources suggested that the attack might have been orchestrated by the military chief as pretext for disarming the aguentas a few days later (Diario de Bissau 10.1.2009). The very personal battle between the president and the general had reached its end. With the dissolution of the aguentas the president lost power to influence the military. Nino Vieira was exposed to more attacks, although the armed forces claimed to be ensuring his security. The permanent threat of military intervention virtually paralysed the new government right from its installation in January 2009.

QUO VADIS GUINEA-BISSAU?

More political murder on the eve of the anticipated presidential election campaign in mid-2009 further worsened the situation.Footnote ⁸ In the midst of fear and uncertainty the people of Guinea-Bissau voted and demonstrated great courage and democratic sentiment. They made clear that they would not be intimidated by the impenetrable power struggle of the politico-military elite, and that ordinary people are not involved in the vicious circles of violence and organised crime (own observation of the electorate in Bissau).

Malam Bacai Sanha,Footnote ⁹ the new president, declared in his inauguration speech (8.9.2009) that national reconciliation, security sector reform and the fight against impunity would be the central objectives of his presidency: the modernisation of the armed forces and the security sector would not result ‘in the expulsion of anyone’, but the army has ‘to be corrected from a guerrilla army to a modern Republican Armed Forces’ (Nô Pintcha 1.10.2009, my emphasis). The new president stressed national dialogue, political stability, social justice and the end of impunity as his main concerns, promising also tough action against drug trafficking.Footnote ¹⁰ With the death of the protagonists whose power struggles had dominated public life for years, some optimism emerged in regard to overcoming the ‘criminalisation’ of the state. Expectations after the elections were high: now that, for the first time ever since independence, two men without direct affiliation to the military governed the country, would the new president and prime minister seize this historical opportunity to respond to the manifold social, political and economic challenges of Guinea-Bissau?

It was not particularly surprising that the military rapidly tried to topple the ‘post-Nino regime’ of Carlos Gomes Junior and Malam Bacai Sanha. Military infighting among different Balanta factions and drug cartels in Bissau had evidently not come to an end with the deaths of Nino and Tagma. Former navy commander Bubo Na Tchuto re-entered the country by the end of 2009 and instigated a new political crisis. While seeking refuge at the local UN installations for security reasons, the government was for months too weak to resolve the case, giving the former navy chief the time and opportunity to orchestrate plans for a coup.

On 1 April 2010 some military entered the UN building and ‘freed’ their leader. Together with the vice general chief of staff, Bubo Na Tchuto stood up against the military leadership and the prime minister. While illegally deposing and detaining the general chief of staff (Zamora Induta) in the face of a powerless government, the coup leaders failed to remove the prime minister from government responsibility, due to massive protection from the people of Bissau and immediate international pressure. The coup leaders announced on local radio and TV stations that they would kill the prime minister and his supporters on the streets. Nevertheless people gathered near the prime minister's office, demanding his immediate liberation. Never before had the population stood up against the military to defend a legitimately elected civil government. The coup leaders had not taken such resistance in Bissau into account, and had to withdraw gradually from their position. The military later interpreted the events of 1 April 2010 as internal vengeance (INEP Research 2011).

The international community tried in vain to prevent the nomination of Antonio Indjai as new chief of staff and the return of Bubo Na Tchuto to his post as navy commander. Continuous pressure on the government and the presidency did not have the desired effect, as these institutions remain very weak vis-à-vis the military despite some economic progress (90% of external debt relief) and political development (institution building, administrative, financial and legal reforms, policy planning) in 2010–11. The USA cut its military cooperation with Bissau, while the EU ended its reform mission in September 2010 (Europafrica 2010). The two governance poles, prime minister and president, seemed to struggle more for particular interest than collaborate for political stability and democratic order, thus motivating the military to capture politicians and violate diplomatic space in Bissau, in Rambo-like style. Civil political leadership continued to alternate between resisting the military and following the political will of the dominant officers’ faction.

Navy commander Bubo Na Tchuto openly rejected the security sector reform plans accepted by the National Superior Council of Defence and Security in August 2011 (Jornal Digital 26.8.2011), and on 26 December came up with a new coup attempt against the chief of staff, General Antonio Indjai. Both are of Balanta origin, but lead different regional factions (Dabo 26.12.2011). The authors of this latest coup scenario took advantage of the political power vacuum in Bissau due to the severe illness and absence of the president for medical treatment from November 2011; he died on 9 January 2012. The infighting between different Balanta groups is also related to disputes over drug distribution after a small plane, suspected of transporting drugs, landed on the main road from Bissau to the east of the country, 60 km from Bissau, in mid December 2011 (www.bissau.digital.com 26.12.2011). Apparently, more militaries and politicians are involved in this latest crisis; the confiscation of weapons, interrogations and a wave of arrests continued for days after this latest coup attempt (ibid.).

In the post-conflict period since 1999, no military chief or elected president has been able to stay in office until the regular end of his term. The project of democratic transition in Guinea-Bissau never had a fair chance to take shape and develop. Cut down eight years after its beginning by the war of 1998/9, the democratisation of the political system made no real progress in the post-conflict circumstances and was hampered from all sides: governance incapacity, party quarrels, political violence, militarism, economic crisis, drug trafficking and so on. The powerful PAIGC party and the personalisation of the political system undermined the internal and external bases that could facilitate the emergence of new professional national elites. Against the difficult background of extreme poverty and political instability, a young and largely inexperienced political class developed with the democratic transition, but did not manage to design an encompassing project for national reconstruction (Cardoso Reference Cardoso, Augel and Meyns2001: 244). Repeatedly, the military appeared on the political stage as the only regulatory force in the heterarchical political figuration of Guinea-Bissau. The events of 1 April 2010 and more recently of 26 December 2011 demonstrate once more the true scope of military power in Guinea-Bissau.

Although African countries generally possess the necessary formal mechanisms to ensure civil supremacy over armed forces, the formal de-linkage of the military from politics and some professionalisation of the army in the era of multiparty democracy did not automatically improve civil–military relations (Williams Reference Williams, Williams, Cawthra and Abrahams2003: 266–7). This is particularly true in the case of intensive political ties between the military and the ruling political class. As we have seen, historical patterns of civil–military relations rooted in the experiences of the liberation war and post-colonial authoritarian single-party rule still have significant influence in Guinea-Bissau.

The army of Guinea-Bissau is characterised by high percentages of older officers (see above) and approximately 6,000 war veterans with unclear status, partly still living in the barracks. These veterans, older officers and other non-regular armed forces (paramilitary, security forces, militias etc.) prefer heterarchical figurations to consolidated statehood, as this helps them to impose their own political and economic agendas under mutable and instable conditions (Schneckener Reference Schneckener, Bryden and Caparini2006: 23–40). The military commander-in-chief is remarkably autonomous in his decisions and actions. He is largely responsible for questions of recruitment, weapon facilities and promotions (Law of National Defence and the Armed Forces, Organic Law of Armed Forces, both approved by parliament in 2011). Together with his council, the general chief of staff elaborates national defence strategies and the army budget (to be approved by the ministry of defence and parliament). Thus, the military chief has direct and wide ranging decision-making powers, not only over technical (military) issues but to a certain extent also in political and financial matters. The Guinean navy formally controls all resources in the territorial waters of Guinea-Bissau and has the power to confiscate goods from illegal industrial fishing and smuggling (ICG 2009: 8). Given the severe economic crisis of Guinea-Bissau, the generally badly paid army has little interest in changing this status quo towards efficient public control over its decisions, economic resources and income.

Security sector reform and the issue of national reconciliation have been top priorities on the national policy agenda since the presentation of the first strategy document on ‘Restructuring and Modernisation of the Defence and Security Sector’ by the Government in 2006 (Inter-ministerial Committee 2006). Nevertheless, due to continuous political crisis in Guinea-Bissau, national stakeholders, the justice sector, parliament and civil society organisations, assisted by international and bilateral partners, have as yet been unable to push forward the implementation of army, police and judiciary reforms (envisaged in the SSR process), or significantly enhance the subordination of the military to the democratic institutions of the country. This crisis situation is reflected in various UN resolutions in recent years calling on the military to respect the constitutional order and refrain from any interference in political issues of Guinea-Bissau (Security Council Resolutions 1876/2009, 1949/2010, 2030/2011).

The SSR reform plans and measures concerning adherence to the rule of law, demobilisation, retirement and social integration of elder officers and war veterans, modernisation and capacity-building of the armed forces and the police/security forces as well as basic reforms of the legal frameworks and the justice sector have also been anchored in the second national poverty reduction strategy paper, a guiding document for the national development of Guinea-Bissau, formally endorsed by the government on 5 July 2011 (DENARP II 2011: 57–68). The Guinea-Bissau authorities intend to launch the special pension fund (created in the frame of the SSR strategy) for army retirees very soon. According to former defence minister Aristides Ocante, currently 1,500 officers are willing to retire, which is seen among national stakeholders and the international community as an advantageous opportunity to initiate this top priority of the reform process (Ocante Reference Ocante2011).

This article has demonstrated the largely dysfunctional character of the heterarchical political system of Guinea-Bissau. The national development plan underlines the view of the Guinea-Bissau government that sustainable reforms of the army, the security and the justice sector based on an inclusive national reconciliation process are a key condition for the country's stabilisation and national development (DENARP II 2011). But to improve civil–military relations in Guinea-Bissau, many problems still remain to be resolved on the internal level, particularly concerning the reluctant and corrupt state apparatus and the lack of a strong unified political leadership. At least three different power poles might act against each other, shifting back and forth as political conditions become favourable for each of them: the prime minister, the president, who has quite a strong position in the semi-presidential system of Guinea-Bissau, and a largely autonomous army chief. Good relations between the president, the chief executive and the general chief of staff as well as the latter's authority on his commanding officers, who are mainly Balanta and backed by the Balanta-dominated PRS party, are critical for any sustainable improvement of democratic political order in the country. Local authorities (regulos or chiefs) and other (traditional) representatives of the rural communities may raise their voices in favour or against any of these power poles.

Thus, it seems unlikely that the tense civil–military relations in Bissau, essentially going back to deep mistrust within the politico-military elite fostered by personal rivalries, inner-party factionalism, militarism, economic fighting on the profits of drug trafficking and patronage mentality, will improve quickly. The death of President Malam Bacai Sanha on 9 January 2012 provoked a further constitutional crisis, which once again left the country in a situation of great political unpredictability. Honoured as hero of national reconciliation, Sanha left a difficult legacy for the candidates in the anticipated 18 March 2012 presidential election. Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior nominated himself as ‘natural’ presidential candidate against significant protest from political parties and civil society. Disregarding the Guinea-Bissau constitution and the PAIGC principle of internal selection of its presidential candidate, the prime minister tried to accumulate power at all costs. This may motivate the armed forces sooner or later to intervene again in politics and take action – simultaneously in ‘legal’ defence of the fragile democratic system of Guinea-Bissau and of their own position – against the power ambitions of civil political leadership.