IRAQI RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

The United Kingdom had dominated Iraq since the close of World War I, when Iraq came under the British Mandate. Although Iraq by the 1950s was already an independent state, Britain still maintained a close relationship with Baghdad. British subjects served the Iraqi government in many posts. Iraq, which was a member of the Sterling Area, was the site of major economic investment by British companies. The oil concession for the country was held by the Iraqi Petroleum Company, which was largely owned by British investors. British business interests dominated the transportation infrastructure of Iraq. By the terms of the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty of 1930, Baghdad was compelled to look exclusively to London for advice on foreign affairs, military training, and the purchase of military equipment. The agreement also allowed the Royal Air Force (RAF) to maintain two bases in Iraq, at Habbaniya and Shaiba. Discontented Iraqi nationalists correctly saw the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty as a continuation of British domination under a different guise.²

After World II, nationalists increased their pressure on the Iraqi monarchy to reject or modify the Treaty of 1930.³

Despite the anti–British stance of the local nationalists, the Iraqi monarchy, allied with a group of older Iraqi politicians led by Nuri al-Said, supported the continued British presence in their country. This conservative ruling clique was more concerned about the danger of possible communist expansion into the Middle East than in ending British influence in Iraq.⁴

Although Iraq's main Western ally was Britain, in the 1950s American economic assistance to Iraq was growing. The United States and Iraq concluded a technical-assistance agreement in 1951 that promised American advice and aid in agriculture, public health, and general economic development. This program was budgeted at $1.6 million for fiscal year 1953.⁵

Up to this point, the U.S. government had made it clear to London that it did not want to undermine the traditional British role in Iraq.⁶ As long as London's policies in the Middle East did not alienate the Arabs from the West, Washington saw the British empire as a bulwark against communism in the region.⁷ Increasing American strategic interest in Iraq became an important component of Baghdad's plan to extract military grants from the West.

One of the main reasons that Nuri wanted to continue to have good relations with the West was that, unlike some Arab leaders—such as Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser—Nuri did not believe that the Arab states could defend themselves from the Soviet Union without help. However, despite its fear of communism, the Iraqi government was eager to reduce its formal dependency on Great Britain. Nuri hoped that the Treaty of 1930 would be replaced with an alliance among equals. In addition, he wanted the Western powers to supply Iraq with weapons free of charge. Aside from enhancing the efficacy of the Iraqi armed forces, Western military grants would have the advantage of reducing the Iraqi military budget and thus freeing funds for Nuri's main domestic goal: promoting political stability through economic development in Iraq.⁸

Faced with domestic opposition from nationalists who wanted to sever all ties with Britain, the Iraqi government needed to make continued military cooperation with the West as palatable as possible by placing the financial burden for increased armaments on the British or the Americans. Therefore, Baghdad began a policy designed to push the Western powers into supplying weapons by exploiting both the general Western fear of the Soviets and Britain's fear of U.S. competition in the Middle East.

IRAQ'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Baghdad's plan to modify the Treaty of 1930 and induce London to provide a grant of arms was given a boost by the growing strategic importance of Iraq in the mid-1950s. From 1952 to 1954, the British moved away from their earlier plans to send major reinforcements to the Middle East in case of a general war toward promoting greater military self-reliance among their allies in the region. Particularly after the July 1954 Anglo–Egyptian Agreement ended the British plan to center regional defense on the massive Suez base, the concept of a Northern Tier position became paramount in British defense thinking concerning the Middle East. Western alliances with Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan would form a defensive cordon on the Soviet Union's southern border. Iraq was the key Arab piece of the Northern Tier puzzle, and Britain therefore needed to promote good relations with Baghdad to secure its cooperation in a regional defense pact.⁹

Of equal importance to London was creating a defensive alliance that could be financially supported by the United States but politically dominated by the British; this constituted a major element of Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's plan to maintain Britain's power in the Middle East. Eden reckoned that Washington would cooperate to facilitate the containment of the Soviet Union. If his plan succeeded, Britain's position in the region would be secured in a form that appeared less “imperialistic.” Eden hoped that shedding the mantle of overt imperial power would reduce the threat to Britain from anti-colonial nationalists in the Middle East and placate traditional U.S. anti-imperialism.¹⁰

The British government saw a military connection as the key link to continued close association with Baghdad.¹¹

In March 1953, when Nuri, in his capacity as the Iraqi Defense Minister, suggested that the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty of 1930 should be modified, London was prepared to accept renegotiating with an eye toward promoting long-term good relations with Iraq.¹² This was the opening round of Iraq's plan to use its enhanced strategic importance in the eyes of the British to extract concessions from London. At the same time, the Iraqi government hoped to enhance its negotiating position with London by approaching the United States for weapons.

IRAQ BEGINS TO MANEUVER FOR A MILITARY GRANT

In February 1953, at a meeting with the military attaches of both the United States and Great Britain, Nuri began to put pressure on both governments for arms. Nuri stated that he “was not satisfied with the policies of the British and United States governments in furnishing equipment and supplies.” Nuri expressed a desire for the most modern arms available and claimed that Iraq could pay for these arms, although dollars were in short supply. U.S. Ambassador Burton Y. Berry saw this meeting as a pointed reminder to Britain that Iraq would seek arms from the United States if it was not satisfied with those purchased from London.¹³

Within a month, Iraq raised the ideas of receiving grants of military aid from the West and modifying the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty. On 22 March 1953, Iraqi Foreign Minister Taufik Suwaydi gave letters to the British and U.S. ambassadors outlining Iraq's need for assistance from both countries. Suwaydi explained that, as Iraq hoped to build up its forces to four army divisions, it could not afford to pay for both military expansion and internal development. In an interview with British Ambassador Sir John Troutbeck, Suwaydi also made it clear that Iraq sought a modification of the 1930 treaty that would result in the RAF bases' being returned to Iraq. Troutbeck stood firm on both issues. He told the Iraqi Foreign Minister that he “did not see how we could effectively help Iraq in war unless we had the right to maintain RAF squadrons actually stationed in Iraq.” On the issue of military aid, Troutbeck warned Suwaydi that because of Britain's tight financial position, Iraq should not count on “obtaining gifts” from London.¹⁴

Despite his cool response to the Iraqis, Troutbeck urged London to consider carefully granting aid to Iraq. Troutbeck believed that Baghdad would be a valuable anti-communist ally to the West. He foresaw Britain as supplying most of the arms to Iraq, with the United States granting financial aid to allow for the purchase of additional weapons to fill in any gaps. Troutbeck also suspected that the Iraqis would be more pliable in renegotiating the 1930 treaty if they were granted aid.¹⁵

Two days later, on 24 March the Iraqis began to threaten the British with the possibility that they would replace London with Washington as their chief Western ally. In a meeting between Nuri and Troutbeck, the Iraqis told the ambassador that, if London was having financial troubles, Iraq would seek assistance from the United States. Nuri pointed out that Iraq was being treated differently from Turkey, which had received military aid from the West long before it joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Nuri repeated Suwaydi's call for an end to the stationing of British forces in Iraq during peacetime.¹⁶

The following evening, Nuri changed tactics from bluster to bribery when he again spoke to Troutbeck. Nuri suggested that if Britain would provide aid, then Baghdad might be able to allow Britain to continue to use military facilities in Iraq.¹⁷

At the same time that they were applying pressure to the British, the Iraqis were seeking assistance from the United States by playing the Cold War card. When Foreign Minister Suwaydi met with U.S. Ambassador Berry on 22 March 1953, he stressed the importance of Iraq to the West in terms of its oil reserves and strategic location. The foreign minister claimed that if Iraq diverted money from economic development to arms, “communism would arise in Iraq.” Berry's initial report to the State Department expressed pleasure that Iraq was taking the communist threat seriously and seemed willing to participate in a regional defense pact.¹⁸

The British were aware that the Iraqis were trying to play them against the Americans and tried to warn the United States not to become involved in providing weapons to Baghdad. On 26 March 1953, Ambassador Troutbeck discussed the Iraqi request for arms with the U.S. charge d'affaires, Philip Ireland. The ambassador tried to persuade Ireland that Baghdad was not contemplating weakening its ties to Britain. He claimed that the Iraqis expected to receive arms from Britain and required only funding from the United States.¹⁹

In the meantime, Iraq was doing its best to undercut the British with the Americans. On 28 March 1953, Nuri had a private conversation with Ireland in which he contradicted Troutbeck. According to Ireland, Nuri's “approach differed from that described by the British Ambassador. Nuri emphasized to me his wish for the best arms possible. If American tanks were better than British he wanted them; similarly with planes, etc.” When pressed by Ireland about the possibility of purchasing American arms, Nuri replied that this would be politically impossible because of the negative impact such expenditures would have on economic development. Nuri also said that he could not understand why Iraq was expected to pay for weapons while Turkey received them free of charge. He claimed that Iraq held a strategic position just as valuable as Turkey, particularly with Iran in an unstable state.²⁰

The Iraqi government was clearly hoping to exploit its strategic importance to force the West to provide military aid. Nuri was also shrewdly playing the British against the Americans in an effort to get the best possible deal for Iraq. In doing so, Iraq forced the British to face up to their fear that the United States might replace them as the dominant foreign power in the region.

BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES RESPOND TO THE IRAQI REQUEST FOR ARMS

Iraq's request for arms from the United States caused considerable concern in London. The Foreign Office considered a number of factors in its analysis of the Iraqi request for military assistance. The British and Iraqis already had a long-term plan to expand the Iraqi army to four divisions equipped with British weapons, and London believed that the supply of U.S. arms would disrupt this plan. London believed that Baghdad was using Western fear of the Soviet Union to extract grants from the West, even though Iraq probably had the capacity to pay for military expansion with its own resources. Still, the Foreign Office believed that Britain and the United States should be generally sympathetic to Iraq's desire for a better-prepared military, as this would be a valuable addition to regional security. Although Iraq seemed unsure about the shape a regional pact should take, it was still allied to the British by the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty, and Britain remained hopeful that the two vital air bases would continue to be used by the RAF.

In Whitehall, the fact that for the first time Iraq had requested assistance from the United States raised the specter of a potential rival in Baghdad. Therefore, the Foreign Office believed that the next step should be consultation with the Americans. After apprising the United States of the extent of current Anglo–Iraqi plans for rearmament, London hoped to get Washington to agree to a number of points of cooperation. Because of the Treaty of 1930, and the fact that in any war Iraqi forces would be fighting side by side with British units, London wanted Iraq to continue to be armed exclusively with British pattern weapons. On this point, the Foreign Office noted that the United States already appeared to agree in principle. London also wanted to make sure that any Anglo–American moves to rearm Iraq were publicly linked to a policy of fostering an anti–Soviet military alliance in the Middle East. Finally, the Foreign Office hoped that the United States would agree that Iraq should be asked to pay for military expansion, as a gradual build-up was not only affordable but prudent, given the low level of training in the Iraqi army.²¹

The British Treasury expressed particular concern that Iraq not be given a gift of free arms from London as the government had cut the overall British defense budget. The Treasury suggested that if Iraq could not pay for weapons, it would have to get them from the United States or arrange for Washington to “procure UK arms offshore for supply to her.”²²

Ambassador Troutbeck, however, disagreed; he warned the Foreign Office that if Iraq were forced to pay for military expansion, it would indeed curtail its economic development, which “would have unfortunate political repercussions here.”²³

London softened its demand that Baghdad purchase the weapons it desired but still hoped that Iraqi oil revenues might lead to a surplus in the development budget that could be shifted to the purchase of arms.²⁴

One of the reasons London proved willing to give Iraq some benefit of the doubt on its ability to pay for weapons was its concern for the future of Anglo–Iraqi relations after renegotiation of the 1930 treaty. A close military relationship with Iraq seemed to be Britain's best bet to retain its influence with Baghdad.²⁵

London initially supplied an ambiguous reply to the Iraqi request for a grant of arms. Troutbeck expressed support for Iraq's goal of an expanded military and claimed that London was willing to live up to its treaty obligations to assist Iraq. However, the ambassador said that Britain “would only consider further assistance as part of the regional defense problem.” Troutbeck stressed that Britain believed that the bilateral alliance of 1930 should not be scrapped until a firm plan was found for its successful replacement. Furthermore, Britain wanted to help insure that Iraqi oil revenues would allow internal development and military expansion to take place simultaneously. When Nuri renewed the Iraqi request for a grant of arms later in the summer, Troutbeck told him more bluntly that it would be impossible to fulfill his request. As Troutbeck explained, Britain had many bilateral and multilateral military alliances and could not afford to set a precedent by giving arms to Iraq, as its other allies would then demand similar grants.²⁶

Rebuffed by the British, Iraq put increased pressure on the United States for arms aid. In May 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stopped in Baghdad as part of a tour of the Middle East. In meetings with Dulles, Nuri and other Iraqi officials reemphasised the strategic importance of Iraq vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and stressed the danger to domestic security of diverting funds from internal development. The Iraqis expressed disappointment that the United States had given assistance to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran but not to Iraq. Dulles expressed satisfaction that the Iraqis recognized the danger that communism and the Soviet Union posed to the Middle East, but he informed the Iraqis that he could not give a definitive answer to their request for aid.²⁷

On his return to Washington, Dulles informed Baghdad that its request for arms would receive more favorable consideration if Iraq joined a regional defense pact.²⁸

In the summer of 1953, Ambassador Berry cautiously endorsed Baghdad's call for a military grant in a series of cables to the State Department. According to the ambassador, the pro–Western Iraqi government would be strengthened if the United States and Britain could agree on an aid package to Baghdad.²⁹

Although Berry recognized the need for cooperation with the British on the matter, he did suggest that supplying American arms, rather than financial aid to purchase British arms, would enhance Washington's influence in Iraq.³⁰

In September 1953, State Department and Defense Department officials traveled to Baghdad to meet with the embassy staff for face-to-face discussions about aid. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with the State Department that a regional defense pact among the Middle Eastern states would help keep the Soviets out of the area. Military aid to friendly Arab states would be a positive interim step on the road to regional defense. The Defense Department agreed with Ambassador Berry that American weapons should be provided to a specific Iraqi unit to demonstrate clearly Washington's largess. Despite the ambassador's position, the other members of the embassy staff pointed out that the British were likely to be very upset if American arms were introduced to the heretofore British armed Iraqi forces.³¹

BRITAIN'S GROWING FEAR OF AMERICAN RIVALRY

The State Department's assessment of the level of Britain's fears proved accurate. In particular, Britain's Ambassador Troutbeck harbored apprehensions about the expansion of American influence in Iraq. Troutbeck considered the presence in Iraq of American technicians as a threat to Britain's commercial predominance even before the issue of arming Baghdad had come to the fore. Troutbeck disliked the American civilian advisers in Iraq, describing them as combining “an instinctive distrust of British ‘imperialism’ with a firm conviction of the superiority of American methods and machines as well as a pronounced inclination to ‘empire-build’ on their own.” The ambassador realized, however, that there was little that Britain could do to stop U.S. penetration if Iraq requested it, especially since London hoped to maintain good relations with both Baghdad and Washington.³²

Troutbeck's fears were magnified when American Ambassador Berry confided to him that the Iraqis had asked the United States to pressure the British to give up the air bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba, a move that would involve Washington in the renegotiation of the 1930 treaty.³³

In a summary of the situation sent to Foreign Secretary Eden, the ambassador concluded, “There is a grave danger lest by a combination of free gifts and a blundering diplomacy the Americans will end up seriously weakening our own position without getting very much out of it either for themselves or for the free world in general.”³⁴

The Eastern department of the Foreign Office agreed with Troutbeck's ominous assessment of U.S. penetration in Iraq. The risk of being replaced by the United States—not only in Iraq, but all over the Middle East—greatly disturbed London. However, the Foreign Office recognized that, because Britain needed American assistance to resist the Soviet Union in the region, the risk of being displaced by its ally had to be accepted. As far as the threat posed by the possibility of U.S. weapons being given to Iraq, the Foreign Office believed that the “best hope” for Britain lay in maintaining a close military relationship with Baghdad along the lines of the 1930 treaty and in the possibility that U.S. aid would not amount to much.³⁵

London clearly saw that Baghdad was playing on British fears of U.S. competition in the Middle East to force it to give a grant of arms to Iraq. As a result, the British government sought to limit and control the weapons that Washington would supply to Iraq by coming to a secret agreement with the Americans.

ANGLO–AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS

Discussions between the United States and Great Britain concerning the issue of arms supplies to Iraq began even before Washington made the formal decision to grant Baghdad's request. In July 1953, the State Department made an effort to assuage Britain's fears concerning U.S. competition in a letter given to the British embassy. The letter reassured London that, despite the Iraqi request for American aid, the United States still recognized that Britain held the position of principal supplier of arms to Baghdad. America also recognized the value of maintaining the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty as the best method of Western cooperation with Iraq until a regional pact could be created. The State Department offered to hold informal discussions with Britain about the general issue of Iraqi–Western relations.³⁶

Foreign Office officials concluded that talks with the United States would be valuable to make it clear that Britain did not intend to withdraw from its “special position in Iraq.”³⁷

In an early September 1953 meeting in Washington with British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins, Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade informally notified the ambassador of the State Department's decision to propose that Iraq be granted approximately $10 million in military assistance. Byroade also told Makins that, despite London's wishes, under the legal authorization for the grant the United States would have to send a military team to supervise its expenditure. In an attempt to placate Makins, Byroade said that this military group would not constitute a “military mission in the proper sense of the term.”³⁸

The Foreign Office realized that, although this was the first U.S. foray into supplying arms to the Arabs, it probably would not be the last. London thus hoped to control, as much as possible, the Americans' entry into the field.³⁹

In addition, Ambassador Troutbeck warned that Baghdad might seek to exploit any perceived Anglo–American rivalry. If the Iraqis could get free arms from the United States, Troutbeck speculated, they would no longer be willing to purchase British weapons.⁴⁰

After more than a month of negotiations, the United States and Great Britain initialed a memorandum of understanding on 26 February 1954 that detailed their agreement about the supply of American military aid to Iraq. Both governments agreed to keep the agreement secret. The key components of the memorandum of understanding were as follows: all American aid would fit into the current Anglo–Iraqi military expansion plan; the United States agreed to “impress upon the Iraqi government” that any American training or aid should be considered supplementary to that of Britain; Washington agreed to consider the use of offshore procurement to allow the Iraqi army to retain its compatibility with British forces; although the United States still hoped to provide some equipment that could be readily identified as American, it would consult with London about the nature of that aid; London had to concede the right of the Americans to accept some Iraqi officers for training in the United States and to send a Military Assistance Advisory Group to Iraq, but Washington agreed to close consultation on these matters. To allow the agreement to conform to the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty of 1930, Britain formally waived those parts of the treaty that barred Iraq from obtaining non-British arms and training.⁴¹

The memorandum of understanding went a long way toward meeting the demands that London had to limit the nature of American aid to Iraq. It is clear that London and Washington realized that the Iraqi government was attempting to exploit its strategic position to avoid having to pay for its own military expansion. But despite this knowledge, and the resulting Anglo–American attempts at coordination of their policies, Nuri had succeeded in drawing the United States into supplying free weapons to Iraq, thus putting pressure on Britain to do the same.

U.S. INTEREST IN THE NORTHERN TIER

One of the factors that assisted Baghdad in securing aid from the Americans was the growing interest that Washington had in developing a Northern Tier military alliance. In January 1954, the Eisenhower administration decided to furnish military aid to Pakistan to facilitate ongoing Turko–Pakistani talks about the formation of a mutual defense pact. Turkey and Pakistan successfully concluded an alliance in April 1954. Washington saw this as the beginning of a wider Northern Tier pact that it hoped would eventually include Iraq.⁴²

The American aid package to Iraq was meant to promote the idea of a Northern Tier alliance. When President Dwight Eisenhower wrote to the chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services to request formally the aid package for Iraq, he stressed Iraq's regional importance as “strategically located in the Northern Tier of countries between the Soviet Union and the heart of the Middle East.”⁴³

In late January 1954, Ambassador Berry received an update on the status of Washington's plans to arm Iraq. The State Department instructed him to stress to Baghdad, when the time came for a formal announcement, that the level of aid it received would be based in part on Iraq's willingness to join Turkey and Pakistan in a defensive alliance.⁴⁴

The Iraqi government found itself in an awkward position. Nuri had privately informed Berry that Iraq had an interest in adhering to the Turko–Pakistani pact, but Arab nationalists led by Egypt opposed any Arab state's joining a non-Arab security organization. To placate Arab nationalists at home and abroad, at least temporarily, Iraq disavowed any intention of receiving U.S. aid or joining the Turko–Pakistani alliance at the April 1954 meeting of the Arab League.⁴⁵

Secretary of State Dulles expressed his extreme displeasure with Baghdad's announcement in a cable to Berry. “It seems to us that if the Iraqis are so unwilling to stand up and be counted on [the] side of the free world,” Dulles wrote, “we should reflect very carefully before concluding [the arms] agreement.” Dulles stated that if Baghdad had a legitimate fear about public reaction to receiving U.S. weapons, then it would not be worth pushing the issue. He concluded,

Berry duly informed Iraqi Prime Minister Fedhel Jamali of Dulles's concerns. Jamali assured Berry that the communiqué issued from the Arab League meeting did not truly reflect Baghdad's position. The prime minister said that Iraq remained interested in U.S. aid and would adhere to the Turko–Pakistani pact “at the proper time.”⁴⁷

Dulles and Eisenhower discussed the issue at a meeting in Augusta, Georgia, on 19 April 1954. The two agreed that “it was all right to conclude the mutual security agreement with Iraq on the condition that the actual aid given should be dependent upon the international situation at the time.” Both men hoped that by offering aid to Iraq, despite Baghdad's public statements, they would achieve their ultimate goal of having Iraq join with Turkey and Pakistan.⁴⁸

Berry received instructions the same day to inform the Iraqis that wording would have to be inserted into the aid agreement stating that the United States would take “into account the international position in the [area] in determining the amount, character, and timing of aid.”⁴⁹ The formal Military Assistance Treaty was signed on 21 April 1954, and on 25 April the Iraqi government publicly announced that the United States would supply “the Iraqi army with military assistance without any conditions or obligations either political or pertaining to alliances.”⁵⁰

Washington's desire to promote a defensive pact in the Middle East was clearly the major reason for its commitment of assistance to Iraq. Unless Baghdad was willing to adhere to a regional alliance aimed at deterring the Soviet Union, Iraq could expect little aid from the United States. American aid thus came at the price of a quid pro quo promise by Baghdad to join a regional anti-Soviet alliance. This is not to suggest that the United States forced Iraq into a military alliance that it did not want to join. Although it is true that from the point of view of Baghdad a Western alliance might cause some problems with Arab nationalists, Nuri had already decided to continue Iraqi cooperation with the West and was willing to face the consequences. Iraq simply hoped to extract as large a reward as possible from the West for moving to join a regional alliance that also served Western goals.

THE BAGHDAD PACT AND THE ARMS DEAL

Despite the signing of the secret Anglo–American memorandum of understanding and the formal beginning of U.S. aid, Iraq did not stop its bid to extract grants of arms from its Western allies. Initially, Baghdad had focused on its importance vis-à-vis the Soviet threat to the Middle East to achieve its ends. However, once the United States was committed to providing military aid to Iraq, no matter how limited, Baghdad attempted to play the Americans off against the British to induce London to provide free weapons as well.

London was well aware of this Iraqi ploy. When British Undersecretary for Middle Eastern Affairs Evelyn Shuckburgh visited Baghdad in November 1954, Nuri, who was now serving as prime minister, told him that Iraq could not afford to pay for the weapons needed to expand its army. Nuri informed Shuckburgh that the United States seemed willing to provide Iraq with tanks and aircraft. Although the Iraqis would prefer to continue to use British pattern weapons, Nuri asserted, they would have to accept free U.S. weapons rather than purchase arms from London. In Ambassador Troutbeck's assessment, Nuri believed that he had “an opportunity of squeezing both us and America and forcing us to pay the maximum price for building up the Iraqi forces…. The Iraqis are past masters of playing us and the Americans off against each other. This is the first thing we must avoid.”⁵¹

Sir Roger Makins subsequently received instructions from London to warn the U.S. government not to accept the Iraqi plea of poverty and to stick to the Anglo–American memorandum of understanding that left Britain as the primary arms supplier to Baghdad.⁵²

In December 1954, Troutbeck's final report as ambassador to Iraq painted a fairly grim picture for Foreign Secretary Eden. Troutbeck admitted that in principle the United States had agreed to support Britain, but he believed that America was undermining Britain's ties with Iraq. The ambassador suggested that “there is therefore a serious danger that the Americans may end up destroying the British bulwark and leave nothing but a vacuum for communism to fill.” Troutbeck concluded that, although Britain needed to avoid a diplomatic break with the United States that would only serve the ends of the Soviet Union, it had to redouble its efforts to maintain its economic and military relationship with Iraq.⁵³

Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden shared Troutbeck's determination to maintain Britain's traditional position in Iraq.⁵⁴

The foreign secretary hoped that the renegotiation of the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty in the form of a regional defense pact would be the key to cementing British influence in Baghdad. Accordingly, London concluded a new Anglo–Iraqi Special Agreement in March 1955. This new bilateral accord was to come into effect when Britain adhered to the alliance that Turkey and Iraq had signed in February 1955. This three-way alliance was formalized by the creation of the Baghdad Pact in April 1955. This defensive agreement linked the United Kingdom to both Ankara and Baghdad. The alliance also included Pakistan and Iran by the end of 1955. London hoped that, by replacing the Treaty of 1930 with a regional defense arrangement, nationalist feelings in Iraq would be placated. To conclude the new Anglo–Iraqi Special Agreement, Britain had agreed to hand over sovereignty of the valued air bases within a year, although they would be available for use by the RAF in case of a war.⁵⁵

From Nuri's point of view, the Baghdad Pact fulfilled a number of goals. In sharp contrast to Nasser's government in Egypt, Nuri saw the Soviet Union as more of a threat to the Arabs than Israel. The Baghdad Pact provided the Western assistance that Nuri believed was vital to defend the Middle East from the Soviet threat. Unlike the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty of 1930, which it replaced, the Baghdad Pact could be portrayed as an alliance of equals to the nationalist critics of Arab association with the West. Nuri also saw the new defensive treaty as placing Iraq in the valuable position of chief mediator between the Arabs and the West, particularly if more Arab states could be induced to join.⁵⁶

Although both Britain and Iraq were pleased with the formation of the Baghdad Pact, the Iraqi government's implied threat to replace Britain with the United States as its principal arms supplier ran counter to Eden's plan to preserve London's power in Iraq. Once Britain had turned over control of the air bases, the future of the Anglo–Iraqi relationship centered on military cooperation, and therefore London had to remain Baghdad's primary Western ally. The new British ambassador to Baghdad, Sir Michael Wright, made it clear to London that if Britain hoped to maintain its position in Iraq, than London would have to agree to Baghdad's continued requests for free weapons. If London could not supply a considerable grant of arms, Baghdad might well turn to the United States as its benefactor.⁵⁷

Following a suggestion by Wright, the Foreign Office decided that Iraq should be supplied with de facto free weapons by granting Baghdad financial credit in lieu of demanding payment for handing over the permanent installations at the Habbaniya and Shaiba bases. As part of the Anglo–Iraqi agreement Baghdad had agreed to pay London for the RAF facilities at the air bases. Under the proposed plan this payment would not have to be made if Iraq promised to use the money it saved to purchase arms in the United Kingdom. The Foreign Office had come to the conclusion that, even if the United States could be made to agree to supply Iraq's arms demands solely through the off-shore purchase of British weapons, this would eventually lead to Washington's becoming the “the guiding influence with the Iraqi forces.” Undersecretary for Middle Eastern Affairs Shuckburgh believed that Britain could maintain its influence in Baghdad, and some control over U.S. aid to Iraq, only if it could prove that it could make a considerable contribution of free arms itself.⁵⁸

Despite the financial concerns raised by the British Treasury, Eden presented the cabinet with the bases-for-arms proposal on 14 March 1955.⁵⁹

The Foreign Secretary informed his colleagues that

The cabinet approved the scheme on 15 March 1955, and the Working Party on Anglo–Iraqi Negotiations formally endorsed the base facilities for arms deal a short time later.⁶¹

The final arrangements with Iraq were not made until December 1955, by which time Eden had ascended from the post of foreign secretary to that of prime minister. Under the terms of the Anglo–Iraqi Special Agreement, Baghdad had agreed to pay £2.75 million for the permanent installations at Habbaniya, Shaiba, and the port of Basra. In diplomatic notes exchanged on 20 December, London agreed to waive this payment in return for an Iraqi promise to spend the sum on weapons and training from the United Kingdom.⁶² The Iraqi plan to play on British fears of the Americans had paid off handsomely.

However, the Iraqi government was not satisfied with this important success and continued to press its Western allies for more free weapons. When Iraq requested that Britain and the United States supply tanks to the Iraqi army, Britain agreed to the proposal. London believed that Nuri needed to be maintained in power and rewarded for his support for the Baghdad Pact.⁶³

In January 1956, twelve Centurion tanks and thirty-one Ferret scout cars were formally presented to the Iraqi government. Two of the tanks were a gift from Britain, and the rest of the British-made vehicles were procured with funds from the United States.⁶⁴

Of course, in the near future, despite the military equipment that Nuri was able to secure from Britain and the United States, the monarchy's links to the West helped to undermine the regime. The Baghdad Pact was never popular with the Iraqi public. Nuri's hope that military expansion would provide stability for Iraq proved ill founded. The last straw for the monarchy was its support of the pro–Western Camille Chamoun government in Lebanon against the Arab nationalists in that country. In July 1958, Brigadier-General Abdu

l-Karim Qasim, a radical nationalist, led a unit of the Western-armed Iraqi army in a coup that overthrew the monarchy and led to the death of King Faisal II and Nuri al-Said. The new government quickly moved to reverse Nuri's policy of close ties to the West by withdrawing from the Baghdad Pact and seeking aid from the Soviet Union.

⁶⁵

After 1958, the Iraqis would look to the other side of the Cold War divide to furnish their weapons.