For a very long time now, philosophers have been inclined to distinguish two kinds of reasoning. There is theoretical reasoning, in which one aims to figure out what is true, and there is practical reasoning, in which one aims to figure out what to do. Figuring out what to do (e.g., what to eat, when to leave, what to say) is something we do all the time, but it’s not so easy to say just what this activity is.
On its face, it seems to have something to do with selecting a course of action. But sometimes we select a course of action without figuring out what to do, simply because as far as we can see there is nothing to figure out. Faced with eleven indistinguishable twelve-ounce cans of crushed tomatoes, I may see nothing to choose among them. Perhaps I have already determined that I want the crushed tomatoes, as opposed to the diced tomatoes, the whole stewed tomatoes, the tomato paste, or the tomato sauce. Only crushed tomatoes are suitable for the dish I have in mind. But now that it’s down to a choice of which can of crushed tomatoes, there is nothing to do but pick one. There is no hope of figuring out which one to take, because there is no basis for a choice. This suggests that figuring out what to do, as opposed to just picking, has something to do with reasons. You can figure out what to do only if you can at least see some reason that privileges one selection over others. Moreover, it looks like the reasons in question will be somehow connected with value. A reason for using crushed tomatoes will be an advantage of using them over using other sorts of tomatoes. It will be something to be said for, or something good about, using them.
It looks, then, as if this activity of figuring out what to do is a reasoning activity in which one sorts through what is to be said for and against different courses of action, with the aim of doing the action that is in fact called for in the circumstances. The aim of practical reasoning, on this view, will be to choose well. There will be cases, as with the tomatoes, in which choosing well is compatible with more than one course of action, and then you just have to pick.
So far, one might wonder what all the fuss over practical reasoning is about. The foregoing account seems fairly straightforward. What makes this a difficult topic? The answer, of course, is that there are many difficulties, but there is one that I think may be useful for getting a handle on Tenenbaum’s book. To put it crudely, the problem is that practical reasoning has to be both practical and reasoning. As practical, it seems it must be aimed at action, but as reasoning, it seems it must be aimed at knowledge. An account of practical reasoning therefore has two masters to serve, whereas an account of theoretical reasoning only has one.
Let’s see how this problem lies behind Tenenbaum’s thought. Tenenbaum distinguishes practical and theoretical reasoning by their aims. Just as in theoretical reasoning one aims at truth, so in practical reasoning one aims at the good. As we’ve just noted, though, the claim that practical reasoning aims at the good is ambiguous. On the face of it, there are two things one can do to the good. One can know it and one can do it. On the face of it, knowing what the circumstances call for in the way of a response on your part and responding that way are two different things. When Huckleberry Finn lied to protect his friend Jim, he did what was called for though he didn’t know what was called for. When I continued smoking cigars into my thirties I knew what was called for, but I didn’t do it. So the philosopher who wants to say, as Tenenbaum does, that practical reasoning aims at the good, will have to say something about whether the goal is knowledge or action.Footnote 1
Another way of putting the question is to ask what success in practical reasoning is supposed to be. Have I succeeded just insofar as I come to know what the situation calls for? In that case, akratic action, like my continued smoking, is compatible with complete success in practical reasoning. This doesn’t seem quite right, because akrasia seems like a form of irrationality and it’s hard to see how to bring a charge of irrationality against someone whose reasoning is a complete success.
Alternatively, one can say the reasoning is successful only insofar as I actually do, or at least intend, the action that is called for. Here the challenge will be to describe a sort of reasoning that can lead all the way to action, so that reaching a conclusion in such reasoning actually entails action, or at least intention to act. As I understand him, Tenenbaum follows this second path. He wants to understand practical reason in such a way that success in practical reasoning entails not just knowing the good but doing it. In this respect, he follows Davidson.Footnote 2 He departs from Davidson’s picture, though, in one important respect.
For Davidson, practical reasoning does not end with a judgment about what action is called for, all things considered, in the circumstances. For this judgment is actually about what conclusion is warranted in the circumstances. When I knew I ought to give up cigars, what I was knowing, really, was that I ought to be drawing the conclusion that it was best to give up cigars. What happened was that instead of drawing that conclusion, I drew the conclusion that it was best to go on smoking cigars, despite my knowledge that the weight of the arguments went against this conclusion. There are thus two kinds of judgment in the Davidsonian picture. One, the all-things-considered judgment, is a belief about what conclusion of the form “It is best to … ” is called for in the circumstances. The other, the unconditional judgment, is a belief of the form “It is best to…” And according to Davidson, forming an unconditional judgment suffices for acting, or at least for intending to act. This, then, is how practical reasoning leads to action. Really, it just aims at the truth about what it is best to do. But as it turns out, reaching a conclusion (an “all-out” conclusion, as T puts it) about what it is best to do suffices for acting.
For Davidson, then, there is really only one kind of reasoning, namely the kind in which one aims to figure out what is true. Practical reasoning is just an instance of this, where the aim is to figure out the truth about what is good. Tenenbaum, on the other hand, denies that figuring out the truth about things is the only kind of reasoning. For him, the relation between practical reason and the good is the same as the relation between theoretical reason and truth. Practical reason aims not at the truth about what is good, but at the good itself.
I want to focus, now, on a particular consequence of this departure from the Davidsonian picture. It is a consequence that Tenenbaum notes in his chapter 2. There he considers whether “an intention is a kind of belief:” “In particular, we may ask whether an intention to pursue X should be identified with a belief that X is good. If ‘good’ is the practical analogue of ‘true,’ the precise answer cannot be ‘yes.’ If α believes that p, then α holds p true, but this does not mean that the content of α’s belief is ‘p is true.’ ”Footnote 3 To believe that p, on Tenenbaum’s view, is to hold p true, but the content of the belief is just what you hold true, namely p, and not “p is true.” Likewise, to intend to pursue X is to hold X good, but the content of the intention is just what you intend, namely the pursuit of X, and not “X is good.” On the scholastic view, then, to act intentionally is to hold the action good in a way that is distinct from believing it to be good.
Now I think we can see why Tenenbaum thinks of desires as appearances of the good. Appearances are, roughly, inclinations. For an argument to appear valid to me, for instance, is for me to see it in a way that inclines me to believe that it is valid.Footnote 4 For some fake fruit to look real to me is for me to experience it in a way that inclines me to believe, or makes it at least somewhat difficult not to believe, that it is real. “It’s hard to believe they’re not real,” I say, admiringly. These appearances may persist even when I know full well that they are illusory. I can still feel the attraction of the idea that the stick is bent, say, even if I know it is just a very convincing trick of light. So far, these are all examples of appearances of the true. They are inclinations to hold it true that the argument is valid, that the fruit is real, that the stick is bent, etc. But now we have another sort of holding to think about, namely intending, which is holding good. An appearance of the good, then, would be an inclination to intend. And what is an inclination to intend if not a desire? Desires, then, are inclinations to hold good, just as those other appearances are inclinations to hold true. And just as an appearance of the true is illusory if it is an inclination to hold true what is not true, so an appearance of the good is illusory if it is an inclination to hold good what is not good.
The beauty of this is, largely, that it allows for the case of desiring what you know is not good, perhaps even because you know it’s not good. When philosophers put forward the idea that everything wanted is wanted under the aspect of the good, they normally have something truth-oriented in mind. Maybe they are thinking everything wanted is believed to be good. Or maybe they are just thinking that everything wanted is something the desirer is inclined to believe good. But there seem to be counter-examples to these views. Satan wants to corrupt the souls of good people. He doesn’t believe this is good, nor is he inclined to believe it is good. He does it because it is bad, and he is as clear as you like about its being bad. But Tenenbaum is not committed to the idea that Satan believes, or is even inclined to believe, that his acts are good. He is only committed to the idea that Satan is inclined to hold his acts good, where holding an act good is simply identical with intending it. Satan knows that his desire is an inclination to hold good acts that are not good. He is the practical analogue of someone who knows his inclination to succumb to the gambler’s fallacy is an inclination to hold true what is not true. So Satan is not a counter-example to the scholastic view.
But merely evading counter-examples is not enough. Tenenbaum’s aim is to show that the old formula of the schools is not a crazy idea. The old formula of the schools says, among other things, that we desire only what we conceive as good. To succeed, Tenenbaum must make it plausible that the scholastic view he has crafted actually captures the thought behind the old formula. I am worried, though, that even someone who rejects the old formula can accept Tenenbaum’s scholastic view.
To test this out, let’s have an image of the sort of view that rejects the old formula. Suppose we think of desires and intentions as functional states. Perhaps we understand the functional role of desires in terms of their interaction with beliefs to produce intentions, and we understand the role of intentions in terms of their causal relation to bodily behaviour. Moreover, we hold that these functional states can be characterized without appeal to normative notions like the good or the desirable. On this view, one can understand what it is to want something without bringing in the notion of value.
I take it that such a view is at odds with the old formula. The idea of the old formula is that seeing the object as good is at least part of what it is to want it. There is no way to understand desire, therefore, without bringing in the idea of good.
But is this functionalist view at odds with Tenenbaum’s scholastic view?
On the contrary, it appears to be an instance of the scholastic view. The scholastic view uses different words for intention and desire, but once the functionalist has understood what Tenenbaum means by these words, she can recognize the scholastic view as her own. For instance, Tenenbaum says practical reasoning is moving from appearances of the good to holding actions good. But when we ask what Tenenbaum means by “holding an action good,” the answer is that he means intending. (Holding X good, recall, is distinct from holding it true that X is good, and hence distinct from believing that X is good.) And when we ask what Tenenbaum means by “appearance of the good,” the answer is that he means an inclination to hold good. (Again, recall that an inclination to hold X good is distinct from an inclination to believe that X is good.) The functionalist writes all this down and comes up, by way of translation, with the view that practical reasoning is moving from inclinations to intend to intentions. But this is her view. She rejects the old formula of the schools, since she thinks there is no need to bring in the notion of value in characterizing the notion of desire. But she accepts Tenenbaum’s scholastic view, since she holds that the functional role of desire is, roughly, to produce intentions.
My worry, then, is that although the scholastic view is immune to counter-examples, it fails to capture the thought behind the old formula. To capture the idea that everything wanted is wanted under the aspect of the good, it looks like we have to talk about appearances of the true. In other words, we have to talk about appearances whose all-out versions are beliefs about what is good. When an argument seems valid, though perhaps we know it is not, this is an appearance of the true about validity. Likewise, when an action seems good, though perhaps we know it is not, this is an appearance of the true about the good. Tenenbaum’s view forces us to distinguish appearances of the true about the good from appearances of the good. This is because an appearance of the true about the good would be an inclination to believe something was good, whereas an appearance of the good is an inclination to hold something good.
One thing Tenenbaum could do, then, is give up the idea that desires are appearances of the good, and say instead that desires are, or at least necessarily involve, appearances of the true about the good. That would generate a view that is genuinely at odds with the functionalist picture, since there would then be no hope of saying what it is to want something without bringing in the notion of value. But at the same time, it would tend to revive the standard counter-examples. Must one really be inclined to believe something good in order to want it? Must Satan really be inclined to believe his acts are good? On Tenenbaum’s official scholastic view, Satan need only be inclined to intend his acts, and that is something even the functionalist can accept. The claim that he must be inclined to believe his acts are good is more ambitious.Footnote 5
To conclude, then, Tenenbaum’s scholastic view appears to face a dilemma. As it stands, it evades the standard counter-examples to the old formula of the schools, but fails to capture the idea behind the old formula, since it is consistent with views that eschew any mention of value. But if we revise it to make it suitably controversial, it is once again threatened by counter-examples.
