The author argues that the transnational Islamic terrorist organization al-Qaءida set up its base in Bosnia–Herzegovina during the war there (1992–95) and afterward used it to infiltrate the Western world and carry out terrorist attacks. In Kohlmann's view, Bosnia was extremely important for al-Qaءida's activities in the West.
One can divide the book into two parts, which together make a coherent whole. In the first part (chapters 1–7), Kohlmann stresses that Bosnia provided (1) safe haven for the Arabs who in the 1980s had fought Soviet troops in Afghanistan and who later, as members of al-Qaءida, strove to overthrow “non-Islamic” regimes in their countries of origin and were consequently persecuted by those regimes; and (2) a place for military training and indoctrination of new recruits of al-Qaءida coming from Western Europe (Muslim immigrants and native converts to Islam), who were extremely irritated due to Serbian massacres of their Bosnian coreligionists and inaction of the West. Both groups of Muslims effectively fought on the Bosnian government's (predominantly Muslim) side.
In the second part (chapters 8 and 9), the author emphasizes that, after the war, al-Qaءida used Bosnia to bridge the land gap between the Middle East and the Western world and spread its sleeper-cell terrorist network across the latter. Finally, the author points out that, despite American warnings, for a long time the Bosnian authorities tolerated the postwar presence of foreign Islamic fighters.
Kohlmann provides enough evidence to prove that, during the war, there was a strong presence of foreign Islamic fighters in Bosnia. However, he underestimates a possibility that at least a part of the Arab–Afghans became extremely hostile to the West and, therefore, eager to retaliate due to the scandalous policy of Western countries. Namely, he is consistently stressing their fanaticism and somehow irrational hatred of the West. In addition, one can hardly ascertain the approximate number of foreign Islamic fighters as the author mentions (explicitly or implicitly) considerably different numbers, ranging from 800 to 5,000.
As the author carefully follows postwar activities of a considerable number of al-Qaءida's members and traces their connections to Bosnia, it seems that the foreign Islamists' network in Bosnia provided a logistical base for terrorist activities in the West, at least to a certain extent. Moreover, Kohlmann persuasively points out the importance of the Bosnian War for al-Qaءida's recruitment because he proves that, due to the conflict, radical Islamic ideologues have been able to persuade many of the world's Muslims to follow their instructions. On the contrary, it seems that the author excessively argues ad hominem when he puts almost all the blame for tolerance of the postwar presence of foreign Islamists in Bosnia on the late Bosnian president Izetbegovic; most Bosnian Muslims appreciated the wartime help of their foreign Islamic allies.
As for sources, Kohlmann is relying almost exclusively on radical Islamists' publications, journalistic articles, and official documents regarding prosecution of terrorists in the West. Given the nature of his research topic, this is appropriate. The book improves our knowledge of foreign Islamic activities in Bosnia as it definitely rejects the quite often expressed view (e.g., in Yossef Bodansky's Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America) that, during and after the Bosnian War, intelligence and terrorism operations in the country were under control of Iranian agents. The author plausibly asserts that the game was led by the Arab Sunni radicals who were probably hostile to Shiעi Muslims.
More importantly, Kohlmann's work should be regarded as a major contribution to the ongoing discussion concerning measures that ought to be taken with regard to the acute problem of Islamic terrorism. It tells us that the best way to deal with militant Islam is the political one, as Bosnia is proof that radical Islam has been decisively fed by the regional conflicts involving unjust treatment of Muslims. As the author stresses, al-Qaءida was allowed (and indeed, invited) to come to Bosnia due to the failure of the West to prevent genocide against the Bosnian Muslims. (It seems contradictory that Kohlmann criticizes the Clinton administration's tacit approval of Islamic shipments of weapons to Bosnia aimed at helping the Bosnian Muslims.) Therefore, the book is strongly recommended to the world's statesmen to inform them that they should solve the protracted conflicts in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Xinjiang in a just way. Of course, specialists in Islamic terrorism should read the book, too.
However, the book can benefit from some additional doctrinal clarifications. For example, Kohlmann emphasizes that the foreign Islamists operating in Bosnia “dedicated their lives to the reestablishment of the khalifa (‘Muslim empire’) lost by the Ottomans” (p. 137). Thus, he is implicitly warning a reader (at least a less-informed one) that the Islamists pursued aggressive territorial and political aims. However, from the 18th century on, the Ottoman sultans regarded themselves as caliphs merely in terms of spiritual leadership of the Muslims, thereby trying to promote the ideal of Pan-Islamic unity.
Finally, mention should be made of the fact that there are numerous factual errors in the book. For example, Kohlmann consistently refers to the Bosnian conflict as “civil war,” although according to international law, it has been established that there was (also) aggression of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as Croatia against Bosnia–Herzegovina. Furthermore, there are some errors concerning events (e.g., the Washington Accord) and names (Franco Tudjman, Novni Travnik).
