I. INTRODUCTION
The scope and nature of Adam Smith’s treatment of justice continues to be a live issue for historians and philosophers, largely due to the persistence of disagreement over the extent to which justice, as Smith understood it, encompassed the needs of the poor. According to one view, which was at one time regarded as the standard or traditional view, Smith thought that the needs of the poor, regarded as a matter of public policy, fell within the domain of political economy and, as a matter of private duty, within the domain of charity or benevolence. In neither case, however, did the needs of the poor fall within the domain of justice.Footnote 1 Judging by the trend of recent scholarship, however, the standard view seems to be losing ground to a rather different interpretation, according to which Smith adopted a broader conception of justice, which incorporated distributive issues in general and the needs of the poor in particular.
Smith undoubtedly regarded the distribution of wealth in the commercial societies of his day as unfair and inequitable, and his support for a policy of high wages was explicitly argued for on grounds of equity. In one of the most frequently quoted passages from the Wealth of Nations (WN), Smith wrote:
No society can surely be flourishing and happy of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed, cloath, and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged (I.viii.36).
It is not, therefore, a distortion of Smith’s views to say that they display a concern with social or distributive justice, as these terms have come to be understood in the contemporary, post-Rawlsian, period; that is to say, as terms that are practically synonymous with fairness.Footnote 2 However, the revisionist claims regarding Smith’s discussion of justice are not confined to the uncontroversial observation that he regarded poverty as a matter of justice as it is currently understood. According to recent statements of the revisionist view, Smith regarded the needs of the poor as a matter of justice in the sense that he understood the term.
The standard interpretation has tended to view Smith’s discussion of justice in terms of the features of his theory that confirm or depart from the continental natural law tradition established by Hugo Grotius and transmitted to the writers of the Scottish enlightenment by Samuel Pufendorf, Gershom Carmichael, and Francis Hutcheson. Two propositions in particular are crucial: first, throughout his writing and teaching, Smith consistently kept to the Grotian conception of justice, according to which justice meant abstaining from causing positive harm to others. In terms of rights, this confines justice to perfect rights—the rights people have in the things they own or possess, and which they can claim and protect by force. The second proposition underpinning the standard view is that Smith departed from Grotius, and from other important natural law writers, over the doctrine of the right of necessity, according to which a person in extreme poverty facing starvation can rightfully take the surplus property of others. Smith’s theory, according to the standard view, is marked by a complete absence of any endorsement of this principle.
Both these propositions have been challenged by the revisionist interpretation. Smith, so it is argued, moved away from Grotius’ conception of justice by extending its scope to include moral duties that are normally duties of benevolence or love, such as our duties to look after our children and our duties of charity. At the same time, it has been argued that Smith endorsed the traditional doctrine of the right of necessity. According to one version of the latter claim, the right people have to the property of others in times of necessity is seen as part of a more fundamental natural right of subsistence that, so it is claimed, is embedded in Smith’s account of property rights in the Lectures on Jurisprudence (LJ).
My purpose in this essay is to defend the traditional reading of Smith with respect to the distinction between perfect and imperfect rights, the right of necessity, and rights of subsistence. It is not my intention to provide a thorough assessment of the traditional and revisionist readings of Smith, a task that would go beyond the scope of a single article.
II. PERFECT AND IMPERFECT RIGHTS
An important part of the standard interpretation is Smith’s distinction between perfect and imperfect rights in the Lectures on Jurisprudence and the corresponding discussion of justice and benevolence in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) where Smith provides the theoretical basis for the distinction. Smith refers to Hutcheson and Pufendorf as the source of the distinction between perfect and imperfect rights (LJ[A], i.14–15), but the foundations are in Grotius. Grotius defines a right as “a moral quality of a person, making it possible to have or do something lawfully.” This moral quality can be perfect, in which case it is called a ‘faculty,’ or not perfect, in which case it is an ‘aptitude’ (Grotius Reference Grotius and Kelsey1925, I.I.IV). Faculties are the concern of expletive justice, which Grotius says is justice “properly or strictly so called.” This includes the rights or powers over ourselves and others, ownership, and contractual rights. Aptitudes are the concern of attributive justice, which is about “those virtues which have as their purpose to do good to others, as generosity, compassion and foresight in matters of government” (I.I.V and I.I.VIII.I). Pufendorf took over Grotius’ distinction and introduced the terms “perfect rights” and “imperfect rights.” This was more than a terminological tidying up and reflected a wider conception of the duties required by natural law. Nevertheless, Pufendorf retained the idea that when what is due to us on the basis of a perfect right is not “voluntarily given,” people living in a state of natural liberty can resort to violence and war to claim it, while people living in states can bring an action in law. What is owed by an imperfect right, by contrast, cannot be extorted by violence or by the threat of law (Pufendorf Reference Pufendorf, Oldfather and Oldfather1934, I.VII.7).
According to the revisionist interpretation, Smith effectively abandoned the distinction between the two kinds of rights, and thus between justice and benevolence. The evidence for this is the passage in the Theory of Moral Sentiments where Smith contrasts the juridical relationship between equals, on the one hand, and between superiors and those over whom they have jurisdiction, on the other:
Even the most ordinary degree of kindness or beneficence, however, cannot, among equals, be extorted by force. Among equals each individual is naturally, and antecedent to the institution of government, regarded as having a right both to defend himself from injuries, and to exact a certain degree of punishment for those which have been done to him. . . . But when a father fails in the ordinary degree of affection towards a son. . . . when a man shuts his breast against compassion, and refuses to relieve the misery of his fellow-creature . . . nobody imagines that those who might have reason, perhaps, to expect more kindness, have any right to extort it by force.. . .
A superior may, indeed, sometimes, with universal approbation, oblige those under his jurisdiction to behave, in this respect, with a certain degree of propriety to one another. The laws of all civilized nations oblige parents to maintain their children, and children to maintain their parents, and impose upon men many other duties of benevolence (TMS, II.ii.I.7–8).
According to Samuel Fleischacker, the passage shows that in granting that a superior can use force to compel an inferior to do something that is not owed by a perfect right, Smith is taking a step back from the Grotian theory, and blurring the distinction between perfect and imperfect rights. As a consequence, Fleischacker says, Smith “moves the jurisprudential tradition closer to, not farther away from, a recognition that people in certain circumstances may have a strict, properly enforceable right to beneficence” (2004, p. 27). Amos Witztum and Jeffrey T. Young offer a similar interpretation of the passage, and claim that it shows Smith thought that “The sovereign can make an imperfect right a perfect right” (Witztum and Young Reference Witztum and Young2006, pp. 462, 465).
However, these assessments of Smith’s remarks seem to be based on a misunderstanding of the grounds of the distinction between perfect and imperfect right as they appear in Grotius and his successors. In chapter 25 of book II of De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Grotius raises the question of the proper use of force by the sovereign—whether someone can be compelled to do that which under normal circumstances he is only morally bound to do. He cites the Spanish dominican theologian Domingo Soto, who had argued that force can be used only in the case of a perfect duty. Soto illustrated his argument with the case of “the rich man who by the precepts of mercy is bound to give alms to the poor man, but who nevertheless cannot be forced to do so.” Grotius replies that the
relation of parts among themselves is one thing and, and that of superiors, when they are contrasted with those subject to them, is quite another. For an equal cannot be compelled by an equal, except to perform what is owed in accordance with a right properly so called. But a superior can compel an inferior to do things also, which some virtue demands, because this is embraced in the proper right of the superior as such. Thus during a grain famine citizens may be compelled to contribute what they have to the common store (II.XXV.III.4).
Now, it is important to grasp that this does not blur the distinction between expletive and attributive justice, or between perfect rights and those that are not perfect. The use of force, which distinguishes perfect rights from imperfect rights, refers to the permissibility of the right holder’s enforcing compliance or exacting punishment. Thus, an individual who holds a perfect right can enforce it by court action (or in a state of nature by violence), whereas an individual cannot force other people, either by court action or otherwise, to treat them kindly, to show them respect, or to be grateful for kindnesses shown to them. However, this distinction does not limit the legitimate use of force by a sovereign. When the sovereign compels property owners to contribute to a common store, he is not enforcing the imperfect rights of the beneficiaries to charity, nor is he making an imperfect right a perfect right. He is exercising his own superior right over the property of his subjects.
Grotius makes all this explicit in his definitions of different kinds of law and rights. He first considers law as a rule of action, and divides it into equatorial law and rectorial law. The former is concerned with relationships between equals, such as brother, citizens, friends, and allies, whereas the latter is concerned with relationships between unequals, such as fathers and sons, masters and slaves, and king and subjects (Grotius Reference Grotius and Kelsey1925, I.I.III). He then discusses law considered as a body of rights, and says that a distinction can be made between private rights, which are concerned with “the interests of individuals,” and public rights, “which are superior to private rights, since they are exercised by the community over its members, and the property of its members, for the sake of the common good” (I.I.VI). It is, thus, by the superior right of the king or magistrate—that is, by rectorial law—that citizens can be compelled to contribute their property to a common store in times of famine.
Smith is making the same distinctions as Grotius. The use of force that perfect rights permit refers to the right of the right holder to compel other people to refrain from or perform certain actions. It refers also to the right to exact punishment. Thus, a property holder is entitled to use force, or to call on public officials to use force, in order to protect her property. And she is entitled to seek redress and or punishment against people who infringe her rights. However, when a father fails to carry out his paternal duties, or when a person fails to be charitable, “nobody imagines that those who might have reason, perhaps, to expect more kindness, have any right to extort it by force” (TMS, II.ii.I.8). This corresponds to the definitions of perfect and imperfect rights that Smith provides in the Lectures on Jurisprudence: “Perfect rights are those which we have a title to demand and if refused to compel another to perform. What they [Pufendorf and Hutcheson] call imperfect rights are those which correspond to those duties which ought to be performed to us by others but which we have no title to compel them to perform” (LJ[A], i.14–15). The distinction clearly falls on the question of whether we, the right holders, are entitled to use force. The point Smith is making in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, therefore, is that children have only an imperfect right to the benevolent care of their parents and people in need have an imperfect right to charity. Neither children nor the needy have a title to compel the correlative duties. The sovereign, on the other hand, can use force to compel people to perform duties that are, with respect to the beneficiary, merely imperfect duties. This does not mean that the beneficiaries have an “enforceable right to beneficence,” as Fleischacker thinks, which is a contradiction in terms for Smith as for Grotius. Nor can the sovereign change an imperfect right into a perfect one. The beneficiary has only an imperfect right but the sovereign has a superior right to compel the benefactor.
The distinctions that Grotius and Smith are both making can be elucidated with the help of the modern distinction between the interest theory of rights and the choice or will theory of rights (Raz Reference Raz1984; Kramer, Simmonds, and Steiner, Reference Kramer, Simmonds and Steiner2000). According to the interest theory, a right exists when someone benefits from someone else’s duty, and when the reason for imposing the duty is the interest of the right holder. In the case of parental responsibilities, a supporter of the interest theory would say that children have perfect rights when parents have an enforceable duty to care for them and when it is the children’s interests—rather than, say, the interest of society as a whole in having healthy, well-brought up children to form a productive labor force—that are the grounds for imposing the duty. According to the choice theory, by contrast, to have a right is not just to be the beneficiary of a duty, even when that duty can be enforced by a third party such as a government. Rights give those who have them control over the relevant duty. A supporter of the interest theory would struggle to make sense of the distinctions that Grotius and Smith are making, since the question of who has the power to enforce compliance is irrelevant to the definition of a right. The choice theory, however, can make perfect sense of the distinctions. In fact, the distinctions practically entail the definition of (perfect) rights as choice rights.
So, in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith is saying that the interests of children are sufficiently important for governments to impose duties of care on parents, and in De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Grotius is saying that the well-being of the public can sometimes justify governments in forcing citizens to contribute to public food stores. But in neither case do the beneficiaries of these measures acquire perfect rights.
Before leaving this issue, we should note that the kind of conceptual blurring of the distinction between perfect and imperfect rights that has so far been discussed, and that is entailed in the claim that in certain circumstances people have an ‘enforceable right to benevolence,’ should be distinguished from the acknowledgment that it is sometimes difficult to know where to draw the line between the two kinds of rights. Fleischacker misleadingly runs these two kinds of blurring together (2004, p. 26). But it is possible to maintain that there is a clear conceptual distinction between the two kinds of rights, so that force can be used only in the case of perfect rights, but allow that there are some hard cases where the boundary between the two kinds of rights is difficult to define with precision. Smith, for example, thought this was the case with gratitude (TMS, II.ii.1.3).
III. THE RIGHT OF NECESSITY
A central aim of Samuel Fleischacker’s influential book A Short History of Distributive Justice is to counter the view that the historical importance of Smith’s treatment of justice consists in the narrowing of justice to commutative justice, thereby “excluding” matters of distribution from its scope. Hont and Ignatieff (Reference Hont, Ignatieff, Hont and Ignatieff1983), Griswold (Reference Griswold1998), and Winch (Reference Winch1978) are all taken to task over this but Hont and Ignatieff come in for particular criticism. They built their case around their claim that Smith rejected the traditional idea of the right of necessity as it had appeared in Grotius and Pufendorf. Grotius, according to Hont and Ignatieff, had taken the important step of narrowing the scope of distributive justice to the exceptional cases of “the right of theft in necessity and the right to buy grain at a fair price” (1986, p. 29). When Smith rejected the idea of a right of necessity, he thus took the final step of excluding distributive justice from the domain of justice entirely.
Fleischacker objects to this on two grounds. First, he correctly notes that for the natural lawyers, the right of necessity was part of commutative justice, not distributive justice, so, in rejecting the notion of a right of necessity, Smith cannot be said to be changing the content of distributive justice. Second, Fleischacker argues that Smith, in fact, endorsed the right of necessity. Fleischacker goes as far as to say that “Smith’s endorsement of the right of necessity was as full as that of all his predecessors” (Fleischacker Reference Fleischacker2004, p. 34).
Fleischacker supports the latter claim by three references to the Lectures on Jurisprudence. He attaches most weight to the following remark: “in time of necessity the people will break thro all laws. In a famine it often happens that they will break open granaries” (LJ[A], iii.141).Footnote 3 According to Fleischacker, this is evidence that Smith was endorsing an argument that David Hume makes in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (EPM), where he says that, in times of famine, it is not unjust for people to open the granaries. According to Fleischacker, the passage from the Enquiry shows that Hume endorsed the doctrine of the right of necessity: “Hume maintains the natural law tradition intact on these matters” (Fleischacker Reference Fleischacker2004, p. 31). And Smith’s remark in the Lectures shows he is following suit.
However, Fleischacker is mistaken on both counts. Smith is not here agreeing with Hume, and Hume was not, in any case, endorsing the doctrine of the right of necessity. First, Smith is not saying, as Hume was, that the behavior of the mob could be excused or that the normal precepts of the law did not apply to them. He is simply reporting the fact that people sometimes behave in this way when they are desperate. Moreover, the context of the remark shows that Smith did not think such behavior was excusable. It appears in a passage in which Smith is elaborating one of his set piece themes: that commercial societies ameliorate the dangers of inequality. In ancient times, the desperation of slavery and indebtedness drove people to demand agricultural reform and to break the law by breaking open the granaries. There is no suggestion that Smith thinks such acts can be excused, and his main point is that, in commercial societies, inequalities, in fact, work to the advantage of the poor who can work for the rich in providing their luxuries (LJ[A], iii.139–144).
But even if Smith was agreeing with Hume, that would not support Fleischacher’s interpretation. The passage from the Enquiry has no bearing on the right of necessity as traditionally understood by the natural lawyers. The context of Hume’s reference to opening the granaries is his discussion of what, following Rawls, has come to be referred to as the “circumstances of justice.” According to Hume, the origin of justice and the duty to be just are derived from their utility to the public interest. In order to convince his readers of this, he argues that justice is useful, and, therefore, necessary, only if resources are moderately scarce. Where there is abundance or extreme scarcity, justice has no purpose. To illustrate his claim that justice would be useless in extreme scarcity, he says:
Suppose a society to fall into such want of all common necessaries, that the utmost frugality and industry cannot preserve the greater number from perishing, and the whole from extreme misery: It will readily, I believe, be admitted, that the strict laws of justice are suspended, in such a pressing emergence [sic], and give place to the stronger motives of necessity and self-preservation. . . . The public, even in less urgent necessities, open granaries, without the consent of proprietors; as justly supposing that the authority of magistracy may, consistent with equity, extend so far (EPM, 3.1.8).
Notice that Hume begins this passage by saying “Where the society is ready to perish.” He is discussing circumstances in which a whole society faces either total destruction or extreme shortages, and where the rules of justice cease to have any purpose. They are, thus, suspended for the duration of the emergency, during which time no one has any rights. The right of necessity, by contrast, was about the plight of individuals who faced starvation in circumstances that were exceptional for them, not where the whole society was under threat. The right of necessity gave the necessitous person a right to take from the surpluses of the rich. It was, as Fleischacker correctly argues, part of commutative justice, and for Grotius, at least, it gave the person in need a perfect right to use other people’s surplus property.Footnote 4 In Hume’s theory, by contrast, there is no sense in which the mob who breaks open the granary has a right to do so. Moreover, and most important, Hume’s thesis provides no remedy for an individual who faces extremis but where the normal laws of ownership continue to apply to the rest of society.
Witztum and Young (Reference Witztum and Young2006) also think that Smith argued for the right of necessity, but they base their case that Smith allowed “a perfect right to avoid starvation” on Smith’s discussion of the corn trade in the Wealth of Nations. The crucial passage is Smith’s famous remark that:
To hinder . . . the farmer from sending his goods at all times to the best market, is evidently to sacrifice the ordinary laws of justice to an idea of public utility, to a sort of reasons of state; an act of legislative authority which ought to be exercised only, which can be pardoned only in cases of the most urgent necessity (WN, I.IV.v.b.39).
According to Witztum and Young, this is evidence that Smith regarded the protection of the population against starvation as a matter of distributive justice and a proper aim of government (Witztum and Young Reference Witztum and Young2006, p. 466). Moreover, they say:
we can view this as a case of the sovereign creating a perfect right to avoid a “shocking enormity”—namely, starvation. . . . Smith asserts the right of the poor not to starve in such a way as to make this an obligation of justice on the part of the community (Witztum and Young Reference Witztum and Young2006, p. 467).
However, the point Smith is making is that public policy can sometimes be based on considerations of utility even when this means that the laws of justice are sacrificed. Smith is arguing that the needs of the poor ought to be attended to in times of extreme shortage as a matter of public utility even though justice requires that governments should not prevent farmers and merchants from freely disposing of their products. This does not demonstrate that Smith considered distributive justice to be a proper aim of government. The intervention that Smith is allowing is a concession to public utility against the laws of justice and the rights of citizens. He describes it as “a sort of reasons of state; an act of legislative authority” precisely to contrast it with an act of justice (WN, I.IV.v.b.39).
Witztum and Young are even further from the mark in claiming that the intervention amounts to the creation of perfect rights. As explained in the first section of this essay, Smith defined perfect rights in terms of the legitimate use of force by the right holder to enforce compliance and exact punishment. This is essentially a legal rather than a political conception of rights, by which I mean that rights define the legitimate use of force by individuals rather than the legitimate use of force by governments. Smith, of course, allowed that governments are entitled to use force to compel individuals to do things that they are not under a strict perfect duty to do—refraining from exporting corn in times of extreme shortage being an example—but this does not mean that the beneficiaries of this intervention have a perfect right. The only rights that are exercised in this case are the superior rights of the government to force merchants to comply. To use Grotius’ terminology, it falls under the heading of rectorial law and is equivalent to his example of a government that compels citizens to contribute to a common store in times of a famine.
IV. THE RIGHT OF SUBSISTENCE
Witztum and Young’s contention that Smith supported the right of necessity is part of a larger claim that they have pressed in a number of contributions; namely, that human beings have a natural right of subsistence that operates not just in emergencies but as a permanent constraint on property acquisition. Acquisition of property—say, through occupation—that deprived others of their livelihood would thus be unjust (Witztum Reference Witztum2005). They acknowledge that Smith makes no mention of a right of subsistence in his teaching or writing, and that in the Lectures on Jurisprudence, where Smith lists the perfect rights, he confines them to rights to person, estate, and reputation. However, they claim that “the right of subsistence is embedded in the other rights that Smith clearly lists as perfect rights: the right to life, and property rights to the fruits of one’s labor (Witztum and Young Reference Witztum and Young2006, p. 439).
Their case rests on a particular interpretation of the famous passage in the Lectures on Jurisprudence where Smith explains to his students that the right of occupation is said to exist when the person who has acquired the thing has a reasonable expectation of using it. The test of whether the expectation is reasonable is that an impartial spectator would concur with the expectation of the possessor:
The spectator would justify the first possessor in defending and even in avenging himself when injured. . . . The cause of this sympathy or concurrence betwixt the spectator and the possessor is, that he enters into his thoughts and concurs in his opinion that he may form a reasonable expectation of using the fruit or whatever it is in whatever manner he pleases (LJ[A], i.36–37).
It is clear from the context that the expectations in question are the expectations of using the thing held by the person who has acquired it. Smith does not say that whenever people can form reasonable expectations of acquiring something, they therefore have a right to acquire it. According to Witztum, however, the passage allows a broader interpretation: these expectations can be formed before occupation, “when such expectations are based on the use of one’s natural assets” (Witztum and Young, p. 444). And again: “The expectation to subsist through the use of one’s natural assets” is a reasonable expectation, and so: “Social institutions should therefore take notice of that expectation and respect it.” In particular, “private ownership must not come at the expense of anyone’s claim for subsistence” (Witztum Reference Witztum2005, p. 287).
This reading of Smith’s account of the foundations of property has to be seen in the broader context of Witztum’s and Young’s attempt to counter the standard Grotian reading of Smith, according to which justice meant commutative justice—the protection of the rights in the things we have (ius in re)—namely: our person, estates, and reputation—along with those ius ad rem, which are rights to things owed to us on the basis of a promise or contract.Footnote 5 Witztum’s and Young’s claim that Smith maintained a universal right of subsistence is presented in support of their broader claim that Smith’s conception of justice included a more expansive class of ius ad rem, encompassing rights to things that we can claim on the basis of a substantive principle of distributive justice.
The plausibility of this reading of Smith seems to be fatally undermined by the fact that throughout his discussion of property acquisition in the Lectures on Jurisprudence, Smith upholds the legal opinion that it is a requirement of all property rights that the thing must, at least once, be brought into the power of the proprietor. For example, occupation cannot take place “unless the subject has been brought once at least into the power of the occupant, and becomes by that means separated from the common ones” (LJ[A], i.77 and ii.1–2). It is founded on the fact that the person who acquires possession can form a reasonable expectation of using the thing, and that an impartial spectator would concur with this expectation. People do not, therefore, have rights to things growing on the common, or to animals in their wild state, before they have taken physical possession of them, even though they may have some kind of prior expectation or intention of acquiring them.
Witztum has acknowledged the potential force of this objection to his reading of Smith, and has attempted to counter it directly by playing down the importance of the requirement of an initial physical possession in Smith’s account of the acquisition of property in order to open the door to his own broader interpretation (Witztum Reference Witztum2005). Witztum does not deny that Smith explicitly endorsed the view that an initial physical possession is needed for a successful acquisition of property. Rather, he claims that Smith’s detailed discussion of the right of property reveals a different view. Three specific examples are offered in support of this: Smith’s discussion of hare hunting, property in dwellings, and the occupation of land.
Hare Hunting
Witztum confines his discussion of Smith’s treatment of hunting to the shorter version of Smith’s Lectures of 1766 (LJ[B]). Smith asks here whether ownership of wild animals begins on the discovery of the beast or only after it is actually in possession. He says that while lawyers have disagreed about this, “all agree that it is a breach of property to break in on the chase of a wild beast which another has started, though some are of the opinion that if another should wound the beast in its flight he is entitled to a share, as he rendered the taking of it more easy upon the whole.” Smith adds to this, however, the remark that “Among savages property begins and ends with possession” (LJ[B], 150). Witztum concludes three things about Smith’s theory from this brief non-judgmental remark about the opinion of lawyers: first, that property does not always begin with possession; second, that “expectations which people may form with regard to anything will be approved by an impartial spectator if they are reasonable,” and third, that it is possible for people to have claims on animals that are not in their possession. He then conjectures that the real explanation of the right in the case of hunting is that the reasonable expectation is formed because of the skill and effort of the hunter, which he takes to be evidence of the possibility that Smith thought people have a right to the fruits of their natural assets (Witztum Reference Witztum2005).
Now, even if we take the brief remark from LJ(B) as exhausting Smith’s discussion of the matter of hunting, it does not support the conclusions Witztum draws from it. The fact that it is the view of lawyers that property in the case of hunting begins before actual possession tells us nothing about whether Smith held to a theory in which we have rights to the fruits of our skill and effort. Even if we had reason to think that Smith concurred with this legal opinion, there would be no grounds for the claim that “expectations which people may form with regard to anything will be approved by an impartial spectator if they are reasonable.”
However, in the more complete version of the Lectures on Jurisprudence, delivered in 1762–63 (LJ[A]), Smith provides a much fuller and very different account. Crucially, before he discusses the opinions of lawyers, Smith tells us what he thinks:
In most cases the property in a subject is not conceived to commence till we have actually got possession of it. A hare started does not appear to be altogether in our power; we may have an expectation of obtaining it but still it may happen that it shall escape us. The spectator does not go along with us so far as to conceive we could be justified in demanding satisfaction for the injury done us in taking such a booty out of our power.. . . We see, however that on this point lawyers have differed considerably (LJ[A], i.38).
Now, Smith here actually gives us this legal opinion and it is apparent that this part of his Lectures is based on Pufendorf’s account (Pufendorf Reference Pufendorf, Oldfather and Oldfather1934, IV.VI. 9–10). This is worth mentioning because it reminds us that these are lectures. Smith taught to the syllabus required for Moral Philosophy and Jurisprudence at Glasgow University, and he is concerned to convey accepted legal opinion as well as his own theories. He concludes the discussion of the different legal views with: “In most cases however property was conceived to commence when the subject comes into the power of the captor” (LJ[A], i.40).
This conveys a very different picture from the single and factually inaccurate remark Smith makes (or is reported to have made) in LJ(B). However, the main point here is that we must see what Smith is doing in his lectures in the context of both legal opinion and his own theory. Occupation was generally held to begin, almost definitionally so, with seizure; that is, taking physical possession either of land or fruits or animals. Smith was explaining why this is so by using his theory of the reasonable expectation of use: in most cases, an actual possession is required before such expectations would be seen to be reasonable by an impartial observer, and, in more practical terms, by a court or magistrate. Wild animals were always regarded as a special case, and Smith is acknowledging this by discussing the legal opinion. And in the more complete report of the lectures, Smith is showing that his own theory can be used to adjudicate in such cases of legal dispute, and that it confirms what he there says is the majority view.
The House and the Grotto
Smith says in the Lectures on Jurisprudence that in the age of hunters, property was confined to what people had about their person, their clothes, and instruments, but, because their place of abode was constantly changing, there was no property in land or buildings. In the age of shepherds, habitation was “somewhat more fixed but still very uncertain,” and the “huts they put up have been by the consent of the tribe allowed to be the property of the builder” (LJ[A], i.47). Consent was needed, Smith says, because it was not obvious why a hut should be the property of someone who had left it unoccupied even for a small amount of time. Particularly so, given that people were not yet fully used to a life of fixed habitation:
A cave or grotto would be considered as belonging to him who had taken possession of it as long as he continued in it; but it would not appear that one had any right to it tomorrow night because he had lodged there this night. The introduction of the property of houses must have therefore been by common consent of some tribe or society. Hence in time the house and the things in it came to be the property of the builder (LJ[A], i.48).
The point of this example is to show that the question of the extent to which something continues to be our property when we are not actually using it is a matter of convention. The fact that one had occupied a cave, or a hut that one had built, does not convey by itself the intention or expectation of the extent of continued use, especially when people were used to continually changing the place where they live. Smith explains how this convention is necessary in the age of shepherds when people settle their habitation. Witztum, however, puts a completely different gloss on it. For him, the distinction is between the cave or grotto, on the one hand, and a built dwelling on the other: “the house becomes the property of the builder because it is the fruit of his natural assets in exactly the same manner as catching animals is the fruit of the hunter’s natural assets. Thus, the builder has reasonable expectations to enjoy these fruits” (Witztum Reference Witztum2005, p. 285).
But this is not the explanation that Smith gives. What Smith tells us is that houses become the property of builders by consent. There is no reference to the idea that it is the builder’s because it is the fruit of his natural assets. This is clearly an example of what Witztum calls a “logical extrapolation”: having argued (incorrectly) that the hunting example shows that people have a right to the fruits of their natural assets, he extrapolates this to the case of houses. But the interpretation we are left with has nothing to do with Smith.
Property in Land and Subsistence
In his account of the introduction of private ownership of land in LJ(A), Smith once again follows the natural lawyers in telling his students that private property in land begins with the division of the land that was previously held in common by tribes and nations.Footnote 6 Prior to this, the land was cultivated in common, and the crops were divided according to the number of people in each family and according to rank. Nobody could seize for himself a parcel of land: “the rest of the community would cry out against him as incroaching on and appropriating to himself what ought to be in common amongst them all.” Private property began when people settled in cities. Habitation became fixed and people cultivated fields near where they lived. People then realized that it would be more convenient to divide the land once and for all rather than go to the trouble of annually dividing up the crops (LJ[A], i.47–50). The account in LJ(B) is much the same, although Smith says that, under common property, the crops were divided equally between the members of a village and that the division was made by common agreement (LJ[B], 151).
According to Witztum, Smith’s discussion of the privatization of land, and the fact that private ownership of land began with a division, show that “the mere possession of things cannot be the origins of one’s right to the land as such a right will depend on its effects on others.” Moreover, an impartial spectator would not go along with a person who unilaterally privatized a parcel of land because “by appropriating land without common consent, he will reduce the amount of crops available to the rest of society” (Witztum Reference Witztum2005, p. 286).
However, Witztum is here confusing two quite separate questions: the historical question of how private ownership of land as an institution first arose in communities that traditionally held the land in common; and the question of how an individual can lawfully acquire property such as land through the right of occupation. Smith followed the traditional natural law view that the right of occupation of land was introduced only after an initial division was made, and it applied to land that was not divided in the first division. Prior to this, any individual who seized a parcel of land would indeed be acting unjustly, whether or not doing so deprived anyone else of their subsistence. Not only was the right of occupation unheard of at that time, but in any case, occupation only applies to unowned land and no one has a right to occupy what is already jointly owned even after the right of occupation is established. Once the right of occupation has been introduced, however, people then have a right to occupy any unowned land without the consent of the community or of anyone else.
In Witztum and Young (Reference Witztum and Young2006), the claim that Smith maintained that people had a natural right to subsistence is further defended but now a distinction is made between the first age of society and subsequent ages:
Smith’s own analysis of the impartial spectator suggests that only in the very early stages of the development of private property could justification be based on actual possession. As society progresses the justification for private ownership becomes more complex and appears to be based on something entirely different (Witztum and Young Reference Witztum and Young2006, p. 443).
The first thing to say about this is that Smith nowhere provides a justification for private ownership in terms of possession. In the disputed sections of the Lectures on Jurisprudence, Smith is providing an explanation of the standard Roman rules of property acquisition. He takes it for granted, as Hume had done, that these were the generally accepted rules that need explaining, and whereas Hume tried to explain them in terms of his theory of imagination and the principle of utility, Smith presented a rival explanation in terms of his theory of the impartial spectator.
Second, even if it were true that Smith’s stipulation of an initial possession applied only to the first age of society, this would hardly support the contention that Smith upheld the idea of a natural right of subsistence. If the requirement of an initial possession blocks the natural right of subsistence in the first age of society, it is hard to see how it can be a natural right at all. However, it is not the case that Smith dropped this stipulation of an initial physical possession in his discussion of the subsequent ages of shepherding, farming, and commerce. And the fact that he does not do so marks an important part of Smith’s discussion of property, where he was making a significant revision of Grotius’ views.
In arguing that occupation must always begin with a physical act of attachment, Smith was following Grotius, and both authors were following standard Roman law (Grotius Reference Grotius and Kelsey1925, II.VIII.VI; and 1916, p. 27). According to Grotius, this restriction on acquiring the ownership of natural resources was absolutely binding in the state of nature, and it also governs the relationship between sovereigns who, lacking a common sovereign, are regarded by Grotius as coexisting in a natural state. It was in relation to the latter that Grotius made the most conspicuous use of the principle, arguing that it undermined the Portuguese claims to the lands of the East Indies by virtue of discovery as well as their claims to exclusive navigation of the Indian Ocean by virtue of occupation (Grotius Reference Grotius1916, chs. II and V). However, Grotius says that human law can “set limits to natural liberty, and forbid what by nature was permitted.” Consequently, human law can “by anticipation prevent an acquisition of ownership, which by the law of nature might have been permitted” (Grotius Reference Grotius and Kelsey1925, II.II.V). Thus, the right to acquire wild animals and other unowned things exists only “if no statute has prevented.” It exists “by permission of the law of nature, not by a positive provision that such permission should always be granted; for no such provision is demanded by the requirements of human society” (Grotius Reference Grotius and Kelsey1925, II.III.V). Thus, for example, the Germanic kings assigned to themselves property in wild animals. In general, Grotius’ view is that it is open to the rulers of sovereign nations to retain for themselves, or award to others, the exclusive privilege of acquiring any things that have not become the property of anyone.
For Smith, by contrast, the requirement that valid acquisition of property must begin with a physical attachment did not only apply to an early state of the world before the introduction of the civil law. Moreover, it was a requirement of all forms of property acquisition, including derivative acquisition, and not just of the original acquisition of unowned things in the first age. Smith thus provides an important revision of the Grotian account of derivative forms of acquisition including voluntary transfer, and prescription or usucaption (Grotius Reference Grotius and Kelsey1925, II.VI.I.2 and II.VIII.XXV; Smith LJ[A], i.77 and ii.1–13). This is not the place to go into the detail, but Smith’s view is, roughly speaking, that property can be acquired in different ways: by first taking possession, as in hunting; or by an agreed division, as in the case of land; or by voluntary transfer or prescription. But in all cases, the actual possession of the thing by the occupant or receiver must be present and, in the case of derivative forms of acquisition, conjoined to the declared will of the other, for an impartial spectator to judge that a real property right has been acquired. Property rights could not, therefore, as Grotius had said, be created by statute whenever governments thought it was expedient to do so. Those estate rights that are created by statute are not, in Smith’s view, property rights at all. They are exclusive privileges, which give a right to exclude all others from a thing before it has been acquired as property. The hunting privileges of the feudal princes were rights of this kind, and Smith says there can be “no reason in equity” for them. They were the product of “[t]he tyranny of the feudal government and the inclination men have to extort all they can from their inferiors” (LJ[A], i.54–55).
Witztum and Young are thus on weak ground in trying to play down the importance of the requirement of an initial physical attachment in Smith’s account of property acquisition. And this effectively rules out their claim to have found in Smith a theory of a universal right to subsistence. Moreover, it obscures the way in which, in revising Grotius’ theory, Smith is providing a crucial link between his account of justice as protection of perfect rights, and his conception of natural liberty. Generally speaking, his view is that governments should, as much as possible, confine their use of the law to the protection of perfect rights, and his revision of Grotius’ theory reduced the discretion of governments in the creation of property rights. He was prepared to allow that, in some exceptional cases, the civil law could, with some justification, go beyond the protection of property rights and personal rights, and be used to provide ‘artificial’ economic incentives. But, in most cases, that which the natural sense of justice requires and that which is recommended by public utility are the same. Laws that protect property and contracts safeguard individual expectations, and this is usually all that is required to promote the public good: “[t]he establishment of perfect justice, of perfect liberty, and of perfect equality, is the very simple secret which most effectually secures the highest degree of prosperity” (WN, IV.ix.17).
V. CONCLUSION
It is now widely accepted that in arguing for economic and political liberty, most notably in his support for a policy of high wages, Smith was adopting the perspective of the least well off members of society, and his condemnation of the oppression of the poor and indigent by the rich and powerful has been given far more prominence than was once the case in discussions of his complex defence of the commercial society of his day. It has become a commonplace among Smith scholars to describe Smith as a friend and champion of the poor (Rothschild Reference Rothschild1992, Reference Rothschild2001) and Gertrude Himmelfarb has claimed that the Wealth of Nations is “genuinely revolutionary in its view of poverty and its attitude towards the poor” (Himmelfarb Reference Himmelfarb1985, p. 46).
These are facts that have profoundly influenced the debate about the scope and nature of Smith’s conception of justice. For modern readers, for whom justice means social justice, and is almost synonymous with fairness, the claim that Smith excluded the needs of the poor, including the starving poor, from his discussion of justice may seem paradoxical. And for scholars who think it is still necessary to rescue Smith from the conservative image of him as the founder of free-market economics, it is perhaps an embarrassment that has to be explained away. There seems to be a presumption among some readers that someone who was as sympathetic to the suffering of the poor in commercial societies as Smith was must have regarded poverty as a matter of justice, and, whatever he tells us about this in his formal definitions of justice and rights, it must be possible to find evidence to the contrary.
I have argued in this essay that with respect to the distinction between perfect and imperfect rights, the right of necessity and rights of subsistence, the evidence is not there. Smith followed Grotius in defining perfect rights in terms of the legitimate use of force by the right holder to enforce compliance and exact punishment. In this respect, their conception of rights had much in common with the modern choice or will theory of rights. Both authors allowed that it is in the nature of sovereignty that governments are entitled to use force to compel individuals to do things that they are not under a strict perfect duty to do; that is to say, where there is no correlative perfect right. This should not be taken as evidence that they moved away from the tradition of thought that confined justice to commutative justice.
Smith parted company with Grotius over the doctrine of the right of necessity and over the question of subsistence rights more generally. A central problem for Grotius and for other seventeenth-century natural law writers was to interpret the nature and consequences of God’s original gift to mankind of the earth and its resources. Since men received this original inheritance in common, the task was to show how private property was morally possible, and how the introduction of private ownership could be accomplished without deviating from the terms of the original gift. Smith, by contrast, dispensed entirely with this natural law problem. The acquisition of property through occupation, for instance, meant getting a thing into our power “that was not the property of another before” (LJ[A], iv. 7). There were no anterior claims on the earth’s resources and so it is not surprising that the idea of natural subsistence rights play no part in his theory.
More surprising, however, is the complete absence in Smith’s theory of any acknowledgment of the idea that crimes against property committed out of the pressure of extreme poverty should be regarded as exceptional in some way. In his central definition of justice in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith writes: “The violation of justice is injury: it does real positive hurt to some particular persons, from motives that are naturally disapproved of. It is, therefore, the proper object of resentment, and of punishment, which is a natural consequence of resentment” (TMS, II.ii.1.4, emphasis added). It is crucial that Smith thinks we do not sympathize with the resentment of the sufferer unless there is some impropriety in the motives of the perpetrator. On the contrary, if the “affections which influenced his conduct are such as we must necessarily enter into, we can have no sort of sympathy with the resentment of the person who suffers” (II.i.3.2). Now, it is precisely at this point in the argument that we might have expected Smith to have at least referred to the idea that we do sometimes sympathize with the motives of people who commit crimes. Grotius and Pufendorf had both done so, arguing that the motive behind the crime is an important consideration that can sometimes constitute mitigation (Salter Reference Salter1999). Smith, by contrast, simply asserts that “There can be no proper motive for hurting our neighbour, there can be no incitement to do evil to another, which mankind will go along with, except just indignation for evil which that other has done to us” (TMS, II.ii.2.2).
As Smith reminds us in a lengthy and important footnote, he is not here asserting a matter of right but a matter of fact: he takes himself to be faithfully reporting the common sentiments of mankind (TMS, II.i.5.10). So, in the end, Smith’s exclusion of the needs of the poor from the scope of justice results from his extraordinarily pessimistic and uncharitable assessment of our capacity to sympathize with the motives of people in extreme need.
