In any healthcare system in which demand exceeds supply—which means any typical public healthcare system—patients cannot always get the care they want or need when they want or need it. It is also unrealistic to suppose that it will ever be otherwise. There have been such advances in medicine and growth in the population that even if we forgot about all other goods such as education, roads, social services, and so forth and put the entire budget into healthcare, there would still be a gap between supply and demand. Moreover, even if we could by that expedient make them match and had eyes only for health, we still should not. For it is now understood that healthcare is the least important determinant of health, lining up well behind poverty and social status.Footnote 1 But if suboptimal care is to be our destiny, we must plan how it is to be delivered. Such planning has already taken place at the admission and treatment stages of healthcare, where wait-lists, triage, and rationing are standard fare, and I contend in what follows that similar planning should go into the discharge phase.
Specifically, I argue that hospitals will not have a comprehensive plan for the delivery of suboptimal care until aggressive discharge policies are added to the suboptimal care policies already in place, that such discharge policies include discharging patients before their ideal time, and that, unless hospitals have such a comprehensive plan, they will not provide patients with the very best care resources will allow.
Aggressive Discharge Plans
Public health systems typically have large wait-lists for admission that are accompanied by an undesirable level of mortality, morbidity, and discomfort. To lower this level, patients must be admitted more rapidly. But if the capacity of hospitals cannot be expanded, this can only be done by increasing (as the current word is) “throughput,” and that means that patients in the hospital have to be discharged more quickly. Aggressive discharge policies are thus becoming more common, and we can identify three species of them.
The first seeks to increase throughput without impairing care. To this end, hospitals may do such things such as adding short-stay treatment rooms so patients need not be admitted at all or lightening the anaesthetic for surgeries so patients will wake up sooner and thus facilitate bed turnovers. But the main expedient is to discharge patients to alternative levels of care more rapidly. In this plan, all patients at admission will be assigned an expected length of stay based on diagnostic-related groupings derived from patients in similar conditions. Clinical overrides for patients who do not progress according to their statistical class and social overrides for patients for whom discharge would be a hardship will be available. But physicians will be encouraged to move patients quickly from expensive hospital beds to beds in the community—to their homes if possible, to hotels or long-term care if not—where home or outpatient care will be made available as needed. The basic idea is to make a more efficient use of bed space by progressively moving patients to lesser levels of care, but care proportionate to their needs, and thus to improve the overall profile of patient mortality, morbidity, and discomfort without impairing the quality of care that any patient receives.
The second species does not observe the nicety of always discharging patients to alternative levels of care and will selectively move patients to inferior levels of care. Hospitals regularly do this temporarily when there are massive incoming casualties (“Code Orange” in the Vancouver Coastal Health region), and some hospitals have extended the idea. Hospitals in Calgary, for example, have a code called “Code Burgundy,” which is called when there are patients in emergency who urgently need beds. Selected physicians and nurses then confer in what is described as a “bed huddle” to identify patients well enough to receive premature discharges. It is understood that such discharges will certainly increase their discomfort and may increase their mortality and morbidity as well, but the idea is that an increase in those things at discharge may so reduce those things for patients in emergency that there will be an overall net gain. Here is one report from a nurse of Code Burgundy in action.
We had a patient transferred to the cardiac intensive care unit from Red Deer. He had an MI and needed to be transferred to us for a catheter. He had a PCI and was discharged the next day. He did not have any clothes or money and no ride back to Red Deer. His wife was sick from chemo she was receiving and they had no children (no one could come and get him). We needed the bed so he could not stay another day. We ended up getting social work involved who found him some clothes and gave him a voucher for a taxi to the bus depot and a bus ticket to get home. My concern with this patient is follow up care. He had an angioplasty and they go through the femoral artery. This could re-bleed especially if he is sitting upright for a long period of time. He will be on the bus for 2-3 hours. If his wife is sick who is caring for her and him? We do try to get home care involved but I know that they get overwhelmed.
The third species of aggressive discharge extends Code Burgundy one step further to (what we can call) Extended Code Burgundy. If, as Code Burgundy has it, patients should sometimes be discharged before their time to inferior care because that will reduce overall mortality, morbidity, and discomfort, patients should regularly be discharged in that way if it will reduce those things even more, and Extended Code Burgundy does just that. Extended Code Burgundy thus combines the generality of the first species of aggressive discharge planning above with the willingness of Code Burgundy to impose hardships at discharge to remove hardships elsewhere. Accordingly, hospitals that adopt Extended Code Burgundy will routinely discharge patients to inferior levels of care if, and to the extent to which, that will result in a net reduction of mortality, morbidity, and discomfort for their patient population.
The first species of discharge planning seems unobjectionable in principle. Of course, adding it is not without difficulty. Alternative but equal care must be available, and the incentives used to motivate staff to increase throughput must be finely tuned to produce just the right behavior at just the right time and not work to the detriment of patients. These are daunting problems, but if the plan works as advertised, and no one receives worse care while everyone has an expected reduction in mortality, morbidity, and discomfort, it would not only be unobjectionable to add it, but irresponsible not to. It is more difficult to decide whether hospitals should adopt Code Burgundy and Extended Code Burgundy, and trying to settle this question will be the main event of the paper. Code Burgundy and Extended Code Burgundy are distinct, and we can have one without the other, but they are also compatible, and we can have both. In what follows I bundle them together and refer to the combination as “Burgundy Codes,” distinguishing between them only as the need arises. In discussing the acceptability of Burgundy Codes we must bear in mind that the promised reduction of mortality, morbidity, and discomfort does not refer only to hospital stays, but encompasses the postdischarge period and other aftermaths of Burgundy Code discharges. Thus the possibility of readmission and ongoing chronic problems due to quick discharge and reduced follow-up must be part of the calculation in predicting a lesser overall risk. No one could be interested in a net reduction of risk during hospital stays if there were a net increased risk overall. Because it is this large picture that is relevant and that will depend on provisions for after-discharge care, I treat those provisions as part of Burgundy Codes. I thus reckon the rules of Burgundy Codes to include not only what happens in the hospital but also what happens in the recovery phase after discharge.
Burgundy Codes
There is an asymmetry between wait-lists at admission and Burgundy Codes at discharge. There is no alternative to wait-lists at admission, as there simply is no space to admit patients, and so hospitals have to engage in triage and do the best they can. But although suboptimal care at admission is inevitable, it is perfectly possible never to discharge any patient before his or her optimal time. Thus if Burgundy Codes are adopted, hospitals choose to visit suboptimal care on patients when this could have been avoided. Should they ever do this?
The most helpful way of thinking about this question is in terms of a decision procedure that derives from John Rawls's theory of justice.Footnote 2 I say “derives from” advisedly, as Rawls's aim in that theory is to identify principles of justice to determine the basic structure of society, that is, that are to govern the assignment of rights and duties and regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages, and it is not clear that he would approve of extending it to making decisions or policies concerning allocation.Footnote 3 Such decisions and policies, however, frequently have to be made and are almost always troublesome. In healthcare, for example, we have to decide how much of the budget should go to healthcare; how much of the healthcare budget should go to acute care, long-term care, community care, and so forth; how resources within those areas should be allocated to their component units; how units should translate those resources into patient services; how tests and treatment should be rationed and wait-lists constructed when demand exceeds supply; and whether ability to pay should make a difference to access to care. It would be extremely useful to have a principled way of looking at these matters, and extending the scope of Rawls's decision procedure to cover such policy decisions seems to me to provide just that. I thus apply it to the issue of Burgundy Codes and offer that application as a proof-of-the-pudding justification for the extension.
The decision procedure comes in the form of a thought experiment. Suppose that we are charged with the task of deciding on a policy, that we will have to live under the policy we select, and that we want to select the policy that will best promote our own interests and the interests of those we are interested in. We thus do not care about justice or other people, but only about ourselves and our own. Suppose, also, that we are behind a thick veil of ignorance such that we do not know our circumstances or economic or social status. In the case at hand, for example, we do not know whether we will ever have to make use of a public hospital, or are in a condition such that Burgundy Codes will accelerate our admission as well as our discharge, or in emergency waiting for a bed, or in a bed and vulnerable for premature discharge. In short, we know nothing about ourselves that would make us indifferent to the question or that we can use to choose a policy that would be to our advantage at the cost of that of others.
Rawls claims that any policy we choose under these suppositions will be fair. The rationale is that if there is one pie and two people who both like pie want as much as they can get and have equal claims on it, the fair way to divide the pie is for one person to cut it and the other to have first choice of pieces. Similarly, the argument here is that if we, under the above suppositions, select a policy that allocates benefits and burdens and are willing to take whatever the policy allocates to us, that policy must likewise be fair. It would thus in this view be a serious criticism of any allocation policy if anyone could, with a convincing show of argument, indicate a distribution that would be more attractive to Rawlsian decision makers. By the same token, the inability to do this provides an effective answer to those who ask why certain burdens are being placed on them. The answer is that, if they were among the decision makers, they too would have chosen the plan that does this, and so the hardship now imposed by it may be regrettable but is not unfair.
In applying this decision procedure to the question of Burgundy Codes, I make two simplifying but realistic assumptions. The first is that reallocations of resources cannot enable hospitals to secure the reduction in mortality, morbidity, and discomfort sought by Burgundy Codes. It may be theoretically possible to do this, but I (as realism bids many hospitals for the foreseeable future must) assume that the situation is to either try Burgundy Codes or leave those things unreduced. Sometimes the plain fact of the matter is that the capacity of hospitals cannot be increased, there are insufficient resources to provide alternative levels of care, and the only prospect of reducing morbidity, mortality, and discomfort lies in accelerated discharge to inferior care. Second, I assume that it would be unacceptable to leave those things unreduced in order to leverage more funding for hospitals. It is sometimes urged that even if we could improve the lot of current patients by Burgundy Codes we should not, on the ground that if hospitals do more with less they will never get more, but if they refuse they will, and that more will outweigh the burdens allowed. This may sometimes be good counsel. But it rests on such highly speculative factual and controversial moral assumptions—namely, that hostage taking will work, that the interests of the hostages are discountable, and that the shock to the public of implementing Burgundy Codes will not likewise have exactly the same effect—that it will seldom, if ever, be a realistic basis for action.Footnote 4
With these qualifications, we can now return to our question of whether hospitals should have Burgundy Codes. Taking the answer to be “yes” if Rawlsian decision makers would choose them and “no” if they would not, let us ask what they would choose. It will be convenient to apply this test in two stages. The first is the simple choice between having Burgundy Codes in a hospital or not. Consulting persons who know their situation will predictably yield different opinions. For instance, those who are in emergency waiting for beds may want the hospital to have such Codes; if they already had beds they would not; if they knew they would never have to come to a public hospital they would be indifferent. But if those consulted did not know what their situation was—if they were Rawlsian decision makers—my conjecture is that they would want a hospital to have Burgundy Codes if and only if everyone entering that hospital would have a better chance of avoiding death, disease, and discomfort.
To meet this standard it is not necessary that everyone who enters the hospital must always do better with Burgundy Codes in place than they would have without. It is manifest that they would not. For example, patients who are not seriously ill and those who are not in need of immediate care may not have their admissions accelerated by those Codes, but they will be discharged more quickly. Burgundy Codes are a logical extension of treating patients according to need, and to be choice worthy by Rawlsian decision makers it is enough that everyone benefits from them in the way that everyone benefits from emergency rooms run on that principle, namely, by getting an insurance policy against the worst health outcomes. It is, however, to be insisted that everyone benefits in this way. It is not enough that Burgundy Codes increase throughput and bring the average or total amount of mortality, morbidity, and discomfort to the lowest possible level. For such results are compatible with some populations of patients not having their prospects improved at all. That could come about, for example, if hospitals declined to admit so-called frequent flyers and bed blockers—typically the homeless noncompliant substance abusers—more rapidly while holding them to the accelerated discharge of Burgundy Codes. Because this would be unacceptable to Rawlsian decision makers, who must consider the possibility of actually being such persons, they will insist on the condition that everyone has improved prospects.
If, however, hospitals would want Burgundy Codes if they brought about this result, the next question they must face is how exactly to formulate the rules that put them in place. There are many ways to specify length of stay guidelines, the amount of postdischarge care offered, and how that care is to be distributed. Different rules will yield different benefits and burdens for different people, and because hospitals cannot just institute Burgundy Codes but must institute some particular variety of them, they need to select one from a large possible array. This brings us to the second application of Rawls's test, and my conjecture is that Rawlsian decision makers will choose a particular set of rules if and only if they satisfy two conditions. (1) The rules will produce the greatest possible reduction in mortality, morbidity, and discomfort compared with any alternative variety that a reasonable search could discover and that could have been as easily adopted. It is sometimes prudentially rational to “satisfice” rather than optimize, that is, to settle for a suboptimal alternative, as when there are significant costs attached to seeking the best, or minor costs but the best is not very much better than the good, and so on. But it is never so when the better alternative can be obtained as easily as the worse,Footnote 5 and to settle for less than the optimum reduction in the case of Burgundy Codes would be like a physician using a less effective treatment when a more effective one is equally obtainable. (2) The rules will equalize the burdens as much as possible. Similar cases will be similarly treated, the least ill will be discharged first, and postdischarge care will be provided in proportion to need. The first two stipulations require no comment, but the last does. What distinguishes Burgundy Codes from the more innocuous forms of aggressive discharge is that they bring about their benefits by offloading onto patients and families costs and burdens that otherwise would be covered by hospitals and healthcare systems. This has the consequence that those who have money will be able to secure the therapy that is being withdrawn, avoid having the burdens of care falling on families and friends, and minimize their discomfort in a way that those who do not cannot. Burgundy Codes thus threaten to place disproportionate burdens on the poor, and Rawlsian decision makers would want to have them equalize those burdens as much as possible by providing help to those who cannot help themselves. Once the veil of ignorance is lifted, those who find they are among the well-off may complain that it is they who bear the disproportionate burden. For under (what I conceive to be) ideal equalization, everyone will get the care that would maintain the standards of the status quo, but only those who can afford to pay for it will. They cannot, however, complain that this is unfair if they would have wanted equalization when behind the veil, as it seems clear they would.
If the above is right, hospitals should add Burgundy Codes to their discharge planning if and only if the rules that define those Codes will reduce net expected mortality, morbidity, and discomfort for everyone, do so to a greater extent than any other set of rules that can be thought of after exercising due diligence, and equalize the burdens imposed by accelerated discharge as much as possible. If so, the normative question of whether hospitals should have Burgundy Codes resolves itself into two factual questions—Can rules be devised that, if followed, will have this result? Can hospitals ensure that those rules will be followed?—and they should add them if and only if the answers are “yes.” I will now argue that these questions do not introduce any novel issues and that it would be surprising if those were at least sometimes not the answers.
Implementing Burgundy Codes
Whether rules for Burgundy Codes can be devised to reduce mortality, morbidity, and discomfort to the lowest possible level is a question of cost–benefit calculation. In this regard, the problem is similar to that of determining the standards that must be met by nuclear power plants, buildings in San Francisco, mandatory aircraft inspections, or—to come closer to our case—how much time one has to wait in a clinic after donating blood, remain inactive after an illness, or stay in the postanaesthesia recovery room after surgery. In none of these cases will it be reasonable to set standards that would exclude the possibility of misadventure altogether, for that would have such enormous opportunity costs as to not be overall advantageous. Discharge planning is no different. It is not as if there is a bright red line dividing safe from unsafe practices and that Burgundy Codes cross that line. Rather, like all policies involving safety and risk, they are a matter of cost–benefit calculation, and once this is understood, we can proceed with good conscience to explore whether imposing risks at discharge can exclude such risks at admission as to be, on balance, best. Nor does this seem to call for a different order of calculation than is required for a policy of accelerated discharge to alternative levels of care. If we can calculate the modal lengths of stay for such discharge and know the mortality, morbidity, and discomfort this will reduce, it should be relatively straightforward to estimate the increased risk of mortality, morbidity, and discomfort that would come from various kinds of accelerated discharge to inferior levels of care, determine whether a net gain can be made, and identify the formula that will produce the greatest net gain.
Meeting the equalizing condition likewise does not seem any more difficult. Once there is a commitment to bring overall expected mortality, morbidity, and discomfort to the lowest possible point for every patient who enters the hospital, it will be most efficient to do this by designing rules according to which similar cases are treated similarly, those who are least ill will be discharged first, and aftercare is provided on the basis of need. Hospitals also already do similar things in the suboptimal care they regularly deliver. For example, we find analogues of Code Burgundy in the practices of triage, Code Orange, and constructing wait-lists; of Extended Code Burgundy in rules of rationing for admission to the hospital, tests, and treatment; and of providing postdischarge care in proportion to social need in means-test criteria for receiving home care. No one should, therefore, behave like a cow at a new gate when faced with the problem of designing rules of Burgundy Codes to meet the equalization condition.
Turning now to the compliance condition, there are two approaches we can take to ensuring that the rules of Burgundy Codes are followed. One is to leave it to physicians to police themselves. The argument for this is that, as soon as physicians understand that Burgundy Codes are good for their patients, they will pressure each other to comply with their rules. And because they will understand that whenever physicians cheat they hurt patients of other physicians, cheaters will quickly gain the contempt of their colleagues. Conversation may be brusker, they may eat lunch alone, referrals and consultations may slow, and claims that their patients urgently need beds or MRIs may be taken with a grain of salt. Because scarcely anything is worse for physicians than this, because cheating in Burgundy Codes is very liable to be detected, and because physicians must continue to have interactions with other physicians, cheating will be effectively controlled.Footnote 6 The second is to introduce external enforcement into the system in the form of third parties—“case managers”—whose job it is to monitor the compliance of physicians with length of stay rules and ensure that deviations from them occur only for good and sufficient reasons. Adding these will certainly generate conflict with physicians, but the argument is that hospitals will thereby maximize the throughput of patients and make their treatment more uniform.
My preference is for the former. For present purposes, however, we do not have to take sides on this issue. As long as one or the other—or perhaps some third way—will provide reasonable assurance that the rules of Burgundy Codes will be fairly applied—and it is hard to see on what grounds this can be denied—the compliance condition can be satisfied. Nor does satisfying this condition require us to alter the way the role of a patient advocate is understood. It is sometimes claimed that responsible cost containment requires a change in the traditional view of patient advocacy from a “dyadic relation between one patient and one doctor,” where the role of the physician (or healthcare provider generally) is to act in the interest of the patient, to one of acting “for the fair delivery of health to a population, balancing various interests that may compete.”Footnote 7 This modification, however, would divest the role of the patient advocate of everything that makes it important to patients. For to balance interests is necessarily not to simultaneously satisfy them, and what patients want is someone who can be counted on to act in their interests without compromise. The belief that physicians will act in this way is what makes patients trust them, and the role of the patient advocate cannot be made to deviate from this without destroying that trust.
It is thus important to see that Burgundy Codes do not give us any reason to alter it. If those Codes really are to the advantage of patients, they are things that all patients will want. But one who wants the end must also (albeit in a different sense of “want”) want the means, and thus if patients want the benefits of Burgundy Codes, and understand that these can be achieved only if physicians follow certain rules, they must want physicians to follow those rules. Of course, what patients really want is for the physicians of others to follow the rules but for theirs to cut corners on them. But this is not a realizable desire. The real alternatives are between having the rules generally observed and not, and between these prudent patients will not only prefer the former but also think that the more general observance there is the better. Because any laxity weakens the assurance that Burgundy Codes provide the avoidance of the worst health outcomes, prudent patients who look at the matter coolly must see strict observance of the rules as a cardinal virtue of physicians. But, if so, physicians can comply with the rules of Burgundy Codes (or rationing generally) without any compromise to their traditional role as patient advocates. They can still look patients in the eye and say that they are doing all that they can for them—all that they can, that is, within the constraints under which they must operate and that patients would want them to.
I thus conclude that the conditions that are necessary and sufficient for the acceptance of Burgundy Codes can, under very unremarkable circumstances, be satisfied. One worry remains in recommending that those Codes be added to the suite of suboptimal care regularly offered, however. This is that administrators may be precipitous and implement them before there is reasonable assurance that those justifying conditions are in place. Under pressure from a funding formula to increase throughput, they may consciously or unconsciously cut corners to the cost of patients. The solution to this problem, I suggest, is to be found in the obligation that hospitals and governments have in a democratic state to be transparent and consultative, and I now turn to that.
Transparency and Public Consultation
Hospitals and health authorities have not typically been good at fulfilling these obligations. When Wal-Mart comes to town or light rapid transit through neighborhoods is proposed, there is much community participation. Flyers go out, public surveys are made, invitations to speak up are offered, and town hall meetings are called. The people get detailed information about the proposals, right down to square footage and decibel levels, and an opportunity to have input into the decisions before they are made. But this is not the case in healthcare. What we get, instead, is the most general information with (at best) requests for the most general input, and no organized or real opportunity to grapple with the issues in a way that would make a difference. Often the first time people encounter those issues is when they enter the healthcare system.
This, however, is inconsistent with how things must be done in a democracy, which, it is worth noting, is not just a preference or commitment we happen to have, but a form of government required by justice and for which a Rawlsian justification can be provided. If democracy means anything at all, it means rule by the people. In a democracy the government is not the ruler. Rather, the people rule using the government as their instrument. This means that the people must be able to have input into the decisions of government and replace it if it does not perform to their liking. The ability to do these things, however, requires that the people have full information about all matters of proposed and executed public policy. Transparency and public consultation are thus not frills, but things that lie at the heart of the democratic state. Taking healthcare policies to the people in this way is sometimes resisted on the ground that the people cannot understand the complex information that must be digested or sufficiently free themselves from their own interests to give useful opinions about it. This, however, is not what Vancouver City Planners found (to their surprise) when they consulted the public on changes to neighborhood zoning. There they received thoughtful input that recognized the need for trade-offs and did not simply consist of “not in my own backyard” ultimatums.Footnote 8 There is no reason to think that the public will not respond similarly well when it comes to healthcare policies, and thus full information about such policies should be provided to the people, warts and all, in exactly the same way it goes to those who have to actually make the decisions in the end. Anything less than such transparency bespeaks an arrogant elitism unjustified by the facts and incompatible with democratic decision making.Footnote 9
The plain implication of this for Burgundy Codes—and also for plans to discharge patients to alternative levels of care, which likewise may be implemented on insufficient evidence and turn out to be Burgundy Codes in disguise—is that governments and hospitals must make these plans clear. The public must be told what they propose to do, what they hope to achieve, and why they think it is a good idea. It must also be told how things turned out, what changes (if any) will be made in the light of that outcome, the rationale for that, and so forth, and so begin the process again. Absent a viable form of direct democracy where all policy matters are settled by vote by the public,Footnote 10 delegating the authority to make decisions is inescapable. But it is democratically defensible only if those decisions are transparent to the public and overseen by it. The public need not be consulted on every decision. It is, however, owed periodic accounts of the doings of its agents, just like any other stockholders, whereby governments and hospitals will fail to exercise good judgment on what they consult on and what they do not at their peril. Nothing short of this will put the public in a position to evaluate their actions, nothing short of that will put it in the position of rulers, and nothing short of it being in that position will provide a reasonable safeguard against bad judgment, wishful thinking, and impure motivation. We thus have a happy coincidence between what is required in a democratic state and a system of checks and balances that will safeguard the public from misuses of Burgundy Codes and other aggressive discharge planning. What will get people on both sides to act as democrats is another, more difficult, and still unsolved problem.
Conclusion
It is common to hear healthcare providers complain that more money should come to healthcare, that what comes could be allocated better, and that their own areas should get more. It is not as common to hear reasoned justifications for the claims. I want to end with some brief remarks on how to think about these issues and relate them to my recommendations about Burgundy Codes.
I am an unrepentant methodological Rawlsian. What the basic structure of society should be, how public funds should be allocated for the public good, and what policies should be put in place to make the most of that funding should all be in accordance with what decision makers who are interested only in themselves and those they are interested in would choose from behind a veil of ignorance. Once we have a society that meets this test, we will have a society that is pareto optimal in that no part could be improved without making the whole worse or at least no better. Until we achieve that goal, however, there are things that we can and cannot complain about in the name of justice, and Rawls helps us distinguish between these. As noted earlier, it would be a serious criticism of any allocation policy if anyone could indicate a mode of allocation that would be more attractive to Rawlsian decision makers. For then the policy could not be defended by anything other than reasons relating to special interests, which is to say that it cannot be defended at all. And conversely, if one cannot do this—if one agrees that Rawlsian decision makers would choose the policy—one cannot complain about its consequences, for such complaints could then likewise only be grounded in special interests.
I thus submit that a Rawlsian approach provides us with a test that helps focus public debate over whether more funding should come to healthcare in general or hospitals in particular. But, as argued above, whatever comes to hospitals will never be enough to provide everyone with everything they need or want when they need or want it. It follows that much of the care of public hospitals is destined to be suboptimal, and that the art and science of running a public hospital is to know how to deliver suboptimal care to make the best use of existing resources. If the argument of my paper is right, a Rawlsian viewpoint will help us with this as well and point us toward Burgundy Codes as one of the ways of achieving that goal.Footnote 11
