Armin Mattes takes a well-known fact—that the French Revolution had a significant impact on European and American thought and politics—and transforms it into a prism to rethink how and why we have come to understand “democracy” as we do. More important than his trans-Atlantic perspective is his commitment to reading texts closely and looking for subtle changes in meaning, changes that, when added together, demonstrate a transformation in the meaning of democracy during and after the French Revolution.
For scholars of political thought, Mattes offers a new intellectual genealogy for democracy. Most scholars—notably historians Quentin Skinner and Paul Rahe, and political theorist Philip Pettit—have looked to the roots of republican political theory in ancient Greece and Rome, Italian city-states, and then, most relevant to the United States, the English Civil Wars and Glorious Revolution. In short, the story has been one premised on the ideals of civic duty and popular consent. Mattes suggests, instead, that republican ideals underwent a transformative shift as the French Revolution progressed, so much so that even America's Founders—men like Adams and Jefferson—started to be read differently and even to think differently. Modern ideas about democracy emerged not just from the long history of republican thought, but from the few short years of the French Revolution.
Each chapter pairs an American and European political thinker to examine how the French Revolution reshaped political understandings in similar ways on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. The first chapter uses Thomas Paine and Edmund Burke to examine the question of equality. Both Paine and Burke supported the American Revolution, Mattes argues, but for different reasons. Burke supported equality of corporate entities, including the colonies, in a society of corporate orders. Paine, however, embraced early equality for individuals. Their differences came to matter only during the French Revolution.
The next chapter examines the constitutional thought of John Adams and Friedrich von Gentz. Both had been considered liberals prior to the French Revolution, but were transformed into “conservatives” during and after the French Revolution. Both Adams and von Gentz believed that inequality was simply a fact of life, and that any political system that failed to recognize it was bound to fail. They thus remained committed to traditional notions of balanced constitutionalism. In the wake of the French Revolution, however, this perspective came to be seen as “aristocratic” rather than “democratic.” Democracy thus came to mean the abolition of inequality, and thus any defense of inequality was deemed archaic.
The third chapter examines James Madison's and Immanuel Kant's strikingly similar ideas about perpetual peace, which, Mattes writes, established what came to be known as Democratic Peace Theory. Both imagined that well-structured states would come to be more effectively guided by reason, and in turn, democratic states could, in the international arena, compose a quasi republic that would limit the need and possibility for war. For Madison, a state governed by the people, if organized well, would eradicate monarchs' wars of glory and, because the people paid for wars themselves, citizens would be less likely to choose war over peace. Thus, the potential for global peace was linked to the internal political structures of states in the international order.
Chapter 4 uses Thomas Jefferson and Desutt de Tracy to argue that modern understandings of democracy and nation emerged together and were coconstitutive. Before the French Revolution, the word “nation” had multiple meanings, from ethnic group to state. After the French Revolution, it had come to mean a people with shared language and culture that governed itself. This was no small transformation. Once the Third Estate claimed to be the French people, the nobles and monarch were no longer legitimately part of the nation. Instead, a democratic state was a state governed by its nation. But the nation brought new exclusions as well. One either belonged to “the people” or did not, which meant that Jefferson increasingly read Indians, African Americans, and even his Federalist opponents out of the national imaginary during the 1790s.
Thus, we have, in a few short years, the transformation of the meaning of democracy from a mode of rule into a new sign system. It now meant equality for all individuals, considered “aristocracy” its foil, aspired for the rule of public reason, and assumed a connection between cultural unity and self-government.
Mattes's book both “starts and ends with Alexis de Tocqueville” (1) despite not being about Tocqueville. Yet Mattes helps us see why no one questioned Tocqueville's assumption in Democracy in America that the United States, despite its size, pluralism, and government, was a democracy. It was because democracy was no longer a technical term for a system of government in which the people ruled, but something larger. Democracy came to mean a rejection of traditional society, with its orders, its pluralism of peoples and privileges, and its assumptions about inequality. That is why, in Democracy in America, Tocqueville assumed that democracy's antithesis was aristocracy and the ancien regime.
It is also why, Mattes argues in his conclusion, reformers and radicals in the United States and Europe—he invokes Thomas Skidmore (class), William Apess (Native Americans), Judith Sargent Murray and Sarah Grimké (women), and David Walker and William Lloyd Garrison (race)—argued that a true democracy must root out all vestiges of aristocratic rule, which also meant denaturalizing all inherited forms of inequality. It is why equality came to be the guiding principle of democracy, not just in politics but society as well. And it was this broader understanding of democracy, born in the French Revolution, that Tocqueville, and all of us, have come to take for granted. Despite its intellectual depth, however, Mattes is less attentive to social and cultural history—to the fact that, by the time Tocqueville arrived, American society had in fact been transformed by the idea of equality, a point Gordon Wood makes most clearly in his 1991 Radicalism of the American Revolution.
Despite ending on an optimistic note, Mattes is critical of the modern idea of democracy. He concludes chapter 4 (on the idea of the nation) by arguing that the conjoining of democracy and nation undermined the other aspects of the democratic project. Nationalists' aspiration for “an ethnically and linguistically homogenous population in a territory defined by natural borders” ended up limiting democracies' commitment to individual equality and world peace. Instead, democratic nations relied on state power to exclude entire groups of people and to go to war with other states. In short, there was a contradiction at the heart of modern democracy: nationalism. This finding will intrigue contemporary scholars of nationalism, who continue to debate the benefits, costs, and origins of nationalism. One might even ask whether Mattes discounts the importance of social solidarity—of the nation—in making possible the more expansive claims for democratic equality with which Mattes concludes his book.
