This is an important book on a big topic. Kent Calder sets out to explain the way in which the countries of Eurasia are increasingly interacting in relation to the supply and consumption of energy, in turn expanding the significance of this region in world politics more generally. The basic point of the book is that Eurasia is home to the world’s most important producers of oil and gas, while at the same time having four of the world’s major economies. The links between these producers and consumers have become more and more important, in turn highlighting the role of this region as an economic hub, with consequences also for the political influence these countries exert in world politics. From this perspective, what is happening in Eurasia is illustrative of the increasing pluralism of world politics and of the declining significance of the Western powers led by the United States.

In terms of substance, Chapters 5 and 6 are key to the author’s discussion of the political economy of the Eurasian petrostates and the Asian capitalist consumers. The petrostates discussed are Russia, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran; China, India, Japan, and South Korea are the consuming countries that receive attention. These two chapters contain a wealth of analysis in relation to the basic economic and political circumstances of both sets of countries, and to the way in which producers and consumers are connected. The Eurasian context, from this perspective, has become more and more integrated as an energy market, with the United States and Western Europe increasingly less significant as markets for the Eurasian energy producers.

This basic material about the Eurasian energy producers and consumers is set in an analytical framework that represents a major contribution to the understanding of Eurasia’s place in contemporary geopolitics and geoeconomics. Calder frames his discussion in the context of contributions to geopolitical and geostrategic thinking from the past that focused on the importance of the Eurasian landmass: Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman are important names in this respect, and Calder also discusses the traditions of geopolitical thinking that have emanated from Germany, Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, China, and Japan. He makes use of the concept of “critical junctures,” emphasizing the role of contingency to explain the way in which Eurasia has attained a new eminence in world affairs. Particularly important in relation to the strengthening of key Asian economies were Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernizations in China in the late 1970s and Manmohan Singh’s economic reforms in India in the early 1990s. The other critical junctures discussed are the 1973 Arab oil embargo and related nationalizations, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the advent of the Putin administration in Russia in 1999.

In order to develop the argument that what is occurring with the various producing and consuming states needs to be put in a Eurasian context, the author devotes Chapter 7 to an elaboration of the nature of the relationships that are emerging, summed up in the concept of “complex continentalism.” Chapter 8 focuses on the strategic implications of the developments that have been discussed, highlighting the increasing weight of the Eurasian countries in world politics. Chapter 9 draws attention to policy implications, particularly for the United States.

There is no doubt that The New Continentalism provides an insightful analysis of what is happening to the key energy producers and consumers that are the author’s focus. My main query in reading this book is whether the specifically Eurasian context should feature as prominently as the author claims. There is no disputing where the countries under discussion are located geographically, nor can one argue with the data that are presented on the energy interactions occurring within the Eurasian area. However, do the various actors under discussion think of themselves as primarily Eurasian? Or, if “Eurasian” does feature in some respects at least, how much priority is given to this aspect of any given actor’s identity? Among the producer states discussed, my perception would be that the Eurasian context was a high priority for both Russia and Kazakhstan but less so for Saudi Arabia and Iran; the latter two are more oriented toward the Middle East as their regional context, with Southwest Asia also being important for Iran. In the case of the energy consumers, one could argue that China was more oriented toward East Asia than toward Eurasia; the Open the West Program has as much to do with consolidating China’s rule in its western provinces as with promoting Eurasian continentalism. India’s primary regional context is South Asia; beyond that, Eurasia is certainly relevant but so is a broader “Indo-Pacific” orientation. In relation to South Korea and Japan, the argument is that while both countries are peripheral to Eurasia, in many respects (Japan more so than South Korea), they are also engaged in important ways; the author has a case but it comes down to a matter of emphasis.

The book makes some important conceptual contributions relating specifically to the topic of emerging continentalism in Eurasia, but with relevance also to international political economy and international relations more broadly. The elaboration of “critical junctures” was helpful in explaining how important directions in international politics can be triggered by events that, if not quite random, cannot be completely predicted either. The discussion of petrostates in Chapter 5 adds to our understanding of this phenomenon, elucidating such issues as the resource curse and whether oil wealth undermines the prospects for democracy. In relation to behavior on the energy markets, Russia and Iran are portrayed as destabilizing, Saudi Arabia as stabilizing; Kazakhstan’s direction is unclear at this stage. In explaining the various linkages that are emerging in Eurasia, Calder develops his concept of complex continentalism. While I have suggested that the author might be overstating the extent to which the key players prioritize Eurasia as a region, he does provide a helpful analysis of the factors facilitating continentalism and of what is entailed in the variety of relationships that are emerging.

As far as the strategic implications and policy issues are concerned, the main point is that the Eurasian players are going to have increasing influence in world politics, and not just in relation to energy issues. While Western countries (and some of the Eurasian consumers, such as Japan and South Korea) might be moving toward greater energy efficiency and reduced dependence on imports of oil and gas, there is no question that the major energy producers discussed in this book are going to have a greater influence on world politics. Apart from Western countries reducing dependence on energy imports, soft balancing and changes in domestic politics in producing states might also be constraining factors. The author directs most of his recommendations toward the United States, but they also have global implications. It is important for the United States and other Western countries to engage in a variety of ways with both the producing and consuming states discussed in The New Continentalism. Insofar as effective engagement occurs, one would have a situation whereby any trend toward greater Eurasian cohesion would be weakened. In the meantime, the trend discerned by Calder can be seen as a manifestation of the increasing pluralism of world politics, and the added weight of illiberal forces.