For the vast majority of law school students, the existence of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) has been a worldwide reality since childhood, with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992, and less notable agreements between the US and Israel and Canada dating back to the 1980s. Consequently, the widespread and accelerating adoption of PTAs between developed and developing countries may appear to the current generation of law students to be a harmless and efficiency-maximizing result of the movement to liberalize global trade relations.
But what if the push for “foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational firms”, not multilateral efficiency, is the “key driving forc[e]” of these North-South agreements? What if “much of the efficiency gains of increased trade and investment are eaten up by a patchwork of complex rules”? What if these PTAs “raise the barriers for competitors from non-member states” and result in a “prisoner’s dilemma” in which “multilateralism unravels”?
These are the concerns raised by Mark S. Manger in his book Investing in Protection: The Politics of Preferential Trade Agreements Between North and South. It provides a pointed critique to those who view PTAs as catalysing the broader liberalization process governed more slowly by multilateral agreements.
Indeed, to Manger, protectionism is the primary motivation for firms urging the passage of PTAs. He contends that manufacturing firms from developed countries use PTAs to create trade barriers, for instance by incorporating strict rules-of-origin requirements. In addition, service firms create first-mover advantages by locking in regulatory rules and technical and legal standards to stifle competition. These protectionist manoeuvres trigger defensive agreements from non-member countries as their firms seek to close competitive gaps. Thus, “the competitive dynamic between countries becomes the driving force of bilateral deals”.
What hope then, lies for a resurgence of multilateralism? Is the sprawling labyrinth of PTAs destined to halt global compromise? On a hopeful note, Manger predicts that PTAs’ influence will remain “partial and incomplete” due to high transaction costs resulting from repeated negotiations and the “burden of compliance with numerous agreements”.
Manger provides a useful guide to PTA rules, the lobbying that precedes their enactment, and the ripple effect they produce around the globe. With his focus on multinational firm lobbying and negotiation, Manger demonstrates how PTA formation politicizes trade and is not a direct shift towards more efficient markets. His case-studies of NAFTA, the defensive EU-Mexico and Japan-Mexico PTAs, Chile, and Japan’s agreements with Malaysia and Thailand detail the jockeying of politicians, firms, and other interest groups as countries race to ratify trade agreements and entrench advantages over competitors. Manger avoids polemical judgement of free trade doctrine, and instead makes his case through statistical analysis and a clear narrative of the struggles of parties to complete, alter, and resist the formation of these agreements. In sum, a reading of these case-studies would be beneficial to those already sceptical of bilateral agreements, as well as those who are convinced that PTAs provide a promising alternative to broad resolutions.
