There is no dearth of academic writings on China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). An enormous, if not repetitive, body of work has enquired into the impacts of BRI projects and whether China has locked recipient countries into debt-trap diplomacy. However, that is no reason to dismiss Debby Chan's book on Myanmar. Defying Beijing is a welcome addition to the burgeoning literature exploring how recipient societies react to, and often successfully oppose, the thrusts of Chinese-funded megaprojects. Readers looking for an empirical analysis of how a weak state can exercise agency when engaging with China will find the book validating.
Now a lecturer at the Australian National University, Chan develops her argument as follows: for small states trapped in an asymmetric economic relationship with China, effective and nationwide social resistance to Chinese-funded megaprojects can be a source of bargaining power (p. 3). The more significant and sustained mobilization against large-scale Chinese infrastructure projects is in a host society, the more accommodating China will be to the host government. Myanmar offers a fine case for probing such a proposition.
The author builds on Robert Putnam's classic two-level game structure to explain how domestic politics impact international negotiations. Whereas Putnam posited that domestic audiences could influence foreign policy decisions before the latter were made, Defying Beijing illustrates how domestic constituents can exert pressure after an international agreement (or foreign investment) is signed. Such pressure from below manifests itself especially when host societies undergo tremendous social and political change, as Myanmar did in the 2010s (p. 10). While resolutely drawing on IR theory, the author mentions en passant the political process approach to social movements developed by Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, among others (pp. 5, 40, 62). In her case, the latter model may even have greater explanatory power than Putnam's. Policymakers in Myanmar considered contentious politics as a bargaining tool against China precisely because significant changes occurred in the country's political structures after the end of direct military rule in 2011 – not merely because of strategic and foreign policy considerations by its elites.
Drawing on fieldwork conducted in Myanmar between 2015 and 2019, Chan examines three contrasting cases of Chinese-funded megaprojects: a hydropower dam abruptly shelved in 2011, a copper-mining project renegotiated yet maintained, and a dual pipeline delivered as planned without new concessions gained. The book thus sheds light on variations in the successes and outcomes of BRI projects and how successive Myanmar governments have strategically deployed popular resistance as a chip when bargaining with China. While compelling, the book's core hypothesis would have benefited from a more rounded framework to test it. The “audience cost dilemma” concept is introduced in chapter two to explain China's tolerance of smaller states having second thoughts on proposed megaprojects. Worldwide, BRI investments have been prone to social conflicts, notwithstanding China's narratives. Local leaders and tycoons may have welcomed such large-scale projects, but civil societies have often been more sceptical of China's motives and offers. To measure the strength of social opposition to BRI projects in Myanmar and assess its deployment as a foreign policy tool, Chan constructs a three-layer framework cross-checking the domestic audience cost, the host government's preferences and China's position (pp. 64–65). One wonders whether merely gauging how many protesters joined a demonstration (and where) – based on debatable media estimates – is the most appropriate tool for measuring a domestic audience cost (pp. 97, 128). The author herself admits that local media in Myanmar have often failed to report anti-BRI protests (p. 160). Other tactical repertoires – boycott calls or dress codes – are mentioned (p. 69) but are not included in her toolbox for assessing such social resistance.
That said, the empirical evidence presented in chapters three to six is noteworthy. Chapter three focuses on the Myitsone hydropower project, a case of renegation by the government that emerged in Myanmar after the 2010 elections. Thein Sein's administration was eager to demonstrate goodwill. It strategically responded to the nationwide opposition to the dam by cancelling it. This is where the author is at her most original. The Chinese authorities recognized such hostility in an environment that was quickly transitioning from military rule to election-based politics. They conceded without retribution, acknowledging that when opposition in recipient societies proves emotion-driven, local authorities could deploy it as a tactical tool against China.
Chapter four focuses on Letpadaung's mining project – a case of renegotiation (but not suspension). There was also a strong resistance against a project operated by Wanbao, a Chinese mining company. Social opposition was rooted in land evictions. Yet there was no emotional framing about a revered national site like the Irrawaddy River. That explains why the government deployed repression but still sought to mobilize social turmoil as a chip and renegotiate the contract with China. Chapter five then looks at a third case, an oil and gas pipeline project completed as planned. The Myanmar administration could not capitalize on the opposition to such a project. Mobilization was marginal and inspired mainly by distant transnational organizations – of which China has often been suspicious. China viewed the Myanmar government as not constrained by domestic opposition and rejected all renegotiation attempts.
Little of this will be surprising to those familiar with China–Myanmar relations. However, they will enjoy the original ethnographic study advanced in the book, with field notes and interviews conducted in major cities and BRI sites in northern Myanmar. I wished the author had elaborated further on her ethical approach, though, and the bias she has brought in as a scholar from Hong Kong (thus likely viewed by her respondents as Chinese herself). Chan also tends to reify and essentialize political regimes in Myanmar through the use of “Naypyidaw,” presenting governmental power as a single, unified decision-making entity. This overlooks the complex realities of policy decisions during Myanmar's decade of power-sharing politics between 2011 and 2021, and the Myanmar army chief's own backdoor diplomacy with China.
Lastly, this monograph illustrates how gruelling it remains to morph a doctoral thesis into an academic book. More work could have been done to reduce jargon and redundancy, and readers unfamiliar with Myanmar's recent institutional developments will lament the lack of a coherent contextualization. Yet, contemporary observers of BRI travails and accomplishments will find much to like in this book. Efforts like Defying Beijing are essential as they offer solid hypotheses worth testing under different political settings.
