SK: Julian, thanks very much for letting us see your paper. Would you like to start things for us by summarizing it please.

JD: Sure. I'm interested in whether it is possible for an artwork, and in this case a film, to be made more or less funny merely by dint of facts about the artist's moral status. Maybe the artist's behaviour is somehow morally dubious or perhaps they hold immoral views. I am interested in such cases where we hold a view about the artist but the artwork doesn't change at all with respect to its perceivable, manifest properties. That is, there is no change in such properties from when we are considering it to when we find out about the artist's immorality.

In the paper, the case I focus on is Woody Allen’s film Manhattan (1979). This is an interesting case since the main storyline of the film concerns a sexual relationship between a 42-year-old man (played by Allen, who also writes and directs) and a 17-year-old teenage woman. It reflects real life, say some people. Subsequent to the making of this film, in 1991, Allen started a relationship with Soon-Yi Previn. (Soon-Yi was Mia Farrow's adopted daughter with Andre Previn. After Previn and Farrow separated, she and Allen had a 10-year relationship. Farrow and Allen's relationship ended ‘at some point’ and then Allen and Soon-Yi started their relationship, according to them.) Whilst there are different accounts of exactly when Soon-Yi and Allen started dating – a judicial trial concluded they started a sexual relationship in December 1991 – what is clear is that there is a large age difference between them and that when they started their relationship Allen was 56 and Soon-Yi was 21, or 20 depending on who you believe.

Not only does the film reflect real life, it is widely reported that many people view Manhattan differently from how they first viewed it, and this change is caused by what happened in Allen’s real life after the film’s completion. In particular, many people find the film less funny or unfunny. Indeed, many people are reported to find the film creepy.

Some philosophers think that the change in people’s views – from funny to unfunny and perhaps to creepy – reflects or represents a change in the film itself. What I try to do in my paper is figure out what kind of story one would have to tell for that to be true. I think it's fair to say I don't want to rule this option out, however I also think there are considerable obstacles that have to be overcome for one to make good on this claim.

SK: Great. Thanks Julian. That sets things up nicely. I'll let Julian B and Alex come in first, but I suspect I want to ask about something soon given what you have just said.

AF: Thanks for writing the paper, Julian. It got me thinking about this topic in a way I hadn't before. I would normally say that if someone thinks or feels differently about a film, then it has changed its meaning. And that is okay. But, to be clear, you are taking a different stance, a strong realist stance on such things, or at least that is how I would put things. Similarly, in this case or a case like it, I would normally say that if the artist, such as a comedian, had done something immoral, then that could change the meaning of the artwork, and perhaps (depending on the artwork and the behaviour) quite easily change the meaning. That will include changing something from funny to unfunny.

JD: Yes, thanks for these points, Alex. To be clear then, yes, first I do take a realist stance. I am harking back to a lot of material that was popular in the 1980s and 1990s about secondary qualities. So, for some philosophers, something's being red consists in its being such as to look red (to normal observers in standard circumstances). That is, there isn't redness aside from how we understand human eyesight to work. Colour is a real property or quality of objects, but it is often referred to as being a ‘secondary quality’ of them. A real property, certainly, but something that is essentially based on human perception of such objects. In contrast, length might be thought to be a primary quality or property: what it is for something to be a certain length is not explained in terms of its being such as to present a certain kind of perceptual appearance, even if the measurement of the object is something dependent on humans and our categories.

Second, as I say, whilst I allow that the behaviour of an artist can change the meaning of a film or artwork, I am pretty sceptical about the possibility. I want to distinguish between the meaning of the artwork itself and our judgement about the artist and their behaviour. I allow that a case can be made, as I say, in the way some philosophers do that the artist's behaviour can change an artwork's meaning, but making the link or dissolving the distinction between behaviour and the meaning of an artwork can be hard.

AF: Great. Thanks.

SK: Yes, I imagine you will have some cases in mind from stand-up, Alex! Let's begin by thinking through what the issues might be.

First of all, Julian, I want to point out that we go from a general claim to a specific case, that of Manhattan. So, we can ask whether what you say holds generally for artworks (or narrative artworks), or whether it is holding specifically for Manhattan and Woody Allen. Second, we can ask a different question, which is what we say specifically about stand-up as an entertainment-cum-artform. For instance, we might think there are differences between, say, films and plays on the one hand and stand-up on the other. For a start, films and plays are often multi-person, whereas stand-up typically isn't. In the former we have people playing characters, whereas in stand-up we have more of an interesting issue: the stand-up comedian (aside from obvious character comedians) will often play or be a version of themselves and adopt a persona, but it is still often an extension of who they are. (We can then turn this question back to Manhattan, of course, and think about actor-writer-director Allen who might be playing a version of himself, as he seems to do in several of his films.)

Anyway, I just wanted to put these ideas on the table. I suppose there are two main issues that we can focus on: the idea of changes in the film and changes to its meaning, and then the case of stand-up comedy. Let’s take them in that order.

Can I start us with a different way of thinking about changes in meaning given what you have just said, Julian D? You talk about a change in meaning where we find something out about the artist and this seems to make the artwork less funny or unfunny. But, what about the case where we find out something about the artist and our reaction is that the artwork is funnier? Is that possible? Do we have complete symmetry here, or is there something going on concerning immorality and a ‘drop’ in the funniness?

JB: Yes! Here is a possible example. Imagine watching Father Ted and you don't know anything about the actors. Frank Kelly, who played the dipsomaniac Father Jack, was a very well-respected actor in Ireland, often described as urbane and thoughtful. That can make the joke and the character even more funny. There will be plenty of examples like that, too.

JD: Yes, good, although notice that is not quite the mirror of the Allen case: it isn't obvious that Frank Kelly is doing something explicitly morally good. We are finding out something about the actor’s personality that goes against the character in the sitcom, and that is worth noting, Julian B. It is still a nice example to think about, concerning incongruity in general and whether an appreciation of that does make the whole thing funnier. So, I think that the example I mention in the paper, Allen’s own Sleeper, is a different example of the general phenomenon we are trying to nail. As you might recall, the scene I mention is of Allen’s character learning that this man, Richard Nixon, had done something terrible, so heinous that a particular clip is the only thing that survives of him. The film was made before the Watergate scandal and released before Nixon resigned. That might well be a phenomenon where we can ask ‘Do the (moral) events coming to light make the film, or that part of the film, funnier?’.

When it comes to this case, I think I find it more plausible that we have a change in the artwork, I mean, more plausible than the similar claim when it comes to the case of Manhattan.

SK: Right! So, I think there are two things now going on. First, making sure we have good examples in mind. Julian B gives us a nice example of finding out something about the actor which makes something funnier and which (potentially, arguably) is a change in the artwork. (I’m sure we will come to that!) But you are right, Julian D, that what we come to know here isn't anything of moral import. We also need to find an example where a comedian or an actor in some comedy artwork or some artist does something (a) morally good and (b) that in some way ‘links with’ the theme of the film or their character or something similar. But (c) the comedian's actions are not causally responsible for the film's having the manifest properties that it has. (I include (c) since otherwise we are back to your example in the paper, Julian, of the racist comedian who makes racist jokes or writes racist material because they are a racist. We want our understanding of the artwork to change through ‘mere dint’ of the character of the artist. We don't want the character of the artist to cause the manifest artwork in the first place and (perhaps?) that be obvious when we experience it.) And then (d) the upshot is that this makes the film or artwork funnier. (I suppose this reflects something Matthes and others are trying to get at (Matthes, Reference Matthes2021).)

I think I struggle here to think of good examples, or at least clear-cut ones. Off the top of my head, I think I am inclined to say that if only (a) holds, then this is unlikely to make things funnier. Imagine we discover that a decent comedian or actor gives lots of money to charity or has saved some stray dogs, and this is unconnected to their material or the film's theme, or their character, or whatever. Do we find the film or artwork funnier? It isn't obvious to me that we would. I think we would definitely need (a) and (b) to hold to give us a fighting chance of (d) happening. And we need to observe (c) or something like it, it seems. As it happens, Julian D, I think your example of Sleeper is a good case of a different phenomenon – the immoral act connects with the artwork and makes it funnier – and what you say about it is plausible.

Second, given what you just said however, I want to return to something I said earlier. Do we have to go from case to case – these two films, Julian B’s case of Frank Kelly, and presumably many other actors – or can we say something credible that is more general? One suggestion is to start with the following idea, based on what I have just offered. We have an asymmetry. Ceteris paribus, when some artist / comedian does something morally bad and that is in some way linked to the themes of the artwork, that makes their artwork / comedy less funny, but when we find out something morally good about an artist / comedian, it has little to no effect on something being funny even if it has links with the themes of the artwork. (But we can return to that example of yours, Julian D, of the racist comedian.) Is this useful as a starting point, to think with or think against?

AF: I suppose that makes the ‘through mere dint’ claim very interesting and it might be what you had in mind with the racist comedian example, Simon.

SK: Yes.

AF: So, we want to say that the film can change its meaning – in this case, how funny it is – through ‘mere dint’ of the artist’s actions. But we want to rule out the example of the case where because they are a racist, they create an artwork that has racist jokes or tropes.

JD: Yes. Although note that I want to rule out this this kind of case as it is not the kind of case I'm interested in.

AF: So, there is something interesting going on with Manhattan and perhaps other artworks. One interpretation is that Allen has a certain character trait and that caused him to make the film in a certain way, but then he acts on that trait in real life only afterwards, which only then becomes apparent to us. So, the character trait comes to the fore only afterwards, even if it was already there. That is not quite the racist example, perhaps, but it is damn close. In the case of the racist comedian, it would be obvious to everyone that if someone is making racist jokes then they are a racist there and then. We don't learn anything new afterwards. Any action the comedian does just cements their reputation. In the case of Allen we have Simon's (a) and (b), but (c) is questionable. His future actions don't cause the creation of the film, by definition. But arguably, at least according to one interpretation, his character does help to create both the film and cause his future action. So, the film's meaning does stem from him and his character, but the film hasn't changed. Instead, we have just learnt more about the film. So, it always was unfunny, even if we or some people found it funny at the time.

JD: Maybe. But I think I’d be inclined to say that people's present-day knowledge of Allen’s personal life distracts them from seeing the humour in the film. People in 1979 were, perhaps, better equipped to appreciate the film than those people now who have allowed themselves to be so distracted.

AF: But then I worry about the kind of case we are searching for, and what ‘through mere dint’ means. Something where the artwork can change its meaning – go from funny to unfunny, say – where the art or the artist’s character or whatever is in some way undermined or in tension with an artist’s subsequent moral action, but where the artist’s character was such as to both cause the action but not wholly determine and cause to a specific degree the nature of the art (otherwise we are back to the racist comedian case). The wording is probably not quite right there, but I hope you get the drift.

JD: Yes. And I think that is why this is such a hard position to defend and make out. I don't think it is impossible, but it is hard.

In the case of Frank Kelly and many similar cases, I think you are right, Julian B, that knowing something about the actor or writer or whoever that is at odds with the character or joke and where there isn't any immorality, is something that is likelier to make us react differently to the artwork. But I am still sceptical that this alone changes the artwork itself.

Of course, it raises an interesting question of what it is for something to be an artwork. Perhaps that is the general question you are pushing us towards, Simon.

SK: Yes, possibly! When we say that ‘through mere dint’ X changes Y we need to be certain that X and Y are different things. That seems basic and fundamental to this debate. I suppose Alex is getting us to think about Allen’s (and other artists’) characters and their relation to the artwork.

JD: Right. So, we could have a narrow view of an artwork, so Father Ted as seen and heard on the television. Our knowledge of Frank Kelly’s acting career is something outside of and extra to the artwork, and yet it helps us respond differently to the artwork. (That is of apiece with our discussion.) On the other hand, we could take a radical and broader view of the artwork where the relevant facts of the actors and writers are themselves part of it. In the case of Frank Kelly, what we learn when we learn about Frank Kelly is something that extends our understanding of the artwork itself, since Frank Kelly was always the sort of actor he was. We just learn more about the artwork. Likewise, we have the Manhattan case. Allen’s actions that are subsequent to the film change the nature and meaning of the film, so some people argue. As I say, I am sceptical of this.

One other type of example that comes to mind are guest stars in comedy or entertainment programmes, stars that often played against type. So, for example, stars on Morecambe and Wise’s 1970s UK Saturday night shows. The joke is that you would often get a serious actor hamming it up in a silly scene, or you have newsreaders dancing and showing their legs. That sort of incongruity clearly adds to the joke and is meant to. There was an assumption that the audience would know who these people were, and their backgrounds were an essential part of the joke being funnier. Their accepted personas and the fact that they were playing against type were a central part of the entertainment-cum-artwork. If someone didn't know that someone was a serious newsreader, but later found out that they were, then this would add to the viewer's appreciation of course, an appreciation of what the artwork was in the first place. In that case, I don't think the artwork has changed its meaning or nature. The person has just come to understand it better.

There is a key difference between this case and the Frank Kelly case (as I imagine it to be): Kelly’s acting career, I suspect, wasn't an essential part of the writing and creation of Father Ted. Of course, if that is wrong, then we are closer to the Morecambe and Wise case.

JB: Good. That takes me to the main point I want to make about your paper, which I suppose cuts right to the heart of your position. So, I think that one thing that we haven’t discussed in the case of Manhattan (and many other artworks, funny or otherwise), is that there are significant changes over time to the social and cultural mores in which the artwork is made and received. And these seem completely relevant to whether an artwork, such as a film, is found funny or no longer found funny. Further to this, changes of the social mores might affect whether an artwork such as a film is or is not funny, and they might do this because such mores influence what the artwork is itself.

The reason I say this is part of a broader point, which I will put in a deliberately general way. In typical Western philosophies, theorists think in quite atomistic ways, both when they are thinking about ontology and about other matters, such as ethics. So in this way they – we – typically isolate an artwork such as a film and we talk about the beginning, the middle, and the end of the film, its direction, its scenes, its dialogue, and whatever else. We then say, ‘This is the artwork.’ And so when we have a case, such as Manhattan, where people have different views and reactions to it, we frame our question as ‘Has the artwork changed or not?’, with a particular, narrow view of what the artwork is. But in some non-Western philosophies and ontologies, they take a different view of what an artwork is. They think of ontology in a far more relational manner. So, they might include, or be more inclined to include, the reactions that people have to it and the social mores in which the artwork is created, say. Having been schooled in a particular philosophical tradition, they might say that the understanding (or understandings) that we bring to the moving pictures and sound, to the characters and dialogue, is itself part of the artwork. Similarly, the cultural norms and theoretical fashions (and the like) of the day are part of the artwork.

So, your favoured interpretation of the example of Frank Kelly and Father Ted is something that could be challenged. Perhaps our initial reaction to Father Ted is part of the artwork, and then when we learn something new about Kelly and react in a different way, then the artwork has changed, at least in principle. Ditto, roughly, for Manhattan and Woody Allen. Here both our reactions have changed but also, crucially, the social mores that helped to create Manhattan have changed. Perhaps the artwork has changed. Perhaps it has got less funny, not just that it is found to be less funny.

(One small note: I always felt slightly queasy about Allen and Manhattan. Similarly, Annie Hall. Much of his work at the time seemed to be normalizing the sort of sexual and romantic behaviour that we are pointing to, and I had major moral concerns about it even when I first watched these films.)

JD: Okay, good. So, I think I want to say this. I think that a work's meaning does have something to do with human reaction. Echoing McDowell on aesthetic value, we can't come up with a conception of artistic meaning that is detached from the idea of an artwork's seeming to have it. Here, again, I refer us back to the secondary quality and response-dependence literature of the 1980s and 1990s. On this sort of view, adapted for judgement about complex objects such as artworks, the meaning of a work comes down to how a certain normal or ideal or reasonable human viewer would react and think about the work. That is compatible, of course, with any individual or with many people coming to find meaning in the work that they had previously missed, going wrong about it, and so on. This is in contrast to the position you have just voiced, Julian B. That position seems to be more relational, or relational in an additional way. It seems to view the artwork as in part constituted by social and cultural norms and fashions, rather than being separate from them and part of the understanding of how that (separate) artwork was created, and the artwork is also perhaps constituted by actual, everyday human reactions. I want to hold to the idea of the work being outside of such relations and how they change. The changes to our reactions and norms seem to me to be separate events or processes: they of course help to change our reaction to the artwork, but I worry about whether changes of this sort change the artwork itself.

I want to leave room for loads of cases where people have views about an artwork or a comedian and their reactions and the social mores might explain why they do or do not find them funny, but these are not changing the artworks or the jokes themselves. All sorts of examples come to mind. Here is one repeated from my paper. Perhaps I find Michael MacIntyre excruciatingly corny and unfunny, but that is because he reminds me of a work colleague I don't get on with. Perhaps I do or don't find Manhattan funny, but this is because of some prior issues in my personal life or moral attitudes. Perhaps it is because I do or don't like Woody Allen. All of these can exist, of course. I am just sceptical as to whether these or some of these will change the artwork itself or, at least, I am sceptical as to whether it will be an easy philosophical story to carry through.

JB: Okay, but I am still trying to pin down what is required to say or not say that there is a change in the film itself. After all, you have just said you are sceptical, not that you have ruled that out completely. You have opened the door to the idea that what makes a film the film it is (or what makes an artwork the artwork it is) can be something (a little) beyond the manifest image. It is then easier to make sense of the idea that there has been a change in the film itself if you include some of the things I have said. This is particularly true because we are talking about an artwork and its meaning, not just its (normally) perceptual properties. So, I want to suggest that the film gets it meaning in part from the social mores and fashions of the day. When these change, the film's meaning can change. Similarly, perhaps the author of the film – its director or writer-director – imbues the film with a certain meaning in part because of their life and perspective. We then find out something about the writer-director that previously was not known. Or perhaps they do something in their life after the film that is in keeping with both the film and their perspective. This changes the nature of the film and its meaning, surely? All of this seems to offer more sensible paths to understanding a film, both ordinary ways of understanding and criticizing a film and philosophical ways of understanding films and other artworks.

JD: Yes, although this obliges you to do some philosophical heavy-lifting. You'll then have to make out what the significant relations are, what the significant social norms and mores are, and what the significant reactions are. Otherwise, a film or artwork will have all sorts of reactions and social fashions they are swimming in and you won't be able to get a handle on what a film (in fact) is. There is the possibility and actuality of many things changing over time, or new knowledge emerging, and we won't know what an artwork is. We have to allow room for error: some people have a view of an artwork that is wrong because they haven't appreciated its meaning. Similarly, an artwork will have little if anything to do with the social mores and norms of the time, so tying the two together would be a mistake; such social mores won't help us to understand the work at all and it would be a mistake to see them as tied. But how and why do some reactions and fashions make a difference to the artwork being what it is and how and why are others irrelevant? That is a very hard question to answer, but it is an essential and very large question (or set of questions) to answer convincingly. I prefer to think of and define the artwork independently of any actual and particular reaction or social norm. Of course, meaning for artworks comes, as I say, from humans in general and from the societies and cultures in which they are made. And a response-dependent account will make use of normal or idealized conditions and viewers. But the sort of relational account you are talking about, Julian B, strikes me as riven with substantial philosophical problems.

JB: Well, I can see that, but I don't think that that is an insurmountable problem. After all, the response-dependent accounts still have some similar work to do, to define what it is to be a normal or an idealised or a ‘whatever’ viewer. I just want to nudge us a bit further and take on board the idea that all artworks are culturally situated and (essentially) influenced. I wonder whether they ever have an essence independent of particular social and cultural mores. Acknowledging that and starting one's philosophical account with that in mind as central seems to me to be absolutely core, otherwise you go wrong at the start. And so, in this case, we can say coherently that Manhattan was funny and then stopped being funny, not that some people found it funny and then stopped, without us having to create an account of Manhattan being always funny or unfunny. (Of course, even on my account, we can say that Manhattan was never funny, just that some people found it to be so.)

I suppose I have a general point here: I think humour and comedy obviously involve culturally specific moods, emotions, or attitudes, and the artworks (and everyday events) that we find comical are obviously bound by and helped to be created by those cultural specific norms and reactions. So, I understand completely what you are saying, Julian D, but I just prefer to try to situate the artwork and its humour in a different philosophical space. The ontology could be relational or more relational than you make out.

SK: Okay, thanks for that both of you. So, just to summarise, Julian D isn't positing any sort of Kantian or Kantian-like noumenal object. You both agree that responses (at least) and perhaps cultural norms help to create film and its meaning. I suppose Julian B saying ‘… more relational …’ just now is the clue. Julian B wants to be more expansive in how the film and artwork is understood ontologically: more, perhaps many more, particular and actual reactions and social norms need to be included in what makes the film the film it is or the artwork it is, and in what makes aspects of the film what they are, including how funny a film is. In the case of Manhattan, Julian B wants to allow more readily for the artwork changing because of the changing social mores and reactions, whereas Julian D is more inclined to say that it is our reactions and social mores that tend to change, and that the film itself, together with its meaning, is (far) less subject to change. When our views of a film change, we can come to see the film for how it really is, or start to fail to appreciate the film for how it is, depending on the case.

One thing to be explicit about, I think, is this. Throughout your exchanges we have drifted to talk about the audience's reactions and the social mores of the time. Julian B, are you also wanting to say that Allen’s private life – or the relevant parts of his private life that influenced his writing, directing, and acting – are also part of the film? (There was a hint of this earlier.) So, when we discover things about Allen, we are discovering more about the film itself and not just of the person whose film it was?

JB: Yes, I am tempted to. In contrast, think about another example. Rolf Harris, a known child abuser, made a guest appearance on Kate Bush's Aerial album. We might wish he had not, but his immoral activity has nothing whatsoever to do with the theme of the album as a whole or his specific contribution. In contrast, Allen's thoughts and feelings that so many object to are expressed through his character and are a major theme of the film he directs, writes, and acts in. That seems to me to be a significant contrast: Allen's thoughts and feelings help to make the film it is and they affect how funny the film is. I also think that this case is distinct from the case of the racist comedian whose racism obviously and directly causes him to craft and tell racist jokes. I think Allen acting on his tendencies subsequent to the film is a significant event and I can see why some are inclined to think this changes the meaning of the film. (As I say, I was always worried about the film anyway, though.)

JD: So, I stand by everything I have said so far, but notice that I am not presupposing a completely conservative or rigid or narrow view in the ontology of art. In particular, I agree with you, Simon, that Allen’s thoughts and feelings pretty obviously gave the film the character it has. My point is just that we should hesitate before thinking that Allen’s behaviour, subsequent to Manhattan’s completion, can make the film less funny than it once was. We need to spend time working out what the philosophical story would be here, and it doesn't go through cleanly and quickly in my view.

SK: Okay, so here is the follow up and then a second thought. This just shows me how nuanced and subtle the discussion has got and how each case will have to be considered carefully. We are talking of the director or writer-director having a certain character and that character influencing the nature of the movie. (Julian B mentioned it a couple of moments ago.) To my mind this takes us back to our discussion of Julian D’s example of the racist comedian, as Julian B also mentioned. So how much we allow the artist's character to influence/create the film and be counted as part of the film is a key question here. Has the film changed its meaning when they do something in future or when we discover something about them, or was the film's meaning fixed all along and it is has just become clearer to us?

Now a second thought, a thought that repeats something from above, that I want to recapture just to give you a chance to end this part of our discussion, Julian D. In the case of Manhattan and other Allen films, whilst it is true that he is literally playing a character, he is also playing a version of himself. Allen does this across pretty much in all his films, in my view. And he isn't just in the film; he writes and directs it. It really is his film, and he plays a version of himself. I think that is significant when it comes to Manhattan and your starting question, Julian D. We find out something about Allen subsequent to the film's release and we see, obviously, that Allen has this attraction. We then go back to Manhattan and rewatch it. I don't know if the film has changed or not. (I am genuinely open to thinking about that.) But it isn't just any actor or any director we are finding something about that now taints the film. We are seeing the actor-writer-director who has played a version of themselves. (That seems true aside from any concern about Allen's sexual attractions. We could make that claim at the time of Manhattan’s release: Allen is playing a version of himself.) That means that Allen's real-world thoughts and feelings are infused into the nature of the film itself in a way that those of other actors or directors might not be, or might be far less.

So, I suppose this whole discussion has led me to this point: if we allow that the film is more than the manifest image and we allow something of these types of feature in to help influence what the film is, we might be thinking about the question on a case-by-case basis. If so, then I think we have a firm foundation for thinking that Allen's perspective influenced what the film itself was and its meaning and humour. That perspective also led him to do things that were morally dubious by some people's lights and affected not just their view of the humour of the film, but affected what the film was.

JD: Hmmm. Perhaps I should add that I think the idea of Allen playing a version of himself and the flaws of his character mirroring the flaws (as people see it) of the real-life Allen has a chance of being fertile ground. That is, there is a link between Allen’s character and Allen himself. So, when we find out about the real-life Allen or when the real-life Allen does something after the film that is in keeping with his general character and his fictional character, then I can see how one could then mount a case for the film’s meaning changing. (Julian B might be more positively inclined to the idea that the film has changed. I am a little more sceptical.) However, I do think, in addition, that the idea that Allen is playing a version of himself can be overplayed. I still think he is acting and he likes playing the same kind of character. How well that character corresponds to the real-life Allen is a moot question, perhaps.

SK: Well, perhaps. I think I need another go at this another time.

Let’s leave this discussion there, anyway. I don't think the two Julians will convince each other! Alex, why don't we think about how this relates to stand-up and, I suspect, the idea of comedians or comic actors playing versions of themselves.

JD: Just to say, before we start on this topic, I also worry about how much weight we put on the idea of comedians playing versions of themselves. It might be that Allen just has a very limited range as an actor.

AF: I like that! Perhaps I'll use it in future.’“I am a character comic. I just have a very limited range!’

There are some interesting cases in the world of stand-up very similar to the Allen case, and perhaps stand-up is interestingly different. I suspect Simon has the same case in mind as the one I have been thinking of. It's the recent case of Louis CK.

Here are the basic facts. (You can look up more details online.) Louis CK is an incredibly successful comedian, both artistically and financially. Hugely popular. Or, at least he was, and with certain people still is. Around 2015 rumours started appearing in public about his sexual impropriety and how he treated particular women. He admitted the allegations in 2017. Some of his stand-up up until that point had focused on relationships, including sex. In fact, he covered quite a lot of very controversial topics in his work. After a period of time he came back to stand-up – which some comedians supported and which others did not – and carried on talking about many controversial topics.

This seems to me to be a case where we have the form of stand-up - a theatrical form where the comedian is more or less performing versions of themselves – and the content of stand-up, with a certain sort of material. Louis CK did many bad things that reflected some of his material and which was in keeping with his act and persona. We learn something about Louis CK’s act, or we have a deeper understanding of the act, when we learn something about what Louis CK was like in private. In my view it is impossible to view those earlier routines or listen to his recordings without thinking about the sexual misconduct. There are some comedians who say to me that they now can't watch some of his earlier material because of what happened. Even if he was funny, some of his earlier material was a ‘difficult watch’. For some people, watching his earlier routines and present routines are simply not funny and an ‘impossible watch’.

In my view, the Louis CK who was/is on stage and the Louis CK who committed sexual misconduct are very, very close, both as a performer-writer and literally – sometimes the green room where some of his actions took place would be just a few yards (or metres) from the stage.

SK: Just to say, I think this is a really interesting case that is probably different in degree from the Allen case or at least one can argue about the difference. I made out the case that Allen is the actor-writer-director and so even though it seems that Manhattan is his film, he is still playing a character. One could argue – although I'm not so sure – that there is still some distinction here, between Allen and his character. But in the case of stand-up (bar character comedians) and particularly in the case of Louis CK, I think it is far less plausible to claim some difference between the artist and the character. So, sure, stand-ups will adopt some on-stage persona. But it is normally a version of themselves or an extension of themselves. And they write the material as well. It is all in their voice, both literally and figuratively. And as Alex says, we have such a match between some of Louis CK’s material and what he did in his private life, often to fellow professional female comedians, close to the stage or in the hotel before or after gigs.

JD: So, I love stand-up. I suppose I haven't thought enough about the artform itself to be confident of a clear answer here. Given how the discussion is going, one might say something such as this: the less an artist is playing a part in producing the art, the more their character flaws are part of the art produced. But I am putting it forward only as an interesting claim to be considered. I'm not sure if I would sign up to it. Also, as a quick comment on what you have just said, Simon, perhaps the stage is a confounder here. Perhaps it makes a stand-up comedian's performance more akin to playing a role than it may first appear.

AF: For me a good contrast case here is the character of the Pub Landlord, which helps to introduce a different point. Al Murray's landlord character is quite different from Al Murray: he is boorish, right-wing and so on. Some people in the audience understand the joke, but some don't and genuinely and naturally have some of the attitudes that Al Murray is sending up. In the case of non-character stand-up, however, the audience really will see the person on stage as being (really) Louis CK or Chris Rock or Ricky Gervais or Josie Long. Even if they might appreciate there is a difference being on stage and off stage, the audience really is seeing these people and knows who they are.

JD: Hmmm. Okay. So, it might be the case that that is how some in the audience see them, but I still think that they might be playing roles more than we (or some people) might initially think.

SK: Well, I think there is something to that, Alex. For me it is the same as the different parts of one's character that might be on show variously at home, or at work, or with certain members of one's extended family. They are all me, even if they are slightly different versions of me. And when I joke in different places, it really is ‘me’ making a joke and being funny or unfunny.

So, when a comedian cracks a joke and is funny, we can say truthfully that X made a joke and X is being funny. When we find out that X has done something in their private life that is linked to the joke and we take a dim view of the action, I think we can say straightforwardly (as a matter of description) that we find the joke less funny. I think we can also legitimately and credibly say – depending on the details of the case and the link between the comedian's actions and the joke – that the joke is less funny. I am inclined to say that I think this very strongly because there is (a) such a link between the material and the comedian's own character and (b) there is little if any difference between the comedian on stage and the comedian off stage. It is a type of hypocrisy, perhaps. I say and joke about X whilst on stage, making fun of it, making light of it, putting it in a positive or negative light but still using it as a source of jokes. It turns out I do X-actions off stage and X-actions are morally bad or dubious. I am making light of X! And the two ‘I's here are (pretty much) identical.

We get something like this in the case of Manhattan too, perhaps, but less so in other cases because the link isn't as strong between both the artwork and the artist's (moral) activity and perhaps because we are less sure about the link between the character/artwork and the actor/writer/comedian. We then get all the way to Julian D's understanding of the case of Hitler and his landscapes: true, Hitler did paint the landscapes and his perspective might have influenced them, but there is little to no connection between Hitler's subsequent actions and the art.

AF: Can I take us back to Manhattan and think about one aspect we haven't mentioned yet but which might also be present in stand-up, or at least in the case of Louis CK and others. It's the idea of ‘normalization’. Some people say that Allen normalizes certain sorts of relationships in Manhattan and other films. (There was mention of this earlier.) We see a character we are supposed to invest in doing certain things and having certain relationships. Similarly, a comedian such as Louis CK has a certain sort of presence on stage and a certain reputation. Both before and after he still has quite a following and, perhaps, he has normalised certain attitudes towards sex and other people.

JD: Interesting suggestion. I understand what you mean, but I think that Manhattan no more normalizes this morally dubious relationship than Lolita does. (I note the age differences as well in the two artworks.) Properly understood, Manhattan is a more complex film than it first appears, as I hoped I brought out in the paper. What the film does is let us into the mindset of a middle-aged man exploiting a teenage girl, and I think there are certain clues in the film that tell us that this mindset is not a good one, some of which I mention in the paper.

SK: Yes, so I liked that in your paper, Julian D. There is a possible criticism of Allen in the offing, though, something that might be described as ‘a bit meta’. Again, Allen is the writer-director-actor. So perhaps he puts these features into the film to throw us off the scent! Perhaps he is so cynical and perhaps so manipulative that he has these tricks in mind as a way of protecting himself. And, frankly, some people who have all sorts of sexual and romantic attractions to others, attractions that others might consider to be morally dubious or weird, might do something like this. They might sow seeds in conversations with friends or present a version of themselves to others to disguise their true intentions. They might deceive, gaslight, and do similar things.

JD: Sure. Well, that would make some people's view of the film very complex and if true we would then think very badly of Allen. Again, I am not sure what it would say about the film itself. I am very tempted to say that artistic meaning is not determined by an artist's intentions (although that's a very long and complicated story). So, again, I am sceptical that this would affect the film's meaning. It would just mean we take a complex stance towards Allen himself.

JB: Just a quick point about Manhattan again and this idea of normalization: I think the film does make something morally dubious seem less abhorrent. In contrast, there is The Woodsman starring Kevin Bacon as a convicted child molester. The film takes us into his mind, but you never for one moment sympathize with that attitude. It isn't normalised.

JD: Okay. So, as well as the philosophy I guess we disagree about the film, Julian B! In my view, it doesn't normalize sexual relationships between middle-aged men and teenage girls; rather, by largely presenting such a relationship from the perspective of the middle-aged man, and holding back from moralising, it presents us with such a mindset and, in so doing, perhaps helps us to better understand a deeply troubling phenomenon.

SK: Can I introduce one last topic, please? There is something we have skirted round, I think. We have discussed which things have an influence on the artwork being what it is and we have mentioned the idea of the artist and the character (or similar) being close to each other, and in stand-up they seem virtually identical. What about the issue of an artwork's meaning, be it the meaning of a film or stand-up material? Specifically, what about funniness and humour? Is there something special here about funniness? Does everything we have been saying about the nature of an artwork and its meaning, and the nature of character and performer, go through no matter what the artistic-cum-entertainment meaning is of the artwork? Or does funniness need different treatment? In particular, is there something special about something being morally dubious and whether it retains its humour?

To give a little more detail, comedy can be outright funny with lots of laughs, but it can also be wry, dark, bitingly satirical, and so forth. The character of the comedy and the ‘funniness’ might come in different forms. That itself might affect what we say here about artwork and meaning change. Perhaps what we find out about the artist is something dark. That might be in tension with some romantic comedy, but not in tension with some artwork that is bleakly comic.

AF: I think there is some difference between comedy and other artforms in this regard, but I am struggling to nail exactly what it could be. I suppose that even in the case of black and bleak comedy, Simon, comedy has a positive core: there is either out-and-out funniness, as you say, or there is some attempt to (positively) shake one's fists at the gods or find something to hold on to, as with gallows humour. It is often the opposite of some emotions, ideas and moods found in other artworks, such as pity or outright despair. Of course, an artwork can mix these with comedy, but the comedy will still have some positive aspect to it, I think.

But … hmmmm … having spelled it out, perhaps having some positive core to comedy doesn't make it unique. (Perhaps romance can come in different forms, but it might also have a positive core.) However, it does make it distinct from other artforms and aspects of artforms.

Incidentally, I do like the idea, Simon, that comedy is broader than funniness. I might use that line, too.’“I am a comedian. I'm just not one of those funny ones you are used to!’

JB: In a similar vein, I don’t think that this marks comedy as unique, but stand-up can often be intimate, even big shows with big audiences. The comedian is speaking to you, both as an audience and you as an individual member, and they are taking you into their world, through jokes, set-ups and whatever else. And getting you to laugh or appreciate at the same time, in the moment, can be quite an intimate experience. Other parts of theatre are like that, and perhaps some sorts of literature, but it is quite distinctive about stand-up. In one of our other discussions, Graeme A. Forbes talked of stand-up being an ephemeral artform, since recordings don't quite do it justice.

If this or something like it is on the right lines, then we might say this. You feel antagonistic to someone or hostile. But if they are funny, really funny, then that feeling will go. There is a kind of intimacy there. You can't be completely negative towards people you find funny, I think. There has to be some admiration and some intimacy between the audience and the performer. And that gets us back to the main topic: what if we find out that there really was a good reason to be hostile to someone when we find that they did something bad. We now find them less funny, for sure. But perhaps the artwork or their material has itself changed.

JD: Yes, nice. Ted Cohen's book on jokes says that the purpose of jokes is to create and enhance intimacy (Cohen, Reference Cohen1999).

SK: So, I think these are nice thoughts to have about humour and comedy. But I do still wonder if there is anything unique or even distinctive here about humour and comedy. Think about the contrast case introduced briefly, that of romance in artworks. Romance can come in all sorts of forms: completely lovey-dovey, light, doomed, desperate, bleak, and so on. Yet it might have something positive at its core, some way of viewing the world that says, ‘despite everything, we can hang on and go for love’, or ‘life is worth living if you are in the world’, or whatever. Imagine, some actor or writer who is famed for their romances. Then imagine they do something awful in their private lives, perhaps an Allen-style sexual relationship or perhaps they are a serial abuser of their partners. This doesn't seem to me to be any different from what we have said about comedy. Even many romantic artworks or the romance of them can be ephemeral.

JD: So, I understand what Alex and Julian B have said, and that is important to bear in mind when appreciating comedy. But, I'm inclined to think that there's not anything special in this regard about comedy. For example, you get the same reaction and debate about Picasso and his treatment of women as you do with Allen.

AF: I can see that, but I still think that there might be something special about comedy. Perhaps it is something about the prime laughter response. It is so obviously positive that any bad things the artist does seem to be in obvious tension with it. It operates as a special sort of speech act: perhaps as something to invite an agreement response in the audience and/or as a way of signalling that everything is okay or great. Go against that and you are in trouble. That is what can make comedy a risky art category. But, then again, the same can be said for romance: the prime response is also obviously a positive one. Comedy can lift the spirits and show us the absurd, but then so can other artforms, such as things that are romantic. Hmmmm. Perhaps I want to make a special case for the two of them!

SK: Well, listen, I think we have covered a lot of ground there. We have attempted to get deeper into the puzzle that Julian D got us thinking about and working out what conditions might have to hold for the film to change its meaning. We've discussed whether this is just about artworks in general or whether stand-up performances, and comedians, are interestingly special. And then we had a brief discussion about whether funniness and humour are special cases of the meaning change with regard to the puzzle. Plus, more discussion of Manhattan. Thanks so much, Julian D, for your paper that gave us lots to chew over, and thanks to you, Alex and Julian B, for your thoughts.