Clifford Bob seeks to understand why some rebels receive more attention and support from the international community than others. Rather than arguing that some groups are inherently more deserving, Bob takes a novel and very insightful perspective on the international relations of contention by applying the dynamics of marketing. “Despite its promise, today's ‘global civil society’ is for many a Darwinian arena in which the successful prosper but the weak wither” (p. 8). His answer focuses on how well groups market themselves in a competitive realm where large numbers of movements are seeking support from nongovernmental organizations with limited resources. He focuses on this key inequality—that the rebels around the world need help from the NGOs far more than any NGO needs to support any one group of dissidents—insisting that it is a buyer's market.

To be clear, Bob is not suggesting that altruism and humanitarianism play no role, but that there are many groups deserving of attention. Therefore, the NGOs have to do triage—they have to make decisions before they invest much time and money about which groups should receive assistance. “In deciding whether to support an insurgent group, NGOs often attempt to evaluate both the group's predicament and the utility of adopting it” (p. 20). While the author's argument seems cynical, an examination of the decision making made by NGOs is necessary, and his interviews of NGO workers provide key insights. As a result, this book is part of a larger trend to consider NGOs and global civil society with less idealism (e.g., Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action, 2002).

Bob considers the various attributes groups might possess that would give them an advantage in this competitive marketplace, particularly organizational cohesion, good contacts, leadership, and, most surprisingly, good writing skills. The groups that do best in his case studies have, as leaders and spokespeople, individuals who are articulate and use humor effectively. A key necessary trait is flexibility, as groups must adapt and sell themselves to NGOs. Because all groups have multiple goals, grievances, and even identities, they have some room to define themselves in ways that are most appealing to NGOs. Thus, the title of the book is quite apt, as movements very much need to market themselves.

The author applies his approach to two cases: the Ogoni of Nigeria and the Zapatistas of Mexico. These cases serve him well as he also considers less successful movements in each state, juxtaposing the relative successes of certain movements against others, holding constant many potentially relevant variables. He gains insight and leverage, for instance, in comparing the Zapatistas to the Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR), which emerged at roughly the same time. The Zapatistas used violence at the outset, taking several cities to gain attention in Mexican and international media, but quickly changed tactics, focusing mostly on communiqués, interviews, and other forms of communication. Their wit played much better than the EPR's consistent use of violence. The Zapatista story is largely one of managing public attention and fostering it after their initial military foray. This contrasts rather interestingly with the Ogoni's efforts to attract NGO support, which preceded domestic mobilization.

In both cases, the groups found that certain appeals resonated further and more powerfully than others. The Ogoni, residing in an oil-rich part of Nigeria, were motivated more by complaints of resource distribution among minority ethnic groups, but ultimately framed their complaint as an environmental one. By criticizing Shell Oil's damaging oil drilling, the Ogoni appealed to environmental NGOs, leading to publicity by CNN, Time, and television documentaries. While the Zapatistas had a litany of complaints against the Mexican government, particularly its treatment of indigenous peoples, they found that the critique of NAFTA and globalization seemed to play better. Consequently, the focus moved toward these issues and away from indigenous rights.

Bob does an excellent job of defining his concepts, providing clear examples, and organizing his argument. The case studies are well researched, with good use of interviews, particularly with NGOs in the Nigerian case. He is also clear about the limitations of the project, as the ingredients for a successful appeal are many, and it is hard to tell which conditions might be necessary or sufficient. Still, this is not so problematic, as his book is more about the process by which groups seek support and by which NGOs make decisions about whom to support than a definitive test of which groups receive assistance.

One of the key questions, both in this book and for politicians on both sides of conflicts, is whether violence works. Bob tries hard to show that using violence is a turnoff—that the Zapatistas negotiated and communicated after an initial and “spectacular” use of force, while the EPR lost support through violence. The problem is that both the Zapatistas and Ogoni gained momentum after the conflict escalated. While the frame of Ogoni as environmental movement may have mattered, so did Nigerian repression. The author raises the point that reaching out for external support may frequently antagonize the host country—and this is exactly what happened in the Nigerian case. In Mexico, it was the use of force by the Zapatistas, holding several cities for a day or more, that gained attention. So it is not clear that violence does not work. Indeed, the quantitative literature on the international relations of ethnic conflict consistently shows a relationship between violence and external assistance, although it is unclear which way the arrow goes.

Bob makes an important contribution to several literatures, including contentious politics, civil war, and globalization, as well as ethnic conflict and its international relations. The Marketing of Rebellion is quite useful for both undergraduate and graduate courses in comparative politics and international relations. In sum, he provides significant insights into an overlooked but increasingly relevant aspect of civil war.