Gordon Corera has written a history of A. Q. Khan's proliferation activities over thirty-some years. The book struggles a bit inasmuch as Corera is not a scholar of nuclear proliferation or the region, but he is telling a story that is fairly complicated. Thus the text is not as analytical as an academic might hope, yet neither is it as readable as a layperson would desire. Still, the text has value as a summary from the Western perspective of Khan's activities.
The book is divided into two sections. Section 1 discusses Khan's proliferation “successes,” first in helping develop Pakistan's nuclear capability, and then later in proliferating those capabilities to Iran, North Korean, and Libya. Section 2 examines how the West became aware of Khan's network, then terminated Libya's nuclear weapons program, and at the same time attempted to roll up Khan's network.
Part 1 initially examines how Khan came to sell nuclear weapons to the likes of North Korea, Iran, and Libya. What emerges is the portrait of a man with grievances against India and the West. Khan was deeply affected by Pakistan's defeat and dismemberment in 1971. He was especially disturbed that Pakistan's allies, including the United States, offered no assistance. Khan had just finished his PhD and would soon begin working indirectly for URENCO, an international consortium that even today focuses on uranium enrichment. Khan used his security clearance to learn how to build centrifuges and put cascades together, and who supplied the parts for such activities. This last bit of information may appear mundane but it became essential to Khan's proliferation activities. Khan left the Netherlands and returned to Pakistan in December 1975, where he was soon given control of a lab, the Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL), later to be renamed Khan Research Laboratories (KRL). Inside Pakistan, ERL/KRL competed intensely with the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PEAC). This bureaucratic infighting would both help and hinder Khan later.
Through the 1970s Pakistan used every tool it had to acquire the elements necessary to its nuclear weapons program. Khan was one of Pakistan's most effective tools. While Western intelligence tried to limit Pakistan's access to nuclear technology, Khan drew on his scientific and commercial contacts across Europe. “There was no shortage of people queuing up to make money. Khan said … ‘Many suppliers approached us. … In the true sense of the word they begged us to purchase their goods. And for the first time the truth of the saying “they would sell their mother for money” dawned on me.’ We purchased whatever we required” (27). By 1979 the CIA concluded that Pakistan had almost everything necessary to make its own centrifuge plant. But proliferation concerns within intelligence agencies were shunted aside in favor of the opportunity to damage the Soviets after the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Broader strategic goals trumped nonproliferation goals. This ordering of interests would later have implications for the nonproliferation regime.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s Khan traded centrifuge enrichment technology to the Chinese for help with reactors, a weapons design, and possibly some level of enriched uranium or uranium hexafluoride (UF6). This was a pattern Khan would repeat successfully in the future (for example, with North Korea). Once a proliferator develops a particular skill, it can trade that skill with other proliferators in order to shore up its own program. The late 1980s and 1990 saw the end of the Cold War as well as repeated military crises between Pakistan and India. Both states engaged in nuclear brinkmanship, worrying officials in Washington. “President George H. W. Bush finally invoked the Pressler Amendment and cut off American aid, saying that he could no longer certify that Pakistan did not have the bomb. … In Pakistan the sanctions were seen somehow as another example of the fickle nature of US friendship rather than a product of their own actions over nuclear weapons” (55). America had waited too long to act, however.
Like many proliferators, Iran sought to develop uranium enrichment over plutonium separation because uranium enrichment is easier to hide. The Khan network met with the Iranians in Dubai (to become the center of his network) in 1987. The Iranians bought P-1 centrifuge designs as well as “technical data on how to cast uranium metal into hemispherical form—something vital in making the core of a bomb” (65). Even then it was therefore clear that Iran was searching for weapons-related technology. In 1989 the Ayatollah Khomeini died and the last vestiges of resistance to nuclear weapons among key Iranian decision makers disappeared (the “moderate” Ayatollah Rafsanjani was in power at this time). A second deal was struck in October 1994 whereby Iran would purchase “500 components for P-1 machines, as well as drawings for the more advanced P-2 centrifuge” (69). By 2000 Iran was constructing two enrichment facilities at Natanz, one of 50,000 centrifuges. Corera here first broaches the question of how much the Pakistani state knew about Khan's activities. He ultimately concludes that the answer to this question is situation specific. With regard to Iran, Corera believes “that Khan could have received tacit approval and support from a small number of senior individuals but he may have continued and deepened the relationship on his—or his network's—initiative” (73). Corera bases this conclusion on the observation that Pakistani and Iranian strategic interests diverged in the mid- to late 1990s and thus high-level support for such cooperation probably disappeared.
Iran is contrasted to North Korea where it appears there was strong support among Pakistan's leadership for nuclear dealings. At this time Pakistan was in need of a long-range missile with which to hold Indian cities at risk. North Korea, on the other hand, was seeking to expand its uranium enrichment capacity, and enrichment was Pakistan's strength. Hence it was natural for a trade to occur here, especially since both states lacked cash. There were also bureaucratic reasons for Khan to want the North Korean Nodong missile. His KRL had not developed a missile while PAEC had access to Chinese M-11s (as well as indigenous production). The M-11 knock-offs (the HATF II) lacked the range of the Nodong, however. Pakistan has since admitted that dozens of centrifuges were sent to North Korea, as well as facility designs and UF6. The question of state knowledge and involvement seems clearer here, according to Corera. Given the strategic implications and the fact that the Nodongs were delivered to Pakistan's military, it is hard to imagine that high-level military officials were unaware of the deals. Corera thus demonstrates that there were probably differing levels of state involvement in different deals, but does not explore this in any systematic way. The book would have been academically stronger had Corera structured the book around a few key questions, and focused analysis on those questions. Corera also notes the importance of procurement intelligence at this point. This is a key open-source intelligence resource used both by governments and by private groups such as David Albright's ISIS in Washington, DC. A more academic argument could have traced the use of procurement intelligence throughout Khan's network or indeed as an antiproliferation tool.
Khan's interactions with Libya began in 1995. In 1997 the first centrifuges arrived in Libya. But the Libyans were incapable of producing centrifuges on their own and instead asked for a turnkey enrichment facility, which the Khan network agreed to supply. This represented a massive expansion of the network's capabilities and potential. Khan provided everything the Libyans asked for and more. In addition to centrifuges, the Khan network provided 1.7 tons of UF6 so Libya could test its cascades. Twenty more tons were promised for later delivery. In late 2001 or early 2002 a bomb design was delivered. Corera argues there was probably less Pakistan government involvement in Libya than in either Iran or North Korea. Rather, he argues the Libyan deal was the culmination of Khan's move into the private sector. Again, this discussion of the role of state and nonstate actors in nuclear proliferation could have been the central theme of a more scholarly approach to this subject.
The second part of the book focuses on the downfall of Khan's network. Corera argues that Western intelligence began tracking Khan more seriously because of his travel habits. Almost certainly it was more than travel habits that fanned Western interest. In fact, Corera implicitly acknowledges this when he notes that procurement patterns were beginning to alert Western intelligence in the late 1990s. One suspects there were additional alerts. At all events, by the late 1990s the United States was pressuring Pakistan to rein Khan in. But the United States had cut aid to Pakistan and no longer had the leverage it once had. Moreover, the United States was unwilling to risk intelligence assets in order to make the case most forcefully to Pakistan. On top of this, it is unclear that Pakistan's leadership could control Khan who had his own powerbase, was adroitly playing one sector of government off against others, and was a national hero. Nevertheless the United States continued to apply steady pressure. Finally, in 2000 Musharraf moved to weaken Khan by separating him from KRL and forcing him into semiretirement. September 11 complicated things because counterterrorism and cooperation with Pakistan became paramount goals. But unlike the 1980s when other strategic interests supplanted nonproliferation, in the twenty-first century the linkage between proliferation and terrorism was acknowledged by policymakers. Consequently Khan remained an important issue. By 2003 the United States and Britain agreed that they had to move against Khan, but they wanted to do so in a fashion that also allowed them to roll up as much of Khan's network as possible. Libya provided the optimal opportunity.
In March 2003 Gadaffi met with British intelligence agents and indicated a willingness to end his nuclear program. Protracted negotiations followed, with Libya often promising one thing but remaining uncooperative and refusing site visits. But in September 2003 the ship BBC China was intercepted carrying thousands of centrifuge components to Libya. An October 2003 site visit was arranged, yet Libya remained recalcitrant. At the end of a second site visit in December 2003, however, Libya turned over a stack of documents that included a nuclear weapons design. Thereafter, on 19 December 2003, Gadaffi made a televised speech confirming the deal to give up his nuclear weapons program. The West now had indisputable evidence with which to confront Pakistan. On 31 January 2004 Khan was placed under house arrest. Soon thereafter he confessed on television in return for a pardon.
The United States and Britain knew they had only a short time to move on the network once Libya agreed to disarm. Libya was central because it allowed the West to claim information came from Libya and not sources within the network. “There was no need to protect any intelligence source or method since the Libyans had voluntarily handed over so much information about who had supplied them” (224). Beginning in the spring the United States eliminated parts of the network in a wide variety of locales including Malaysia, Turkey, South Africa, all over Europe, and so forth.
Corera considers key questions arising out of the roll-up, including Iran, the “fourth customer,” and Libya's UF6. Iran may have received a bomb design from Khan, and almost certainly received P-2 centrifuges. Corera considers that the P-2s went into a secret military “second line” enrichment program (232–33). There has been information from 2008 forward that Iran is attempting to install the P-2s at Natanz, but that would not necessarily preclude a second line. Regarding the fourth customer of Khan, Corera considers Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt. Given that the book had a second printing in 2009 and was allegedly brought up to date at this time, it is puzzling that the Israeli raid on Syria's nuclear program in 2007 is not mentioned. Finally, Libya received 1.7 tons of UF6, but no one is sure where it came from. Likely sources are Pakistan or North Korea.
The epilogue of the book speculates on a number of unresolved issues. The source of the Libyan uranium hexafluoride is one open question. The long-term impact of releasing the technical designs of the centrifuges (not to mention the bomb) are also of concern. Much like the proverbial genie that was released in 1945, no one is going to put these designs back into the bottle. When combined with other technical diffusion, nuclear proliferation is far easier today than it was even in 1990. Moreover, North Korea continues to need cash and has shown no compunctions about selling anything. Iran too could become a proliferator and, unfortunately, has an ideological axe to grind. This leads to the possibility of nonstate actors gaining access to nuclear technology. Though Corera does not discuss it, Iran is fundamentally a revolutionary actor and is thus more willing to risk upsetting the regional and international systems. Others have noted, and Corera agrees, that elements of the Khan network remain in place and that perhaps entirely different networks exist. Khan showed proliferators how to share among themselves. We can expect North Korea and others to duplicate this method. As the number of nuclear actors increases, the nodes for sharing increase as well. Corera also notes the possibility of a Khan-like figure emerging from a biological program. This is on some level scarier than Khan because of the devastation that could be caused by a really nasty bug.
Another key question for Corera is “whether regime change is more important than preventing the development of weapons of mass destruction” (248). This is a central theme of his book. And yet, it strikes me that this question is no longer applicable. The answer for potential proliferating states, in view of the invasion of Iraq, the Arab Spring, and support for revolution against the regime in Libya, is that Western security guarantees are unreliable and nuclear weapons are indeed the only answer. “Gadaffi himself has said Libya did not receive enough in terms of security guarantees and civilian technology” (223–24). Yet at the same time, North Korea has not been invaded in part because it has nuclear weapons. Neither will Iran be attacked once it develops nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons work to deter aggression, whether from the Soviet Union during the Cold War or the United States in the post–Cold War world. Security guarantees are far less reliable, as the world's “rogue states” have discovered. Gadaffi attempted such an agreement and in his view was betrayed. This betrayal has implications for nonproliferation efforts in the future. To wit, in the wake of Iraq and certainly the Arab Spring, the United States lost its opportunity to negotiate nuclear programs away by providing security guarantees.
One final question concerns the impact of the current wave of secondary proliferation on further (or “tertiary”) proliferation. Corera and other analysts have been less than accurate on the likelihood of tertiary proliferation. Corera strongly implies that a North Korean test would lead to tertiary proliferation in Asia. “A North Korean bomb, confirmed by a test, for instance, would send shock waves across Asia. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would be forced to reassess their current position on nuclear weapons, and all have the technical capability to move forward” (250). Of course North Korea did test on 25 May 2010. Yet the implied tertiary proliferation has not occurred. US security assurances (based on long-standing relations with each of these states) held. So the conclusion seems to be that among Western-oriented states the incentives for proliferation do not increase markedly even when potentially aggressive dictatorships proliferate. Democratic states do not need to proliferate because they can rely on the United States. But dictatorships themselves have every reason to proliferate in view of the United States' continuing willingness to attempt to overthrow these regimes. One might therefore expect tertiary proliferation to occur in the Middle East if Iran tests because its neighboring states are undemocratic and do not feel they can rely on the United States in the same way the democratic states of Asia can. The Arab Spring, including both the US abandonment of longtime allies such as Egypt and support for Libyan rebels, bolsters this conclusion for local leaders.
Beyond the speculative analysis, Corera emphasizes a number of themes through his book. One is the willingness of Western businesses to sell dual-use technology to proliferators. This approach is endemic not just among businessmen but also scientists. It seems inherent in capitalism. Therefore we should expect private citizens from America, Europe, Russia, and Asia to supply technology and know-how to current and future proliferators.
A similar clash of interests sometimes occurs among US strategic goals. While nonproliferation goals rank higher today than they did in the 1970s or 1980s, these interests can still be trumped by more immediate or overarching strategic interests. As Pakistan's support against the Soviet Union resulted in the deprioritization of nonproliferation interests in the 1980s, so too could nonproliferation interests be subsumed in exchange for cooperation elsewhere. Even today we see the nonproliferation regime taking a back seat to friendly relations with India, both for economic reasons and because a friendly India is seen as complicating China's strategic calculus.
Another theme present throughout the book is that understanding Khan's autonomy is in some sense dependent upon which episode one is examining. The question is therefore not whether Khan was acting autonomously, but rather to what extent Khan was acting autonomously in a given case of proliferation. In the North Korea example, Khan was likely acting on behalf of Pakistan, or at the very least very high elements within Pakistan's military. But in Libya Khan may well have been on his own, beyond whatever bribes were necessary to Pakistanis.
A final theme for Corera is the impending breakdown of the nonproliferation regime. Khan merely took advantage of a natural process that was well under way (the dissolution of this regime). If the regime were healthy, Khan would have been caught and stopped early on (e.g., in 1970s Europe). But the philosophical inconsistencies within the regime, the democratization of technology in the increasingly globalized world, and the difficulty of limiting economic actors in a global free market all combined to undermine the nonproliferation regime. If not Khan, it would have been someone else. Ultimately, the problem is and was the regime, not the individual who manipulated the regime.
The book has strengths in the areas of Khan's network, country-specific episodes of proliferation, research from Western sources, the demonstration of certain political science concepts, explaining the weaknesses of the nonproliferation regime, and implications for certain approaches to nonproliferation policy. Khan's network is painstakingly set forth (though diagrams would have helped). The book does a good job of explaining proliferation in North Korea, Iran, and Libya, from a Western perspective. Not only are the major events explained, but detail has been gleaned from open sources and interviews with Western specialists and nonproliferation players. The author interviewed Richard Kerr (the former director of intelligence at CIA), Gary Schroen (former CIA station chief in Islamabad), and former Congressman Stephen Solarz, among many others. The author has examined IAEA publications and heavily invested in Western newspapers. Chapter 2, in particular, illustrates how conflicted US policy failed to prevent Pakistan from going nuclear. This story might be best assigned in conjunction with the popular account Charlie Wilson's War. These two views on the same episode show how clashing yet rational policy preferences can exist within the same state. After reading these two selections students will always understand less than optimal foreign policy outcomes. Chapter 2 also demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of the bureaucratic-politics and rational-actor models. More broadly the book explains clearly the weaknesses with the current antiquated nonproliferation regime, from its Atoms for Peace beginning, through Pakistan's acquisition of the weapons, to Iran's impending acquisition. Though the book is less explicit about implications for nonproliferation policy, the reader can draw conclusions. These implications include the importance of moving early and decisively against potential proliferators. There is little doubt that proliferators reach a point beyond which they cannot be stopped. It is likely that Iran is past this point, as Pakistan was in the early 1980s. Finally, the book provides a nice final chapter of informed (if dated) speculation about Iran's program.
The book has weaknesses as well. One small yet significant problem is that this edition of the book was published in 2009, yet too often the book has not been updated past 2006 (its original publication date). For example, the September 2007 Israeli attack on a Syrian nuclear reactor is not mentioned, even though this is relevant to the question of the “fourth customer.” Similarly Khan was released from house arrest in February 2009, yet this is not mentioned. The book is dated, but this cannot be avoided. The letter to Khan from North Korea Workers' Party Secretary Jon Byong Ho would be a good source to review along with the book. Siegfried Hecker's November 2010 visit to North Korea also bears discussion in any use of the book. Perhaps the book's greatest weakness is that it relies almost entirely on Western sources. While it may be impossible to interview Khan, other Pakistanis have shown a remarkable willingness to grant interviews in order to tell their story. It is not unreasonable to think General Beg or Musharraf would consent to be interviewed. Certainly other actors could be located. The author would also do well to read Pakistan's vibrant English-language dailies and possibly translate the occasional Urdu language story or website. Given the number of Westerners interviewed, it is inexcusable not to seek Pakistani and Libyan sources. This smacks of unfinished scholarship, as does the next problem. The author occasionally makes notable claims without sufficient substantiation. For example, Corera speaks of additional pay for KRL employees (42), without citation. He remarks on spies inside Khan's network yet provides only the broadest citation (www.wmd.gov) and upon tracking the document down I found it far too large to locate the specific reference. He notes the claim by a “few US hawks … that the only way to stop proliferation is to make the consequences more like those for being involved in terrorism—a life-risking venture for those involved, whether businessmen or scientists” (228) but provides no citation to this rather significant departure from policy and law—not withstanding the undeclared war in Iran.
Corera is really telling a story rather than making an argument. Because of this, he does not always follow his thinking to its logical conclusion. Still, the book leaves one considering a failing nonproliferation regime and implies certain lessons. The most significant lesson is not for the West but is instead for proliferating states. These states, states that by definition reject some of the primary norms of the international system, have learned that they should never give up their nuclear weapons programs. Security assurances provided by the West have proven unreliable and economic rewards have been far less than expected. Thus no matter what North Korea says, we should not expect it to relinquish nuclear weapons. Similarly, Iran will not stop in its quest until it acquires the weapons. Iran can be expected to make any sacrifice necessary to obtain the weapons because once obtained these weapons are perceived to guarantee regime survival. Moreover, once Iran acquires nuclear weapons we should expect a number of other nondemocratic states (or even democratic states that have interests opposed to those of the United States) to seek the weapons. Regional states unfriendly to Iran may not trust US assurances and thus may seek nuclear capability. States (and possibly nonstate actors) friendly to Iran will also seek to proliferate from Iran, as Iran did from Pakistan. Time is on their side; notions of justice and nondiscrimination are on their side; and the free market economic system is on their side. A new approach is necessary and any delay by policymakers is negligent if not wanton and willful misconduct.
