The tumultuous journey of health reform from President Barack Obama's opening push in February 2009 to his bill signing in March 2010 may be inexplicable from afar. Swept into power on promises of change, Democrats controlled the White House and enjoyed the largest Congressional majorities in decades, and they agreed that the existing health care system cost too much and delivered too little—stranding over 30 million with no health insurance and leaving millions more with only inadequate coverage or dependent on emergency rooms for urgent care. Unified party control and programmatic agreement would seem like a veritable checklist of what was needed to pass health reform legislation.
Yet, America's political system produced a mind-boggling set of moats, trap doors, and curses that made the passage of health reform long, tortuous, and precariously close to failure on more than one occasion. Both profound and seemingly silly divisions not only polarized the political parties but also split Democrats, compromising the institutional power of unified government and making nearly every major vote a do-or-die situation. Obama's promise to change the way Washington works fell prey to politically necessary but unseemly deals both with stakeholders, in exchange for not unleashing their considerable firepower, and with Democrats, who held out until the bill was larded up with backroom bargains that became known as the “Cornhusker Kickback” and other salacious names. Obama entered the fray as a transformational leader and left it—according to some early supporters—as a feeble and ineffectual leader.
While the process that produced the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act may be baffling from a distance, its dynamics and results both revealed longstanding features of American politics and produced striking departures from the normal dynamics of American political development. Generations of political scientists pointed to America's political and institutional predisposition toward “deadlock and delay” (Burns Reference Burns1963), but yet, the Affordable Care Act enacted the largest change in social welfare policy since the Great Society and perhaps the New Deal, impacting one-seventh of the country's gross domestic product and restructuring the business models of some of the country's largest industries. The American economy has generated and government policy accepted a swift widening of economic inequality since the 1970s, as income has stagnated in the bottom 80% of households while rising rapidly among the wealthiest 10%, or, even more strikingly, the top 1% of families. The Affordable Care Act departs from this pattern, extending insurance coverage to over 30 million people and providing hundreds of billions of dollars of subsidies to low- and middle-income families, while primarily being paid by the most affluent families and prosperous medical providers and manufacturers (Jacobs and Skocpol Reference Jacobs and Skocpol2010). (Medicare's higher taxes on earnings and its new taxes on capital gains raise most of the new revenue; they are paid by the wealthiest 3% of American households.) Most Americans are unaware of this extraordinary distributional shift; only 29% of Americans believe that they and their families are better off under the Act, according to a May 2010 Kaiser Family Foundation poll.Footnote 1 (Thirty percent believe that they will be worse off, 32% do not think it will make much difference, and 8% are unsure.)
The confusion about and misunderstanding of the Affordable Care Act is both a deliberate political effect of the strident opposition against health reform and a pattern of great political import for the future, as stakeholders and determined reform opponents gear up to use the implementation phase to gut or rewrite health reform. Understanding the puzzling, even enraging, travails of health reform is a key step in demystifying its passage and assessing its impacts. I review five components of the health reform process that have been generated by well-known—if frustrating—dynamics of contemporary American politics.
INSTITUTIONS MATTER
As Obama, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, and other political behemoths strode back and forth across the national stage, it was easy to lose sight of the institutional floor boards undergirding the stage on which they performed. The combination of unified party control of the legislative and executive branches and the largest congressional majorities in decades made comprehensive national health reform politically possible, if not guaranteed. This structural reality set the parameters of what was feasible. Although Obama's personal temperament and expressive skills dominated press coverage and indeed played a role in the journey of health care legislation, they were not the foremost driver of reform.
Beyond setting the parameters of legislative action, the institutional rules and procedures of Congress impacted the particular form and timing of health reform. While the House allows the majority significant leeway to dictate what is voted on and under what rules, the Senate imposes more significant barriers. The now-common opposition tactic of calling for a filibuster requires a supermajority of 60 votes to move legislation. This constraint required Reid to secure the votes of all 58 Democrats and two independents, setting the stage for several nail-biting votes in the days leading up to the dramatic Christmas Eve passage of health reform. It also empowered each senator to bargain for the inclusion of his or her dream deal in the bill, helping to explain the motivation for reaching the “Cornhusker Kickback” with one of the last Democrats to sign on—Nebraska's Ben Nelson.
The impact of Senate rules was on full display when the “reconciliation” budget process was used to modify tax and other budget-related provisions in March 2010 in order to mollify the House. (In its penultimate vote on March 21, the House approved the Senate's Christmas Eve bill and then voted on a “side-car” bill of changes that the Senate subsequently approved.) Because the rules of reconciliation require only a simple majority and freed Reid from kowtowing to conservative Democrats, the Senate adopted changes in financing that were more liberal than had been possible during the Senate's Christmas Eve votes. The result was that Medicare's taxes on the most affluent segment of the population were substantially increased, and a new tax on Wall Street and commercial real estate was established, sparing 97% of the least affluent Americans from any hike in their Medicare taxes.
The tempo and content of health reform was also shaped by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which is charged with “scoring” the revenue and costs of new legislation. Budget estimates from the CBO that showed the ability of Democratic health reform bills to pay the costs of the new benefits and even contribute to reducing the projected budget deficits were critical for holding moderate and conservative Democrats. The sizeable role of the CBO in the legislative process prompted the Senate's second ranking leader to quip, “That's what it's going to say on my tombstone: ‘He was waiting for CBO’” (Herszenhorn Reference Herszenhorn2010). Health reformers had come to appreciate the institutional significance of the CBO after the failure of Bill Clinton's drive for health reform in 1993–94, which some attributed in part to the long delays waiting for budget scores. In a shrewd decision made out of public sight well before Obama began his crusade, Peter Orszag, who was appointed CBO director after the Democrats won congressional majorities in the 2006 elections, added new staff and expertise to the CBO to facilitate quick and accurate budget evaluations of health reform proposals. Indeed, Obama recognized the strategic advantage of institutional knowledge and coordination and accordingly appointed Orszag to run the White House's budget office, known as the Office of Management and Budget.
The impact of institutions was also evident in the federal government's strengthened administrative capacity to manage health care costs. These steps mark a striking departure from the formulation of Medicare in the early 1960s, when Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson rejected the persistent advice of civil servants in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to establish “direct government control” over the program's payments to doctors and hospital providers. Driven by political fear that centralized budgetary control would fuel “big government” charges, as well as by a genuine lack of confidence in the government's capacity to sensibly control expenditures, influential Democrats opted for an administratively perverse reimbursement arrangement—medical providers determined their own charges after providing treatment and were paid by nonprofit insurers (usually, Blue Cross/Blue Shield). As predicted, this retrospective, cost-based system led to years of rapidly rising Medicare costs. In a striking historic irony, it was left to Ronald Reagan (a leader of the opposition to Medicare's initial passage) to establish centralized government control over Medicare's expenditures to stem rising budget deficits in the early 1980s. Reagan created a prospective payment system for hospital charges that subsequent presidents expanded to physicians and outpatient services (Jacobs Reference Jacobs1993).
When lawmakers and policy experts began work on health reform in 2009, government administration of health care expenditures was no longer inconceivable to either Democrats or a number of Republicans; instead, the question was political feasibility. The most demonstrable display of strengthened administrative capacity and confidence was the establishment of a strikingly independent 15-member Medicare commission to monitor and constrain expenditures. The commission's proposals automatically take effect unless congressional majorities vote otherwise, and they are able to override a veto if the president supports the commission's recommendations.Footnote 2 Not surprisingly, the commission's establishment was opposed by interest groups for medical providers and manufacturers and by some members of Congress (especially in the House of Representatives), because it would reduce their leverage, with predictable impacts on future reimbursement. The creation of the new Medicare commission was accompanied by a plethora of new offices and initiatives to develop innovative reimbursement rules and identify high-quality, cost-effective medical treatment. To tamp down opposition to these measures during the legislative battles in 2009 and 2010, the impact of these administrative capacities was hemmed in a bit and their implementation delayed, but they represent a new set of tools for lawmakers to use once their concern for reducing health care costs overrides their concern about interest group opposition.
BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR: “RESPONSIBLE PARTIES” COME TO AMERICA
Half a century ago, the country's preeminent political scientists recommended that America adopt “responsible” political parties that would run for election on clear programmatic platforms and govern based on them, allowing voters to choose between distinct alternatives (American Political Science Association 1950). Modeled on Britain's parliamentary system, the “responsible party” was promoted as a welcome change from what Theodore Lowi has described as “interest group liberalism”—a highly fragmented system in which the dispersal of power enables decentralized, elite-dominated control of substantial parts of government and obstructs democratic accountability by obscuring who voters should punish for poor performance (Lowi Reference Lowi1969).
The health reform battle vividly displayed the bowdlerized version of party government that has developed in American politics. On nearly every vote of significance, all Republicans lined up in opposition, and all Senate Democrats and nearly all House Democrats lined up in support. Clear programmatic differences over taxes, programmatic direction, and government authority have divided the parties, providing voters with distinct choices as they head for the 2010 elections and future contests.
How have responsible parties worked out in practice? They have linked the exercise of executive and legislative power by Democrats and organized political conflict in readily discernible terms. The effect has been to institutionally fuse (imperfectly, of course) the separate branches of government that the Constitution's framers worked hard to divide by instilling divergent political motives in each—the president's national and long-term calculations versus the legislature's more parochial and, in the case of the House, short-term considerations. Lopsided Democratic majorities combined with unusual unity provided a powerful advantage to health reformers.
America's bowdlerized version of party government has also meant, however, that the political parties (especially the Democratic Party) have had to wrestle with internal divisions that obstruct concerted, coherent direction. Conservative Democrats were essential to passing health reform, and yet their resistance delayed passage and nearly defeated it on several occasions, giving rise to an ongoing war over taxation, the generosity of subsidies to pay for private insurance, and whether to include a “public option” that would allow a national government health insurance alternative to private insurers. The depth of the divisions among Democrats was so extensive as to make conflict appear to be between members of different parties—and, indeed, they would have been in a European multiparty system.
PREVAILING AND COUNTERVAILING INTEREST GROUP PRESSURE
The organization of business, professional, and public interest groups to pressure government has long been heralded as a critical component of America's democratic life. Pressure groups have been championed for enabling citizen influence on government and fostering a competitive process of cross-checking that prevents any one group from monopolizing government power. In the case of health reform, the strident opposition of business organizations like the Chamber of Commerce and private insurers was counteracted in part by the support of medical providers (doctors and hospitals) and manufacturers of pharmaceutical products and medical devices. In addition, unions, public interest groups, and liberal organizations not only supported health reform, but also pushed the White House and congressional leaders to adopt new taxes on the wealthiest citizens and to expand subsidies to low and moderate income Americans.
Even as the countervailing pressures of health reform advocates checked the influence of reform opponents, it would be a mistake to conclude that health reform primarily resulted from the politics of pluralism. Many interests—including those of the uninsured—were not organized or were only weakly evident in the halls of government. Their voice was, in effect, muffled or silenced.
By contrast, powerful stakeholders enjoyed privileged access to and extraordinary influence on the design of health reform. Democratic leaders concluded at the outset of the Obama presidency that the organizational battlefield was heavily biased against them: compared to the poorly organized and diffuse publics that would most benefit from reform, powerful stakeholders were the most motivated and best organized to protect their interests. Democratic leaders reasoned that health reform was doomed if stakeholders unified in opposition as they had against Clinton's failed reform effort. Their political remedy was to cut deals with medical providers and medical manufacturers that promised these groups millions of new patients and favorable terms of payment in exchange for their vocal support or silence.
The result is that health reform has been built on preserving and, indeed, strengthening the current private system of financing and delivery of medical care. Liberals gnashed their teeth at the Democrats' refusal to seek a radical restructuring of the system. Beyond the partisan acrimony, headlines in the business section of newspapers revealed a fundamental reality of reform: “Wall Street welcomes new health prescription.” Stocks in the health care industry rose the first trading day following congressional passage of the Affordable Care Act and were up nearly 7% during the first quarter of 2010 as the legislation moved toward enactment (Phelps and Yee Reference Phelps and Yee2010).
THE EFFECTS OF POLICY
The ways in which pressure groups defined their interests and policymakers responded to their lobbying were shaped in important respects by established policies (Mettler and Soss Reference Mettler and Soss2004; Jacobs Reference Jacobs1995). The structure of American health policy has historically accepted and reinforced the private financing and delivery of medical care. It is true that Medicare's financing of seniors, the disabled, and those with end-stage renal disease replaced private insurance, but these populations were difficult to cover on a profitable basis, which was a primary rationale for their coverage. With the passage of Medicare in 1965, though, the preferences of beneficiaries and medical providers shifted to reflect new opportunities and constraints. For the current beneficiaries of Medicare, their interest in and motivation for health reform in 2009 and 2010 focused on whether it protected current provisions and filled in existing gaps in coverage. Forcefully supported by the American Association of Retired People, lawmakers designed the Affordable Care Act to reward Medicare beneficiaries by devoting a significant portion of new spending to fuller coverage of prescription drug costs, even though this group already enjoyed more generous and secure insurance coverage than many Americans.
Most Americans receive their insurance coverage through their employer. In a “hidden” subsidy to this employment-based system, the federal government's third largest expenditure on health care is tax subsidies for employer payments for employees' premiums. The Affordable Care Act accepts employment as the foundation for obtaining health insurance and creates subsidies and new marketplaces known as “exchanges” to facilitate its continuation.
Government policy has accommodated the private operations of doctors, hospitals, and manufacturers of prescription medications, medical devices, and equipment. Historically, the decisions of Kennedy and Johnson to reject direct government budgetary control of Medicare expenditures reflected their deference to the private sector; similarly, the longstanding design of Medicare reimbursement rests on the assumption that medical manufacturers are due a profit, and that providers need to be paid close to rates prevailing in the private sector and above those in other affluent democracies, including neighboring Canada. The Affordable Care Act introduces new regulations and subsidies, but they are largely geared to rationalizing the private system. Even the most liberal version of health reform that passed the House included a public option for government insurance that was limited to a miniscule number of Americans; the Senate never passed the public option that liberals advocated. Private insurers do face significant new restrictions, but they retain—to the chagrin of liberals—their primary role. In addition, medical providers and manufacturers (including the big pharmaceutical firms) agreed to certain concessions but received in return millions of new patients and what are anticipated to be substantial new sources of revenue and profits. A common theme across these disparate components of America's health system is that the tendency to defer to private markets has continued to exert a powerful influence on law makers and left a profound imprint on the Affordable Care Act.
PRAYING TO THE FALSE GODS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
The unilateral assertion by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama of extraordinary national security powers—from detaining enemy combatants to preempting judicial review by claiming the existence of “state secrets”—has fueled public perceptions of an all-powerful presidency. During the battle for health reform, pundits and some political scientists simply assumed that Obama could dictate congressional action and savagely criticized him for failing to act the part of Caesar. They hammered the President for failing to direct congressional decisions by detailing proposals at the outset rather than offering general principles, as he did in February 2009, and for lacking the will and skill to force members of Congress to accept key provisions of the legislation (whether adoption of the public option or the immediate imposition of an excise tax on high-end insurance plans).
In truth, generations of research demonstrate the limits of presidential power to dictate either the legislative process or, especially, the making of domestic policy. James Madison's invitation in Federalist No. 51 for each branch of government to follow its “constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others” has humbled generations of presidents eager to impose their will on Congress. The relatively rare instances of unified government since the Second World War have allowed political parties to coordinate the separate lawmaking branches that competitively share powers. But even parties have served as imperfect bridges. Partisan coordination—even at its high points—has been tripped up by the ideological divisions among legislators from the same party, especially among congressional Democrats. Adding to the obstacles of interbranch coordination is each legislator's fidelity to the distinctive interests of his or her constituents, as well as his or her own personal views of good public policy (Edwards Reference Edwards1989; Bond and Fleisher Reference Bond and Fleisher1990). Put simply, there are durable structural barriers to what any president can accomplish, as exemplified by the failure of both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush to even receive floor votes on their top domestic priorities (health reform and Social Security privatization, respectively).
Enduring institutional features (rather than personal predilections or failings) primarily explain the limits on presidential legislative power and why legislators from Obama's own party repeatedly challenged him over health reform. Philosophical differences, constituent interests, and personal ambition for reelection have repeatedly trumped presidential preferences. Unlike parliamentary systems in which party leaders can punish recalcitrant legislators by blocking their nominations in subsequent elections, conservative Democrats who opposed health reform enjoyed substantial autonomy—they ran on their own records and assembled their own campaign teams—and therefore were beyond the direct control of Obama, Pelosi, or Reid. Indeed, congressional leaders were beholden to their party's legislators, making them less dictators than herders of cats, facilitating the movement of members in the direction they preferred.
Even as Obama avoided the false and debilitating myth of an all-powerful presidency, he did seize on the presidency's unparalleled capacity to put comprehensive national health reform on the agendas of the nation and Congress. He focused attention on health reform through nationally televised speeches in the winter of 2009 at the outset of his term; in September 2009, after August's Tea Party insurrection sapped the momentum for reform; and in early 2010, as he refortified Democrats following Republican Scott Brown's shocking win to replace the deceased Ted Kennedy in the liberal state of Massachusetts. These efforts elevated the salience of health reform and set the general direction for policy change.
One of the most striking features of Obama's handling of health reform was his clear-eyed appreciation of the limits of his power and how these limits prescribed the terms of his influence. Rather than naively trying to command compliance that would never succeed, the President devoted large blocks of time to meeting with members of Congress and using persuasion based on shared interests to bring them around to his side. His invitation to the strong public option advocate Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) to fly with him to an area of Ohio near the Congressman's own district produced a critical endorsement that contributed to the House's winning margin in its penultimate vote on health reform in March 2010. Obama could never “force” Kucinich's vote, but he was able to secure his support by highlighting the ways in which the Affordable Care Act would allow states to adopt the public option and bring the country closer to the Congressman's goals.
Obama's realism about what he could not do in Congress informed one of his most important decisions—deferring to legislators to design the details. In 1993, Bill Clinton devoted nine months to assembling a 500-person task force to design a detailed road map for Congress to follow; his State of the Union address after his first year in office pressed legislators to start holding hearings on his package. By contrast, Obama's quick hand-off to Congress shortly after his inauguration created the time for Democratic leaders to build the complex legislative coalitions necessary to produce bills from four of the five key committees within his first six months in office, and to gain Senate and House approval of separate bills within a year. While Clinton's squandering of time early in his term blocked Congress's opportunity to move before Democrats suffered sharp losses in the 1994 midterm elections, Obama capitalized on his progress and remaining time until the midterm elections to rebound from the Scott Brown loss and push health reform across the finish line.
IMPLEMENTATION AS A FORM OF RESISTANCE
Many Americans assume that health reform became a “done deal” after President Obama signed the Affordable Care Act into law. The reality is that implementation often redirects or blunts legislative intent (Pressman and Wildavsky Reference Pressman and Wildavsky1984), and the three-year period allotted for implementing the Affordable Care Act creates new arenas for refighting the health reform wars. Reform opponents have quickly turned to the courts to strike down key components of health reform as unconstitutional. While the vagaries of small group dynamics within the courts do not absolutely preclude this outcome, it is unlikely, owing to the weight of past court rulings and the impact that a decision striking down health reform could have on previous conservative rulings. For instance, judicial acceptance of the arguments by reform opponents could undermine previous Supreme Court rulings that prohibit medical marijuana and loosen restrictions on gun ownership. The legal challenges by reform opponents face significant obstacles in part because of the behind-the-scenes work by reformers to bullet-proof their work against future court challenges. Some legislative decisions—such as allowing exemptions from the individual mandate on religious grounds—were geared toward preempting judicial challenges. The larger effort of shaping the bill focused on anchoring health reform on well-established court rulings that support legislative power to tax and to regulate interstate commerce. Indeed, the language of the Affordable Care Act deliberately includes phrases and “findings” that explicitly refer to critical court decisions and judicial formulations. While the legal challenges seem unlikely to prevail in court, they are effective in sustaining public opposition to reform and raising funds to maintain resistance.
The most critical battles are occurring in obscure state and federal government offices as part of ongoing negotiations with providers, insurers, and pharmaceutical and medical device manufactures over how to implement the dozens of vaguely worded but critical legislative provisions. For instance, the Affordable Care Act requires insurers to spend by 2011 at least 80% of premiums on “clinical services” and “activities that improve health care quality” for patients; if they fail to document this return, they must provide rebates to their customers. Insurers are currently lobbying to broaden the list of actions that count as “improving quality” to include expenditures on technology, call centers for nursing consultations, and review of medical care by doctors and nurses. The intention of legislators in creating these provisions, though, was to minimize the proportion of premiums and government subsidies that could be siphoned from medical care and directed to profits or administration. Consumer advocates are insisting that quality be tightly defined by measurable benefits to individual patients. This kind of hand-to-hand combat over rule-making will have enormous implications for controlling costs, expanding access, and improving the quality of medical care.
Elections in 2010 and afterward may well be fought as referendums on health reform. With the in-party usually losing congressional seats in midterm elections, the question is whether Democrats will lose their House and Senate majorities in 2010 as they did in 1994, which would open the door to a significant rolling back of the Affordable Care Act, or whether they can hang onto majorities in one or both chambers, as Senate Republicans were able to do in 1982, even as a steep recession dragged down President Reagan's popularity and took a more general toll on GOP candidates. It is quite possible that Republicans will be positioned to force revisions in tax and subsidy provisions. With most of the Affordable Care Act not scheduled for implementation until 2014, the outcome of the next two cycles of national elections will have a potent impact on the extent to which America's new health system follows the law passed in March 2010.
HEALTH REFORM IN PERSPECTIVE
If the Affordable Care Act survives attempts to repeal or substantially reverse it over the next few years, it is likely to substantially expand America's welfare state. The history of Social Security, Medicare, and other social welfare legislation documents a striking pattern of durability and expansion after the first wave of opposition fades. This pattern of historical institutional development is precisely what most worries conservatives.
From the perspective of comparative health policy, the Affordable Care Act is likely to introduce new themes into national political debate that focus on the cost and access of medical care. What had been discrete and disconnected exchanges or disagreements between an insurer and a business or individual will now occur in a public arena in which decisions to increase premiums or deny coverage will be subject to broader scrutiny and possible government reversal. Rising national health expenditures that impact government costs may also receive focused national debate and policy responses. Although the precise form of the newly reformed health system remains uncertain, we can be confident that a new series of issues and divisions are likely to emerge in American politics.
