Is the United States a “weak state”? For decades, most scholars would have responded to this question with an emphatic “yes.” Although this particular characterization of the American state has become something of a cliché in political science, it is not an unreasonable conclusion. Judged according to the traditional Weberian criteria, the US national state does indeed appear small, decentralized, and underdeveloped. Nevertheless, in recent years scholars have located pockets of state strength and autonomy in a variety of policy areas, from the Postal Service to the Department of Agriculture (e.g., see Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy, 2001), while others have suggested that US social policy, in various periods and for particular populations, has been far more comprehensive than the conventional wisdom acknowledges (e.g., see Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, 1995). Yet the influence of this scholarship stems, in part, from the challenges it presents to the still-dominant narrative of the United States as a weak state and a laggard in welfare policy.
How can we reconcile these competing images of American state power? The two excellent books under review join work by Jacob Hacker (The Divided Welfare State, 2002) and Christopher Howard (The Welfare State Nobody Knows, 2007), among others, in arguing that we have been using the wrong criteria all along to judge state strength and the extent of American welfare policy. By conflating size and bureaucratic centralization with power and effectiveness, these works suggest, scholars have overlooked the many ways in which American officials have harnessed private power to enact public policies. Rather than merely cataloging the existence of these alternative state-building strategies, however, both of these books explain why state officials sometimes choose to exercise power through private means that camouflage the state's role in directing public policy.
If Suzanne Mettler is right, the public has had as much difficulty recognizing the state's role in American social policy as have political scientists. In The Submerged State, a concise book brimming with insights, Mettler explains that citizens simply do not realize that many of the benefits they receive, from student loans to social tax expenditures, are state-supported policies because they are delivered by private organizations or appear only as tax deductions. Nor are these seemingly “stateless” social policies small. The Home Mortgage Interest Deduction (HMID), for example—a cherished subsidy for many middle- and upper-middle-class Americans—cost $104.5 billion in 2011 (p. 12). Such programs, Mettler argues, form a “submerged state” and “obscure government's role from the view of the general public, including those who number among their beneficiaries” (p. 5). If citizens are unable to recognize the ways in which they depend on social programs and the government's role in providing them, she reasons, then it is hardly surprising that many Americans express hostility about a government they perceive as wasteful and ineffectual.
Would Americans feel less cynical about their government if its essential support of these programs were revealed? To test this proposition, Mettler conducts a series of survey experiments that expose subjects to different types of information about three programs—HMID, the Retirement Savings Contribution Tax Credit, and the Earned Income Tax Credit. The results are striking. For example, when provided with details showing that the wealthy were the disproportionate beneficiaries of the HMID subsidy, support among low- and middle-income respondents declined dramatically.
In the second half of the book, Mettler turns to the equally challenging matter of reforming these programs. Her case studies, which track the Obama administration's attempts to alter policy in three areas of the submerged state—student loans, health care, and taxes—reveal the difficulty of this task. Student loans emerge as the most revealing case, largely because the administration succeeded in transforming a system that had previously subsidized private lenders into the current arrangement of government-financed loans. Despite this success, Barack Obama did little to reveal the role of the state in student lending after winning this victory over banking interests. For most college students, the author laments, the change is unlikely to be noticed—a missed opportunity to reveal the productive role of the government to this important constituency.
Social welfare is not the only area where state power and influence are hidden beneath a seemingly private, market-driven system. Of the roughly 20,000 job discrimination lawsuits filed in federal courts every year, the vast majority—an astounding 98%—are brought by private attorneys on behalf of private citizens. How did these plaintiff-driven lawsuits come to play such an essential role in augmenting American state capacity? This is the provocative question that drives Sean Farhang's landmark work, The Litigation State. While one might be inclined to blame America's notoriously litigious culture and its greedy lawyers, or simply to fault the unexpected consequences of carelessly written legislation, these explanations turn out to be wrong. Deftly drawing on Robert Kagan's work (e.g., Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law, 2001) and rational choice institutionalism, Farhang argues that the fragmented nature of the American state itself explains these developments. In his book—one of the most important works on the state to appear in years—private enforcement regimes made up of citizens and their attorneys, as opposed to traditional bureaucratic regulatory agencies, emerge as an essential component of American state capacity and a “deliberate and effective state intervention” that shapes public policy (p. 7).
For Farhang, the chief cause of this curious form of state building is legislative–executive conflict. When members of Congress fear that the president or executive bureaucrats will not provide vigorous enforcement of regulations, they may choose to construct private enforcement regimes to mobilize aggrieved litigants. Legislators, he argues, are perfectly aware that they have a choice between building bureaucratic regulatory regimes or delegating enforcement to citizens, the courts, and private attorneys. To induce private litigants to act, Congress can insert a variety of provisions into the statute, such as determinations about standing, the damages available to plaintiffs, and, perhaps most significantly, specifications about who will bear the costs of litigation. To evaluate these propositions, Farhang compiles an original data set of these statutory inducements—fee shifts and increased damage awards—from 1887 to 2004 and subjects them to an impressive array of statistical tests that confirm the central role of executive–legislative conflict in this form of state building.
The second half of the book—Chapters 4 through 6—considers the origins and evolution of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its reauthorization in 1991. In this policy history, the pivotal role of conservative Republicans in establishing a private enforcement regime for job discrimination emerges. As the book explains, Republicans supported this system of private litigation with fee-shifting arrangements for plaintiffs in order to avoid the bureaucratic enforcement regime that Civil Rights liberals advocated. Over time, however, as the Civil Rights bar grew, liberals came to regard these fee-shifting arrangements as more effective than the toothless Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The result was an ironic, if not entirely unintended, consequence of legislative–executive conflict. Although Republicans had favored the creation of this private enforcement regime in 1964, it was Civil Rights liberals who came to see it as the essential enforcement mechanism of job discrimination laws. Farhang's evidence here is very persuasive, but one lingering question remains: Is there something unique about Civil Rights policies that make them particularly well-suited to private plaintiff-driven litigation? Although the author argues that this is not the case, my only criticism of this otherwise superb book is that his discussion of private enforcement regimes in other policy areas is so brief that it is difficult to put these suspicions to rest.
Despite their diverging substantive concerns, these two books find several areas of theoretical common ground. Perhaps the most significant is the claim that America's fragmented political system drives the creation of the submerged state and private enforcement regimes. As both authors explain, this form of state building is often less politically costly than traditional state-building strategies. Consequently, private enforcement regimes and submerged additions to the welfare state are easier to enact during periods of sharp partisan polarization, making them attractive to Republicans and Democrats alike. In both books, too, policy feedback processes bolstered these public–private partnerships after their enactment. Although a private enforcement regime for job discrimination was not liberals' first choice in 1964, the for-profit Civil Rights bar learned to take advantage of this arrangement. In a similar way, banks, which did not see student loans as a particularly important part of their business in 1965, emerged as the most vigorous opponents of the Obama administration's reform efforts in 2009.
Collectively, these books also show the power of mixed-methods research. In Farhang's work, the statistical model and large-n data set suggest causal relationships that are then fully fleshed out in his case study. In several instances, however, findings that would otherwise have been dismissed as insignificant or unobservable in the statistical model are shown to be key mechanisms in the qualitative studies. In a similar way, Mettler's book demonstrates the potential for work at the intersection of historical institutionalism and political behavior. Either book would be a fine addition to any graduate-level methods course.
In the end, both of these volumes advance our knowledge of the American state and suggest exciting new areas for research. If they demonstrate anything, it is that scholars must look beyond traditional modes of analysis to truly assess the power and reach of the American state. Whether one finds the submerged social policies of the American state to be troubling for democracy, as Mettler suggests, or simply another fascinating result of America's system of separated powers, as Farhang argues, it is difficult to finish these books without concluding that it may be time to set aside old tropes about the weakness of the American state and to focus on the myriad ways in which the United States has marshaled private power to make public policy.
