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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 February 2004
Jon Alterman seeks to demonstrate that the Cold War prism through which most scholars have examined Egyptian–American relations during the 1952–56 period has produced a somewhat “distorted” view of that relationship. Those efforts, he feels, have placed too great an emphasis on how and why cooperation failed in the area of military-strategic affairs, a failure that led Egypt's leaders to build a closer strategic relationship with the Soviet Union. Alterman argues that such studies give short shrift to serious efforts by Egyptian and American officials to establish an enduring relationship built on economic assistance and presents his own study as one designed to record those efforts and highlight their significance. Thus, regarding the heavily studied Aswan High Dam project, and in presenting his principal thesis, Alterman asserts that “[t]he traditional explanation for the cancellation of High Dam funding is that the United States had lost patience with Gamal Abdel Nasser and that he was finally being punished for his recklessness and adventurism in foreign policy. A more careful study of the history of the Egyptian–American relationship creates a fascinating picture of missed messages and mutual frustrations. It suggests that the relationship was in some ways a victim of its context: uncertainty on both sides about how to promote economic development, uncertainty over the roles that Egypt and the United States would each play in the post-colonial world, and the intervention of third countries—the UK, the USSR, and Israel—into that relationship”(p. xix).
Alterman begins his study with a brief yet insightful review of how contemporary thought in developmental economics affected key figures in Egypt in the early 1950s. He neatly contextualizes Egypt's economic decision-makers, convincingly demonstrating that, far from being “babes in the woods,” they were well-informed and heavily influenced by Western economic orthodoxy, United Nations studies, and American development success stories such as the Tennessee Valley Authority.
Next, Alterman launches into his investigation of U.S. government assistance to Egypt. He follows a chronological path, focusing in fine detail on the full gamut of U.S. economic aid programs, from small “chicken aid” (poultry development) assistance to the prospective mother of all aid packages, funding for the Aswan High Dam. Particularly interesting is Alterman's discussion of the Egyptian–American Rural Improvement Service (EARIS) program, agreed to in March 1953, whose principal objectives were land reclamation and a significant expansion of an ongoing Rural Social Center program. The latter program's goal was to provide special educational, vocational training, and health services to raise the quality of village life for peasants throughout Egypt. Here Alterman does an excellent job of depicting the tug-of-war between American and Egyptian officials over the EARIS program, as well as of describing how EARIS's “bottom-up” developmental approach inspired rival “top-down” programs, such as the Liberation Province land-reclamation scheme and the Combined Centers rural-development program. Although Egyptians involved with EARIS deemed it, in retrospect, a success, some American counterparts were vexed to the point of a revolt. Mutual perceptions of heavy-handedness and an obvious values-based divergence in how peasants were to benefit hampered collaboration, although EARIS limped along for most of the time until joint cooperation was terminated in 1963. Alterman's coverage of EARIS's challenges will undoubtedly strike chords familiar to many involved in U.S. Agency of International Development work in Egypt in recent decades and offers important lessons to bilateral assistance workers in general.
Because Alterman is both thorough and accurate, he ends up demonstrating the extent to which military-strategic factors consistently trumped concerns about economic collaboration. To prove this point, one can begin by noting that American assistance to Egypt by summer 1955 amounted to $40 million in development assistance funds and some tens of millions in additional PL480 money. Compare this, as does Alterman, with the annual $220 million in combined economic and military aid that Turkey was receiving from the United States as the Americans built their bulwark against the Soviet Union during this period. Providing commentary from a U.S. team's 1955 evaluation of EARIS and economic aid to Egypt, Alterman notes how, “[o]verall, the team expressed the belief that many of the problems in the Egyptian aid program were far bigger than the aid program itself” (p. 91). These problems included U.S. cotton policy; Israeli intransigence in Gaza; Egypt's spurning the Baghdad Pact; and Sudanese–Egyptian difficulties over Nile water rights. As the same report stated, “These four factors outweigh all others in determining Egypt's attitude toward the US and, indirectly, the extent to which Egypt is willing to accept US counsel and guidance in solving her economic problems” (p. 91).
Nowhere was the primacy of “high politics” and geo-strategic considerations in greater evidence than in deliberations over the Aswan High Dam. As Alterman himself again correctly concludes, “Throughout the 1950s, the High Dam project never really ceased to be an economic project for the Egyptians. However, in high-level discussions in the U.S. Department of State and among the National Security Council, it was never anything but political. While Egypt's leaders continued to view the High Dam as a key to the economic future of Egypt, Secretary of State Dulles and his subordinates in the Department of State regarded it as a mere bargaining chip for regional peace” (p. 129). In brief, one can conclude that earlier studies' emphasis on military-strategic affairs was well placed, but Alterman's study does represent a highly useful addition to that work—one that leaves us with a more robust and nuanced picture of the politics of that period.
Alterman has left few stones unturned in his research. He has made skillful use of secondary resources in Arabic and English. He also succeeded in gaining access to previously closed records from the Egyptian Embassy in Washington, D.C., and examining untouched files from American bureaucratic agencies, including those of the Foreign Operations Mission in Cairo. He supplemented this resource base through personal interviews with a range of Egyptians and Americans with special knowledge of the 1950s aid programs. Last but not least, he very carefully mined the diplomatic cables between Cairo and Washington for the period under study.
The fruits of Alterman's laudatory research effort have been presented in a highly engaging, generally balanced, and informative manner. The book will undoubtedly prove of greatest interest to post-graduate, graduate, and advanced undergraduate students specializing in Middle East politics, economics, and history. But there are also important lessons here for anyone engaged in studying the trials and tribulations of aid projects between more and less economically developed countries.