Despite its title, this book is more than a study of the management of ‘human resources’. It is a collective history of the employees of a pillar of France's financial system. Except for short intervals, the Crédit lyonnais was the country's largest bank until 1966. On the eve of World War I, it ranked as one of the world's largest banks. Omnès opens new ground because the study of office staff had not yet extended to bank employees. It is likely to stimulate research on the personnel of other French banks, rendering possible comparison and a more complete picture of the sector. The book is a useful reminder that financial history encompasses the social history of all personae in the banking profession, from the decision-makers about whom biographies are extant to the less prominent actors.

Resulting from a dissertation supervised by Professor Alain Plessis, the book is packed with a wealth of information, systematically organised and tightly presented. It is meticulous and carefully researched. The author had full access to the rich holdings of the Crédit lyonnais, including the personal files of individual employees, and used them skillfully. She also called upon the records of the police to obtain a wider picture of the situation in times of social tension. An interesting aspect of the methodology is the relationship established between the social and labour context, on the one hand, and the financial state of the bank, on the other. To that end, Omnès has used the firm's accounting records to keep a constant eye on profitability, expenses, payroll and other relevant data.

In 1863, the year Henri Germain founded the Crédit lyonnais, staff numbered 41. In 1939, the bank had 22,224 employees. Omnès divides her study into four periods. Between 1863 and 1885, the Crédit lyonnais was still no more than a small regional bank, an upstart feeling its way in its working environment and learning the ropes of deposit banking. Methods of recruiting personnel were not systematised. Schooling did not count for much in the hiring of staff. Primary school attendance – not necessarily certificated – was apparently the norm. Learning was done on the job. More important than formal education was ‘education’, in the sense of character, as well as social background, appearance and recommendation, preferably by an officer of the bank. About one-fifth of recruits were sons of members of the upper bourgeoisie. Functional (inter-service) and geographic (inter-branch) mobility was common. Although turnover did not seem to be high, few employees spent their working lives at the Crédit lyonnais. The bank was really a stopover in their career.

The second period saw the Crédit lyonnais attain the pinnacle where it stood in 1914. Beginning in the 1880s, recruitment became more democratic and, especially, more feminised. Women were entering the work force to fill office jobs, first in government services, then in businesses. Recruits were younger, unmarried and less experienced. The Credit lyonnais tended to hire more former employees of private bankers than of banks. This was a testimony to growing competition with the Société générale and the Comptoir national d'escompte, and awareness by each bank of the advantage of holding on to staff trained in-house. Formal education became a more important hiring criterion than ‘education’ or appearance. As the educational policy of the Third Republic took root, more and more recruits to the Crédit lyonnais held primary school certificates. Recommendations and ‘moral worth’ still counted. The social origins of employees were somewhat more democratic; two-fifths came from families of employees and a quarter from working-class families; sons of the upper bourgeoisie were proportionately less numerous than in the past. Voluntary resignations were still more frequent than involuntary terminations of employment. Recruitment by other banks and reasons of health are cited as factors. Management reduced the working day to nine hours in 1893 and the law of 1906 made the weekly day of rest compulsory. In the 1900s, the Crédit lyonnais began adopting the five-day week (semaine anglaise). Guided by a paternalistic philosophy, the Crédit lyonnais engaged in ‘social management of personnel’, set up various forms of social insurance and promoted in-house charities (œuvres sociales).

World War I inaugurated a more troubled era for the Crédit lyonnais, as well as other banks. Omnès divides the period into two parts. Eight thousand Crédit lyonnais' employees were mobilised; 1,592 did not return. Personnel increased from 18,628 in 1919 to 19,923 in 1925. Between 1915 and 1925, the proportion of women among new personnel rose from 3 to 45 per cent. Their recruitment was supposed to be temporary. In fact, the war permanently altered the gender composition of bank personnel because women continued to be hired after 1918. They held office jobs and were not involved in banking activities as such. War led to the suspension of the five-day week, annual holidays and end-of-year rises and bonuses at the bank. Lower pay, longer working hours and loss of benefits previously acquired led to a worsening of the social climate and considerable involvement of Crédit lyonnais staff in the strike by bank employees in May 1917. The law of 23 April 1919 established the eight-hour working day; that of 20 February 1924 led to the gradual application of the five-day working week. More and more the social status of bank employees tended to resemble that of workers, losing its middle-class aura. Although they still enjoyed the advantage of paid annual holidays, bank employees underwent proletarianisation. Inflation and the soaring cost of living added to the woes of all salaried personnel in the post-war years. Pay was not indexed to the rise of the cost of living. Despite the fact that the law of 25 March 1919 gave legal status to the negotiation of collective contracts, none was signed in the banking sector before the law of 24 June 1936, instituted by the Popular Front, made the process compulsory. Bank work was intensified and complicated by inflation, while management held fast to traditional authoritarian practices. Handling of personnel was considered a problem of surveillance and social order, best left to a retired military officer, than a question of productivity. High turnover, absenteeism and resignations were the order of the day. Agitation became endemic and Crédit lyonnais staff participated massively in the first general strike of bank employees in July – September 1925. Company mentality gave way to solidarity encompassing the entire banking sector. The strike was unsuccessful; pay rises, indexation to the cost of living and recognition of unions remained beyond reach. The Crédit lyonnais was slow to adapt to new conditions. In 1920, it was overtaken by the Société générale as France's largest bank. Inflation created the illusion of brisk activity but revenues declined, operating costs rose and profitability sagged. Management had to find sources of income other than the low cost of labour.

Mechanisation, rationalisation, taylorism, the principles of Henri Fayol and ‘scientific management’ were in due course introduced in the final period, beginning in 1926. Calculating machines and other labour-saving office equipment were introduced. More bizarrely, graphology, ‘psychotechnics’, ‘egometry’, ‘physiognomy’, ‘chirology’ and astrology were called upon for help. A meter to measure typewriting speed was adopted. Machinery led to a new division of labour and made banking activity look more and more like factory work, with personnel bound to equipment, movement reduced to a minimum and office space organised in straight lines drawn by the alignment of machines. Between 1931 and 1938, the work force was reduced from 24,349 to 20,612. Operating costs were compressed from 560 million Francs in 1931 to 480 million Francs in 1935. Productivity increased. Why then did personnel remain quiescent in the midst of the cost-cutting campaign? Why did they not participate in the strikes of May–June 1936? One reason was that management refrained from massive layoffs and pay cuts. Another was the rise in purchasing power due to lower prices during the Depression. Like civil servants and unlike workers, bank employees benefited from circumstances. Their real income actually rose, reawakening their pre-war impression of belonging to the middle class. In 1936, collective bargaining came into force and the institution of the elected shop steward emerged. As in 1925, social gains induced management to seek increases in productivity with a new programme to intensify mechanisation. As a final note to the interwar period, collective contracts and collective bargaining were suspended on 10 November 1939 and remained in abeyance for a decade.

The author concludes that changes in the management of personnel at the Crédit lyonnais were a response to the growing size of the business and the transformation of social relations between management and staff. Her book is a noteworthy contribution to the history of the service sector and the prehistory of the boom in employment in the ‘tertiary’ economy.