1. Introduction
It has been pointed out that enterprises in China usually encounter barriers when they try to invest across provinces (Tan, Reference Tan2013: 149). An empirical study by the Development Research Center of the State Council demonstrates that businesses in China may be confronted with some barriers in the process of inter-provincial investment, including more stringent capital requirements than those made by national law (Li et al., Reference Li2005: 104).
Ensuring easier inter-provincial establishment for firms could benefit China. Cross-provincial investment by firms has been recognized as one form of capital mobility across provinces in China (Boyreau-Debray and Wei, Reference Boyreau-Debray and Wei2004). A World Bank study pointed out that in a market economy, capital mobility plays a crucial role in achieving efficient resource allocation if investment can be made in ideal locations and for the most efficient use (World Bank, Reference Bank1994: 4). In this way, the expansion of China's internal market could become a more significant ingredient for its economic development in the future (Naughton, Reference Naughton, Hope, Yang and Li2003: 207).
Of course, businesses in other federal jurisdictions, such as the EU, may also face barriers to expansion across borders. Since the beginning of European integration, the creation of a common market has been a primary task (Schwarze, Reference Schwarze2006: 91). Apparently, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and EU institutions (especially the Commission) have interacted with each other, playing an important role in promoting economic integration (Craig, Reference Craig, Barnard and Scott2002: 40). Considering the development of the internal market, this article investigates to what extent the European experience in promoting market integration is applicable to China, based on an analysis of the institutional features of the Chinese and European legal regimes.
This article focuses on learning lessons from the European experience for facilitating inter-provincial establishment in China. Also, the empirical evidence in this paper can contribute to the literature on regulatory competition. One can find a large body of theoretical economic literature that examines the effects of competition between jurisdictions on regulatory standards (Van den Bergh, Reference Van den Bergh, Faure and Van der Walt2010: 76). However, whether regulatory competition will lead to a race to the bottom or rather a race to the top is still a highly disputed issue (Eger and Schüller, Reference Eger, Schüller, Eger, Faure and Zhang2007: 11;Van den Bergh, Reference Van den Bergh2000: 445). This paper seeks to contribute to the literature by examining the conditions under which Chinese local governments create entry barriers to non-local firms.
2. Inter-provincial establishment in China and cross-border establishment in the EU: comparing apples with oranges?
There are profound differences between the European and Chinese legal regimes. One major difference relates to the institutional features of these two regimes, which will be elaborated on in this paper. Moreover, China has its own law-based order, including ‘a low level of legal consciousness, lack of a robust civil society, and the enduring influence of paternalistic traditions and a culture of deference to government authority’ (Peerenboom, Reference Peerenboom2002: 12). Furthermore, while the objective of market integration in the EU is to remove barriers between the markets of different nations, market integration in China aims to eliminate barriers between local markets within one nation.
Notwithstanding the above differences, regulation of inter-provincial establishment in China and regulation of cross-border establishment in the EU can be comparable for the following reason – both China and the EU have a structure of multilevel governance. While the Chinese central government delegates some managerial responsibility over the economy to local governments, the process of European integration shifts certain regulatory responsibility from Member States to the Union (Eger and Schüller, Reference Eger, Schüller, Eger, Faure and Zhang2007: 3–4). With a structure of multilevel governance, China and the EU both face the task of preventing lower level political entities from impeding capital mobility.
The EU has rich experience in removing barriers to the internal market (Weishaar et al., Reference Weishaar and Philipsen2016: 3). Moreover, improving the internal market is an ongoing process (Craig, Reference Craig2012: 22). Therefore, referring to the formation, operation, and evolution of the EU's internal market regulation may provide useful insights for Chinese policy makers to design and enforce the Chinese regulatory framework (Weishaar et al., Reference Weishaar and Philipsen2016: 8).
3. The reality of inter-provincial establishment in China
The available evidence shows that licensing barriers, as a main protectionist measure, are sometimes created by Chinese local authorities, leading to restrictions on inter-provincial establishment. Moreover, whether or not to create such barriers depends on various factors. To illustrate this point, this section refers to existing literature and my interviews.
In summer, 2013, 15 interviews were conducted in three eastern provincial areas (Beijing, Zhejiang, and Shandong) to provide insights into the reality of inter-provincial establishment. All interviews were held on a semi-structured basis, i.e. interviewees conveyed their opinions on specific issues of inter-provincial establishment on the basis of a questionnaire. The interviewees are lawyers, managers from foreign invested companies, private companies and state-owned enterprises, licensing officials and officials responsible for attracting capital. Compared to local authorities in Eastern China, their counterparts in Western China and Central China are more likely to create entry barriers to non-local firms through using administrative authority (Jia and Qin, Reference Jia and Qin2014: 17).
Of course, this section does not suggest that licensing is the only way of preventing firms from expanding nationwide. Corruption by local officials may also deter inter-provincial establishment. On the basis of panel data concerning 28 provinces for the period 1988–2010, Hu and Guo (Reference Hu and Guo2013: 45) hold that corruption by local officers and rent seeking by local companies have caused severe regional market disintegration. Nevertheless, it appears extremely difficult to present a whole picture of barriers to inter-provincial establishment, due to the lack of evidence.
3.1 Licensing as a major obstacle to expand across regions
Local governments are said to often take disguised measures to restrict the entry of enterprises from other places to local areas by abusing the power to establish licenses. As a result, market barriers are created (Yang and Han, Reference Yang and Han2006: 19). According to the study by Xia et al. (Reference Xia2011: 139), protectionist measures are taken by local authorities, which lead to restrictions on inter-provincial establishment and to market segmentation. Their discoveries will be detailed in section 3.3.
In the 2012 China Business Climate Survey Report, the American Chamber of Commerce in China (hereinafter AmCham China) (AmCham China, 2012) lists licensing as one major obstacle for Chinese companies that are foreign-funded to make investments or open new businesses in China. It needs to be said that the members of AmCham China are Chinese companies funded by American investors. In total, 390 members of AmCham China responded to the survey. Specifically, 68% of the participants found their expansion and investment pace to have slowed down, because of licensing requirements.
As demonstrated by 37% of the interviewees in the 2012 research, it has become more difficult to acquire their licenses in recent years (ibid.). In the 2011 survey of AmCham China (2011), asked ‘which licenses are difficult to obtain’, 42% of 434 members of AmCham China mentioned new business licenses, 34% named new product licenses, and 25% new expansion licenses.
The interviews provide a more vivid picture of barriers to inter-provincial establishment. Strict licensing requirements are imposed to create market entry barriers in certain fields, according to Z, a local licensing official. In these industries, monopolies or State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) have occupied a significant market share and have gained huge profits. To impose obstacles for potential competitors, authorities usually set very harsh terms for businesses to obtain licenses. The establishment of these licensing systems can block the expansion of non-local companies.Footnote 1
According to N, a local licensing officer, it is likely that local protectionism is the norm in the café industry. The same is true of the coal mining, highway construction, and town and village bank establishment industries that can be highly profitable. Local ventures are more likely to obtain licenses and to do business in these industries than companies that have been incorporated in other regions.Footnote 2
Z provides an example concerning the difficulties of entering the market for public transport. Currently, mainly local SOEs provide public transportation services and they make good profits doing so. In order to prevent (or restrict) competition, local authorities have established licensing regimes that regulate market access. Ordinary individuals or businesses can hardly form companies for passenger transport, because of the strict requirements that need to be fulfilled in order to obtain a license.Footnote 3
The following information offered by C, a national café chain manager, exemplifies how authorities exercise licensing power to create barriers. Although C's company has a permit for opening cafés nationwide, as a result of the behaviour of local cultural agencies, it still encounters tremendous difficulties in the process of establishing branches. These licensing authorities require C's firm to obtain their permission prior to opening shops in their regions. Local protectionism can be noticed here in the approval process. In some cases, enterprises meeting certain conditions have been granted licenses, whereas non-local firms meeting the same conditions were not. Moreover, one requirement made in a particular district provides that a license for an additional café will be given only if a firm can open five such branches in the area. This provision most certainly benefits local companies only. This is because these businesses have already established numerous internet cafés and therefore can easily obtain a new permission. By contrast, most non-local enterprises are just starting their business in the region and hence are by no means able to meet the requirements. Furthermore, in a northern province, local cultural agencies set a precondition for C to obtain licenses. The authorities asked his business to fund them by contributing 0.8 million RMB, to support local cultural activities. In sum, the expansion of café chains is hindered significantly, because of the exercise of licensing power by local cultural authorities, as C demonstrated.Footnote 4
3.2 Local governments’ preference for the establishment of subsidiaries
As noted by X, apart from the imposition of strict licensing requirements, local governments usually prefer the establishment of subsidiaries to the establishment of branches for tax reasons. When new factories are opened, local governments always consider the ability of such factories to make profits and generate tax revenues.Footnote 5 Recent empirical research has indicated that, for tax reasons, only the establishment of subsidiaries is allowed in the logistics industry (China Federation of Logistics and Purchasing, 2013: 26). If companies headquartered in province A open branches in another region B, the branches pay the bulk of their enterprise income tax to province A.Footnote 6 The enterprise income tax, the consumption tax, and the VAT are the main taxes imposed on enterprises, together accounting for the lion's share of tax revenue (Deng, Reference Deng2003:16). As a result, subsidiaries pay a large share of their taxes in local regions, whereas branches do not, as pointed out by X. In order to attract subsidiaries, local authorities often apply favourable conditions to this business form.Footnote 7
A case in point is X's own corporate group. Most businesses established by this group are subsidiaries rather than branches, because the conditions attached to this particular business form are more favorable. For example, governments are usually willing to provide land so that subsidiaries can be formed in the logistics industry. In addition, attractive terms can be given in terms of land prices and locations, and land is highly valuable to the establishment of the logistics trade. Moreover, subsidiaries can get tax refunds. In contrast, it is very uncommon for branches to receive such advantageous treatment.Footnote 8
Local licensing official N notes that in some cases both subsidiaries and branches can be opened. In other cases, the establishment can only be in the form of subsidiaries, because of the tax reasons. A case in point is the formation of project ventures in the real estate/property industry. When real estate businesses bid for a vacant lot in areas other than their places of incorporation, they are usually asked to establish subsidiaries rather than branches. This is because companies formed for land development projects often need to pay up to 30% of their investment as tax. Moreover, such investments often have an enormous scale amounting to billions of RMB. This means that the tax contributions of such plans can be considerable. Therefore, for tax reasons, local governments usually require the incorporation of subsidiaries for this trade.Footnote 9
Some firms establish branches rather than subsidiaries, but it was noted that this business form is used in special situations only. For instance, enterprises owned by the central government sometimes choose to establish branches in Zhejiang province. These SOEs are usually large firms in monopolistic industries, such as petrochemicals, telecoms and banking. In addition, they own advanced technology in these fields that local authorities do not have. As a result, it is difficult for local governments to influence the investment intentions of these firms. There may also be other cases in which branches are opened rather than subsidiaries. However, this may be possible only when tax agreements are reached. Such contracts are signed between local governments and enterprises, requiring the latter to pay a certain amount of taxes.Footnote 10
3.3 Political ties facilitating inter-provincial establishment
Based on the essay of Xia et al. (Reference Xia2011: 132–4), it can be argued that the political connections of managerial personnel in Chinese listed companies can facilitate the expansion of these companies across provinces. The authors collected data about these firms from the initial public offering reports submitted by Chinese listed companies between 1997 and 2003. To begin with, they chose the companies that submitted the reports during that period, but excluded those whose ownership was indeterminate, those whose general managers and chairmen had unknown government backgrounds and those that did not establish subsidiaries and branches. Second, they categorized them into companies not controlled by governments, those controlled by the central government, and those controlled by local governments. Their results can be interpreted from two perspectives.
First, they compared the likelihood for each of the three categories of companies of establishing branches or subsidiaries in other provinces. Specifically, corporations controlled by the central government are more likely to start these two kinds of local businesses than companies not controlled by governments. Moreover, it is most unlikely that companies controlled by local governments will incorporate branches or subsidiaries in other provinces (Xia et al., Reference Xia2011: 128&131).
Second, they explained how important the political ties of managers and directors are to the inter-provincial establishment of branches and subsidiaries by each type of companies. Specifically, enterprises controlled by the central government do not benefit from the political connection of their senior managers and directors in the corporations’ cross-provincial establishment. A possible reason is that these companies can manage with the obstacles created to the establishment of their branches and subsidiaries in another province because they have central government support. The political relation is not important to them according to the authors (ibid.).
By contrast, it is mainly enterprises controlled by local governments which profit from these political connections, but only when their managers and directors have been senior officials e.g., heads of departments under provincial governments or at equivalent levels. However, the political experience held by the heads of these corporations in central governmental agencies does not help in setting up a local business in another provincial area. In Xia et al. (Reference Xia2011) view, this is probably because the barriers to the cross-provincial establishment of branches and subsidiaries are created by the local government of that particular district and not by industrial policies (ibid.). The policies appear to be made by national authorities.
Likewise, the official experience of senior managers and directors in departments of the central government could facilitate companies not controlled by governments to incorporate branches and subsidiaries in other provinces. However, if these senior managers and directors in this category of corporations have only held official positions in the provinces where the headquarters of the companies are located, their political experience is unlikely to influence cross-provincial establishment. Also, according to the writers, this is probably because most of their experience is at assistant department or bureau levels. In such circumstances, local governments are likely to restrict local companies from establishing in other provincial areas, and the managers and directors are very likely to obey that restriction (ibid.).
3.4 Summary: various factors influencing local governments’ decisions to create barriers
The above analysis shows that whether or not local governments create licensing barriers to the establishment of branches or subsidiaries by non-local firms depends on various factors. Firstly, as revealed in section 3.1, if the market concerned is profitable or competitive, local governments are more likely to restrict the entry of non-local firms, in order to protect local industries. ‘Barriers to external competition that bolster the income of local enterprises translate into higher levels of employment for the local population and more tax revenues for local government’ (Mehra and Meng, Reference Mehra and Meng2008: 399&400).
Secondly, if investment destinations are regions where companies owned by local governments have occupied a significant market share, non-local investors may face greater difficulties in establishing businesses. Locally owned companies, as the favored businesses of local governments, can develop cozy relationships with local authorities (Guo and Hu, Reference Guo and Hu2004: 273).
Thirdly, local governments tend to welcome the establishment of subsidiaries rather than branches. The reason is that the establishment of subsidiaries can contribute more tax revenue to local authorities.
Fourthly, it appears to be easier for companies with strong ties with the government to expand nationwide.
4. The situation of cross-border establishment in the EU
4.1 The development of the freedom of establishment
Compared to China, the EU has for decades made major efforts to achieve market integration. As a result, today companies have much more freedom to establish businesses across borders.
Both measures of negative integration and measures of positive integration have been taken to ease cross-border activities in the EU (Pelkmans, Reference Pelkmans2006: 7). The former refers to the prohibition on imposing national restrictions on the free movement of goods, services, workers, and capital. The latter refers to an attempt to to remove barriers to free movement at the EU level caused by divergent national regulations (Scharpf, Reference Scharpf and Marks1996).
The freedom of establishment for companies was limited by the considerable differences between the national legal systems. Since handing down its decision in the case of Centros (C-212/97), the CJEU has effectively dealt with these constraints, which significantly facilitated the free movement of companies (Weiss and Kaupa, Reference Weiss and Kaupa2014: 197). Moreover, on the basis of codifying the rulings of the court on the establishment of service providers (Barnard, Reference Barnard2010: 348), the Services Directive 2006/123 has further facilitated the cross-border establishment of companies (Mustilli and Pelkmans, Reference Mustilli and Pelkmans2013).
4.2 The remaining barriers
It should be noted that improving the internal market is an ongoing process (Craig, Reference Craig2012: 22). The following passages analyze the remaining barriers to cross-border establishment in the EU.
According to Pelkmans and De Brito (Reference Pelkmans and De Brito2012), even in the ideal scenario of the single market, one cannot rule out the possibility for an industry to complain about ‘barriers’. The first reason is the ‘incompleteness’ of the single market. For instance, although financial services regulation is of noticeable influence, the regulation does not apply to mortgages in such a manner as to promote integration of the mortgage sector at the European level. The second factor is that EU countries enjoy regulatory autonomy in certain matters and they often opt for the protection of this autonomy due to national political legitimacy considerations.
With specific reference to cross-border business establishment, the existence of national regulatory autonomy in some matters appears to be the main cause of the remaining barriers. As demonstrated by Hertig and McCahery (Reference Hertig, McCahery and Weatherill2007: 228), company taxes, employee protection, and other social constraints constitute important obstacles to the free movement of companies.Footnote 11 Member States exercise taxing power in the EU (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, Reference Genschel and Jachtenfuchs2011: 293). Codetermination and labor standards also fall under the scope of national production and welfare systems (Höpner and Schäfer, Reference Höpner, Schäfer and Magone2015: 726). Below, this section looks at two areas that are within the scope of Member States’ regulatory competence: taxation and employee participation.
With regard to corporate taxation, according to the OECD (2012: 19), conforming to different national tax systems and dealing with different national tax departments in the EU can impose extra administration costs on businesses. Given the lack of a consolidated tax base, there can be differences in tax treatment between conducting new business in the same state and doing so outside this country. For instance, a parent company based in one Member State cannot always deduct losses of its subsidiary in another EU state from the overall tax costs of this group. This difficulty could create disincentives for establishing firms across borders in the EU. Moreover, as demonstrated by Ilzkovitz et al. (Reference Ilzkovitz2007), firms setting up subsidiaries or permanent establishments in another EU state face higher compliance costs than enterprises with only domestic subsidiaries. This indicates tax obstacles to conducting business activities in different EU countries. For example, engaging in cross-border business entails considerable additional tax costs coming to at least one or two millions of euros for medium-sized European multinational companies.
In terms of worker participation, rules relating to employee participation within the framework of the formation and operation of a European Company (Societas Europaea, SE) are considered to be restrictions on the freedom of establishment (Storm, Reference Storm2006: 134). A SE mainly serves to provide businesses with the possibility to ease business across national borders (Pellé, Reference Pellé2008: 8). The worker participation regime in a SE is a political compromise agreed upon by Member States allowing them to preserve their respective industrial relation models (Callaghan, Reference Callaghan2011: 6). It should be noted that reaching agreement on employee participation in a SE is lengthy and complex, which is often mentioned as the major shortcoming of this company form (Pellé, Reference Pellé2008: 8). The research of Ernst & Young (2010) commissioned by the Commission identifies the worker involvement system as a factor hindering the creation of SEs in some EU countries and leading to the limited success of the SE.
5. The Chinese legal regime for inter-provincial establishment
5.1 Institutional aspects
A key characteristic of China's legal system is a high level of legislative centralization. The National People's Congress, the national legislature of the state, and its Standing Committee take a unified leadership approach in law-making. To complement national law and to adapt to local conditions, it is reasonable to delegate certain law-making power to local authorities (Tian, Reference Tian2004: 315). Local laws, as provided by Article 72 of the Legislation Law (2015), do not contradict national legislation. Considering the legislative power of the central organs, one can note that their legislative activities are unlikely to be subject to any severe restriction.
Chinese central law-makers face few difficulties in regulating its internal market, but Chinese courts can only play a limited role in promoting market integration. According to Article 12 (4) of the Administrative Procedure Law (APL) (2015), courts shall accept suits brought by legal persons against refusal by an administrative organ to issue a permit or license, which the legal persons consider themselves legally qualified to apply for, or for the failure of that administrative agency to respond to the application.Footnote 12 Therefore, when local officials disapprove non-local firms’ licensing applications for entry to the local market, non-local firms can use this provision to challenge such decisions in courts.
Moreover, as provided by Article 12 (8) of the APL (2015), courts in China accept suits against the abuse of administrative power that has been used to eliminate or restrict competition. This provision may cause us to raise the question as to whether businesses could similarly challenge the abuse of administrative authority used to restrict inter-provincial establishment of companies. Until now, no judicial interpretation has answered this question. Also, there appears to be scarce literature on this issue.
However, it is impossible for Chinese courts to use the power of judicial review to strike down general rules. According to Article 13 (2) of the APL (2015), courts are not entitled to deal with suits against administrative regulations, the rules of local governments, the rules of the departments under the State Council. or decisions and orders with general binding force promulgated by administrative organs. Article 3 of the Judicial Interpretation for the APL (2000), explains what is meant by ‘decisions and orders’ as referred to in Article 13 (2). Administrative normative documents with the following characteristics fall into the definition: (1) those created by administrative authorities; (2) those regulating unspecified objects of laws; and (3) those that can be used repeatedly.Footnote 13
At present, when courts consider that rules made by provincial congresses contradict national law, they may submit to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress written suggestions for examination (Article 99 of the Legislation Law (2015)). Nevertheless, according to Xu, an expert on legislation law, the Standing Committee has not responded to any suggestions ever made (Xu, Reference Xu2014: 14).
5.2 Existing ways to tackle the barriers to inter-provincial establishment and their problems
Some provisions of the Administrative License Law (ALL) (2003) could forbid local administrative agencies from imposing licensing barriers to inter-provincial establishment. Articles 14 and 15 (2) of the ALL prohibit local authorities from establishing any administrative licenses for the establishment and registration of enterprises. Gu (Reference Gu2006: 23) holds that this provision intends to prevent the implementation of the market blockade activities by local authorities through licensing. Nevertheless, the ALL does not provide any remedy for the creation of administrative licenses for the establishment and registration of enterprises at local levels.
The 2008 Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) is also important to the freedom of business establishment. This law empowers some administrative agencies to cope with the imposition of restrictions on inter-provincial establishment. As noted by Articles 35 of the AML, ‘administrative departments and other organizations authorized by laws or regulations to perform the function of administering public affairs may not abuse their administrative power to exclude non-local undertakings from making investment or restrict their investment locally or exclude them from establishing branch offices locally or restrict their establishment of such offices, by treating them unequally as compared with the local undertakings, or by other means’. According to Article 51 of the AML, ‘where an administrative department or an organization authorized by laws or regulations to perform the function of administering public affairs abuses its administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition, the department at a higher level shall instruct it to rectify’. Footnote 14
However, the sanctions proposed by the AML are deemed as unable to effectively tackle administrative monopolies (Wang, Reference Wang2008: 149). As argued by Wang, an explanation for this ineffectiveness is that superior and inferior administrative departments are not independent of one another. Since administrative monopolies often share in the profits of companies owned by local governments, protection for them can bring benefits to the inferior agencies and also to the superior ones. Therefore, governments at higher levels are not expected to execute Article 51 with justice and in a neutral way. In fact, they are not motivated to enforce it in any way (Wang, Reference Wang2009: 57). The situation mentioned by Wang can be exemplified as follows. If a government at the county level can receive tax revenues, increase employment, and bring other benefits by protecting local businesses, it could be argued that it benefits a provincial region as a whole. Very likely, local enterprises will also pay some tax directly to the provincial authority.Footnote 15 It should be pointed out that all the mentioned advantages created by local protectionism are considered from an industrial policy perspective rather than from a competition policy point of view. Moreover, if they are companies owned by the provincial government, the provincial government will certainly permit the protectionism activities conducted by its county agencies. Therefore, superior organs are unlikely to order inferior departments to rectify the abuse of administrative power.
The inability of superior agencies to deal with administrative monopolies is pointed out as another reason. ‘Since the so-called “higher-level agency” could be any agency’, it would be hard to expect them to have enough experience in dealing with competition law issues (Wang, Reference Wang2008: 149).
Apparently, the correction mechanism provided by the AML has seldom been used to tackle the imposition of restrictions on inter-provincial establishment. However, it has been shown that businesses sometimes face barriers to expand nationwide, due to the abuse of licensing by local governments.
Moreover, scholars criticize the absence of judicial review of administrative acts (Ohnesorge, Reference Ohnesorge2006: 144). Relying on local legislation, local governments sometimes impede the free flow of commodities and capital and exclude non-local firms from the local market (Nian, Reference Nian2007: 82). However, courts have no jurisdiction over the legislation, as pointed out in section 5.1. Due to the lack of judicial review over general rules, if local authorities create licensing systems for business establishment through local laws, these licensing regimes cannot be challenged in courts.
6 The EU legal regime for cross-border establishment
6.1 Institutional aspects
It is obvious that the EU has a very different institutional structure from China. The EU is currently comprised of 28 Member States and they have ceded some of their sovereign rights to the Union (Borchardt, Reference Borchardt2010: 11). The institutions of the EU have limited legislative competences granted by its Treaty (Weatherill, Reference Weatherill2011: 828). Conferral is the principle that governs the limits of the competences (Horsley, Reference Horsley2012: 269). As provided by Article 5 (2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), ‘Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein.’
In most areas that come under EU competence, the EU holds concurrent legislative authority (Muir Watt, Reference Muir Watt2004: 436), and the choice of who should act is governed by the subsidiarity principle. Article 5 (3) TEU notes that ‘[I]n areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.’
In the case of the completion of the internal market, the EU legislature has competences to adopt directives and regulations that harmonize, replace, or add to national law (Snell, Reference Snell2013: 519). The exercise of these competences, like other legislative actions undertaken by the EU institutions, must comply with the principles of conferral and subsidiarity (Muir Watt, Reference Muir Watt2004: 436). While directives have to be enforced by Member States into their national law, the adoption and publication of regulations allows individuals to rely on this law almost immediately within their own countries (Rotondo, Reference Rotondo2013: 438).
Compared to the Chinese legislature, the EU institutions face far more difficulties in regulating the EU's internal market. However, the judicial branch of the EU, unlike the judiciary in China, can play a significant role in promoting market integration.
The CJEU supervises Member States, applying the freedoms of goods, persons, services, and capital to national law. Through the case law of the CJEU, the principle of four freedoms has developed, thereby removing constraints imposed by Member States on cross-border activities (Rotondo, Reference Rotondo2013: 438).
Among the procedural avenues to the court, infringement proceedings can be started in situations where Member States are in breach of EU law. For instance, Member States may be unable to implement directives within the given time limits or may produce national law contravening EU law (Albors-Llorens, Reference Albors-Llorens, Barnard and Peers2014: 284). As another important procedure, preliminary rulings enable national courts to question the interpretation or validity of EU law to the CJEU (Carrubba and Murrah, Reference Carrubba and Murrah2005: 399). The most vital function of this process, as noted by the CJEU, is to ensure uniform application of European law by national courts throughout the EU (Albors-Llorens, Reference Albors-Llorens, Barnard and Peers2014: 284). Based on preliminary rulings, the judiciary of Member States can enforce EU law over national legislation, so this procedure is central to European integration (Carrubba and Murrah, Reference Carrubba and Murrah2005: 399).
6.2 Tackling the remaining barriers through intergovernmental negotiations and judicial integration
Negative integration and positive integration have also been translated in the political literature as the difference between judicial integration and political integration. Political integration and judicial integration are two forms of integration that can address the barriers to cross-border establishment. According to Höpner and Schäfer (Reference Höpner, Schäfer and Magone2015: 726), Weiler and Scharpf analytically differentiate between two different types of integration in the EU: political integration and judicial integration. The first form is based on intergovernmental negotiations among Member States, while the second type derives from how the Commission and the CJEU interpret EU law. With the increasing diversity in production and welfare regimes of Member States, the interpretation seems more likely to promote integration.
Harmonization of regulatory standards or the reaching of agreements on redistribution across an heterogeneous EU is difficult. Enlargement has added to the diversity of national social support systems and institutions. In fields central to the production and welfare regimes of EU countries, e.g. company taxation and codetermination, intergovernmental negotiations have often taken too long and reached a deadlock. Moreover, the negotiations have not brought about consensus on harmonization, but often the protection of national sovereignty (Höpner and Schäfer, Reference Höpner, Schäfer and Magone2015: 726).
Meanwhile, the political-economic heterogeneity of EU countries has made judicial integration more possible, as the ability of Member States to correct CJEU rulings is based on political negotiation. Any political decision to change the judgments is subject to super-majoritarian procedures. However, due to the differences in the production and welfare systems, it would be very difficult for Member States to meet the requirements made by the super-majoritarian decision rules, giving the CJEU significant room to maneuver. The court has used this room for maneuver to expand the scope of its authority and EU provisions (ibid.).
With specific reference to cross-border establishment, judicial integration rather than political integration seems more likely to cope with the remaining barriers. To demonstrate this point, this section discusses the taxation case where political integration has given way to the protection of national autonomy. At the same time, in this case, CJEU judgments have removed some tax obstacles to cross-border establishment that cannot be erased through political bargains.
With regard to political integration, according to the OECD (2012), the Commission has developed a proposal for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), in order to tackle the taxation barriers.Footnote 16 This would provide a single system for calculating the tax base of companies undertaking business in the EU. Despite some negative economic effects in the short term, the proposal, as the Commission evaluates, would significantly lower tax-related compliance expenditure for enterprises engaging in different national markets. This would particularly profit cross-border establishment. Also, the common system proposed would benefit half of multinational firms in all industries apart from finance through consolidating their cross-border losses. As held by the OECD (2012: 50), reducing set-up costs would translate into increased cross-border establishment in the EU.
However, according to Panayi (Reference Panayi2012: 257), adopting the draft CCCTB Directive remains subject to unanimity voting and its adoption is becoming more and more impossible. In practice, Member States have been unable to agree upon introducing a CCCTB in the EU (Bellingwout, Reference Bellingwout2014: 175).
Since Member States have different corporate tax systems, if an EU legislative measure on a CCCTB is adopted, some Member States will gain, while some will lose (Ernst & Young, 2011). Ireland and some other EU countries have concern that participation in a CCCTB would undermine their competitiveness and lead to decreased foreign direct investment (Munin, Reference Munin2011: 125). Ireland's tax regime has played an important role in attracting foreign investment (Morisset and Pirnia, Reference Morisset and Pirnia1999: 8).Footnote 17 Due to the nature of a CCCTB, there would be no possibility for EU countries to offer tax incentives to businesses (Lamotte, Reference Lamotte2012: 278). Moreover, Member States of Eastern Europe with flat tax rates are concerned that the harmonization could decrease their tax base, resulting in a deterioration of the governmental financial situation (Munin, Reference Munin2011: 125). After the EU's enlargement to the East, further diverse preferences increased opposition to tax harmonization (Wasserfallen, Reference Wasserfallen2013: 11).
With regard to judicial integration, relying on the freedom of establishment, some CJEU rulings in 2003 and 2004 tackled a number of tax obstacles to cross-border establishment (Vanistendael, Reference Vanistendael2006: 416). According to Garbarino (Reference Garbarino2012: 255), in Bosal (C-168/01) and Keller (C-471/04), the court permitted parent companies resident in one Member State to deduct costs incurred by their subsidiaries established in another. Moreover, the CJEU judgment in Rewe Zentralfinanz (C-347/04) allowed a controlling firm incorporated in one EU country to deduct losses stemming from write-downs on its participations in subsidiaries resident in other EU countries.Footnote 18 These rulings have dealt with some fiscal impediments the CCCTB proposal (2011) aims to address. The rules proposed by the Commission confirm the recognition of write-downs allowed by the Rewe Zentralfinanz case. Moreover, the proposal offers a single set of rules for controlling companies to calculate costs attributable to controlled firms (Garbarino, Reference Garbarino2012: 260).
The application of the freedom of establishment to national tax provisions appears to show the court's willingness to achieve integration of national tax systems (Vanistendael, Reference Vanistendael2006: 416). A case in point is the mentioned Bosal case. According to Weber, EU countries enjoy regulatory autonomy in defining the criteria for taxation. The criteria can be an economic link between the participation costs of a parent company relating to a subsidiary and the subsidiary's profits taxable in Member States. In case of defining the criteria for taxation on the basis of this link, Member States may allow the parent company to allocate the costs to the profits. Nevertheless, the CJEU did not permit this allocation, because the allocation would impose restrictions on the freedom of establishment. The author holds that the prohibition has undermined Member States’ sovereignty (Weber, Reference Weber2007). This case shows the great determination of the CJEU to take steps towards further integration of the internal market with fair and equal conditions for businesses (Vanistendael, Reference Vanistendael2003: 193).
7. Insights from standards versus rules debate on China learning from the EU
As shown by sections 5 and 6, while the strong judicial mechanism of the EU has tackled some of the remaining barriers, China's weak administrative and judicial systems seem unable to prevent the creation of licensing barriers to inter-provincial establishment. Considering the different capacities in these jurisdictions, it may be misguided for China to take the same approach as the EU to regulate inter-provincial establishment. The reason is that the EU regulation of cross-border establishment appears to depend to a considerable degree on the existence of a strong judicial system.
In the field of law and economics, there is a debate exploring the circumstances in which the ex ante rules provided by legislatures are better than standards created by judiciary or bureaucratic agencies (Faure et al., Reference Faure2010: 110). We may use the conclusion drawn from this study to investigate whether China would be better advised to develop a standard-based system of inter-provincial establishment regulation that relies heavily on courts for specification of norms, or a rule-based system that concentrates more authority in the hands of legislators.
In recent years, the law and economics literature has suggested that in countries with weak administrative capacities and inefficient judicial systems, rule-based systems are easier to manage. While rules have high initial costs, they possess enforcement and compliance cost advantages over standards. As a result, rule-based systems rather than standard-based systems may be recommendable to developing countries where limited administrative capacities are prevalent (Schäfer, Reference Schäfer2006).
Moreover, Posner (Reference Posner1998: 5) argues that in countries whose judiciary suffers from weak capacities or the lack of judicial independence, rules have one advantage not available to standards, i.e. rules can decrease the likelihood of bribery and political influence on judicial decisions. With less discretion in law enforcement, it will be more difficult for judges to misuse the law when rendering judgments, when rule-based systems are adopted.
In applying these insights to regulatory design for cross-provincial establishment in China, it is better to adopt a rule-based system of regulation. There are two reasons for this recommendation: low-capacity administrative systems and the lack of judicial independence.
First, existing administrative organs appear to face difficulties in building the capacities necessary for dealing with the abuse of administrative power by local governments. Central governmental agencies shoulder the responsibilities of formulating policies and macro-plans, but their implementation usually does not fall within the power of the departments. Instead, local authorities play a vital part in enforcing laws and policies (Liu, Reference Liu2006). It is recognized that they lay down detailed rules to implement vaguely defined central mandates and legal norms (Minzner, Reference Minzner2009: 77&78).
However, the enforcement of laws and policies by local governments turns out to be non-uniform and weak (Ma, Reference Ma2003: 157&158). As summarized by Van Rooij et al. (Reference Van Rooij2016), one can find a large body of literature arguing that in numerous fields of law and policy, enforcement of national provision is hampered by ‘local protectionism’. The reason to hamper the implementation is that strong enforcement can harm the economic interests of local governments. A strong correlation between economic growth and career advancement of local public servants has historically motivated them to violate environmental and other laws viewed as impediments to economic goals (Wang, Reference Wang2013: 380). Based on a large body of literature on local governance in China, Ahlers and Schubert (Reference Ahlers and Schubert2014: 3) hold that local authorities, as implementers, sometimes even displace the objectives of central policies. According to Huaide Ma (Reference Ma2003: 157&158), a leading scholar on Chinese administrative law, there are numerous cases where local officials disregard the law tackling local protectionism, in order to benefit local economic development.
Second, scholars recognize local administrative interference in China's courts as the principal problem that influences their activities in handling administrative litigation cases (Li, Reference Li2013: 46). Local administrative intervention in judicial decision-making remains acceptable and is even supported by party-state leaders (Liebman, Reference Liebman2007: 635). Due to local governments’ influence over the judiciary in various ways, China's judges cannot decide these cases according to law (Ma, Reference Ma2013: 8). Although courts face fewer difficulties to deal with license denial cases than cases involving socio-economic rights, courts may still render rulings favoring local governments in the first type of cases, due to local protectionism or government intervention (Peerenboom and He, Reference Peerenboom and He2009: 47). It is pointed out that litigants have a very low likelihood of winning administrative law-suits (Pei, Reference Pei1997: 841). As revealed by one judge from the China Supreme Court, the winning rate for plaintiffs against the government in administrative litigation cases has decreased from 30% in 2000s to less than 10% in recent years. The courts continue to be subject to interference, since local authorities fear that official misconduct would be curbed (Dahe Daily, 2014).
The reason why local governments are able to exert influence on the courts is that they control court finances and the appointment and removal of local judges (Ma, Reference Ma2013: 8). Specifically, within the party's own hierarchy, many local administrative officers are more powerful than the judges at the same level (O'Brien and Li, Reference O'Brien and Li2004: 84). Moreover, the local governments in China shoulder the responsibility of covering the costs of local courts at the corresponding territorial level. All the basic expenses of local courts, such as the fees for staffing, office equipment, and court buildings, are funded by local governments (Wang, Reference Wang2013: 48). Considering this relation, one cannot expect the judges to have the willingness to oppose local protectionism (Liu, Reference Liu2002: 14). Furthermore, since personal independence has not been granted to individual judges, some court presidents are said to often interfere in judicial decisions in order to meet the needs of local officials (Ma, Reference Ma2013: 8).
8. Conclusions
With a structure of multilevel governance, China and the EU both face the task of preventing lower level political entities from impeding capital mobility. In China, licensing barriers, as a main protectionist measure, are sometimes created by local authorities, leading to restrictions on inter-provincial establishment. Whether or not to create such barriers depends on various factors. For instance, if the market concerned is profitable or competitive, local governments are more likely to restrict the entry of non-local firms, in order to protect local industries. Furthermore, if investment destinations are regions where companies owned by local governments have occupied a significant market share, non-local investors may face more difficulties in establishing businesses. Moreover, in cases of establishing branches rather than subsidiaries, it is more possible for non-local firms to encounter barriers. Nevertheless, it appears to be easier for companies having strong ties with the government to expand nationwide. In the EU, a major effort has been undertaken to facilitate cross-border establishment. The remaining barriers to this activity mainly arise from national regulatory autonomy in some matters.
When considering further facilitating company mobility, importance should be attached to the institutional features of the European and Chinese legal regimes. From an institutional perspective, we should pay attention to the fact that the EU institutions have limited legislative power that is ceded by sovereign countries. Unlike the EU law-makers, with a high level of legislative centralization, Beijing faces few difficulties in legislating its internal market. However, a problem for China could be that law enforcement in this country may be ineffective at tackling local protectionism, due to low administrative capacities. Moreover, compared to their European counterparts, Chinese courts are not well-functioning and independent. Obviously, since administrative intervention in judgments often occurs, China's courts face difficulties in dealing with suits brought by firms against administrative organs who refuse to issue licenses. Another important issue is that the power of judicial review to strike down general rules has not been granted to the judiciary.
The institutional differences have a big impact on finding acceptable solutions to the barriers in China and the EU. The strong judicial mechanism of the EU has tackled some of the remaining barriers. Nevertheless, this does not mean China should adopt a standard-based system of regulation for cross-border establishment used in the EU. Instead, providing precise rules, set by the legislative authority, offers a better prospect of regulatory effectiveness for China whose administrative capacities are weak and courts are not independent. More specifically, legislative decision making in the setting of inter-provincial establishment should be taken at the central level. Moreover, national legislators should precisely and clearly prescribe which authorities are empowered to control inter-provincial establishment, and under what conditions.
Such an approach to regulate inter-provincial establishment can minimize administrative weaknesses, but cannot erase enforcement problems. It is argued that enforcement is crucial to achieve the purpose of substantive law (Faure, et al., Reference Faure2010: 105). Therefore, a future task is to study the issue of the enforcement of the rule-based legal norms, considering China's specific political and economic institutions.
About the author
Guang Shen works as a lecturer at Zhejiang Sci-Tech University (China). Guang's main research focus is on law and governance. He wrote his PhD thesis entitled ‘Regulation of cross-border establishment in China and the EU: a comparative law and economics approach’ at Maastricht University. In 2016, his thesis was published into a book by Intersentia in its Ius Commune series. During his PhD, he was the faculty representative of Maastricht University in the PhD Council of the Ius Commune Research School. He is a graduate of China–EU School of Law.
