During his career, Ronald Dworkin wrote extensively on an impressive range of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy, but, like many of his contemporaries, international law remained a topic of relative neglect.Footnote 1 His most sustained work on international law is a posthumously published article, “A New Philosophy for International Law”, which displays some familiar aspects of his views in general jurisprudence, in addition to some novel (though perhaps surprising) arguments as well. Although I explore both the similarities and differences between Dworkin’s earlier work and this posthumous publication, my primary objective is to highlight the novel aspect of this latest work. This paper will set up a comparison between a view about international law that we might have expected Dworkin to offer, given his firmly established views about state law, and the view he actually adopts in the aforementioned article. I believe there is much to learn from such a comparison, not just about Dworkin’s general jurisprudence, but about the nature of international law as well.
Let us begin with the hypothetical. Had the posthumous article never been published what might we have expected Dworkin to say about the normative, or obligatory, force of international law? Of course, it is beyond the scope of this paper to list all of the possibilities but I think there is one central thesis in Dworkin’s work that would ground any further argument we would expect him to make: namely, Dworkin’s view of law as inextricably related to morality, and in particular his view of law as integrity. In what follows I first examine the variations of this thesis found throughout his previous works. Then, I show how this thesis functions as the foundation for a number of Dworkin’s positions: including, but not limited to, his theory of rights and his conception of human dignity. Although it is not the purpose of this paper to work out, at least not in all of its detail, how Dworkin’s earlier views might be extended into the domain of international law, I put forward a rough sketch of what such a view might look like in order to contrast it with the position Dworkin ultimately adopts in “A New Philosophy for International Law”.Footnote 2
First, at this point a defender of Dworkin might object that I have already attributed a false view to him. Throughout his work Dworkin argues that we ought to treat law and morality as a unified, holistic concept that must be interpreted in a fully integrated way. The problem with speaking about a “relationship” between law and morality, then, is that it wrongly implies that any connection these concepts might share is not essential to the understanding of either—and we would do well to analyze them separately. As Dworkin writes in Justice in Robes “[w]e might do better with a different intellectual topography: we might treat law not as separate from but as a department of morality.”Footnote 3 Or, similarly, as he restates a few years later, “we now treat law as a part of political morality […] law is a branch, a subdivision, of political morality.”Footnote 4 The view that law and morality stand in essential connection, and so ought not to be separated in an account of jurisprudence, is one of Dworkin’s most distinctive theses: dating back to his earliest work on the relationship between law and rules,Footnote 5 and further developed with the idea of “law as integrity” in Law’s Empire.Footnote 6
Unlike H.L.A. Hart, and other legal positivists, Dworkin’s account of law does not rest upon some social fact, institution, or legal system, but rather rests upon arguments of political morality. As Dworkin writes in Justice in Robes, on his “integrity-based interpretation” of legal practice, “[a] proposition of law is true […] if it flows from principles of personal and political morality that provide the best interpretation of the other propositions of law generally treated as true in contemporary legal practice.”Footnote 7 Of course, one might object that Dworkin has got it wrong, that law is not related to morality in the way he has described, but given this understanding we can imagine how this would lead Dworkin to make powerful moral arguments in support of international law. Since the intention of this paper is to note the similarities and differences between what we would have expected Dworkin to say, and what he actually says about international law, I want to bracket objections that reject the central tenets of Dworkin’s position, and focus instead on how his conception of state law might be extended into the international domain.
Let us begin simply by transplanting Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity from the domain of state law to international law. Indeed, such an extension seems to be achieved with relative ease: namely, a proposition of international law is true if and only if it flows from the principles of personal and political morality that provide the best interpretation of other propositions of law generally treated as true in contemporary legal practice. The proposition “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and in rights”, then, could be understood as true insofar as it flows from the principles of personal and political morality and is consistent with the other propositions articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). In cases where propositions of international law conflict, or if they are at odds with the principles of personal and political morality, this conflict does not mean that international law does not exist as law, but rather—just as we do at the state level—that we must work to interpret these laws such that this conflict is resolved.
Insofar as international law is a “branch”, or a “part”, of the concept of law itself, I think there is good reason to believe that Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity could be extended in a way similar to the one sketched above. However, there is a complication when applying this theory of law as integrity to international law: unlike at the level of state law, in the international domain our account must answer two questions. First, what propositions count amongst those to be considered as valid propositions of international law, and, further, who ultimately decides what these propositions are? To the latter question, the corpus of Dworkin’s work stands as a resounding answer to this question: the judiciary. Of course, at the international level no such court exists (at least not one comparable to the ones that exist in mature legal systems to which Dworkin refers), but since our investigation is in the pursuit of the ideal we can posit a hypothetical international court so that we may construct an answer to the first question. To that end, I think Dworkin’s earlier work on state law also indicates where an answer might be found: rights. Thus, before answering what propositions count amongst those to be considered as valid propositions of international law, it is worthwhile to broaden our scope of inquiry to include Dworkin’s theory of rights as well.
Early in his career Dworkin was aware that his views pertaining to “rights” were tendentious: and were criticized from both ends of the political spectrum. As Dworkin writes in the introduction to Taking Rights Seriously, “[t]he idea of individual rights, in the strong sense in which that idea is defended in this book, is for them simply an exaggerated case of the disease from which the ruling theory already suffers.”Footnote 8 Indeed, loosely quoting Jeremy Bentham, Dworkin goes on to acknowledge that some critics think that rights discourse is simply “nonsense”, and the idea that citizens have “human rights”, which exist apart from the law, is “nonsense on stilts”.Footnote 9 Despite such boisterous skeptics Dworkin maintains that those who deny the existence of rights are in the minority. Thus, Dworkin offers us his famous definition of “rights” as “political trumps held by individuals”.Footnote 10 Notably, Dworkin remains committed to this initial definition of rights throughout all of his later work, and reiterates this definition of rights with an unwavering consistency. As Dworkin writes more than thirty years later, rights are “trumps over otherwise adequate justifications for political action”.Footnote 11
It is worth pausing here to get clear on what, exactly, Dworkin means when he says that rights are “trumps”. Are all rights (including, human rights, political rights, and legal rights) created equal? And, if not, what difference is there between these forms of rights? Indeed, many legal positivists would agree with Dworkin that rights are “trumps”, but would hold that the only rights which exist are those legal rights expressed by a state’s constitution or law. As only legal rights have the coercive support of the state, it follows that the only rights that are truly “trumps” are those legal rights which have been expressly affirmed by the law. Although Dworkin agrees that this is a true characterization of legal rights,Footnote 12 he disagrees with the positivists on two counts: first, legal rights are not the only rights that exist; and second, although legal rights are affirmed by the law, they do not exist because of the law. As Dworkin writes:
[l]egal rights are political rights, but a special branch because they are properly enforceable on demand through adjudicative and coercive institutions without need for further legislation or other lawmaking activity. There is nothing mysterious or metaphysical in this way of accommodating law in our structure: it supposes no emergent forces.Footnote 13
Unlike positivists, Dworkin does not think that legal rights derive from the social institutions that enforce them, but rather are derivative of political rights (which exist independently). Legal rights, on the one hand, belong to a “special branch” of political rights insofar as they are enforceable on demand without the need for further legislation. Political rights, on the other, exist as claims individuals make against governments. These claims are not “mysterious” or “metaphysical”, but rather exist as moral claims without legal force. In this way, all legal rights are also political rights, but not all political rights are recognized as legal rights.Footnote 14
Constitutional rights receive a similar analysis in Dworkin’s work. In interpreting constitutions, Dworkin argues that “constitutional provisions [do] not bottom out in any source-based rule; it is an argument of political morality all the way down.”Footnote 15 Unlike legal rights, the status of political rights is not contingent upon some social fact, but exists independently as a feature of political morality. Given this understanding of political rights, it is easy to imagine how Dworkin might extend this theory into the international domain; for, even without the existence of a world government or some similar institution, Dworkin could maintain that there are international political rights that exist as a feature of international political morality.
Still, one might point out that the mere existence of a political right tells us nothing—or at least very little—about what duty, if any, a government has to enforce them. We could imagine, for instance, an argument from political morality which gives individuals a political right to freedom of expression, and yet equally imagine reasons why a government would choose to recognize it as a legal right in only a handful of cases. Such an interpretation, however, would be disallowed on Dworkin’s account. As Dworkin writes, “the Government’s failure to extend the right will show that its recognition of the right in the original case is a sham, a promise that it intends to keep only until it becomes inconvenient.”Footnote 16 For Dworkin, then, not only do political rights exist independently of social institutions, but he could argue (indeed he has argued) that governments have an obligation to extend these rights as far as possible. There may still be disagreement as to what, exactly, falls within the scope of “possibility”, but nevertheless some legal rights do follow.
So, for Dworkin, political rights exist independently of social institutions as features of political morality. However, if political rights exist independently of social institutions, what role, if any, would “human rights” play in this picture? Indeed, there are many similarities between Dworkin’s conception of political rights and our classical understandings of human rights. Like political rights, it seems that human rights, if they exist at all, exist independently of social institutions as claims against the state. Further, even in advanced democracies (such as Canada or the United States) it seems many of these claims fall short of reaching their political ideal: either the rights remain un-instantiated by law, or are instantiated but not fully realized. Given these and other similarities, it is important to distinguish what Dworkin has in mind by drawing such a distinction between human rights and political rights.
First, as Dworkin notes in Justice for Hedgehogs, the “classical understanding” of this distinction holds that the difference between political rights and human rights is that “[h]uman rights are those that trump not merely collective national goals but also national sovereignty.”Footnote 17 In short, on the classical understanding, human rights are limited to guarding against only “truly barbaric” violations of human dignity (such as genocide), which justify economic sanctions and military action.Footnote 18 Like legal rights, on the classical understanding human rights are political rights, but only a particular set of political rights whose violation would trump the value of national sovereignty and justify state intervention.
For Dworkin, however, this classical understanding of the distinction “seems to set too high a bar”, and reducing human rights to only those political rights that would justify violating national sovereignty would leave out many other human rights that are equally valuable. Although Dworkin maintains that there exists an important distinction between human rights and political rights, he wishes to abandon the classical understanding in favour of a more abstract one. As he writes a few pages earlier: “[a]ll political rights are derivative from that fundamental one. We fix and defend particular rights by asking, in much more detail, what equal concern and respect require.”Footnote 19 What “equal concern and respect” requires is simply this: “[people] have a right to be treated with the attitude that these debates presuppose and reflect—a right to be treated as a human being whose dignity fundamentally matters”.Footnote 20 This abstract right—the right to an attitude—is the basic human right upon which all other rights are derivative. Compared to the classical understanding, the picture of human rights Dworkin puts forward here does not consider human rights as a special subset of political rights, but rather as being the political right upon which all others are derivative. Although abstract, this view is also more encapsulating than the classical doctrine as one can imagine that the right to this attitude demands (or at least claims) more than those rights whose violation would permit economic sanctions and military intervention. For instance we can imagine socio-economic rights, rights to education, health care, and paid vacation, all coming under the privy of this abstract right in a way that the classical understanding does not allow.
The distinction between human rights and other political rights, then, “is the distinction between mistake and contempt”.Footnote 21 Similar to the distinction between political rights and legal rights, across cultures, and even amongst each other, we will disagree as to what it means, in practice, to treat people with dignity. Some cultures, or nations, will decide in favour of more paternalistic policies. Others will favour market economics as a sign of respect for individual choice. In either case, we can understand how these decisions act in “good faith” towards respecting human dignity.Footnote 22 This is not to say that respecting human dignity is relative—the abstract attitude is truly universal—but rather that there are permissible, and expected, levels of variation. I emphasize, once again, that like political rights, human rights are not contingent upon some social fact, but exist independently as a feature of political morality. These are the rights one has in virtue of being human, and although we could imagine good faith understandings (such as governments having different obligations to foreigners than fellow citizens), it is clear that the concept of human rights would be meaningless if we owed nothing to foreigners at all. As Dworkin colourfully writes, in his book Is Democracy Possible Here?, “[t]he domain of human rights has no place for passports”.Footnote 23
Before turning to what Dworkin actually wrote about international law, I want to briefly consider another example of how we might imagine Dworkin’s views extending into the domain of international law, by drawing on his conception of human dignity. As seen in his theory of rights above, his conception of human dignity both functions as the basis for human rights, and sets additional limitations around “good” and “bad faith” interpretations of these rights. His conception of human dignity thus underwrites his theory of rights as the reason why individuals have claims against coercive governments (and further, why these claims ought to be recognized, as far as possible, as legal rights). However, even if we leave his theory of rights aside, I think human dignity offers another reason why Dworkin would be in support of international law: namely, it is a moral imperative.
As articulated above, drawing upon Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity, it seems to be a small step to say that a proposition of international law is true if and only if it flows from the principles of personal and political morality that provide the best interpretation of other propositions of international law generally treated as true in contemporary legal practice and interpreted in a holistic way. Insofar as respecting human dignity is foundational to any conception of personal or political morality, then surely some propositions of international law flow from it.
Although I think there are some problems with Dworkin’s conception of human dignity, nevertheless it is relatively easy to see how this both supports his conception of human rights, and, on its own, would support the establishment of international law. Without dwelling on the specifics, Dworkin articulates two principles which together form the basis and conditions of human dignity: the first is the principle of objective value, which “holds that each human life has a special kind of objective value”; the second is the principle of personal responsibility, which “holds that each person has a special responsibility for realizing the success of his own life.”Footnote 24 Insofar as all human beings have this objective value, regardless of where they happened to be born, states, judges, and legislators have a moral obligation to recognize, and protect, this value. Given the prevalence of circumstances which threaten this most basic value of human beings, states, judges, and legislators cannot remain morally neutral in these cases by saying that such violations are beyond the domain of their jurisdiction, and thus have both a moral and legal obligation to protect this value.Footnote 25
Although there are other ways one could imagine Dworkin extending his views into the domain of international law, I have sought to demonstrate how his theory of law as integrity suggests that, whatever argument he might pursue, it would be an argument from the principles of personal and political morality all the way down. As seen above, one could imagine making such an argument from his theory of rights, holding that political and human rights exist independently of social institutions as features of political morality. The most basic of these rights is the right to an attitude: the right to be treated as a person whose dignity fundamentally matters. Further, even if he were to abandon his theory of rights as being too contentious, we saw how this conception of human dignity would create both a moral—and, by extension, legal—obligation on the part of states, judges, and legislators to protect the dignity not just of those under its domain, but of all peoples. As Dworkin writes in his final chapter of Justice for Hedgehogs, “[d]ignity is indivisible”.Footnote 26 Or, as he writes a few chapters earlier, dignity is the “inviolable” value of human beings.Footnote 27 Although Dworkin does allow a distinction between being “mistaken” and showing “contempt” for human dignity, the latter is always cause for action.
I. Dworkin’s Actual Account
In the section above I proposed that we imagine what we might have expected Dworkin to say about international law if his final essay had never been published. Although there are many arguments that we could imagine him making, I considered the dominant argument that we find, in a variety of forms, throughout his works: namely, the argument from the view of law as integrity. However, in the posthumous publication of, “A New Philosophy for International Law”, the moralized account of law seems to be conspicuously missing. Indeed, instead of an argument for the moral underpinnings, and necessity, of international law, we find, quite surprisingly, an argument based upon a form of political realism.
Before discussing the elements of Dworkin’s argument that are, uncharacteristically, realist, it is worth noting that there are several aspects of this article which are unsurprising. For instance, Dworkin begins by examining the origins of international law’s “existential question”: discussing the reasons earlier positivists denied the existence of international law as law; and why the affirmative accounts provided by the later positivists have failed. As such, Dworkin positions his account of international law as a response to H.L.A. Hart and other legal positivists. Briefly, Dworkin describes three stages that legal positivism has undergone since the beginning of his career. In the first and second stage, Austin and Hart denied the existence of “international law as law”. In the third stage, which dominates much of contemporary scholarship, current positivists and others accept the core beliefs of these earlier positivists, but maintain that they (particularly Hart) overlooked important features which would have allowed them to recognize the existence of an international legal system. As Dworkin’s own account seeks to take the objections raised by the first and second stages of legal positivism seriously,Footnote 28 to proceed I want to both sketch these familiar positions and articulate some of Dworkin’s objections to them.
First, Austin’s challenge to the existence of “international law as law” can be summarized as follows: by definition, law is the command of an uncommanded commander, and since there is no such sovereign ruler (or governing body) presiding over all nations, it follows that there is no international law. In short, for Austin, the existential question of whether “international law is law?” is primarily a matter of fact. If one wants to know whether international law exists, one simply has to go looking for whether such institutions exist. It follows that since no such sovereign authority presides over all nations, Austin can definitively answer whether international law is law: it’s not.
However, as Hart points out, Austin’s theory not only denies the existence of international law, but calls into question the existence of (most) state law as well—for, in all but a few authoritarian regimes, there exists no such sovereign authority that satisfies Austin’s criterion. Hart thus adopts a more “sophisticated” version of positivism which broadens the “set of social facts that give rise to law” beyond Austin’s absolute sovereign.Footnote 29 Unlike Austin, for Hart, law is said to “exist” when a political community, though mainly its officials, comes to accept two kinds of rules: primary rules, being those which prescribe and affect the behaviour of those under its dominion; and secondary rules, being those that stipulate how law is created, enforced, and identified. Of these secondary rules, Hart stipulates that for law to exist at all “the rule of recognition”, which ensures the validity of all subsequent law, must always be present.Footnote 30 In short, although Hart disagrees with Austin as to what social fact is relevant to the existence of international law, he remains committed to the idea that the answer to whether or not law exists is a matter of fact—contingent upon a political community’s social and political history.
In spite of this disagreement, however, Hart was still unable to find a system of practices that could be described as international law. Although there are examples of primary rules in the international domain (such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), Hart argues that there are no corresponding secondary rules, or rule of recognition, that ground these primary rules within a legal system. Thus, although Hart remained open to the possibility of speaking of international law as a “sociological concept”, he ultimately denied international law the full status of law.
Nevertheless, the field has changed significantly since the 1950s. Many contemporary international lawyers, such as Samantha Besson, have sought to construct a doctrinal account which affirms the existence of international law as law.Footnote 31 However, as Dworkin (albeit briefly) summarizes, these theories “assume that a sovereign state is subject to international law but […] only so far as it has consented to be bound by that law, and they take that principle of consent to furnish an international rule of recognition.”Footnote 32 Like Hart, contemporary positivism retains the core tenet of Austin’s theory: holding that it is a matter of fact, or political history, whether or not a state has consented to international law.Footnote 33 Unlike Hart, however, contemporary positivists claim to have “found” an existing secondary rule (the principle of consent) in the international community that corresponds to the “rule of recognition” in its domestic counterpart.Footnote 34
On the one hand, Dworkin acknowledges that these theories have the explanatory advantage of solving the paradox of state sovereignty: namely, states are bound by international law not because of some international sovereign, but because they have consented to it. Indeed, these theories, what I have called the “third stage” of positivism, have become widely popular amongst international lawyers and legal scholars and can be credited for the shift towards accepting international law’s legitimacy. On the other hand, however, Dworkin thinks these positivistic theories are still wanting, as they offer no means of prioritizing amongst the different “sources” of law they recognize.Footnote 35 Further, and perhaps most damaging to these theories, even if we were to accept “consent” as the basis for international law, this offers no standard for adjudicating between different interpretations of texts (either international charters or agreements), and it is unclear whose consent, if any, counts as “the state” consenting to be subject to international law. As Dworkin argues, although it is common practice to speak of states as “persons”, or as having “agency”, it is “unclear whose opinion, among the different officers or citizens of these states, counts as manifesting a state opinion”.Footnote 36 As Dworkin remarks a few pages later, the fictional “personhood” we often assign to states cannot bear the justificatory work we need it to do—for we need an explanation of why the citizens of a given country continue to be bound by international law, even when all, or a majority, of their internal political make up has changed.Footnote 37
Dworkin offers other reasons for rejecting the positivistic theories, but suffice it to say that he believes that pursuing such an account “would quickly come to an interpretive dead end” and that “we cannot take self-limiting consent of sovereign nations to be the basic ground of international law”.Footnote 38 In addition to the many problems listed above, the foremost problem with such positivistic theories is that they treat legal principles as matters of fact, or political history, which could have just as easily been otherwise. As Dworkin writes in this most recent essay, “[i]t won’t do to say that they follow the principle that what they regard as law is law. They need some other standard to decide what they should regard as law”.Footnote 39 This objection stands at the centre of much of Dworkin’s work, dating back to Taking Rights Seriously, and serves to motivate his theory of law as integrity. Dworkin thus rejects consent-based accounts of international law: arguing that consent is both insufficient, and unnecessary, as a ground of international law’s legitimacy.Footnote 40
Positivism therefore functions as the foil against which Dworkin constructs his own theory of international law: turning his attention to finding the more “basic principle” upon which the legitimacy of international law can rest. As Dworkin writes, “[i]f we find an answer, it is that more basic principle, not the fact of consent, that provides or is thought to provide the grounds for international law.”Footnote 41 Or, similarly, as he restates a few pages later, “[w]e must locate the source of political obligation elsewhere: in my view, we must locate it in the more general phenomenon of associative obligation.”Footnote 42 In constructing his own theory, Dworkin’s first move away from positivism therefore is to shift the way we think about the concept of “law” itself. Unlike Hart, or other positivistic theories, that treat the concept of law as a “criterial concept”, Dworkin thinks that the “doctrinal concept of law” is best understood as an “interpretive concept”. By this Dworkin means that we share our concept of law not by agreeing about tests for its application (such as agreeing that a triangle is a three sided figure), but “by agreeing that something important turns on its application and then disagreeing, sometimes dramatically, about what tests are therefore appropriate to its use.”Footnote 43 To quote Dworkin at length:
Any theory about the correct analysis of an interpretive political concept must be a normative theory: a theory of political morality about circumstances in which something ought or ought not to happen. Since the doctrinal conception of law is interpretive, we provide a theory of the grounds of law by posing and answering questions of political morality […]
we identify the law of a community by asking which rules its citizens or officials have a right they can demand be enforced by its coercive institutions without any further collective political decision.Footnote 44
The more basic principle that provides the “grounds” for international law is found in our theory of political morality. The “test” for identifying which moral obligations constitute legal obligations is to ask which of these rules can be enforced without further legislation.
At this point, one might observe that the account Dworkin has put forward does not look like political realism at all. In fact, it looks almost identical to the argument that we imagined Dworkin making earlier. Indeed, we can point to at least three unsurprising features of Dworkin’s argument so far: first, he has put forward his theory as a response to legal positivism—a contrast he set up in virtually all of his previous work. Second, he has stated his intentions to find the “grounds” for international law by asking questions pertaining to political morality—a move consistent with his conception of law as integrity. Last, he emphasizes the role of rights in relation to law—and his definition of rights as “rules” which can be enforced without any further political decisions is consistent with the definition of “legal rights” seen above.
In the ensuing series of questions, however, Dworkin’s language is emblematic of the radically different argument found in this work. As Dworkin writes:
How far can we construct an international jurisprudence on the same understanding? How far can we treat international law as a part, but a very distinct part, of what morality and decency require of states and other international bodies in their treatment of one another?Footnote 45
This second question is an odd one for Dworkin to raise, since, as seen in our thought experiment, it would seem that Dworkin has recourse to only one answer: namely, international law must be treated as a part of political morality “all the way down”.Footnote 46 In response to these questions, however, we do not find an argument for political morality, but rather an uncharacteristic concession. As Dworkin continues on the same page: “[w]e should return to what I take to be a golden age of the subject, seventeenth-century European politics, to an at least partially moralized conception of international law.”Footnote 47 In itself, this concession is not such a radical deviation from previous works to be noteworthy. And surely there is nothing to say that philosophers cannot change their positions over the course of their life. In the ensuing pages, however, what Dworkin offers as the basis of international law is not an argument for political morality, or even for a partially moralized conception of international law (whatever that might be); rather, the basis of international law that Dworkin provides is a form of political realism.
Before continuing, it is necessary to get clear on my understanding of this term. Briefly, my claim is that, on Dworkin’s account, the reason states act in compliance with international law is not, as we might have expected, a moral reason, but rather is explained by circumstances that align with a state’s self-interest. To quote two self-identified realists, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner describe their theory of international law as giving “pride of place to two elements of international politics […] state power and state interests”.Footnote 48 As they continue a few pages later, “[i]nternational law emerges from states’ pursuit of self-interested policies on the international stage. International law is, in this sense, endogenous to state interests. It is not a check on state self-interest; it is a product of state self-interest.”Footnote 49 When I say that the basis of Dworkin’s theory is a form of political realism, I mean that, like Goldsmith and Posner, a state’s obligation to abide by international law is endogenous to state self-interest.Footnote 50
With this end in mind, if we are going to understand Dworkin’s shift towards political realism it is important to recall that Dworkin conceives of his project as answering to the challenge put forward by Austin and Hart: namely, that since there are no (already existing) institutional structures in the international domain, that are comparable to those found in its domestic counterpart, it is unclear how we can justify the claim that international law is law.Footnote 51 Unlike state legal systems, at the international level it is unclear what it would mean to ask “what rights should be enforceable by the courts?” as there are no such institutions that already exist, with compulsory jurisdiction, that could enforce them. For many positivists, this “matter of fact” is damning to any attempt to theorize about international law, and international law is best described as a kind of “state-by-state voluntarism”. However, since there is no reason why our theories of international law must be confined to the institutions that currently exist, Dworkin’s next move is to suppose, hypothetically, that there is an international court in order to make sense of these questions. As Dworkin writes, “[i]f we can imagine such a court, even as fantasy, then we can frame a tractable question of political morality”.Footnote 52 Of course, building a theory of international law on top of a hypothetical court is unlikely to persuade people to accept the status of international law as law, but this is not Dworkin’s purpose. As Dworkin continues, the purpose of his theory is to provide the proper “scheme”, or “framework”, to “identify a general theory of what it would be appropriate for such an institution to enforce as the foundation of international law.”Footnote 53 Whether or not such a court does, or ever will, exist, is therefore irrelevant to Dworkin’s purpose. The hypothetical court is only a tool to identify what the law is.
Thus, Dworkin turns his attention to explaining why such a court would be legitimate, and answering—although very abstractly—the question of “what standards and methods it would be appropriate for [the court] to adopt”.Footnote 54 To the former, Dworkin notes that the traditional Westphalian system—which claims states should remain free from interference in their internal affairs—was established on the “old assumption that hereditary monarchs have an absolute right to govern”.Footnote 55 The domestic question of political legitimacy, then, was not only irrelevant, but in many cases was considered to be divinely determinate. In this way, the notion of a world divided up into “sovereign states” was established on the assumption that the only threats to legitimacy states faced were external threats (i.e., interference) from other state actors. But, as Dworkin points out, the assumption that hereditary monarchs have an absolute right to govern has long since been left behind. In its place another assumption has taken hold: namely, “that coercive political power is consistent with the dignity of citizens only if it can be justified not just in pedigree but in substance—in the way it is exercised—as well.”Footnote 56
The modern question, then, is not the paradox of state sovereignty, but rather the question of “what justifies coercive political power?”Footnote 57 This question, Dworkin continues, “arises not just within each of the sovereign states who are members of the Westphalian system but about the system itself.”Footnote 58 Thus, in the same way the “old assumption” of political legitimacy created an obligation to respect state sovereignty in the Westphalian system, the “modern assumption” creates an obligation for states “to try and improve the overall international system”.Footnote 59 As Dworkin reiterates: “[i]f a state can help to facilitate an international order in a way that would improve the legitimacy of its own coercive government, then it has a political obligation to do what it can in that direction.”Footnote 60 This obligation does not assign to states the same responsibilities for all people as those under its own domain, but, as Dworkin clarifies, “it does require a state to accept feasible and shared constraints on its power”.Footnote 61 The acceptance of such shared constraints on state power is what lends (or would lend) legitimacy to an international court, and the acknowledgment of a state’s obligation to improve its own legitimacy forms “the true moral basis for international law”.Footnote 62
It is worth pausing here to emphasize the odd principle that Dworkin has described as the true moral basis for international law. Unlike the argument we imagined earlier, instead of an argument for political morality all the way down, the basis for international law Dworkin puts forward here is the state’s interest in furthering its own legitimacy. Similarly, although Dworkin pays homage to his concern for the “dignity of citizens”, instead of speaking of dignity as an “indivisible”, or “inviolable” value, as was the case in earlier works,Footnote 63 here Dworkin considers it as one value among many. The dignity of citizens does not constitute a “trump” which supervenes upon all other state interests, but is subjugated to the values of furthering world order and the state’s own political legitimacy: the latter being the “true moral basis” for all other obligations. The basis for Dworkin’s argument, then, is not moral at all, but rather relies upon the realist argument which grounds any obligation that states have to international law in the interest of furthering its’ own legitimacy.
At this point, one might object by saying that although the foundation Dworkin proposes is realist, nevertheless the judges presiding over this hypothetical court could still rely on moral arguments for the law’s interpretation. In short, one might argue that Dworkin makes an appeal to political realism as a way of generating obedience to the law, but this is not to say the moral arguments do not take precedent at the level of the judiciary. However, Dworkin negates this possibility by clarifying, a few pages later, that the aforementioned principle functions not only as the basis for international law, but also as its “interpretive background”.Footnote 64 To quote Dworkin at length:
Coercive government (I include not just traditional “sovereign” states but also any institution or organization claiming coercive authority) has a standing duty to improve its own legitimacy. Each traditional state therefore has a duty to pursue available means to mitigate the failures and risks of the sovereign-state system. That duty of mitigation provides the most general structural principle and interpretive background for international law.Footnote 65
The principle of mitigation, the standing duty of states to improve their own legitimacy,Footnote 66 thus functions as both the foundation of international law, and the interpretive background against which that law is applied.
Still, one might object to the above criticisms by arguing that when Dworkin says that “states have an obligation to improve their own legitimacy”, this obligation, at the very least, includes a moral obligation to its citizen. If this is the case, it follows that its obligation to promote international order is likewise a moral obligation and is thus fully consistent with Dworkin’s other writings on law and morality. However, it is worth noting that in a later section—speaking about the NATO invasion of Kosovo—Dworkin depicts Tom Frank’s conviction that Kosovo was “a morally mandatory act of international civil disobedience” as a “dangerous description”.Footnote 67 As Dworkin continues, “[i]nternational law is fragile, still nascent and in critical condition. The proposition that a sense of moral duty can justify violations of international law threatens to strangle the child.”Footnote 68 It seems, then, that we ought to take Dworkin’s realist account of international law more seriously than we might otherwise be inclined. Unlike Dworkin’s conception of human dignity as “inviolable”, or his conception of rights as “trumps” which override all other political projects (including national security), the account of international law Dworkin offers here favours improving state legitimacy, and international order, above all other values.
The implication the realist foundation has for Dworkin’s theory of international law is clear: a state’s obligation to international law is derivative of its standing duty to improve its own legitimacy. Those other values, (such as: justice, human dignity, and political morality), which govern the realm of state law, do not extend into the relations between international bodies and states. On the international level, state interests reign supreme, and the standing duty for states to improve their own legitimacy is the core value upon which all others derive and are interpreted against.
II. Three Interpretations
The question remains as to how we are to interpret Dworkin’s uncharacteristic argument for political realism as the basis for international law. For the remainder of this paper I put forward three possible interpretations: the first two are related to application, and the last proposes an asymmetry between international law and state law.
a) Incorrect Application
The first interpretation of this (apparent) inconsistency between what we would have expected Dworkin to say about international law, and what he actually said, is that Dworkin misapplied his own theory. Indeed, as noted in section two, although the foundation, or the true moral basis, Dworkin ultimately adopts for international law is uncharacteristic, the arguments which led Dworkin to make this claim were certainly familiar. As seen throughout his other works, Dworkin takes his theory to be a response to the failure of Hart, and other source-based theories, to give an account of international law that doesn’t rely on consent or succumb to obvious criticisms. Further, Dworkin’s rendering of a hypothetical international court is neither surprising, and is fully consistent with the emphasis he places on the role of judges and adjudication in his theory of state law. Coupled with the fact that this work remained unfinished, and it is noted by the editor of Philosophy and Public Affairs that Dworkin died before the article could be fully revised, it is possible to interpret Dworkin’s latest work as a misapplication, or perhaps only a “misstep” in the application, of his own theory.
This interpretation may prima facie be farfetched, but I do not think it can be dismissed so easily. Indeed, it is not uncommon to suppose that prominent political and legal theorists, who developed their theories squarely in the context of the single state, erred in the extension of their theories to international law. Jeremy Waldron, for instance, argues that Hart similarly misapplied his theory of state law to the international domain. As Waldron notes, when reading Hart’s final chapter of The Concept of Law,Footnote 69 one can’t escape feeling that “it seems like an afterthought” and that “it departs quite markedly from the flow of the main argument of the book’s later chapters”.Footnote 70 Similarly, a few pages later, Waldron maintains that Hart’s view of international law gives the impression that “[Hart’s] interest in the subject has just run out. His arguments become careless and their application thoughtless in regard to law in this area”.Footnote 71 As seen in the brief summary of Hart’s position in the previous section, Waldron claims that—by Hart’s own standard—Hart was wrong to say that there were no comparable institutions at the international level which could satisfy his requirements. Indeed, even when Hart first published his book, institutions like the International Court of Justice satisfied the success conditions Hart laid out in previous chapters.Footnote 72
But Hart is not alone either. Thomas Pogge has, by the same token, argued that John Rawls is guilty of a similar blunder when he attempted to extend his theory of justice into the international domain. As Pogge notes, whereas in, “The Law of Peoples”,Footnote 73 Rawls proposes that the international order contains “no egalitarian distributive component”, in Pogge’s own understanding of Rawls’ theory, he argues that “a criterion of global justice must be sensitive to social and economic inequalities”.Footnote 74 Indeed, Pogge notes that there are two strategies that we could easily imagine Rawls adopting: the first, extending his two principles of justice to the international order; and second, beginning with a kind of “global original position”.Footnote 75 Remarkably, however, Rawls pursues neither of these strategies: maintaining that there is no such analogue between the institutional inequalities existing at the state level and those existing at the international level.Footnote 76
Of course, it does not follow from the fact that others might have misapplied their own theories that Dworkin might have as well.Footnote 77 But the difference from what we might have expected Dworkin to say, and what he actually said, does provide reason to explore whether misapplication might have occurred.
b) Correct Application, but Underlying Problem
The second interpretation available is that Dworkin was correct in his application of his theory to international law, but the tension found within this final paper highlights an underlying problem with Dworkin’s theory of jurisprudence. To begin with the positive portion of this claim, there are (at least) two sources of textual support, in Dworkin’s earlier works, which suggests that he applied his theory correctly to the domain of international law. First, Dworkin consistently claimed that a necessary condition for legitimate governments is to show equal concern and respect for those under its own dominion: those falling outside of its dominion being the responsibility of someone else. For instance, in Is Democracy Possible Here?, Dworkin writes that governments “must indeed show an equal concern for each of the people over whom it claims dominion.”Footnote 78 Or, similarly, as Dworkin echoes in Justice for Hedgehogs, “[g]overnments have a sovereign responsibility to treat each person in their power with equal concern and respect”.Footnote 79 The implication of these statements, and others like them, is clear: the legitimacy of coercive governments depends on them treating their own citizens with equal concern and respect, but this obligation does not extend to those outside of its dominion.
The second source of textual support, which also lends support to the suggestion that Dworkin applied his theory correctly, is found in Dworkin’s understanding of the relationship between dignity and Kant’s moral philosophy. As previously mentioned, Dworkin considers there to be two principles that work together to form the definition of dignity: namely, the principle of objective value, and the principle of authenticity. Although these principles, at least prima facie, are in conflict with one another, Dworkin holds that they “describe a single perspective [one] must occupy if [one] is ethically responsible”.Footnote 80 The ethical person, then, must find an interpretation of each principle which is both satisfying in itself, and reinforces our understanding and obedience to the other.
With this understanding of dignity in place, Kant’s moral philosophy (which underwrites much of Dworkin’s work) offers two essential contributions. First, it solidifies the idea that ethics (a way of living) and morality (the duties one has to others) are interdependent.Footnote 81 The second contribution stems from Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative: that one achieves the dignity and self-respect necessary for living an ethical life “only if he shows respect for humanity itself in all its forms”.Footnote 82 As Dworkin writes later in the same book, Kant’s categorical imperative “holds that a proper form of self-respect—the self-respect demanded by that first principle of dignity—entails a parallel respect for the lives of all human beings”.Footnote 83
But isn’t this precisely the moral argument we would have imagined Dworkin making in support of international law? If the argument we find in “A New Philosophy for International Law” really is as divergent as I have claimed, how could this particular understanding of Kantian ethics and dignity be used to support it? Briefly, it is important to note Dworkin’s conception of the pedigree, or source, of our moral obligations to others. To quote another passage, Dworkin writes: “[y]ou must treat yourself as an end in yourself, and therefore, out of self-respect, you must treat all other people as ends in themselves as well”.Footnote 84 As this quotation, and others like it, demonstrates, the source of our moral obligation to treat others with respect stems from our obligation to respect ourselves.
Given this understanding of the sources of our moral obligations, it is a small step to see that when Dworkin extended his theory into the international domain, states qua state actors shared the same source for their obligations as well: namely, their interests in furthering their own legitimacy. Further, as the legitimacy of a coercive government depends solely on how it treats its own citizens, it follows that a state’s obligation to furthering international order exists only when its citizens are directly affected. We could imagine states having obligations to respect peace treaties, trade agreements, and perhaps to provide minimal amounts of foreign aid to negate the possibility of future wars, but this would be contingent on whether one could trace the link between these obligations and their legitimacy with respect to their own citizens.
Although I accept that this understanding of Dworkin is available, I think that recasting Dworkin’s moral theory to fit what he came to say about international law does not serve to make Dworkin’s position consistent, but highlights a more general problem found within his theory. There are several problems of consistency if we try to maintain a reading of Dworkin that fits with his theory of international law.
First, it is unclear what grounds Dworkin has for claiming that a state’s moral obligations to its own citizens differ from its obligations to those who are not under its dominion. Indeed, Dworkin notes that although one can quite easily imagine why one might have a special kind of obligation to one’s “parents, children, lovers, and friends” it is unclear how we can justify similar “special” obligations to our fellow citizens.Footnote 85 As Dworkin continues, it is often true that people share “denser personal relations with foreigners than with all but a few fellow citizens”.Footnote 86 Although it might be the case that a government should only extend certain rights (such as the right to vote) to its citizens, it does not follow that governments have no moral obligations to those not under its dominion.
Second, even if Dworkin could provide adequate reasons to support this claim, it is unclear that he would find such an argument desirable. As he writes, although we may disagree about what it means to treat someone with dignity, “the general thrust is clear enough: treating people with the respect we accord ourselves requires, at a minimum, that we claim no right in ourselves that we do not grant others and suppose no duty for them we do not accept for ourselves”.Footnote 87 Or, similarly, as he continues, “respect for all requires equal protection of the moral law”.Footnote 88
At this point, one might object by noting that Dworkin clearly states that respect requires equal protection of the moral law, while saying nothing about equal protection of law qua legal system. Like Rawls, one could argue that Dworkin has bracketed questions of personal morality, discussing here only questions of public morality. However, whereas such a bracketing might be fruitful for other philosophers, it is not an available interpretation of Dworkin’s view. As Dworkin writes, “[o]ur integration project has a centrifugal force that does not allow bracketing: we must attempt as wide a comprehensive theory as we are able to construct, not out of a taste for complexity but out of a philosophical necessity”.Footnote 89 Coupled with the relationship between law and morality explored earlier, this textual evidence casts doubt over any attempt to reconcile Dworkin’s earlier works with his latest essay.
Although I think it is doubtful that we can find a consistent interpretation between Dworkin’s earlier work and his latest essay, nevertheless, in attempting to do so, it has illuminated several tensions that are found throughout Dworkin’s philosophy. Reconciling these tensions is beyond the scope of this paper, but, before turning to the third interpretation, I want to suggest their source: Dworkin’s account of dignity.
As mentioned previously, Dworkin considers our obligation to respect people’s dignity—to treat them with a certain attitude—as the foundational human right upon which all others are derivative. Unfortunately, Dworkin provides little argument to explain why it is that humans have this dignity in the first place. Indeed, Dworkin seems to rely on the assumption that people will intuitively accept the idea that human beings are vested with this special kind of value, and thus devotes the majority of his time to explaining what it means to respect it.
Other philosophers, including John Rawls and Charles Taylor,Footnote 90 have been sympathetic to such an approach: and their theories openly rely on, what they take to be, a shared intuition about human rights. They argue that what is important is that we agree upon what human rights are, and leave discussions of why we have them for another time. Indeed, Dworkin recognizes the advantages to such an approach, and notes that “it would be wise tactics not to stress the principled foundations of our view when we know others would reject those foundations”.Footnote 91 However, coming to an agreement as to what human rights are, without considering why it is that we have them is insufficient. After all, the reasons why we have them surely has some bearing on what they are. Indeed, Dworkin is aware of the limits of such an approach, and continues by noting that “we need to know what we ourselves believe about human rights before we begin to negotiate or persuade. Otherwise we can have no proper aim in view.”Footnote 92 Unfortunately, it appears that Dworkin has overlooked this failure within his own account: failing to ground his notion of dignity such that we have an understanding of why we have it, or what, exactly, it is.
The second interpretation, then, is a non-starter. Although it may be possible to interpret what Dworkin says about international law such that it is consistent with his earlier work, trying to recast Dworkin’s theory in this way points to underlying tensions within his theory. The source of these tensions, as I have argued, is a failure to ground his understanding of dignity. Although Dworkin devotes countless pages to explaining what it means to respect it, he does not provide an argument for why we have it in the first place. If Dworkin’s account is to be rescued, then, we must take up his challenge and “correct his account”.Footnote 93 But such a correction must await another occasion.
c) Asymmetry Between International Law and State-Law
The last interpretation for how we ought to understand Dworkin’s (unexpected) argument for international law does not take a stance on whether Dworkin applied his theory correctly or incorrectly to the international domain. Instead, the third interpretation of Dworkin’s marked departure from his theory of state law rests on a presumption of asymmetry between international law and its domestic counterpart. If we are to attribute any blameworthiness to Dworkin, it is not an aloofness to how to extend his theory, but a failure to articulate the differences between the two.
Although Dworkin fails to acknowledge this difference in his final essay, in previous works he is (perhaps ironically) astutely aware of how the differences between “primitive” and “advanced” legal systems affect subsequent explanation and interpretation of law.Footnote 94 As Dworkin writes,
Suppose the legal system in which the judges operate is a primitive legal system: there are very few judicial precedents or statues, and a very rudimentary constitution. It is probable, in advance of any particular judicial term, both that the judges will judge that several cases in that term are ties, and that in fact several cases will be ties. Since there is very little settled law, more than one theory of law, critically different for the result in a hard case, will often offer equally good justifications for the settled law, and will seem to offer equally good justifications to many judges.
As Dworkin continues,
But suppose, on the other hand, that the legal system these judges administer is very advanced, and is thick with constitutional rules and practices, and dense with precedents and statutes. The antecedent probability of a tie is very much lower; indeed it might well be so low as to justify a further ground rule of the enterprise which instructs judges to eliminate ties from the range of answers they might give.Footnote 95
Primitive systems, on the one hand, are underdeveloped such that, in hard cases, there is a distinct possibility of indeterminacy. Without centuries of precedent, and “settled law” to draw upon, there may be many interpretations available for a given legal decision: leading to an abundance of indeterminate cases, or “ties”. Advanced systems, in contrast, are less susceptible to these problems: drawing on a “thick” history of precedents, practices, and constitutional rules which enables this kind of indeterminacy to be mitigated (if not eliminated entirely).
Although Dworkin does not draw the aforementioned distinction in terms of international law and state law, I think the overlap is clear enough. State law, at least as it exists in most nations, is advanced: thick with constitutional rules and practices, and dense with precedents and statutes. International law, on the other hand, might very well still be primitive: containing few precedents and statutes, and a rudimentary constitution (if it has one at all). This is not to say that international law is not law, but rather—as it currently exists—that it is at an early stage of development.
There is, however, a second failure associated with the unacknowledged asymmetry between international law and state law: namely, it persuades people to think of state law as the Archimedean point against which international law is to be judged. On this view, the existential question of “whether international law is law?” is answered only by looking for comparable institutions, or systems, to those found in its domestic counterpart. To put the matter more succinctly, when we fail to acknowledge the innate differences between international law and state law, and judge international law against our domestic theories, we assume our models of state law to be correct. This assumption, I think, must be resisted. And the failure of Dworkin, and others, to extend their models of state law into the international domain stands as evidence for thinking that our theories of state law are in need of refinement.
Ironically, Dworkin warns of this tautology—that law is law—early in his career,Footnote 96 and correctly notes at the beginning of this posthumous essay that although people generally agree that international law exists, this is not to say that the existential question of law does not need an answer.Footnote 97 The third interpretation of Dworkin’s theory thus argues that Dworkin’s failure does not have to do with the application of his theory, but failing to communicate the asymmetry between international law and state law. In short, Dworkin would have been wise to heed his own advice, and note that “[i]f we shake ourselves loose from this model of rules, we may be able to build a model truer to the complexity and sophistication of our own practices.”Footnote 98
III. Conclusion
I think that all three of the above interpretations of how we ought to understand the difference between what we might have expected Dworkin to say, and what he actually said, about international law are available. To conclude, then, I want to emphasize that I do not think this difference indicates that our concept, and practice, of international law should be abandoned. However, if we are going to continue to advance a discussion about international law I want to make two suggestions as to how I think this discussion should proceed. First, regardless of the interpretation one adopts, it is important to appreciate the differences that exist between international law and state law. To use Dworkin’s metaphor, international law is like a child, and we must not expect it to have all of the answers worked out already. However, unlike Dworkin, I do not think that supplementing the failures of international law with a sense of a “moral duty” is a threat. To push the metaphor a bit further, like a child we must take care to guide international law’s development, and sometimes this means supplanting its authority with moral norms. We must be careful not to supplant excessively, or needlessly, but the worry is not that these actions will “strangle the child”, but that the child will fail to develop and flourish. I think Dworkin is correct insofar as our moral duties cannot always justify violations of international law, but to never allow for such violations while it is still nascent will surely stunt its growth.
My second suggestion has to do with the role of foundations: namely, although foundations are important, we must not become fixated upon them. As previously mentioned, I think the underlying problem for Dworkin’s theory of human rights is his failure to articulate a foundation for human dignity. Although I think Dworkin is correct in much of what he says about dignity, and what it means to respect it, failing to articulate what it is, or why we have it, leaves the term underdeveloped and incomplete. Getting clear on what dignity is, why we have it, and what this means, is essential to a continued discourse on human rights. Importantly, getting clear on the second-order foundations of human rights is not to the exclusion of other first-order moral principles. Indeed, Dworkin’s rejection of meta-ethics and other second-order questions is largely founded on the concern that we will give up important first-order considerations for second-order reasons. But I think Dworkin’s dismissal of meta-ethics comes too quickly—for there is no reason for the two to be mutually exclusive. Moving forward we must be willing to work from both directions: both from bottom-up foundational arguments, and top-down first-order moral commitments. There is much that we can learn from each, and we must be willing to modify our views accordingly.
