INTRODUCTION
Over the past three decades one of the more striking developments across the communist and post-communist world has been the resurgence of religion. In countries where ruling elites once set out to eradicate religious beliefs, temples, churches and mosques have proliferated; religious instruction has returned to many public schools; top leaders openly celebrate religious festivals; and citizens tend to place more trust in religious institutions than political ones (Sarkissian Reference Sarkissian2009; Froese Reference Froese2008; Krindatch Reference Krindatch2006; Greeley Reference Greeley2002; Ramet Reference Ramet1998). Even in countries where communists have remained in power, religious growth is unmistakable. In China religious adherents now outnumber communist party members by four to one, and the Vietnamese Communist Party recently reported that roughly 24% of members were also members of a religious congregation (Madsen Reference Madsen2011; Wu Reference Wu2007; Trần Thị Liên Reference Trần Thị Liên2013).
A number of explanations have been offered for this growth of religious life. One is that as these regimes distance themselves from communist ideals and ruling elite look for new sources of legitimacy an ideological vacuum has emerged. This vacuum creates an opening for religion to offer not only an alternative belief system and moral framework, but also to provide a new identity (Madsen Reference Madsen2011; Froese Reference Froese2008; Wang Reference Wang2002; Nathan Reference Nathan1997; Ding Reference Ding1994). Another explanation points to growing uncertainty brought about by transition politics, including rising inflation, growing inequality, and the erosion of the social safety net. Here, the argument parallels one made by Max Weber where religion provides reassurances and relief in times of heightened insecurity (Yang Reference Yang2005, 425). A growing number of scholars also suggest the answers may be found in economics (Gill Reference Gill2008; Jelen Reference Jelen2002; Stark and Finke Reference Stark and Finke2000; Iannaccone Reference Iannaccone1998; Stark and Bainbridge Reference Stark and Bainbridge1985). The economic study of religion — commonly called the religious economy approach — assumes that religious markets follow a similar logic as commercial ones. There are benefits to competition, burdens to any monopoly, and dangers from too much government interference (Iannaccone Reference Iannaccone1991).
The purpose of this article is to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the religious economy approach by applying it to the communist and post-communist religious revival. The application of the religious economy approach to this region is instructive because the building blocks of this theory and previous empirical evaluations rest heavily on Protestant and democratic countries (especially the United States), where the state has adopted a laissez-faire approach toward religion.Footnote 1 In contrast, the communist and post-communist region is religiously plural, includes countries that experienced the breakdown of state-socialism in 1989–1991 as well as those where the communist party remains in power, and is made-up of political regimes with diverse political and economic characteristics where the state tends to plays an active role in the regulation of religion.Footnote 2
This study applies the religious economy approach to two anchors of the communist and post-communist world: Russia and China. These countries were selected for comparison because their similarities, yet differences make for a particularly important evaluation of the religious economy approach. On the one hand, Russia and China are home-grown communist regimes that share histories of religious repression and decade-long campaigns designed to eradicate religion. They both have also experienced diverse religious revivals over the past three decades (see, e.g., Yang Reference Yang2012; Madsen Reference Madsen2011; Marsh Reference Marsh2011; Chau Reference Chau2011; Ashiwa and Wank Reference Ashiwa and Wank2009; Filatov Reference Filatov2002; Bourdeaux Reference Bourdeaux2000; Kaariainen Reference Kaariainen1998; Ramet Reference Ramet1998). In Russia, for instance, the Orthodox Church claims a majority of the population, but also competes for believers with Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, and a host of new religious communities, such as Baha'i, Hare Krishnas, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Seventh Day Adventists. The Chinese religious landscape is equally as variegated with officially recognized Buddhists, Daoists, Muslims, Catholics, and Protestants, as well as countless unregistered religious communities.Footnote 3 Thus, Russia and China represent diverse but dissimilar religious marketplaces.
On the other hand, Russia and China have distinct political cultures and have taken divergent pathways from communism. Russia's sharp break and dual transition in the 1990s led to the rise of a more (but far from fully) democratic country, which has since slid back toward authoritarianism. This stands in sharp contrast to China where the communist party has remained in power and proven to be both ideologically and economically adaptive (Dimitrov Reference Dimitrov2013; Holbig and Gilley Reference Holbig and Gilley2010; Shambaugh Reference Shambaugh2008). These distinctive pathways from communism, however, should not obscure the point that both countries are authoritarian political systems that strictly control the religious marketplace — that is, the state defines the legal boundaries of religious orthodoxy and orthopraxy, closely monitors and manages religious groups, and the barriers to entry into the marketplace are high (Pew Research Center 2014; Marsh Reference Marsh2011; Grim and Finke Reference Grim and Finke2011; Leung Reference Leung2005; Potter Reference Potter2003; Elliott and Corrado Reference Elliott and Corrado1999). In short, a Russia-China comparison allows us to test the theoretical arguments of the market-oriented approach of religion in plural environments where politics is repressive and the state has a heavy regulatory hand.
I argue that the religious economy framework is beneficial in explaining some aspects of religious change in Russia and China, including macroeconomic market trends and why some faiths thrive while others fail. However, the religious economy approach has less explanatory power in understanding religious-state relations under heavy market constraints — that is, how religious groups interact with state regulators to survive and grow; what are the range of options available to religious actors and their payoffs; and the political consequence of this interaction. To address these issues, this study draws on extensive fieldwork in both countries to show when and how diverse religious communities engage regime regulators around material concerns to ensure their survival and prosperity.Footnote 4 In particular, this analysis reveals that both religious and state actors stand to profit, and that religious communities play important roles in religious and commercial economies. Thus, by grounding the religious economy approach in more political terrain this study provides important insight into religious revivals in restrictive political contexts.
THE RELIGIOUS ECONOMY
The religious economy approach is structured around a core set of assumptions based on the free market. First and most importantly, religious markets are assumed to operate like commercial ones, “they consist of a market of current and potential adherents, a set of one or more religious organizations seeking to attract or maintain adherents, and the religious culture offered by the organization(s)” (Starke and Finke Reference Stark and Finke2000, 193). A second assumption is that the religious marketplace follows the logic of supply and demand. On the supply side of the equation, the market is shaped by both the degree of state regulation and the extent of religious competition, with the expectation that less regulation and greater competition will encourage religious vitality (Stark Reference Stark and Young1997, 17; Stark and Finke Reference Stark and Finke2000, 198–199). On the demand side, market demand for religion is assumed to be inelastic, but may increase in times of extreme economic and social insecurity or when the supply chain is abruptly restricted (Iannaccone Reference Iannaccone1991; Chaves and Cann Reference Chaves and Cann1992; Gill Reference Gill and Jelen2002, Reference Gill1998; Norris and Inglehart Reference Norris and Inglehart2004).
Religious organizations are also assumed to operate like secular firms in the marketplace. They produce and sell “religious goods” to consumers, such as salvation, answers to metaphysical questions, and the meaning of life; they have stable preferences and seek to maximize interests and minimize constraints; they compete with one another for customers and market share; and they are taken to be rational and goal-oriented entrepreneurs (Iannaccone Reference Iannaccone1991). This is not to suggest that issues of faith and theology do not concern religious actors, but simply that they are also constrained by market pressures (Gill Reference Gill2008, 30). Religious competition is further assumed to not only energize the marketplace, but also to encourage innovation and diversification among religious actors and the goods they provide. Thus, competition is taken to increase religious pluralism as groups attempt to fill market niches and satisfy consumer preferences (Stark and Finke Reference Stark and Finke2000, 195).
A final assumption is that religious markets, like financial ones, are subject to government regulation. Regulation is generally articulated through taxes, laws setting the parameters on religious activities, and policy mechanisms to control the inflow of new religious groups. Government regulation may also take more pervasive forms. State policies, for instance, may directly or indirectly empower some religions over others and create religious monopolies.Footnote 5 Regulations may also increase the barriers to entry for some religious groups, restrict their ability to purchase or rent property, or outlaw conversions from one faith to another (Stark and Finke 1998; Reference Stark and Finke2000; Gill Reference Gill1998; Chaves and Cann Reference Chaves and Cann1992; Stark and Iannaccone Reference Stark and Iannaccone1994). In sum, the religious economy approach typically views government regulation similarly to Adam Smith's metaphor of the invisible hand: less government intervention frees the market and unleashes greater competition, whereas more regulation not only depletes market vitality, but also limits the number of religious actors and quality of goods available.
THE RUSSIAN AND CHINESE MARKETS
When applying the religious economy approach to contemporary Russia and China, there is evidence of market forces at work. In the 1980s, both the Soviets and Chinese revisited their religious policies and religious groups were permitted to reorganize; temples, churches, and mosques were allowed to reopen; and select religious property was returned (Marsh Reference Marsh2011). This more tolerant approach was also pragmatic. Reform-minded elites were keenly aware that an image of religious freedom played well both domestically and abroad, and more accommodating and adaptive religious policies would build legitimacy, expand core constituencies of support for ruling elites, and feed into ambitious political agendas (Shambaugh Reference Shambaugh2008). Moreover, there was also a sense that policies of militant atheism had not eradicated religion in either country, but instead drove beliefs underground. Thus, the more efficient way to manage religious life was to gradually open the channels of supply and bring religious groups into a market that could be more easily monitored. In this sense, the state could also ensure that religion was socially “useful” for those in power.
As the Soviet and Chinese religious markets moved from one of scarcity and extreme shortage to the more open supply of religion, there was also a noticeable shift in demand (Yang Reference Yang2009; Froese Reference Froese2008). The newly liberalized markets granted religion greater social legitimacy and legal protection, and religious activities and identities were again publicly (and politically) acceptable. All of this meant that religious goods that were previously illegal or in short supply were now more readily available for consumption.
At the same time, the growing demand for religion must also be understood within the context of political transformation in Russia and China. The religious economy approach generally assumes religious demand to be fixed, but allows for sudden increases in times of heightened uncertainty. The 1980–1990s were periods of fundamental political and economic change in these countries. Not only did the Soviet Union implode and the communist party lost power, but also a combination of shock therapy, rapid inflation, and a devastating financial crisis eroded the life savings of ordinary Russians (Colton Reference Colton2008; Triesman Reference Triesman1999; Jowitt Reference Jowitt1992). During these same decades, the Chinese economy steadily grew and there was continuity in communist party rule, but the country also experienced rising inequality and social stratification, high levels of corruption and consumerism, and the crumbling of the socialist safety net (Perry and Selden Reference Perry and Selden2003; Levy Reference Levy1995). In terms of political change, the guiding ideology of the regime was also carefully reformulated to meet the changing international and domestic environment and to help pave the way for proto-capitalist reforms (Holbig and Gilley Reference Holbig and Gilley2010; Holbig Reference Holbig, Schubert and Herberer2009; Yang Reference Yang2009; Laliberte and Lanteigne 2008; Shambaugh Reference Shambaugh2008). With uncertainty built into the transition politics of both countries, demand for religion grew not only because it was a new commodity that offered an alternative belief system, but also precisely because it provided solace for the anxiety and alienation brought about by profound economic, political, and social change.
Despite greater space for religious expression in the 1980s and 1990s, the state has nevertheless maintained a heavy-handed approach in regulating the marketplace. The regulation of religion in these two countries has evolved somewhat differently, however. In the late Soviet era, for instance, Gorbachev introduced legislation to usher in a new era of religious liberty and bring the Soviet Union closer in line with the West. Greater religious freedoms were largely upheld under Yel'tsin and the regime took few steps to regulate the marketplace.
This early window of deregulation and break from communism in Russia had three important implications for the religious market. The first was that the barriers to entry were fairly low, and foreign missionaries and new religious groups had access into the country (Richters Reference Richters2013; Ramet Reference Ramet1998; but also see, Fagan Reference Fagan2013). Another was that the more crowded marketplace fueled inter-religious competition. Although the Russian Orthodox Church represents a majority of the population, Church hierarchs went on the offensive suggesting it was disadvantaged because religious newcomers tended to have lower startup costs, significant financial resources, and attractive proselytizing activities. Some Church leaders went so far as to compare the influx of missionaries to “spiritual colonizers” with the goal of destroying traditional Russian culture (Kirill 2000; also Poplavsky Reference Poplavsky2012; Lofstedt Reference Lofstedt2012). A third implication was that the Orthodox Church began rebuilding alliances with relevant power brokers to regain its monopoly status. Here, the Church forged alliances not only with the Kremlin, but also with communists and nationalists in order to protect its market share. Church hierarchs maintained that the liberal religious policies of the early 1990s were whimsically adopted “on a wave of democratic romanticism,” thereby giving too much freedom to proselytizing Western religious organizations and failing to protect traditional denominations like the Orthodox Church (Filatov Reference Filatov, John and Bourdeaux1999, 163).
The alliance-building of the Church paid off and by 1997 central control over religion tightened. A new federal law awarded the Orthodox Church a privileged status at the center of Russian religious life; created a second-tier for other “traditional religions,” such as Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism, with full legal protection but less access to state benefits; and a third-tier for non-traditional religious groups, including Catholics, some Protestant denominations, and newcomers such as Baha'i and Jehovah Witnesses. Religious groups in the third-tier were granted fewer rights, had more restrictions, and no access to state resources.
In the post-Mao era, the Chinese government has also taken steps to allow more open religious expression, but maintains tighter control over the marketplace than its Russian counterparts. In the early 1980s, a new religious policy was put in place (Document No. 19) to protect “normal” (zhengchang) religious beliefs and practices, but does not go so far as to define normality. Where the policy is clear is in its limiting of religious activity to five religions — Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism — and establishing corresponding patriotic associations to manage each group.Footnote 6 This means that religious communities operating outside of the five faiths and their state-sponsored associations have no legal rights or protections.
Several implications follow from these restrictions. One is that the heavy-hand of the Chinese government has led to the creation of religious oligopolies. Rather than the privileging of one religion over others (as in Russia), the Chinese government sanctions five religious oligopolies that compete with one another for resources and followers (Yang Reference Yang2010, 201). Another is the emergence of more than one religious marketplace. Fenggang Yang (Reference Yang2006), for instance, writes of a red market for the five favored oligopolies; a black market for banned religious groups; and a gray market for religious communities that navigate between the two. Contrary to the expectations of the religious economy approach, extensive regulation has not stunted demand for religious life in China, but created shadow economies.
Taken together, the religious economy approach sheds light on how the religious arena has evolved and changed across Russia and China. It provides valuable insight into the resilience of religion after decades of repression, and goes some distance in explaining shifting patterns of supply and demand. The metaphor of a marketplace is further instructive in providing a common language for analyzing religious trends, including competition and innovation among religious actors, as well as the development of state-supported monopolies and oligopolies. The market-oriented approach, for example, helps explain the return of the Russian Orthodox Church to its pre-revolutionary status and the formation of religious oligopolies in China.
Where the religious economy approach has less analytical purchase is in explaining the religious revival in the presence of intensive government regulation. On this front, the religious economy approach assumes that too much government interference will stagnate the marketplace and undermine religious vitality. Yet, in highly restrictive markets like Russia and China, this has not been the case. Religion and religious beliefs have grown and at times even flourished under heavy regulatory constraints.
A second short-coming is the lack of attention given to the political dynamics of the marketplace. It is striking, for instance, that the regulation of religious markets in both countries moved in tandem with political change. After communism collapsed and Russia embraced democratic reforms and the free market in the 1990s, the religious market also experienced a window of deregulation. By the end of the decade, however, the country was moving in a more autocratic direction — power was centralized, opposition suppressed, elections became orchestrated rather than competitive, and restrictions on civil society increased. The religious marketplace followed a similar trajectory — the laissez-faire approach of the 1990s was replaced by one that privileges the Orthodox Church and curtails religious minorities. During the same decade, China experienced continuity in its borders and pursued market reform without political liberalization that led to dramatic economic growth. This continuity was also present in the religious market — select religious groups were granted limited space for religious expression under the condition that they serve the interests of the state.
This suggests the need for a richer account of the political contours of the marketplace and an understanding of how diverse religious groups are able to negotiate restrictive contexts to survive and grow. More specifically, how do religious groups confront the political environment to engage regime regulators? What are the options and payoffs for religious actors? And what are the political consequences of engaging the state? Answering these questions is the focus of the remainder of the article.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE RELIGIOUS MARKET
Within restrictive religious markets like Russia and China, religious communities are interested in both their survival and prosperity — whether that means building houses of worship, keeping and attracting new members, or minimizing the intrusions of the state. Achieving these goals can be difficult, however. This is because religious freedoms are poorly defined and protected, but also because political winds can shift quickly. Survival of religious groups, in other words, is by no means guaranteed.
Religious groups face a number of challenges in restrictive markets, but across Russia and China religious leaders identified two that are particularly pressing. The first is political. Across both countries the state is the gatekeeper of religious freedom. Local government officials must implement central religious policies and determine whether the activities of a religious community are legal, or whether a religious group should be classified as cult-like and subject to suppression. This means that in order to openly and legally operate in the public sphere religious groups must interact with the bureaucratic organs of the state. At a minimum, religious groups are required to register with government authorities. The state, however, also controls a number of bureaucratic permits that are necessary for religious growth. To build a mosque or expand a seminary, religious groups must also secure government approval. Without these permissions it is extremely difficult for a group to establish itself in the public sphere.Footnote 7
Here, it is important to remember that while most religious groups in Russia and China do have the legal right to register and expand buildings, the nature of the politics means that these rights are not always guaranteed. When churches apply for tax-exempt status or permits to build a gymnasium, for example, there is always the real possibility that its application will be denied or, by accident or decision, lost for decades. Religious groups must learn to adapt to an uncertain political environment.
A second concern identified by many religious groups is economic. Although financial constraints are also common among religious actors in democratic settings, respondents suggested that they could be particularly acute in Russia and China. This is in part because anti-religious campaigns of the past destroyed or damaged a majority of religious property, and what remains tends to need of significant repairs or is too small to accommodate the growing number of believers. However, religious communities seldom have the capital necessary for the reconstruction and renovation of property. Churches, temples, and mosques need investors, but given the restrictions on religion, options are limited. Perhaps as a remnant from earlier times or a reflection of contemporary authoritarian politics, government policies carefully limit foreign investment and interaction with religious communities. It is precisely for these reasons that religious groups must look to alternative and domestic patrons, including the state.
The state not only control permits for legal operation, but also can invest in religious communities through the use of direct or indirect subsidies, such as support for building renovations, interest-free or highly subsidized loans, and the designation of religious buildings as cultural relics and museums. Consider the example of informal subsidies received by the Russian Orthodox Church of Nizhny Novgorod. In the early 1990s, the Nizhny government was encouraged from above to assist in the restoration of Orthodox cathedrals that had been damaged during the Soviet period, but it was short on funds. As an alternative to direct financial support, Church leaders brokered a deal to import cigarettes and export vodka without paying taxes, both potentially lucrative commodities. This indirect investment was then funneled into the renovation of cathedrals across the Volga region.Footnote 8 One priest explained that even though the Church has more resources than other traditional faiths, these types of subsidies are necessary because Orthodox “start-up” costs are significantly higher than their competitors — medieval cathedrals must be maintained and icons preserved for services to function, whereas other religions may need only office space.Footnote 9 Here, it is interesting to note that although there is no dominant religion in China, both Buddhist and Protestant religious personnel justified similar types of informal state subsidies because the culture of giving to charitable organizations, especially faith-based ones is comparatively underdeveloped in China.Footnote 10
The Currency of Exchange
The previous section outlines the combination of political permissions and economic investments that religious communities need to survive and grow in a competitive and restrictive marketplace. The discussion now turns to how religious communities achieve these goals. I have argued that one of the most effective ways is through direct engagement with the state. The idea here is that religious groups bring a set of material assets to the negotiating table that are attractive to their regulators and may be used as bargaining chips to improve their standing and secure their survival and prosperity. These assets can generally be divided into two categories: public goods and services, and faith-based revenue. Religious groups may provide social services and charity projects to lighten the responsibilities of the government. They may also encourage faith-based investment that feeds economic development and has the potential to provide lucrative revenue for the government. While cultural resources also shape the nature of interaction between religious and state actors, it is often the material assets that function as the currency of exchange and helps religious groups navigate the highly regulated environment.Footnote 11
Public Goods and Services
Providing public goods and services is often a natural extension for many religious groups. Christianity, for example, has the parable of a Good Samaritan who helps a stranger in need, thus making organizing volunteer-labor, raising money for victims of a natural disaster, or opening drug and alcohol rehabilitation centers second nature for many churches (Wielander Reference Wielander2013; Reference Wielander2011). Indeed, most faiths have some aspect of philanthropy that informs religious behavior and actions. Moreover, religious communities also tend to possess dense networks that facilitate their provision of charitable services — for example, they are organized and meet on a regular basis, which facilitates coordination; they have a solid base for volunteer recruitment; and they tend to have highly motivated members driven by strong normative commitments.
The payoffs for providing public goods and services may extend well beyond fulfilling spiritual doctrine. Religious communities can gain influence from the coordination of their members and the spreading of their religious message. One Protestant pastor in Russia explained that by opening a shelter his church was able to attract and even convert new members.Footnote 12 Another church leader from a Pentecostal church explained that providing social services energizes the base, which sees its values being put into practice by moving society in a more sacred direction.Footnote 13 Acts of charity may further improve a religious groups' reputation in the community, which can be particularly important to minority faiths facing social and political hostility. One church member from an evangelical Protestant church in Russia commented that “we hope that people will see our social activities and realize we are not cults, but genuine Russians.”Footnote 14 Similar sentiments were expressed by a charismatic pastor who explained that charity work helps them “find a place under the sky.”Footnote 15 Such activities may allow religious communities to soften the suspicions of the local government and demonstrate their civic and patriotic value.
From the perspective of the state, faith-based philanthropic activities can also be appealing, particularly when local officials are unwilling or unable to offer the same social services. However, even when state capacity is high and government officials do not need to rely on religious communities to provide welfare services, farming out social services is still beneficial because it allows local authorities to concentrate their resources elsewhere. Thus, the charitable activities of religious communities can be attractive both across strong and weak, rich and poor local governments. Consider some examples of how public good provision shapes the dynamics of religious-state relations across Russia and China.
One protestant minister of a government-sponsored church in China explained that in one rural area, local officials were extremely suspicious of Christians — they were depicted as cults and foreign faiths, and worship services were frequently interrupted. The small congregation took action and collected donations and volunteer labor to help pave a road leading into the village. Apparently, the local government had been trying to secure funding from its superiors for this same project, but had been unsuccessful. The minister explained that after the road was paved, local official posted a banner reading “Christian will always be welcome,” and that the harassment of the church ceased.Footnote 16
Some leaders of the unofficial Catholic Church, an illegal organization in China, have also adopted a strategy of providing charity to secure greater autonomy as they operate in the shadow economy. In one district of Shanghai, members of the Church established a home for the severely disabled.Footnote 17 The facility is over a decade old and does not hide its religious underpinnings. Laypeople who work at the home explained that the district government is quite aware of their presence and that they are members of the “so-called illegal Catholic Church”; yet, because the government does not have the resources or the desire to care for these men, the local cadres overlook their illegal status.Footnote 18 This example shows that through social services the underground Church has been able to partially emerge from the shadows and establish an unfettered presence in the community, but the Church still falls short of the protections and privileges reserved for the five oligopolies.
In Russia, non-Orthodox Christians have also turned to providing welfare services as a way of improving their standing with the government. In the early 1990s, Pastor Pavel founded the evangelical Protestant church in Kazan, Tatarstan. At that time the registration process was straightforward and required little more than filing the necessary paperwork. With the passing of the 1997 federal law all non-traditional religions (including evangelical Protestants) were required to document their history in the community and re-register. This documentation was important because the new law distinguished between religious organizations and religious groups — with the former having significantly more autonomy in conducting religious services along with some state benefits; while the latter possesses minimal legal protections and no rights to publish and distribute literature, proselytize, engage in charity activities, or invite religious leaders from abroad. The 1997 law meant that Pastor Pavel's church was in danger of being classified as a “religious group.” However, the church was extremely active in the community and the pastor credited their philanthropic programs for facilitating re-registration. He added that because of the church's favorable community outreach “[the government] now even encourages the homeless to come to our church for help.”Footnote 19
When religious groups do not have the resources or organizational capacity to develop their own charitable projects like the unregistered Catholics and evangelicals mentioned above, they may still improve their standing with the local government by donating to state-sponsored charities and welfare services (Koesel Reference Koesel2014). Religious groups, for example, can organize volunteers to work in state-run orphanages, sponsor “state-appointed” needy students, or collect donations for national disaster relief. One Protestant minister in Changchun explained that faith-based donations are generally included in the public record; governments publish donation sources in local newspapers, religious communities publish the amounts collected in bulletins, and all sides are acutely aware of how much their “competition” is donating.Footnote 20 Here, it is interesting to note that it is not only religious groups that are competing with each other, but there is also competition among government officials. One bureaucrat explained that district-level officials keep a close eye on how much is being raised in neighboring districts, municipal level officials are aware of how much is raised in nearby cities, and the trend continues up the ladder of officialdom.Footnote 21 Moreover, local authorities often have powerful political incentives to deliver large donations from their locales, especially when the target is for a natural disaster that has captured national (and international) attention.Footnote 22 Religious groups for the most part are willing to participate in government organized fund-raising campaigns. As one Chinese minister explained, “We know that the government is under pressure to support these projects, but has no money. We are happy to help and show that Protestants are also patriotic.”Footnote 23 In doing so, church leaders seek to recast Protestants, a faith that is generally seen as an outsider in China, as local and valuable members of society.
Faith-Based Investment
Religious groups can also bring faith-based investment to the bargaining table, which is attractive to government officials whose own legitimacy is often tied to delivering economic growth. Religious organizations can enhance local economic development by going into business for themselves. Such businesses tend to be small shops and restaurants attached to temples or spiritual retreat centers. Although these businesses are relatively small-scale, they nonetheless represent taxable income for the government and some have become quite profitable. Moreover, the profits can also be funneled into religious growth. One mosque in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia opened a halal butcher shop as a service for the Muslim community.Footnote 24 Several Buddhist and Taoist temples in Shanghai operate teahouses, vegetarian restaurants, and meditation centers to accommodate pilgrims and tourists. The small Catholic community in Changchun opened a rice refinery to help support Church activities, and local Muslims built a tofu factory and slaughterhouse (Jin et al. Reference Jin, Kui, Zhou and Feng2000, 38). Other religious communities have invested faith-based ventures on a larger scale. The Orthodox Danilov Monastery in Moscow, for example, has been converted into the four-star hotel “Danilovskaya,” complete with conference center and spa.
Religious groups may also help grow the local economy by tapping their more business-oriented members to encourage investment, such as the development of factories and other commercial ventures. These investments can be highly lucrative for local governments by providing jobs and tax revenue. In Russia and China, growing marketization has created a wealthy entrepreneurial class who use their investments as a platform to further their religious belief. In China, these individuals are commonly called “Boss Christians” (laoban jidu tu); however, all religions have “bosses” who merge their business practices with their belief system (see, especially, Cao Reference Cao2008; Webster Reference Webster2008; Chen and Huang Reference Chen and Tianhai2004). Boss Christians tend to be wealthy entrepreneurs, usually of ethnic Chinese origin, who have made their fortunes and are now reinvesting in the mainland. What distinguishes Boss Christians from other successful entrepreneurs is that they believe their economic success is a blessing, and they use their business operations to promote their religion. In fact, they tend to be quite open about their dual identities as Christians and entrepreneurs and do not hide their proselytizing activities from the local government.Footnote 25
Many local governments across China have been surprisingly tolerant of the illegal proselytizing activities of Boss Christians and generally ignore the religious overtones of their investments. Consider the following case of faith-based investment in Shanghai. The Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) is a worldwide leader in semiconductor fabrication, manufacturing integrated circuits for computer chips. The founder and former CEO of the company, Dr. Richard Ru Gin Chang, was born in China, raised in Taiwan, educated at Southern Methodist University, and worked for over 20 years at Texas Instruments before starting his own business. With the opening of China's borders to foreign investment, Dr. Chang founded SMIC in a high-tech park of Shanghai.Footnote 26
At each of SMIC's factories (located in Shanghai, Beijing, Chengdu, and Tianjian) the local government has built Protestant churches on the scale of a mega-church. The church next to company headquarters in Shanghai, for instance, holds up to 4,000 worshipers in the main hall. One SMIC executive explained that competing municipal governments across China “dangled churches in front of us in hopes of attracting our factories to their city.”Footnote 27
Some Boss Christians who identify with the unregistered house church movement have also opened churches with little government interference.Footnote 28 One respondent explained the religious growth of his unregistered church in the following way. He first completes the necessary paperwork to open a factory, such as land permits and building-code certifications. Then, once all of the paperwork is in order, he makes one surreptitious addition: a cross. Government officials generally ignore these “factory churches” because they feed the local economy. The Boss Christian explained that the only time he feels pressure is leading up to important political events, such as the Beijing 2008 Olympics. In these cases, he removes the cross until the political winds change.Footnote 29
Another way religious groups can promote economic growth is by capitalizing on religious festivals and fairs. Although religious ceremonies may not be a major source of revenue in themselves, the surrounding events can be extravagant, span several days, and attract thousands of participants, including tourists drawn to the performances of local operas, acrobatic troops, and street vendors.Footnote 30 One Buddhist temple in Changchun attracted more than 60,000 visitors during a three-day festival in the early 1980s (Jin et al. Reference Jin, Kui, Zhou and Feng2000, 65). A decade later the same temple fair collected more than 7,000 RMB from ticket sales, 50,000 RMB from donations, and sold over 8,500 books about Buddhism (Jin et al. Reference Jin, Kui, Zhou and Feng2000, 65). As this example illustrate, religious festivals not only open secondary money-making possibilities for religious actors, but also have the potential to attract and possibly convert curious visitors. Indeed, this last rationale can be particularly important in restrictive contexts like China, where there are strict rules against proselytizing outside of state-sanctioned religious buildings.
It is important to note that religious festivals can also create important financial opportunities for the state. Not only do local officials collect fees from vendors, but local police are also often paid for providing security and directing traffic. Police can further benefit in more informal ways, such as being receiving “free tickets, good food, cigarettes, and liquor” (Chau Reference Chau2003, 44; also Wu Reference Wu2000).
Beyond temple festivals and religious holidays, religious groups may also designate places of worship as tourist attractions. This often means employing staff to manage visitors, permitting tourists to observe religious activities, and seeking the necessary permits to operate in the tourist industry. In many cases, local governments are supportive of faith-based tourism because it provides additional revenue for the state and can enhance local prestige.
However, what distinguishes faith-based tourism from other types of religious-state interaction is that it requires a greater degree of commitment from both sides. Such commitment also introduces new risks. As a tourist venue, religious communities take the chance that their religious lives will be supplanted by tourist interests or may disenfranchise their believers, especially as houses of worship become over-commercialized. Local governments must also commit themselves by providing the necessary bureaucratic permits or help with financing renovations. Such collaboration can be risky for government officials not only because their investment of capital, but also because such action requires them to circumvent central policies that mandate a strict separation of religion and state. Local governments run the risk of seeing a small return on their speculative investment as well as attracting unwanted attention from their respective political centers. Such religious-state collaboration, after all, is murky legal territory at best and would likely end a political career. Nevertheless, in the pursuit of profit some religious and state actors strike important bargains around faith-based tourism. Consider the following examples.
In Nizhny Novgorod, the local government and the Russian Orthodox Church have built a relationship around faith-based tourism. Il'inskaja sloboda is a boulevard of 18th century buildings that runs through the oldest part of the city. In attempts to compete with other Russian cities that have capitalized on faith-based tourism — such as Suzdal, Moscow, and Kazan — the local government invested in the reconstruction of the boulevard, which when complete will include up to 10 new Orthodox churches. To help legitimize state investment into this church-building project, the local government declared the street a “historic-cultural treasure” and established a reconstruction fund to manage the tourist area.Footnote 31
It is important to note that the historical accuracy of a faith-based tourism seems to have little relevance. Local governments are willing to designate projects as “historical treasures,” and religious communities are often eager to accommodate. In the interest of turning a profit, government officials readily re-invent their city's image with “conscious and deliberate manipulations of culture in an effort to enhance the appeal and interest of places” (Philo and Kearns Reference Philo, Kearns, Kearns and Philos1993, 3; also see Hobsbawm Reference Hobsbawm, Hobsbawm and Ranger1990). One advisor for the project explained that the restoration exaggerates the presence of Orthodox Christianity in the region. As an inland port on the Volga, Nizhny Novgorod has always been home to a religiously plural population, and the Orthodoxy monopoly is a recent phenomenon. In fact there were only four to five small chapels along the boulevard, not the several cathedrals presently under construction.Footnote 32
Faith-based tourism may also translate into big business in China. At one Buddhist temple in a commercial district of Shanghai, the abbot was able to secure an interest-free loan to cover renovations.Footnote 33 In this particular case, temple property was returned in the early 1980s and was in disrepair having been vandalized during the Cultural Revolution. The abbot and Buddhist Association did not have the financial means necessary to restore the temple and donations were insufficient. The district government provided the temple with the loan under several conditions. One was that a percentage of all temple admission fees would go to the government until the loan was repaid. A second is that the government would have a hand in the scale of the renovations, and had planned to expand the temple from its original modest plans into to one that would be one of the largest and most impressive in the city. In other words, the temple would also function as a tourist attraction. A final condition was that the renovated temple would set aside part of its property for commercial development. To comply with this arrangement, a section of the temple's outer walls were hollowed out and converted into small shops where the rents would go directly to the district government for 20 years. At the end of this term, the temple abbot may decide what do with the commercial space — either retrofit it for worship or continue the current commercial arrangement and collect the rents for the temple.Footnote 34
Faith-based tourism may also reach beyond the five oligopolies in China. Forty kilometers southwest of Shanghai, the Songjiang district government built a Mazu temple. Because the worship of the Mazu goddess is classified as a popular religion in China and not one of the five official (and legal) religions, building such a temple requires special bureaucratic permits, even for local governments.Footnote 35 While it is not impossible to build and register such temples, as there are dozens along the coast of Fujian, local governments must first be able to demonstrate a strong local demand to avoid raising concerns from Beijing. Moreover, in the mid-1990s when the local government decided to construct the temple, there were only a handful of migrants in Songjiang who worshiped the goddess.Footnote 36 Why, then, would the district government go to the trouble of building a temple for a non-local goddess with very few followers that is considered a feudal superstition by Beijing?
The answer lies in business opportunities. The Mazu cult is well-known along the southeastern coasts of China and Asia, with temples scattered along former trade and migration routes across Southeast Asia.Footnote 37 In particular, Mazu's largest numbers of adherents are Taiwanese, and there was hope that a Mazu temple would attract Taiwanese investment to the city. This gamble was partially successful; a wealthy Taiwanese businessman funded the majority of the restoration. However, one temple worker was also quick to add that although the building looks like a practicing temple — there are altars, incense, and monks' chanting piped in the background — it is not registered with the Religious Affairs Bureau. Rather, the temple is officially titled the “Shanghai Mazu Cultural Palace” (Shanghai tianma guan) and classified as a museum. This means that all profits from admission tickets and temple donations go directly to the Parks Department and Ministry of Culture and not to any religious organization. The temple does not employ any religious personnel and a majority of visitors are tourists; however, the local government annually imports Mazu priests from Fujian to conduct religious ceremonies for the Taiwanese patron. According to one temple worker, “this is just good business.”Footnote 38
CONCLUSIONS
This article set out to evaluate religious change in two anchors of the communist and post-communist region by using the religious economy approach. In terms of larger market dynamics, the religious economy approach provides a useful framework for understanding national religious trends and how shifts in supply and demand have shaped the religious revival. Not only did the Russian and Chinese governments open the supply channels for greater religious expression, but also the combination of the newness of religious goods and the uncertainty brought about by transition politics helped drive demand for religion. The religious economy approach also offers insight into the return of the Orthodox monopoly in Russia and the five oligopolies in China. However, this market-oriented approach has less explanatory power in theorizing about how religious actors navigate highly regulated environments to not only survive, but also to grow. To address this issue, this study analyzed the role of religious communities in Russia and China and how they interact with their regulators. This comparison, while not exhaustive, revealed that religious actors' actions are highly innovative and entrepreneurial across both countries. They engage regime regulators in active bargaining games; they trade in favors and offer promises of reciprocal support; they provide public goods and services as gestures of goodwill to expedite bureaucratic paperwork; and they attract financial investment to secure greater influence and autonomy from the state, or at the very least hedge against future problems by setting a precedent of financial cooperation and not subversion. All of these strategies, in short, lessen the vulnerabilities of religious groups and help them secure a place in a highly restrictive and often repressive marketplace.
To be sure, Russia and China are large and complex religious markets and the evidence presented here is, of course, more illustrative than exhaustive. Nevertheless, three general lessons can be drawn from this study. The first is that even in highly restrictive contexts, the borders between religion and the state can be strikingly porous. Indeed, there is a fair amount of give and take between the sacred and secular at the local level. A second is that religious and state actors tend to negotiate their relationship in economic terms. While it may come as no surprise that material assets are the currency of exchange in the marketplace, the fact that religious actors are becoming important economic and political players is revealing. This reinforces the call for greater attention to both the political and economic contours of religious identity and how these contours translate into interests and actions (Gill Reference Gill and Jelen2002; Gryzmala-Busse Reference Gryzmala-Busse2012). The final and more general point is that a market-oriented approach of religion would benefit from greater attention to the political context in which religious groups are embedded. Religious markets do not exist in a vacuum, but are deeply shaped by politics. After all, it is through analysis of the political economy of the religious marketplace that we are better positioned to understand not only the micro-foundations of religious behavior, but also the materialistic origins of religious revival.
