This book gathers together some of Hasker's most important writings on ‘open theism’ and the implications for theodicy. Hasker is a former editor of Faith and Philosophy, journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers, and a leading exponent of the controversial movement called ‘open theism’. The book offers a new essay on ‘The Freedom and Goodness of God’ (chapter 11) and an especially useful appendix in which Hasker replies to various criticisms of his views. This is a carefully written, often deeply insightful book. It is highly recommended for all who are interested in open theism's implications for theodicy and divine providence. Hasker presents his views with admirable clarity and in dialogue with friend and foe alike.

The book is intended as a philosophical framework for a theodicy, one which has the alleged advantage of being the strongest view of divine providence. Since most of the chapters are previously published essays, the line of argumentation, to be sure, is not as precise as one would expect to find if this were an original book. Yet the chapters are remarkably well connected and present a good selection of some of the most interesting and important of Hasker's writings. Only one chapter predates 1998. It is an advantage to us, and a tribute to Hasker's important work, to have these essays available in one volume.

In the first of five chapters on theodicy Hasker argues that, since most of us prefer our own existence to non-existence, we cannot reproach God for the kind of world in which we live. The second chapter convincingly suggests possible reasons why God created this kind of world, followed by three chapters which focus on the evidential problem of evil. Hasker responds to this challenge by noting that only an omniscient God could know if there are evils which, in fact, are gratuitous, evils allowed by God for greater goods not otherwise obtainable. My own answer (not mentioned) has been that evils need not lead to a greater good, but only to some good or occasionally to minimal goods to justify God's allowing them (‘An Aesthetic Solution to the Problem of Evil’, International Journal of Philosophy of Religion, 1994). In any event, Hasker presents a compelling argument that gratuitous evil is necessary (chapter 4), constructing a convincing case that there is good reason for God not to overpower the human free will that has the potential to cause gratuitous evils: divine intervention would undermine morality – an argument used previously by Plantinga and Hick (though Hick is not mentioned). Chapter 5 argues again for the necessity of gratuitous evils, this time in light of the biblical passage that since God works everything for good (Rom 8:28), there have been many who have remained disinterested in seeking to prevent apparently meaningless evils.

The final six chapters defend open theism's view of divine providence and its implications for theodicy. Hasker provides an excellent general introduction (chapter 6) and defends open theism against its main rivals (chapters 7, 8 and 10): theological determinism and Molinism. For the former, only Calvinism is considered; for the latter, only Molinism is considered, relegating to brief notes the other half of Catholic answer: Aquinas. Chapter 9 challenges process theism, but I for one would have preferred Hasker to have revised this (and some of the other chapters) to reflect the debates about his views; see, for example, his debate with David Griffin's criticisms in Process Studies 29 (2000). In any event, we leave this book satisfied that it provides an informed understanding of Hasker's views on theodicy and divine providence, presented competently by one of open theism's major exponents.