The author is representative of the English School associated with the late Hedley Bull that sees states making up an international society. Wheeler identifies with the solidarist wing of the English School, as compared to the pluralists. The latter are more inclined to try to build order on traditional notions of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction. The former, like Wheeler, are more inclined to override these traditional notions in the interest of protecting persons from the machinations of their rulers. It is against this background that he presents “a normative defence [sic] of solidarism” that along the way appreciates “the importance of language in constituting state practices in the society of states” (p. ix). He is thus in favor of “an emancipatory politics” and “of radicalizing the English School” (p. xi).

The early pages review the literature in a way that most constructivist theorists of international relations would applaud and that most foreign policy wonks would find highly academic. A key point is that Wheeler does not include “the primacy of humanitarian motives as a defining test” (p. 37) of humanitarian intervention. Departing from classical just-war thinking on this matter, he does not believe that right intent is crucial. He would accept highly mixed motives, and maybe even a low priority for genuine human rights concerns, as long as the outcome of intervention is clearly an improvement over the past in human rights terms, and as long as the means adopted are appropriate—namely, proportionate to the violations. Another key point for Wheeler is that it is right thinking that should construct the controlling norms, not state practice. The fact that state practice has not endorsed humanitarian intervention “illustrates the moral bankruptcy of cold-war international society” (p. 52), while opening the door to a more progressive normative standard for evaluating state use of force inside other states.

For the author, during the Cold War the international society of states should have approved India's use of force to stop atrocities in East Pakistan in 1971, Vietnam's defeat of the Pol Pot forces in Cambodia in 1979, and Tanzania's toppling of Idi Amin in Uganda also in 1979. The fact that the intervening state had “political” as well as humanitarian motives is less important for him, compared to the nature and outcome of the intervention. The military campaigns were, in his view, not excessive to the violations of human rights being countered, and they were initiated with the prospect of success. The resulting factual situation was indeed a better situation for human rights.

Of various interventions after the Cold War, such as in northern Iraq and Somalia, inter alia, the most difficult case was Kosovo, according to Wheeler. This was not because the United States and NATO had mixed rather than purely humanitarian motives. It was because the avoidance of ground troops and use of high-altitude bombing constituted questionable means, resulting in many Serbian casualties, and because the outcome was characterized by many Albanian violations of Serbian human rights.

Along the path of this analysis, Wheeler, like United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, reminds us of the viewpoint of the victims of atrocities. Wheeler argues that those subjected to atrocities in all his cases would have argued for intervention had they been allowed a voice, regardless of the fact that in most cases a government not of their choosing was installed by the intervening state(s)—at least temporarily. This is a point not often considered by those who focus strictly on state practice as comprised by elite words and deeds. It is a point especially relevant to Rwanda in 1994 where the result of a lack of timely intervention by outsiders was the massacre of perhaps 800,000 Tutsi.

Wheeler can be profitably read in conjunction with “The Responsibility to Protect,” the report (2001) of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun and created by the Canadian foreign minister. This “solidarist” report by a panel of 12 distinguished citizens from various regions of the world argues that when states do not exercise their proper responsibility to protect the human rights of their nationals, then outside states have a duty to intervene. According to them, it is preferable to have the approval of the UN Security Council for this action. But in their view, if states like China and Russia block such approval, those states have to understand that there is a strong probability that the Council will be circumvented. For panelists, the UN Security Council too must act responsibly. This panel, unlike Wheeler, stresses “right intention” and seems more supportive of NATO's action to correct extensive forced dislocation in Kosovo. The panel's report is accompanied by a companion volume that includes an extensive bibliography on the subject of humanitarian intervention.

Then there is “Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects” (1999) by the Danish Institute of International Affairs that finds the NATO action in 1999 legitimate, even if not quite legal. As such, it shares with Wheeler an argument for an emerging norm of international solidarity for the protection of human rights, extant state practice notwithstanding.

These three recent publications on humanitarian intervention provide stimulating, wellconsidered contributions.